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Foreword 
This study poses the question of why national conflicts persist in the 
context of increasing transnational integration. From the early 1970's and 
especially since the end of the 'Cold War', nationalism has gained 
increased global significance. At the same time, seemingly hand-in-hand 
with the upsurge in nationalism, there has been an acceleration in trans- 
national integration. 
This apparent paradox is explored in several ways: first by developing a 
theoretical framework for linking nationalism and transnationalism, 
second by analysing a particular case of national conflict in its 
transnationalised setting, and third by investigating the interpretation and 
re-interpretation of 'national' interests by key political actors. 
The case chosen is the national conflict in Ireland in the context of 
transnational integration in the European Union. In Ireland the two global 
tendencies - of national division and transnational integration - are 
focussed to a high degree of intensity. The transnational integrative process 
is at its most advanced in the European Community which, in 1993, 
became the 'European Union', one of the most ambitious examples of 
inter-state and trans-state regional integration to date. The national conflict 
in Ireland meanwhile, is more deeply entrenched than in any other 
Western European state and was, until the IRA ceasefire on 31 August 
1994, the most highly militarised conflict in Western Europe. 
This study suggests that the relationships between transnational 
integration and national conflict are becoming a defining factor in Ireland's 
political development and that such relationships also pattern 
developments in the wider EU. Indeed, to the extent that the process of EU 
integration is seen as an antidote to nationalism in Western Europe, the 
impact of the EU in Ireland's national conflict could be interpreted as a test 
case of EU integration. 
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Introduction 
Nationalism and national conflict gained increased global significance with 
the end of the post-War 'long boom' which sustained economic stability 
until the early 1970's, and after the end of the 'Cold War' that had 
dominated the political agenda until the late 1980's. In Central and South- 
East Asia, in North and Central Africa and in the Indian subcontinent, 
conflicts over national territory and over national rights, whether 
secessionist or irredentist, gained a sharpened political profile. In East and- 
Central Europe the 1990's saw anti-bureaucratic - and potentially "anti- 
systemic" - revolutions subside into nationalism (Wallerstein 1991). 
"Communist" one party-states disintegrated into their 'national' 
components or were reconstructed as 'national' party-states (Licht 1992; 
Lazic 1992). As state elites in Western Europe set about revitalising the 
transnational 'European Union', they also attempted to strengthen their 
own national constituencies. Simultaneously, the demands of their 
national minorities moved up the political agenda. Confronted with these 
developments, some began to suspect that "what lay hidden beneath the 
European carpet" of Communism in the East and anti-Communist unity 
in the West, was a plethora of exclusivist and "irrational" ethnic identities 
that are only now finding their full expression (Nakarada 1991). 
Seemingly hand-in-hand with the upsurge in 'national' and 'ethnic' 
conflict, trans-national integration accelerated in' the 1970's and 80's, and 
especially after the the thawing of the Cold War. The impact of such 
integration on nationalisms in their 'official', state forms as well as in their 
secessionist or irredentist forms, has become a central question of European 
political development. Transnationalism has often been seen as a cure for 
national conflict, whether between 'national' states or at sub-state level 
between secessionists and multinational states. But experience in the last 
decade of the twentieth century appears to refute this expectation. It 
suggests that, at least in the current historical period, the relationship 
between the two phenomena is not inverse, with nationalisms and 
national conflict diminishing with the advances in transnational 
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integration. On the contrary, they appeared to be mutually reinforcing, 
perhaps two sides of the same coin. 
This study poses the question of why national conflicts persist in an 
increasingly interdependent, internationalised world, and how they inter- 
relate with increasing transnational integration. The historian Eric 
Hobsbawm argues that research is needed into how "national 
identification, and what it is believed to imply, can change" (Hobsbawm 
1992: 11); and the focus of this research is on the processes of redefining, 
realigning or dissolving national conflict in the increasingly 
internationalised context. This is explored in several ways: first by 
developing a theoretical framework for linking nationalism and 
transnationalism (Section 1), second by analysing a particular case of 
national conflict in its transnationalised setting (Sections 2 and 3), and 
third by investigating the interpretation and re-interpretation of 'national' 
interests in the ideological and rhetorical discourse of key participants 
(Section 4). Throughout there is a focus on conflicts between the apparently 
competing tendencies of nationalism and transnationalism in order to 
highlight the "contradictions within the existing order, since it from these 
contradictions that change could emerge" (Cox 1987: 393). 
The case chosen is the substate national conflict in Ireland in the context of 
transnational integration in the European Union. Here the contradictions 
are particularly marked. The transnational integrative process is at its most 
advanced in the European Union while the national conflict in Ireland is 
more deeply entrenched than in any other Western European state. The 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland as part of the UK since 1973 have 
been members of the European Community (EC) and in 1993 the EC 
became the "European Union" (EU), one of the most ambitious examples 
of inter-state and trans-state regional integration to date. The national 
conflict in Ireland was, until the IRA ceasefire on 31 August 1994, the most 
highly militarised conflict in Western Europe. The case study does not 
attempt to analyse post-ceasefire tendencies, but with the end to 'armed 
struggle' the national conflict has not ceased to be the dominant factor in 
Northern Ireland political life and has not ceased to occupy a central space 
in the politics of the Republic and of the UK. 
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In Ireland then, the two global tendencies - of national division and 
transnational integration - are focussed to a high degree of intensity. This 
study suggests that the relationships between transnational integration and 
national conflict are becoming a defining factor in Ireland's political 
development and that such relationships also pattern developments in the 
wider EU. Indeed, the process of EU integration has been interpreted as an 
antidote to nationalism in Western Europe and the impact of the EU in 
Ireland's national conflict could be interpreted as a test case of EU 
integration. 
The remainder of this introduction outlines the objectives of the study, its 
general structure, and the main research methods employed. 
Objectives 
The logics (or perhaps illogics) of nationalism and transnationalism are 
sharply exposed in Ireland and it provides a useful case study of their wider 
inter-relationships, illuminating broader theoretical issues as well as 
highlighting empirical tendencies in the EU and Ireland. Two main issues 
are involved. The first is empirical and concerns the specific circumstances 
of the national conflict in Ireland and its interrelationships with 
transnationalism. The second is more theoretical and focuses on 
integrating theories of nationalism with theories of international relations. 
These translate into the following objectives. 
Empirical objectives 
The relationships between the national conflict in Ireland and broader 
changes in international politics have been under-researched. In most 
analyses of the conflict the scope of research is restricted to relationships 
within Northern Ireland, or within Ireland and Britain. Only rarely have 
the interconnections between the conflict and the framework of 
international society been examined. Yet, as Adrian Guelke points out, the 
conflict is predicated on the existence of 'national' state sovereignty and re- 
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orientations in global politics are likely to have a crucial impact on it 
(Guelke 1988: 205). 
Since the early 1970's and especially since the end of the 1980's there has 
been a major dis-orientation in international politics. The advent of a 
globalised "disorder" in international politics after the demise of the Cold 
War and the shift away from bipolarity, together with the acceleration of 
global economic integration has led to a sharpening of inter and intra 
regional conflict. Inter-regional economic competition in an increasingly 
integrated industrialised 'West' has generated a fear of vulnerability, that 
in turn, has fuelled a process of defensive intra-regional integration. This 
has been most developed in the EU, which has been described as the 
world's first "confederal public power", in which there has been a 
significant "unbundling" of state sovereignty (Thompson 1993; Ruggie 
1993: 168-174). 
Transnational integration has a political dynamic of its own, that is not. 
reducible to inter-state politics. As a result, it challenges the state-centred 
constitution of EU politics. In contrast with international integration, 
which by definition is dominated by national states, transnational 
integration encourages the creation or strengthening of non-state sources 
of political power. While 'inter-national' integration primarily bolsters 
'inter-governmental' organisations, transnational integration tends to 
strengthen non-national, regionally defined bodies. Such regional bodies 
may exercise power 'above' states, as 'global' - "macro" - regions or they 
may exercise power 'below' the state, as local or urban - "micro" - regions 
(Cox 1992b: 34). Such bodies define transnational forms of politics - by 
constructing alliances between substate regions, between global regions and 
across the "macro" / "micro" distinction - to express their transnationally- 
defined joint interests. As such transnational integration - as opposed to 
international integration - accelerates, a political configuration begins to 
emerge in which the state is a central but by no means the central actor. 
Within the EU states have responded to transnationalism by constructing a 
transnational political authority that is founded on national states but is 
relatively autonomous of them. This 'in-betweenness' is symptomatic of 
7 
the EU and reflects a wider shift in global politics towards transnational 
political relations in the continuing context of national state sovereignty. 
This raises a question-mark over the federalist aspirations in the EU - and 
indeed in other, notably weaker regional conglomerations of public power 
such as NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN, the OAU, and the Arab League. Perhaps 
the current uneasy combining of regional integration and state sovereignty 
will remain the dominant tendency. Perhaps what we see is what we get. 
These shifts in international politics and particularly the emergence of the 
EU as a global actor, have a substantial impact on the 'national' state and at 
least on the face of it, have an impact on national conflicts such as in 
Ireland. The tensions between increased transnationalism in many aspects 
of socio-economic life and the system of sovereign 'national' states, is 
forcing a reconstitution of 'national' state authority and, of crucial 
importance here, perhaps also of nationalist political practices and 
ideologies. 
The interaction between these two conflicting trajectories in Ireland's 
national conflict forms the central empirical theme of this study. Analysis 
of the inter-relationships between the national conflict and the changing 
framework for international politics is central to an understanding of the 
historical and contemporary potential for resolving such conflict. 
Recognition of the significance of this dimension to socio-economic 
development in Ireland is reflected in the increased attention given to the 
issue, particularly by economic researchers since the completion of the 
'Single European Market' (SEM) in 1992 (See O'Malley 1993). While 
building on these debates, the empirical concerns of this study are more 
explicitly political, and attempt to trace the political tendencies embodied in 
the process of transnational integration in the EU and their implications 
for the national conflict in Ireland. 
Theoretical objectives 
These empirical issues are reflected in the theoretical objectives. It is argued 
that the relative lack of empirical material examining the inter- 
relationships between Ireland's national conflict and tendencies in 
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international politics reflects a more general under-theorisation of the 
interrelationships between nationalism and international relations. 
Analysis of nationalism tends to focus on the emergence or construction of 
the 'national' community from 'within'. The politicisation of common 
cultural markers - such as language or religion - and their role in defining 
the 'nation' for nationalist politicians - are generally seen as an outcome of 
internal processes. The wider international dimension is rarely addressed. 
Similarly, theories of international relations are biased towards the analysis 
of states in the international system. The domestic conditions of political 
mobilisation may enter into the equation of a state-centred view of global 
politics but rarely do they enter as objects of study. Nationalist ideology is 
interpreted as a factor that can undermine or strengthen the unity of the 
state, but its causes and its changing logic are rarely related to the logic of 
international politics. Consequently there is a wide gulf between theories of 
nationalism and theories of international relations. Both tend to define 
nationalism as an internal, domestic matter while the concerns of 
international relations are defined as external and global. 
This theoretical distance reflects the attempt, in international relations 
theory, to define a clear boundary between itself and political theory. As 
Robert Walker points out, "students of international relations are 
disciplined to think of the realities of relations between states as 
fundamentally different from life within states and to repudiate hopes for a 
future free from the tragic identities of power politics" (1993: 47) (1). The 
"bald assertions consistent with ahistorical claims to state sovereignty" of 
the dominant 'realist' strand of international relations theory "have been 
accepted too easily as a substitute for a properly theoretical account of the 
state as an historically constituted and constantly reconstituted form of 
political life" (Walker 1993: 46). 
There are strong inter-relationships between the 'national' community 
and the 'international' system. Indeed, the two are inter-dependent - 
nationalist aspirations provide mass political legitimation for the 
international states' system and by definition, nationalism would give way 
to communalism, regionalism or cosmopolitanism if states were to cease to 
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exist (Mayall 1993). In purely practical terms, the empirical examination of 
the interrelationships between the two processes in Ireland requires that 
such linkages be theorised. Hence the central theoretical objective of this 
study is reduce this gulf between the two bodies of theory, integrating 
elements from both to develop a theoretical framework for the empirical 
investigation of the international political economy of national conflict. 
Structure and methods 
These empirical and theoretical issues are investigated through theoretical 
analysis, through the discussion of historical and contemporary tendencies 
and through the analysis of discourse. These four, complementary 
elements are organised into four Sections. 
Section 1 constructs a theoretical and methodological framework for 
studying the inter-relationships between nationalism and transnational or 
international integration. Chapter 1 offers a critique of theories of 
nationalism and Chapter 2 of international relations theory. This is 
followed by an outline of an analytical framework, in Chapter 3, which 
integrates these two bodies of theory and identifies three distinct but inter- 
related strands of analysis - material interests, ideological conflict and state 
or public policy -which are used to help structure the case study. 
Section 2 uses this framework to investigate the historical context of 
Ireland's national conflict, and the development of EU integration. Chapter 
4 focuses on material interests, ideological conflict and states policies in the 
national conflict, assessing the competing pressures for North-South 
regional convergence and for North-South national divergence in Ireland 
(2). In Chapter 5 this same analytical framework is used to examine the 
competing pressures to regional integration and to national division in the 
EU. 
Section 3 attempts to bring these analyses together, highlighting the impact 
of EU integration on the national conflict since 1973, focussing on the late 
1980's and early 1990's. Chapter 6 maps out the impact of EU integration 
10 
on material interests, North and South in Ireland. Chapter 7 analyses of the 
shifting context for ideological conflict. Chapter 8 discusses the changing 
framework for state and public policy, including the policies of EU and 
substate bodies as well as the two states. 
Section 4 attempts to step beyond the 'structural' analysis developed in the 
previous two Sections. It identifies how the relationships between Ireland's 
national conflict and the process of EU integration are conceptualised by 
politicians and officials who are directly engaged in responding to it at the 
EU level and in Northern Ireland. Chapter 9 outlines the consensus that 
emerged in the 1990's on the need for North-South socio-economic 
cooperation in the context of EU integration amongst politicians and 
officials at the EU level and amongst politicians in Northern Ireland. 
Chapter 10 contrasts this relative consensus with disagreement on the 
impact of EU integration on states' sovereignties and on the conflict. 
Chapter 11 brings these two elements of analysis together to examine how 
the competing logics of transnational integration and national conflict are 
reconciled, leading to an adaptation and realignment of national conflict in 
the context of increased transnationalism. 
Finally there is a concluding Section that outlines 'how far the study has 
met its empirical and theoretical objectives (Chapter 12). 
Overall, the theoretical framework is given priority, recognising that all 
research is necessarily theory driven, (Layder 1993: 179). The analytical 
framework constructed in Section 1 is derived from Gramscian theories of 
socio-political change, developed by Marxist influenced theorists of global 
politics such as Robert Cox (Gramsci 1971; Cox 1987). It is argued that the 
forces of production are leading to a process of globalisation while 
ideological and institutional relations remain orientated largely to a state- 
centred model. The analytical framework focuses on this contradiction as it 
is manifested in economic tendencies, ideological dilemmas and in state or 
public policy. In doing so, it highlights opportunities for social mobilisation 
and political change. 
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This requires analysis of societies' historical and contemporary tendencies - 
presented in Sections 2 and 3- it also demands analysis of how political 
actors respond to these tendencies. This interest in the 'agents' that bring 
about political change as well as in the 'structural' tendencies that make it 
possible, is reflected in the analysis of interview discourse presented in 
Section 4. 
This allows an intermixing of the various strands of theoretical, historical, 
contemporary and discourse analysis in the process of research, allowing 
each to mutually inform each other. Official documents and secondary 
material were used to develop the historical analysis in Section 2. This was 
complemented by a newspaper survey to continue analysis of the research 
problem up to the end of August 1994 (the date of the IRA ceasefire) for 
Section 3. The arguments in these Sections were developed in tandem 
with the conduct and analysis of interviews for Section 4, allowing at two- 
way traffic in concepts and assumptions between the two bodies of research. 
The arguments and justifications exposed in interviews were used to shape 
the direction of historical and contemporary analysis and vice versa. At the 
same time, the theoretical implications of this analysis were used to 
develop responses to the theoretical questions (See Appendix 1- 
Methodology). 
Overall, this structure and method of enquiry is deliberately driven by 
theory and directed at defining political options -a 'critical-theoretical' 
approach that is an alternative both to over-schematic positivism and to 
'anti-essentialist' relativism. The process of repositioning or redefining 
nationalisms and states in the context of transnational integration has the 
potential to open up new opportunities for political change, which, it has 
been argued, are building the foundations for social transformation as 
forms of social struggle are realigned in new ideological alliances founded 
on broader transnational solidarities (Cox 1992b). This investigation draws 
on the experience of Ireland in the context of EU integration to examine 
these realignments and to highlight their implications for social struggle. 
Notes 
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(1) I had personal experience of this disciplining process while studying for 
an International Relations degree at the London School of Economics. My 
Bsc. Dissertation -A comparative study into the causes of nationalism: the PNV 
and ETA in the Basque Country - was only accepted after intervention by my 
tutor. It was argued that the study of nationalism was not an appropriate 
topic for a dissertation submitted to an International Relations Department 
and in the following year the Departmental regulations on the 
admissibility of Dissertations were tightened. 
(2) 'North' and 'South' are used as abbreviations for 'Northern Ireland' 
and the 'Republic of Ireland'. North and South appear in the lower-case 
where, in Chapter 4, they refer to pre-Partition northern and southern 
Ireland. 
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Section One 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Section Introduction 
This Section surveys theoretical perspectives on nationalism and 
international relations (Chapter I and 2) and brings together elements of 
each to create a framework for understanding relationships between 
nationalism and transnational integration, establishing an analytical 
framework for the case study (Chapter 3). 
A theoretical survey is useful as the main theoretical approaches have a 
bearing on the political positions adopted in Ireland's national conflict and 
in EU institutions. Many political initiatives in the national conflict and at 
the EU level reflect theoretical assumptions about the nature of national 
conflict, or the nature of international relations, or both. Hence the 
theoretical positions outlined here are more than reflections on political or 
social practice: they themselves have often served to inspire, legitimate or 
justify political and social action and play a constant role in political 
developments. Hence, Chapters 1 and 2 provide some essential background 
to the historical developments discussed in Section 2 and contemporary 
debates discussed in Sections 3 and 4. 
Also each of the two sets of theories are assessed to build up an analytical 
framework for the simultaneous analysis of national conflict and 
transnational integration. The two bodies of theory are integrated into a 
model that can serve as a working framework for the analysis of national 
conflict in its transnational context which then guides analysis in the 
subsequent Sections. 
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This second objective requires a set of criteria for evaluating the usefulness 
of the theoretical approaches. The key criterion is that they should take into 
account transnational and international factors. If the theory is premised 
on the specific domestic circumstances of nationalism and focuses on these 
as its central explanatory variables then it is unlikely to assist in the 
analysis of the inter-relationships between nationalism and transnational 
integration. Similarly, the usefulness of international relations theories 
will be assessed according to their ability to take into account developments 
within 'national' societies as well as in global politics. Those, for instance, 
that take domestic societies as a given and focus only on the actions of 
states in transnational or international society would be of limited use for 
the purposes of this analysis, as would those focussing on a particular 
policy dimension of global politics - such as state security or economic 
development. 
The intention is to build a theoretical perspective that integrates the 
'national' and the 'transnational' into the same theoretical 'movement'. 
'National' conflicts are simultaneously defined in a transnational and a 
'national' framework and reflecting this, neither can be treated as 
exogenous. The ceteris paribis assumption that the transnational does not 
impinge on domestic society, or vice versa, allows ä theoretical abstracted 
focus on one or the other that distorts the everyday experience that both are 
simultaneously constitutive of political and social change. 
This criterion also dictates* an emphasis on the dynamics of political or 
social change and on the reproduction of transnational and national 
themes rather than on their initial origins. Ahistorical theories of the 
origins or genesis of national identification or of the interstate or 
transnational system and of their unchanging qualities can, in fact, obstruct 
the process of developing a theory of their current tendencies. 
Some of the theoretical perspectives - for instance, the 'ethno-nationalist' 
approach to nationalism and the 'realist' approach to international 
relations - are presented to meet the first objective of the Section. The 
perspectives are categorised into theoretical 'schools of thought' and 
assessed to identify components that would assist in building an analytical 
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approach to national conflict in a transnational setting. Thus Chapter 1 
discusses theories of nationalism beginning with the most domestically- 
focussed and ending with the most internationally-focused. Chapter 2 
examines international relations theory beginning with the most 
internationally-focussed and ending with the most domestically-focussed 
perspectives. Chapter 3 attempts to weave these components into a 
workable framework for analysis. 
16 
Chapter 1 
Theories of nationalism 
Much of the theoretical work on nationalism ignores the wider context of 
transnational globalisation and inter-state integration. The wide variety of 
theories of nationalism and national conflict can be categorised into five 
broad approaches, each of which is defined by a particular set of 
assumptions about the dominant forces in society. 
The five broad strands of theory are: 'ethno-national' theories such as 
those developed by Anthony Smith (1988) which emphasise the 
communal ties of ethnic identity as a determining factor in the 
development of nationalism; second, 'modernisation' theories developed 
by Karl Deutsch (1966) and Ernest Gellner (1983) which explain the 
emergence and persistence of nationalism in terms of the specific 
requirements of modern industrial society; third, 'state-centred' 
approaches, illustrated by the work of John Breuilly (1982), which link 
nationalism to the demand for popular sovereignty and to the emergence 
of the modern state; fourth, 'class-centred' approaches which emphasise 
the class-base of national movements whether ruling class nationalisms, in 
the work of Eric Hobsbawm (1992), or the nationalisms of oppressed classes 
in Samir Amin (1980) and Jim Blaut (1987); and fifth, 'uneven 
development' theories which examine nationalism's roots in uneven 
capitalist development from the absolutist state to the present day, 
developed in the work of Benedict Anderson (1991), Charles Tilly (1993), 
Miroslav Hroch (1985) and Tom Nairn (1977). 
Each perspective is outlined and there is some discussion of their 
implications for the national conflict in Ireland and for EU integration. 
This provides some theoretical backdrop to the historical account in 
developed Sections 2 and 3 and to the discussion of interview material in 
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Section 4. In addition, each theoretical perspective is assessed according to 
the broad criteria outlined in the Section introduction above, as to whether 
they can assist in the analysis of national conflict in a transnationalised 
setting. The five broad approaches are examined in turn, beginning with 
those most focussed on the internal dynamics of nationalism. 
'Ethno-national' theories 
The 'ethno-national' approach forms the main, if not dominant, strand in 
interpretation of nationalism, both for political actors and for political 
commentators. The analytical framework which is developed in Chapter 3 
does not draw on these theories, but their importance in political life 
merits detailed exposition of their arguments. 
Theories stressing the 'ethnic' components of nationalism claim to explain 
the affective, subjective power of nationalism, while, it is argued, other 
'instrumentalist' approaches only explain its 'objective' conditions. For 
Smith, nationalism is an ideological movement for "attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population 
deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation" 
(Smith 1991b: 73). He focuses on the cultural or "ethnic" elements of 
nationalism which are seen as the "premodern ethnic core", the "baseline" 
for national mobilisation (Smith 1991b: 40,71). These emotional ties of 
ethnic solidarity are seen as having "their own rhythms and properties" 
prior to and independent of less affective, more effective socio-political 
relations. Hence, conflicts between classes, states or ethnic groups, are seen 
as establishing the structure or "form" of ethno-nationalisms while more 
emotional ethnic ties constitute their culture or "content" (Smith 1988). 
For Smith, ethnic revival is at the heart of every nationalism, offering an 
ethic of political legitimacy that defines the mass of people within the 
"culture-collective" as subjects rather than objects of history. It is argued 
that the ethnic categories that define nationalism - pre-modern ancestry, 
geneology, and a common cultural history - exist independently of ethnic 
communalism and can lie dormant for long periods of history. In contrast, 
the "catalysts" of nationalism, such as the transition from absolutist states 
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to 'scientific' states or the transition from a divinely-ordained to a 
rationally-ordained social order, are historically contingent and are seen as 
stimulating ethno-national revivals, but only if they sharpen divisions 
between pre-modern ethnic identities (Smith 1991a: 129). 
Nationalist mobilisation is seen as centring on a dualism between 
impersonal socio-political change that establishes horizontal social 
categories and more subjective affiliations to vertically defined 'ethno- 
national' communities. For Smith, a disaffected intelligensia is invariably 
at the centre of this dualism forming the "social spring of ethnic 
nationalism" it suffers "group anxiety" about the survival of ethnic 
distinctiveness in the face of an all-encompassing, overlord state (Smith 
1991a: 108,135). Since the Enlightenment era the intelligensia is seen to 
invest its energy in "scientific", rather than divinely ordained state 
structures. Inefficient and corrupt state structures prove to be far from 
"scientific" and in fact shore-up vested interests and give political meaning 
to ethnic differences. In these circumstances the modern state can only 
generate 'national' loyalty if it is congruent with the 'ethno-nation'. Unless 
the state reflects "the basic division of mankind, in most times and places 
into separate cultural communities of history and destiny", it will be 
doomed to instability and possibly fragmentation (Smith 1988: 17). 
Smith's approach then, stresses the role played by an intelligensia able to 
rediscover an ethnic past and define a vernacular communal nation 
against bureaucratic incorporation into a state-sponsored nationalism 
(Smith 1991a: 133). Three waves of 'ethno-nationalism' are identified. The 
first, in the nineteenth century was mobilised against imperial, autocratic 
states and had at its core a politicised cultural self determination linked to 
the doctrine of national popular sovereignty. The second, in the mid 
twentieth century, followed a wave of anti-colonial nationalism and was 
directed at the newly independent ex-colonies. In its third manifestation, 
ethno-nationalism breaks out in 'western' liberal democracies. Post-war 
state interventionism acts as a "powerful catalyst" in this: the over- 
production of professionally and technically trained intellectuals; the 
weakness of the central state following the success of anti-colonialism; and 
the failure of liberal democracy to institutionalise substate regional 
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conflicts, are seen as disorientating the 'regional' intelligensia, especially 
those working in the metropole, who often suffer direct discrimination in 
the "cultural dams" of the metropolitan labour market, leading them to 
"search for their hidden inner self in the communal past" (Smith 
1991a: 144,1981: 30). While the alien bureaucracy rejects them, the 'ethnic' 
community welcomes them in a fulfilling and dynamic role at the 
forefront of movements of ethnic regeneration. 
This 'ethno-nationalist' approach has both empirical and theoretical 
weaknesses. In empirical terms, it cannot account for the success of state- 
led national mobilisation and tends to ignore these often spectacularly 
successful forms of 'official' nationalism (for instance in Britain). 
'Premodern' cultural identity or 'ethnicity' may have played a significant 
role in secessionist or separatist "ethno-nationalisms", but it is difficult to 
see how this argument holds equally for state-centred nationalism. 
Furthermore, and very significant for the purposes of this study, the model 
de-emphasises interstate or trans-national factors in the development of 
nationalism. It is seen primarily as an internally generated phenomenon, 
emerging in the context of post-Enlightenment secularism and "scientific" 
state formation. Smith argues that transnational developments such as the 
expanding conditions of global communication, increased porosity of 
'national' societies, the growth of functional integration are too technical 
to draw popular loyalty. Similarly, global social divisions generated by the 
process of capital accumulation, stressed by Marxist influenced 
interpretations, are seen as catalysing nationalisms only if they create 
divisions that are contiguous with pre-modern ethno-national divisions. 
Even if they come to dominate national life, transnational structures will 
not necessarily generate transnational cultures. On the contrary, as ethno- 
national communities react to the process of globalisation, seeing it as a 
form of cultural imperialism, threatening the survival of ethno-national 
identity, national divisions become more, not less salient (Smith 1990). 
This telescoping of history back to one causal, pre-modern element betrays 
more fundamental theoretical flaws in the model. By according ahistorical 
priority to ethnic categories as the "building blocs" of nationalism, 'ethnic' 
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ties are granted an independence "with their own rhythms and properties" 
(Smith 1990). Such elements as a common ancestry, common myths, 
memories, cultures and homelands added together, cluster a population 
behind a "resonant ethno-history" (Smith 1981: 67,137). The 'nation' 
becomes defined simply as a "self conscious or self aware ethnic group" as 
the "comforting warmth" of these ethnic bonds is seen as persuading 
whole sections of the population - who may have no objective interest in 
the nation - to muster behind the nationalist flag in defence of the "ethno- 
nation" (Ma Shu Yun 1990: 529). 
To be accorded this central role in generating national consciousness, 
ethno-culturalism has to be granted its own logic, independent of class 
interests, interstate conflict and even inter-ethnic competition (Smith 
1990). There is a degree of circularity to this claim, not least because the 
concept of 'ethnicity' is itself socially conditioned. By assuming that ethnic 
bonds are an independent, essential part of the human experience, the 
approach avoids having to explain the persistence of ethnic division: a 
firm distinction is constructed between 'subjective' and 'objective' realities, 
an organic, irreducible role is accorded to ethnic ties within the nation and 
it is pigeon-holed firmly in the 'subjective' realm. 
This non-explanation has been extended into a peculiar adaptation of social 
Darwinianism that links the survival of ethnic diversity - or the "right to 
roots" - to the future of the human species (Watson 1990: 213). A false 
distinction is drawn between 'lived' and 'abstract' communities, in which 
the former is given a clear priority in shaping the 'national' identity, 
betraying a retreat into lay-psychology or, worse still, lay-biology, in the face 
of social complexity. In the same vein, the subjective appeal of 
nationalism - which has been described as a "Neitschean virus of belief in 
its rightful and necessary superiority in a given territory" (Watson 
1990: 203) - has been explained in terms of a "primordial" ethnic instinct 
(Douglas 1988; Kellas 1991); while for others, the "deification of the nation" 
has filled a spiritual "void", as all 'national' territory is transformed into 
sacred land, regardless of its 'objective' value (Porter 1982: 59). 
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This proposition - that nationalism is in essence a form of atavism - has 
been condemned as "utter nonsense" (Gellner 1964: 149). It creates an 
almost hermetically sealed 'subjective' world with an internal logic of its 
own and consequently fails to explain how the boundaries of ethnic 
consciousness are selected and are changed. The supposed subjective need 
for ethnic attachment has little explanatory power in a world where the 
fate of ethnicity has more to do with social change than with timeless 
loyalty. To assert that the elements of ethnic identity have an enduring, 
linear existence is to ignore the ways in which even the seemingly 
irreducible elements of ethnic identity - linguistic differentiation for 
instance - have been transformed over time. The contemporary boundaries 
of "ethnic nations" are constantly being redefined, a process that has killed 
off as many "ethnic identities" as it has sustained (Connor 1984). 
Hence the concept of 'nation' must be liberated from the ethnic ties which 
may be linked to it but do not determine it. Other approaches to 
nationalism, discussed below, which Smith categorises as 'instrumental' 
and investigate the societal and international context of nationalism, are 
more appropriate to this task. 
In terms of dominant political assumptions, actors in Ireland's national 
conflict and in EU institutions draw heavily on the 'ethno-nationalist' 
reading of society, despite its empirical and theoretical inadequacies. They 
are often, for instance, uncritically used to justify political positions and 
social action that would otherwise have very little legitimation. Peoples are 
defined by their membership of 'ethno-national' communities rather than 
as the subjects or citizens of states and the membership of this constructed 
community extends to all those whose 'ethnicity' meets supposedly 
timeless, long established criteria. These 'ethnic' identifications are seen as 
constant and unchanging, so providing universal and permanent 
ideological support to political positions. 
In other instances such 'ethnic' attachments - often defined in a pejorative 
way as the mass attachments of the 'mob' - are regretfully cited as 
constraints on political change, thus justifying inaction from actors who 
formally are committed to political change. In this 'liberal' version, for 
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instance in the 'Wilsonian' vision of the post-1919 world order, tensions 
between the 'warring tribes' must be minimised as far as possible by 
allowing state political borders to match pre-modern ethnic attachments. 
Where this is not possible the 'inevitable' conflicts must be minimised 
through equal rights and respect for different 'ethnic' 'traditions'. 
In both versions, national conflict is seen as an unfortunate but inevitable 
consequence of the human condition. As a recipe for inaction it is a 
political tool for the powerful rather than for the powerless and as is 
illustrated in Section 3 and 4, it has a particular hold both in Ireland in EU 
institutions. 
'Modernisation' theories. 
The 'modernisation' approach of theorists such as Gellner (1983,1987) and 
Deutsch (1966) emphasises the role of socio-economic factors in the 
emergence of national identity and focuses on the process of industrial 
modernisation, suggesting that this not only leads to but also requires the 
emergence of 'nations' affiliated to 'national' states. Unlike 'ethno- 
nationalist' interpretations, this 'modernisation' approach is useful for 
developing the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 3, although it is 
is less important amongst political actors. 
Gellner is highly critical of the approach which ascribes 'atavistic' 
motivations to nationalist movements, and recently he has dismissed 
notions of "sleeping beauty nations" in post communist Central and 
Eastern Europe (Gellner 1992: 128). He rejects the idealist, Kantian duality 
between life and reason, or between identity and rationality on which this 
approach is often based. Instead he outlines a more socially rooted dualism 
between social structure and cultural identity (Gellner 1964: 149). This 
dualism draws heavily on theories of communication in modern 
industrialised societies - in particular, Deutsch's distinction between 
effective and affective communication. The modern growth in functional, 
effective, communication leads to greater functional interdependence. This 
"static" quantitative increase in communication, such as transport, radio 
and telecommunications is patterned by the affective - or "cybernetic" - 
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channels of culture and values. As these relative cultural differences act as 
barriers to communication they become "national" markers and play a 
central role in the formation of national loyalty (Deutsch 1966: 38). 
Gellner fleshes out the inter-relationships between these two forms of 
communication. Where social assimilation of the citizenry in the name of 
a 'national' state fails, this occurs along lines of affective cultural 
difference. These differences embody cultural meanings which acquire 
heightened significance in the face of growing functional communication. 
These elements of cultural difference generate social division and 
fragment the state-centred 'national' community into oppositional 
nationalisms. Consequently, the greater the need for cultural homogeneity, 
the greater the political and social fall-out from persisting cultural 
divisions. The less that society is socially structured - in effect, the less a 
social system supplies a "niche" for each of its members - the more 
necessary are the personal and cultural aspects of identity. As social status 
and personal identity become less ascribed and less derived from birth or 
'social station', culture acquires a necessary and overarching significance 
(Gellner 1964: 154). 
This emphasis on the socio-institutional elements of society and on their 
interaction with the need for 'culture' allows Gellner to combine the 
objective and the subjective conditions for national mobilisation in an 
interactive, historical framework (Connor 1986). Under feudalism social 
structure determines life paths, making cultural identity less necessary. 
Under industrialism social structures that inhibit labour mobility are 
eroded to make 'citizens' mutually substitutable in a literacy-sustained 
"musical chairs society", increasing the importance of culture and of 
nationalism. So "agrarian civilisations do not engender nationalism but 
industrialism and industrial societies do" (Gellner 1983: 18-23). 
National affiliation emerges as the central state responds to the "distinctive 
structural requirements of industrial society" (Gellner 1983: 37). The 
'national' state supplies the communal focus for this dis-aggregated, mass 
society. It maintains labour market mobility by claiming monopoly control 
of the national education system and maintains social stability by 
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homogenising a 'national' culture. Doctrines of popular sovereignty define 
the 'national' citizenry as the only source of political legitimacy in the 
emerging 'nation-state'. Rulers and ruled merge into a single, 'national', 
cultural-historical continuum which is placed in a world divided into 
other national communities in a "universal ordering of mankind" 
(Gellner 1983). 
The 'national' state compensates for the depersonalised forces of 
industrialism, offering a re-socialisation into an imaginary nation. The 
dissolution of social structures under industrialism requires the creation of 
a national culture wedded to the state - nationalism then, is a "genuine, 
objective, practical necessity" of industrialism (Gellner 1964: 64). This helps 
to explain why the emerging proletarian citizenry as well as the bourgeoisie 
and the intelligensia define themselves as part of the national community, 
despite not having such an equally direct interest in nation-forming. The 
model also has the advantage of both accounting for integrative, 'official' 
nationalisms and disintegrative separatist nationalisms. The central state's 
attempts at building 'national' unity may be threatened by the spatial 
unevenness of industrialisation and by pre-industrial cultural differences 
which have the potential to be transformed into sub-state 'national' 
divisions. If it actively discriminates against those defined as being outside 
the "core" social groups - in effect as being from the social "periphery" - the 
existing state apparatus gives political meaning to "peripheral" 
attachments at a time when its significance to cultural and social life is 
increasing, in effect sowing the seeds of its own destruction - or at least its 
destabilisation. 
The process of industrialism that generates the dualisms between cultural 
identity and social structure is seen as linear and relatively benign. 
Societies pass though phases of early, late and very late industrialisation, a 
series of stages reminiscent of the modernisation theories of Rostow 
(indeed, the debt is attributed in Gellner 1964: 167). A multiplicity of 
different national communities emerges as the different waves of 
industrialism affect different societies at different times. As societies are at 
different stages of industrialisation and of national assimilation, there is a 
wide range of nationalisms - reflected in the variety of national cultural 
25 
markers, of types of nationalist support base and of nationalist political 
practice. 
As societies move in common towards advanced industrialism, it is 
suggested that there will be increasing convergence in international 
political relations, fuelled by closer inter-national interdependence in a 
process of transnational industrialisation that will diminish the 
significance of national division and lead to federal independence (Gellner 
1992). A more pessimistic reading would suggest that the fragmentation of 
global society into 'national' states is a necessary consequence of 
industrialisation - not just of its current phase - effectively validating a 
'national-state' centred version of international politics. Gellner appears to 
lend support to this interpretation in his criticisms of modernity - seeing it 
as amoral, inhuman and devoted to the mechanical accumulation of 
income rather than to the more affective development of humankind, and 
for him, nationhood offers a possibly necessary compensating ethic of 
'national' progress (Gellner 1987). 
Overall, the 'modernisation' model serves a useful purpose, as it directs 
analysis towards the social conditions under which nationalism emerges. 
Nonetheless, it relies on over-schematic concepts of industrial growth and 
social transformation. Consequently, it is not especially useful in 
explaining the on-going dynamics of national movements in advanced 
industrial society. Also, as it explains nationalism in terms of the domestic 
requirements of industrialism, its implications for transnational politics 
are at best incidental. It does not integrate trans- or inter-national 
dimensions with a domestic perspective, and consequently fails to meet 
one of the central objectives of this enquiry. 
Furthermore, the modernisation perspective tends to analyse the form 
rather than the content of industrialism and, like the 'stages' theory 
developed by Rostow, it tends to ignore the social context of industrial 
development. It is difficult to view industrialism as a relatively value free, 
non-conflictual process that simply reconstitutes societies behind 'national' 
states and defines individuals as 'national' citizens. Industrialism creates 
social divisions of its own which may play a more central role in the 
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development of nationalism. Similarly, it is difficult to view the state as a 
largely interest-free tool of economic development. This raises the 
question of whether it is indeed, 'industrialism' that requires national 
homogeneity and whether there may be other equally significant elements 
leading to the emergence of 'national' societies. 
In terms of its role in shaping political perceptions in Ireland's national 
conflict and in EU institutions, this 'modernisation' approach has had 
some influence, although this is more limited than the 'ethno-nationalist' 
interpretation. Although only implying assumptions about the role of 
nationalism, linkages are often drawn between versions of 'national' 
destiny and the specific requirements of an industrialised society. Concepts 
of the 'national' economy and of 'national' state-led management of the 
economy, of education, or of social provision are employed by many and 
varied actors in Ireland's national conflict. The need for a 'national' 
modernisation, of innovation, of education, or of training is often 
presented as the central plank in a 'national' programme; again, these are 
further investigated in the third section. 
'State-centred' approaches 
Approaches that take a state-centred perspective on nationalism are more 
useful for building a theoretical framework linking nationalism and 
international or transnational relations. They are also, to a greater extent, 
are drawn on by political actors. Nationalism is seen as emerging out of the 
central role played by the modern state in domestic and international 
society. Contrary to arguments about the role of the state in an 
industrialising society, as suggested by 'modernisation' theory, 'statist' 
theorists argue that the state and the system of states have an internal logic 
or autonomy of their own. For writers such as Breuilly, who stress this 
aspect, nationalism is primarily an ideology that links civil society to a 
territorially bounded state claiming universal "boundless" power over the 
'public life' of its citizens (Breuilly 1982: 356). 
Consistent with the argument that the state plays a central role in 
generating and maintaining nationalism, Breuilly argues that nationalist 
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movements have no particular class basis. Against theories which stress 
the role of a dissaffected intelligensia in the formation of national 
movements, he argues that classes are very often internally divided on 
'national' issues. For example, middle classes may be divided into a 
national middle class often based in heavy industry and an internationalist 
mercantile middle class, whilst the petit-bourgeoisie entrepreneur class 
may tend to be more clearly orientated to a 'national' or local framework. 
The working class can also be divided, with the skilled 'labour aristocracy' 
likely to be the most clearly committed to the national state as it is usually 
engaged in national wage bargaining and for the most part its political 
demands are locked into the legitimacy of the existing national political 
order. Other sections of the working class may not be so orientated to the 
national state despite its delivery of welfare and other merit goods. 
Amongst white-collar workers, state employees may maintain loyalty to 
the national state while professionals are likely to shift their loyalty 
according to the conditions prevailing within the national bureaucracies. 
Finally, intellectuals may adopt a nationalist position - particularly if 
excluded from access to power in the existing state bureaucracies (Breuilly 
1982: 322). For Breuilly it is the agglomerations of class fractions which form 
the 'national' constituencies of 'national' states. The source of nationalism 
cannot necessarily be located in any particular class. Rather, it has to be 
located in the nationalist ideology which links society to the state and 
asserts the uniqueness of the particular 'national' community. This 
nationalist doctrine of political legitimacy links political sovereignty to the 
national citizenry and collapses the nation, the society and the state into a 
single political configuration that defines and pursues the 'national' 
interest. 
Breuilly argues that three aspects of the development of the state were 
centrally important for the emergence of nationalism. First, the 
groundwork of national communal identity was laid with the extension of 
institutional co-ordination and state authority. Monarchial power, 
tempered by some limited oligarchic participation led to the growth of 
political structures that defined state territory and its people and gradually 
unified them behind a national ideology. Second, this national ideology 
began to acquire a mobilising as well as a co-ordinating role. This coincided 
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with the growing secularisation of society and with the emerging 
definition of the state as a public institution in the context of 'private' 
capitalist development. Competing demands could be made of a secular, 
'public' state that could not be made of a divinely ordained, absolutist state. 
These demands broadened the definition of participation in the now 
'public' state which became an institutional expression of societal interests 
and a focus for political aspiration and mobilisation. Third, the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty - that the people were sovereign in a territorially 
bounded national state - was also a central element in the emergence of 
nationalism. In order to successfully perform its co-ordinating and 
mobilising functions in the increasingly competitive inter-state system, the 
'national' state needed to become part of a 'common sense' political 
landscape. A commonly held, mass nationalist ideology came to the aid of 
the state, legitimising its role and transforming it into the institutional 
expression of particular national interests. Placed in a panoply of other 
national states, the state became an increasingly particularist public 
expression of 'private' national characteristics. In this scenario personal 
and 'private' cultural characteristics became national markers, founded on 
a mythical version of the past used as a guide to transforming the future, 
and nationalist ideology became the doctrine of 'public' statehood, leading 
to the emergence of the 'common sense' nationalist doctrine that mankind 
is divided up into 'nations' each of which had an inalienable right to 
national self determination. 
This model of nationalism is rooted in the nature of the state and the 
global system: changes in either lead to changes in the nature of 
nationalism. For Breuilly the context for the rise of nationalist movements 
is set by the existing states system. Nationalist strategy, whether it is aimed 
at reforming the state, separating from it or assimilating into it, is shaped 
by the nature of the existing state apparatus and by the "system of 
competing territorial states" (Breuilly 1982: 365). The 'nationalist' account of 
inter-national politics, in which the only limit on state sovereignty is the 
sovereignty of other 'nation-states', may have reflected the reality of state 
sovereignty in the nineteenth century but in the post-1945 era, in the 
context of complex inter-state interdependence, it is increasingly becoming 
a "hollow sham" (Breuilly 1982: 355,378). But at the same time, as states 
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have become less important in global politics, they have become 
progressively more interventionist, leading to a wider dissemination of 
nationalist rhetoric into virtually every avenue of political life. So for 
Breuilly, at the same time as nationalism has become less effective in 
transnational or international politics, it has become more significant in 
defining previously 'private' realms and has been reduced to a possibly 
dangerous and "arbitrary combination of emotion and pragmatism" 
(Breuilly 1982: 380). 
This perspective on the changing role of states - and hence of nationalisms 
- is particularly useful for the purposes of this investigation. Nationalism 
and the state are seen as closely interdependent and in constant interaction, 
hence the model is immediately applicable to an international system of 
'national' states. It is weak though, on other international and 
transnational forms of political interaction except in so far as they affect 
state structures and nationalism. Similarly, it tends to under-emphasise 
non-state factors in the development of nationalism at the sub-state level. 
But even with these reservations, it is clear that the 'statist' model assists 
greatly in specifying both the domestic and the international context of 
nationalism, particularly with regard to the impact and autonomy of 
national state structures, and this approach forms a key element in the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3. 
The state-centred interpretation of nationalism has also had an important 
influence on actors in Ireland's national conflict and in EU institutions. 
The state is seen as having a crucial role in defining inter-national and 
domestic politics, particularly in terms of the emergence and persistence of 
nationalism. For the architects of the EU, the emergence of exclusive, state 
sponsored nationalisms was the central cause of Europe's inter-state 
conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. This diagnosis was one 
of the factors that led to the creation of pan-European inter-state 
organisations. Consequently, political actors at the EU level are preoccupied 
with achieving a diminution of national state sovereignty as a means of 
reducing exclusivist nationalism and therefore of reducing the possibility 
of war between Western European states. 
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A similar understanding of nationalism and hence of the means of 
overcoming national conflict is reflected in the rhetoric of some political 
actors in Ireland's national conflict. The close conceptual association of 
state sovereignty and national identity in Ireland translates into neatly 
delineated defensive British nationalist and offensive Irish nationalist 
positions on the question of Partition in Ireland. The rhetoric of political 
actors is often closely associated with the competing state claims to 
territorial sovereignty embodied in the British 1920 Ireland Act and in the 
1937 Constitution of the Republic. Also, as a corollary to this, the rhetoric of 
self-styled anti-nationalist actors in the conflict is invariably focussed on 
the degree to which British or Irish state sovereignty is being displaced in a 
trans-nationalised, regionalised, Europeanised political context. Again, 
these various strands of contemporary debate are discussed in Sections 3 
and 4. 
'Class-centred' approaches 
Class-centred approaches are useful in developing the themes marked out 
by 'modernisation' theorists into a more critical interpretation of the 
impact of capitalist industrialism. Like state-centred perspectives, class- 
centred interpretations of national conflict are common in Ireland and at 
the EU level, although not dominant, as they are typically linked to the 
Marxian aspiration to a class-free society and are most commonly expressed 
by subordinate national groupings. 
Theorists interpreting nationalism as an expression of class conflict 
emphasise its roots in the exploitative and oppressive logic of capitalist 
development. This encompasses the school of Marxian thought which 
argues - following Rosa Luxemburg - that nationalism is primarily an 
ideological tool of the ruling classes. The state elites that promote the 
'national' interest are seen as directly acting in the interests of the 
dominant capitalist classes and nationalism itself is seen primarily as a 
means of maintaining capitalist relations. This class-centred approach also 
encompasses those arguing that nationalism is the voice of exploited and 
oppressed people demanding the power to shape their own societies. From 
this perspective, nationalism is primarily an anti-imperialist ideology. It is 
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seen as giving political force to popular demands from 'internal' as well as 
'external' colonies and 'neo-colonies' of imperialist powers. 
Writing from the former perspective, Eric Hobsbawm focuses on 'official' 
nationalisms in Western Europe, suggesting that nationalism is founded 
on "invented traditions" linked to a 'national' state (Hobsbawm 1983). For 
him nationalism is reproduced from 'above' in at least equal measure as 
from 'below' (1). Nationalism is seen as an ideological tool of the ruling 
class: a means of socialising and controlling a fragmented citizenry, the 
"expression of local or sectional discontents capable of being wrapped in 
coloured banners" and a "substitute for lost dreams" (Hobsbawm 1990: 178, 
1983: 10). This helps to explain the emergence of nationalism in the 
transition from agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism. The 'national' 
state becomes the focus and "framework of the citizens' collective actions", 
the institutional carrier of the "civic religion". Public education constructs 
a new, secular priesthood wedded to the national state; monuments 
symbolising national events and temples consecrated to the 'nation' are 
constructed; and public ceremonies, focussing the 'national' spirit are 
performed (Hobsbawm 1990: 264). 
In the contemporary period he argues that there has been a general 
mutation of ethnic politics into nationalist politics, stressing nationalism's 
thirst for ethnic roots in the context of disintegrating social structures such 
as in post-Communist Central Europe (2). There should be no surprise that 
such reactionary politics has emerged - across Europe - as states have been 
increasingly constrained and destabilised by global economic forces and 
have consequently persistently failed to meet popular aspirations. 
Nationalist 'revivals' in the context of heightened transnational 
integration reflect the "future shock" of a disorientated generation "hungry 
for new certitudes to replace collapsing old ones" (3). The imagined 
community of the 'nation' or the ethnic group offers something 
permanent in a disruptingly fluid society. 
This analysis has similarities with the 'modernisation' approach. Where it 
differs is in stressing that nationalism presents a false picture and serves 
the particular interests of dominant elites - leading to the irony that "what 
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holds humanity together today is the denial of what the human race has in 
common" (4). 
Nationalism is also significant for anti-imperialist movements of 
"national liberation". Blaut focuses on such movements and - like 
Hobsbawm - seeks to explain them in terms of the specific logics of 
capitalist exploitation. He argues that once immersed in capitalist relations, 
the state becomes an arena of exploitation and resistance, expressing class 
struggle in a class divided society. 'National', communal histories gain 
significance by virtue of their relationship with the capitalist state and 
consequently the nation is defined not as self conscious collectivity but as a 
class bloc aspiring to state power. Depending on their class following and 
historical context, he categorises nationalisms as either reactionary and 
exploitative, or as anti-imperialist and progressive. National movements 
are either aimed at maintaining the control of dominant classes or at 
gaining emancipation from them and these two forms of nationalism are 
seen as constantly mirroring conflicts between imperialism and anti- 
imperialism in the global political economy (Blaut 1987). 
Amin broadens this perspective by stressing the tension between the 
unifying, class forming, logic of global capitalism and its fragmenting, 
nation forming, impact. While the forces of production define a global 
framework of exploitation, productive relations ensure that its surplus is 
distributed to dominant class alliances concentrated in core 'national' states 
(Amin 1980: 13). Exploitative relations of production are seen as generating 
spatially unequal class relations, and 'national' class alliances, reflecting 
spatial inequalities, are seen as centrally important in maintaining 
capitalist stability. 
The ways in which class blocs are built around 'national' interests, how 
these are challenged, re-formed or transformed over time; the impact of 
subordinate classes and linkages with non-national class blocs; and the role 
of 'national' state in expressing, solidifying and adjusting the 'national' 
class alliance, are all examined as a means of explaining 'national' 
movements. Such 'national' class alliances are seen as significant not only 
in the imperialist 'core' societies - as stressed by Hobsbawm - but also in the 
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peripheral, subordinate societies, as alliances between 'local', comprador 
elites and transnational capital maintain dependent or "extroverted" 
development in the periphery, rather than "auto-centred" forms of 
development that are more aimed at meeting the needs of such 
subordinated peoples (Amin 1980: 164). 
This yields a three-phase analysis of inter-imperialist rivalry. A pre-World 
War One narrow class alliance is seen as fuelling competitive interstate 
'national' rivalries focussed in Europe, while a broader social democratic 
class alliance in post-Second World War western Europe is seen as 
channelling 'national' rivalries into collective, US-dominated regulatory 
institutions. In its most recent phase of development a heightened crisis in 
capital accumulation is seen as narrowing the 'national' class alliance and 
sharpening inter-state competition between states now organised into 
'global regions'. 
Significantly, in this most recent phase, Amin identifies a shift away from 
the national state framework as inter-imperialist rivalries are fought out at 
an inter-bloc rather than an interstate level. As the process of capital 
accumulation globalises, there is a "lack of any fit between state space and 
economic space", seriously undermining the coherence and ultimately, the 
dominance of 'national' power elites (Amin 1980: 233). As states are unable 
to construct a 'national' class alliance in the context of global economic 
interests, 'official' nationalisms both in the 'core' and 'periphery' are 
undermined, opening up new opportunities for subordinated movements. 
Overall, the class-centred approach offers an analysis that is global in scale 
and in this respect it is useful in developing a perspective on nationalism 
and transnational integration. It is also useful as it attempts to map out the 
inter-connections between nationalism as a political ideology and the 
exploitative or oppressive impact of capitalist development. These linkages 
between class conflict and national conflict form a key element in the 
analytical framework that is developed in Chapter 3. This approach is 
though, somewhat limiting as it prevents analysis of the state and the 
states system as anything other than the instrument of dominant capitalist 
elites. Nationalism is similarly analysed as a political tool rather than as a 
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political ideology that may emerge out of the real conditions of capitalist 
development. 
As with the other approaches, the class centred interpretation of 
nationalism exerts an influence on the national conflict in Ireland and on 
actors at the EU level. The issue of whether Irish nationalists should attract 
the support of socialists and of the labour movement North and South and 
further afield is conditioned by this essentially tactical approach to 
nationalism. Socialists have rallied to the support of Irish nationalism and 
Republicanism not out of any necessary attachment to the national cause 
but rather, due to the awareness that Britain had maintained its presence in 
Ireland as part of its global role as an imperialist power. Any weakening of 
that power - elsewhere as well as in Ireland - was to be welcomed. 
Similarly, such tactical calculations influence positions on whether 
socialist unity in Northern Ireland between unionist and nationalist 
workers, for instance, should take priority over ending British rule, or vice- 
versa. 
This approach has also influenced socialist strategy at the EU level on the 
question of whether the process of EU integration should be supported. 
The class bloc serviced by EU institutions is variously characterised as 
irredeemably capitalist orientated, as argued by socialist Euro-sceptics, or, as 
increasingly subject to pressures from Europe's working classes, as argued 
by some socialist Euro-enthusiasts (See Palmer 1992). 
'Uneven Development' theories 
'Uneven development' theories focus centrally on the wider inter- and 
trans- national setting in which nationalism is reproduced. They explore a 
broad range of economic, cultural and political relationships within and 
between societies to explain the persistence of nationalism. They are 
therefore particularly useful for the analytical framework outlined in 
Chapter 3 and here are outlined in some detail. 
Hroch (1985) for instance, emphasises the impact of uneven development 
on nationalist ideology. He defines an organic relationship between socio- 
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economic transformations under capitalism and socio-political 
transformations in the development of nationalism, suggesting that 
'national' ideologies are bound into the logics of objective socio-economic 
relations and arguing that the theoretical focus should be on how they 
inter-relate. 
There are three phases of development that he argues apply to all 
nationalist movements -a phase of 'scholarly interest', of 'patriotic 
agitation' and of 'mass mobilisation'. The type of nationalism that emerges 
- its ideological form and its support base - depends on the period in which 
the national movement shifts into the second, 'agitational' phase. This 
forms the basis for a typology of national movements that highlights 
differences between political programmes and class bases, according to 
when they matured into mass nationalisms. Three broad historical periods 
of socio-economic transformation are identified: the fall of absolutism and 
bourgeois revolution; the victory of capitalism and its early development; 
and the acceleration of globalised integration and mass, global 
communication under advanced capitalism. 
Hroch suggests that 'national' class alliances and ideologies are shaped by 
the uneven spread of capitalism across the these historical phases. He 
argues that nationalism is generated and sustained by conflicts of interest, 
with widening communication and social mobility as a contributory - 
secondary - element. This approach is particularly useful for the purposes 
of this enquiry as nationalism is seen as emerging out of sharp material 
disparities derived from the unevenly distributed impacts of capitalist 
development. 
Anderson's approach (1991, first published 1983) complements this analysis 
by focussing on the uneven development of global culture as a key element 
in the emergence and persistence of nationalism. He emphasises that the 
erosion of the defining elements of pre-modern culture laid the cultural 
groundwork for the transition to a system of 'national' states (Anderson 
1991: 36). "Printing press capitalism" used indigenous and vernacular 
languages and replaced written script inaccessible to the vast majority of 
the population, making it possible to communicate with a mass, 
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linguistically defined community. At the same time, with the transition to 
the politics of a secular society there was an increasing demand for popular 
sovereignty voiced by a rising bourgeoisie and an associated implosion of 
social structures centred on 'divine' men. There was a widening 
distinction between cosmology and history as social events became rooted 
in a temporal reality rather in the realm of the divine. People became the 
subjects of history and were placed in a constructed, continuous historical 
narrative that was subject to popular intervention rather than a pre- 
ordained hierarchy subject only to divine intervention (Anderson 
1991: 204). 
As language, social power and history were transformed, an opening, or 
vacancy emerged for a new social certainty linking "fraternity, power and 
time" (Anderson 1991: 36). This vacancy was filled by a new cultural 
trajectory behind the 'national', "imagined community" that subsumed 
individual identity into a public, collective identity as a 'nation'. This 
reconfiguration of culture into a 'national' "framework of consciousness" 
during the first 'wave' of nationalism in the late eighteenth century 
depended centrally on the ways in which state administration gives 
territorial meaning to subject dominions (Anderson 1991: 63) (5). The 
cultural exclusion of territorially defined elites subordinate to the core 
political authority, who had the technology, resources and social power to 
reconstitute themselves as 'national' elites is seen as a crucial factor in the 
development of nationalism as the new doctrine of social and political life. 
According to Anderson this conflict between a populist, often linguistic 
nationalism and a centralised political authority transformed the logic of 
political legitimacy in the core as well as the periphery. This constituted the 
second 'wave' of nationalism, in which the nationalist imaginings of 
peripheral elites were adopted by state leaders in the metropoles, who were 
keen to re-homogenise their populace in the face of social upheavals and to 
re-stabilise their rule in the face of new political demands for popular 
sovereignty. This emergence of what Anderson calls "official" nationalism 
was built on an imperial land-grab in the nineteenth century and was 
reinforced by a further wave of anti-imperialist nationalisms in the newer 
colonies. This third wave of nationalism erupted out of the tensions 
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inherent in attempting to construct an imperial nationalism, as the 
colonial dominions of the metropolitan states, defined as subordinate 
members of the 'nation', mobilised behind their own versions of the 
'national' community. 
This history of conflict between competing conceptualisations of the 
'national' community is driven by socio-economic divisions at the heart of 
international society and is expressed as a political conflict between 
imperial-dynastic interests and revolutionary forces (Anderson 1991: 159). 
The gulf that opens up between the ideologies of the imagined 'nation' and 
the lived experience of its 'nationals' leads to a reactive nationalist 
mobilisation, so reproducing the fragmentation of global politics into 
'national' states. For Anderson nationalism is defined and redefined by a 
conflict between revolutionary nationalist populists articulating socio- 
economic grievances, defining a 'national' programme for popular 
mobilisation and official apparaticks attempting to maintain 'national' 
unity and stability in the metropoles. The first mobilises their national 
community through myths of the 'nation' in an anti-state offensive 
movement, the other conducts a defensive 'national' mobilisation 
founded on a mythical sharing of 'national' interests (Anderson 
1991: 161n). 
Hence Anderson argues that the legacies of nationalism are 'Janus-headed' 
(Anderson 1991: 155-9): nationalist mobilisation depends upon an ability to 
invent or reinvent a community of interest with an historical continuity, 
collectivising past and present experiences and linking them to future 
aspirations. Nationalists both look backwards, seeking to 'revive' an 
historical attachment and forwards to meet 'national' goals. Both 
revolutionary movements and state leaderships are locked into the logic of 
'national' mobilisation as historical experiences and aspirations are defined 
by territory and by the 'national' state framework. 
Nationalist movements and 'national' struggles are seen as mutually 
defining, stemming from an overarching, indeed, unifying confrontation 
of dominant and subordinate political elites. As outlined by Edward Said, 
the conflict between imperialisers and imperialised has to be 
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conceptualised as a mutually defining "contrapuntal" relationship in 
which there is "a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history 
and of those other histories against which the dominating discourse acts". 
Whether imperial or post-imperial, anti-colonial or post-colonial, such 
cultural identities have to be understood as mutually reinforcing - "not as 
essentialisations... but as contrapuntal ensembles". Just as "no identity 
exists by itself without an array of opposites, negatives, oppositions", so no 
revolutionary, anti-imperialist movement is able to define itself as outside 
the 'national' state system. To do so would be an act of political suicide. 
Hence - often ironically - the clash between revolutionary and reactionary 
forces in global politics is fought out in the same 'national' political 
framework (Said 1993: 59-60). 
The sharp discontinuities in global territorial development that ignite and 
fuel the social and political antimonies that are expressed in 'national' 
conflicts are also explored by Tom Nairn (1977). Nairn advocates a holistic 
approach, suggesting that the examination of individual nationalisms 
without setting them in a wider global framework of political relations 
ignores the social dynamics which create and sustain them. Consequently, 
the persistence of nationalism is seen as directly resulting from the 
globalising spread and deepening reach of capitalism. Ironically, as 
nationalist self determination becomes a "grim necessity of modern social 
development", nationalism turns against its creator, becoming the vehicle 
for popular anti-capitalist aspiration, thereby destatiblising 'core' western 
capitalist states (Nairn 1977: 38). 
For Nairn, all nationalisms are defined by regressive and often reactionary 
communal attachments and by the aspiration to 'national' progress. This 
tension-in-unity or rather conflict-in-unity is at the heart of nationalism. 
Nationalism is seen as a political doctrine that confronts the future with its 
face to the past (Nairn 1977: 352). Nationalism is transformative and seeks 
to change the ways in which a territory and its people are developing. But 
in order to achieve this, it is also backward-looking, seeking a continuity 
with a communal past. Nairn suggests that this stems from the need to 
"invite" the masses into history: an aspiration to transform the future 
requires a myth of origins and an account of the communal, collective past 
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in order to explain the present and project needs and desires into the 
future. Hence nationalism is simultaneously progressive and regressive. 
Like Anderson, he argues that it is two-faced - or "Janus faced"- with one 
face looking forwards and the other backwards, standing over the passage 
to modernity, always ambivalent in its attempts to maintain an uneasy 
consistency between the two and occasionally opening up opportunities for 
other forms of social movement (Nairn 1977: 349). 
'National' movements both react to the reality of 'national' division and 
aspire to the re-ordering of international society. They invoke a definition 
of 'national' history, creating a 'national' mission and seek to gear it to 
meet their interests. This is as true for national groupings attempting to 
challenge the logic of capitalist development as for those seeking to shore it 
up, in this sense "all nationalism is both healthy and morbid" (Nairn 
1977: 339,347). This then, offers a way of explaining both the progressive 
and regressive dynamic of nationalism, so avoiding the tendency identified 
in class-centred perspectives, to oscillate between outright condemnation of 
'imperialist' variants and over-celebration of 'anti-imperialist' variants of 
nationalism. 
For Nairn, nationalism is a necessary outcome of global capitalism: it was 
not chosen as the vehicle for political change, it was imposed by the logic of 
uneven capitalist development within the inter-national states system 
(Nairn 1977: 335). Nationalism expresses the fact of territoriality in class 
relations, despite the trans-territorial, now global, logic of productive 
forces. He identifies a constant tension between these two competing 
spatial dynamics, for instance, between 'national' and international capital, 
between 'national' liberation and socialist internationalism (Nairn 
1977: 354). 
This is reflected in the dialectical historical logic of nationalism since its 
emergence in peripheral, colonial dominions in the late eighteenth 
century. Nationalisms in metropoles are in constant, mutually defining 
conflict both between themselves and with nationalisms in subordinated 
territories, shaped by the overarching process of global capitalist 
accumulation -a conflict that "has enveloped and repressed the other 
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antagonism upon which Marxism laid great stress: the class struggle" 
(Nairn 1977: 353). When societies are "smashed" apart by territorially, 
'nationally' defined capitalist development, within a 'national' states 
system, they disintegrate "along the fault lines contained inside them", that 
is, along national lines rather than along clearly defined class lines (Nairn 
1977: 353). 
Nairn's approach integrates the global political, economic and social logic 
of capitalism with the analysis of nationalism, defining it as a central 
element in global capitalist development. As Nairn argues, nationalism's 
"real origins are... located not in the folk, not in the individual's repressed 
passion for some sort of wholeness or identity, but in the machinery of 
world political economy" (Nairn 1977: 335). Without a 'national' state 
apparatus to gain some autonomy for people in the global economy, social 
'progress' or industrial development mean domination. The only way for 
people to "contest the concrete form in which.... 'progress' had taken them 
by the throat" is to construct their own 'national' state (Nairn 1977: 337-9). 
The prediction of 'liberal' thinkers on international politics that global 
commerce would lead to global social harmony could not have been more 
mistaken. On the contrary, the over-riding power of'global capital is seen as 
continually reproducing nationalism and generating rather than abating 
inter-national conflicts. This approach offers a useful corrective to the 
'ethno-nationalist' and the 'modernisation' theories of nationalism. The 
conceptualisation of nationalism as a political ideology driven by the logic 
of the capitalist system directly integrates the reproduction of nationalism 
into the reproduction of global capitalism, defining it as one 'movement' 
whose competing dual logics can be discerned in nationalist rhetoric and in 
their historical development. Also, unlike 'class-centred approaches, it 
retains a theoretical openness. Class interests are counted as significant but 
only as an element in the development of a capitalist system, which drives 
states, ideologies and cultures as well as classes into the logic of national 
aspiration, national competition and national conflict. 
This interpretation of nationalism has particular resonance in Ireland's 
national conflict and also at the EU level. Uneven cultural and economic 
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development in Ireland has been seen by a number of commentators as a 
central factor in the emergence of the unionist-nationalist conflict in the 
late nineteenth century and in the cönstruction of Partition. Partly 
reflecting this, some Northern Unionist politicians talk of the 'two 
nations' of Ireland, while some Nationalists emphasise the on-going 
linkages that may over-ride the dimensions of uneven North-South 
development. Especially for Nationalists, the possible - indeed, likely - 
transition to 'even' development in the mid to late twentieth century was 
seen as undermining the political division of the island and as possibly 
resolving the conflict. 
Meanwhile, at the EU level, concerns at the destabilising effects of uneven 
development, in terms of its impact on substate nationalist movements as 
well as on the 'official' national states themselves, has been a major factor 
in the emergence of EU-led regional and cohesion policies. 
Chapter Conclusions 
The various theories of nationalism can be placed into five broad 
categories. While these overlap and inter-relate, they form a distinct range 
of interpretations, each of which has been briefly summarised. 
The five perspectives have been assessed in terms of their resonance in 
Ireland's national conflict and in terms of politics at the EU level. All were 
found to have had relevance to either or both, with 'ethno-national' 
theories perhaps being the most influential, even dominant, 
interpretation. 
In addition, the five perspectives have been examined to assess whether 
they explain nationalism in terms of transnational or international 
developments as well as in terms of 'national' developments and there has 
been some concern that they should seek to explain the reproduction of 
nationalism under differing and rapidly changing conditions, rather than 
simply offer a limited account of its origins. It has been argued that the 
'uneven development' perspective best meets these criteria as it analyses 
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nationalism as a product of the on-going interaction between global 
capitalism and national-state fragmentation. In Chapter 3 this overall 
perspective - including some of the arguments about nationalist ideology 
and global culture developed by Hroch, Anderson and Said - is combined 
with elements of the 'state-centred' perspective developed by Breuilly and 
of the 'class-centred' approach developed by Amin. 
Before going about constructing this analytical framework it is necessary, in 
the following Chapter, to undertake a similar task for international 
relations theory. 
Notes 
1. For instance, Lenin who proposed a distinction between 'progressive' 
and 'reactionary' nationalisms; Stalin, who set criteria for the recognition 
of 'national' status; and President Wilson who suggested that if only all 
'nations' were given independent statehood then national conflict would 
cease. Meanwhile, the dictates of inter-state imperial competition are seen 
as laying the groundwork for nationalisms and national conflicts in the 
post-colonial societies of Asia, Africa and South America. 
2. Hobsbawm E. (1992) Whose fault line is it anyway? New statesman and 
society, 24 April 1992. 
3. He distinguishes the greater willingness of state elites to resort to 
nationalist policies and nationalist rhetoric, from the various reactionary 
political developments - fundamentalism, racism, xenophobia - that have 
become stronger in the late twentieth century, see Hobsbawm 1990: 165-6. 
4. Hobsbawm E. (1992) Whose fault line is it anyway? New statesman and 
society, 24 April 1992, page 26. 
5. Anderson argues that these meanings were acquired by dominion elites 
while on "viceregal pilgrimages" to imperial capitals in Western Europe, 
while dominant 'at home' in their dominions, once in the imperial 
heartland they were consigned to subordination (Anderson 1991: 61). It is 
argued that as these elite 'national' imaginings of nationalism's "Creole 
Pioneers" gained a wider political currency. Through mass newsprint they 
began to shape a mass 'national' consciousness that challenged the 
metropole's right to rule their 'New World' dominions and fought a series 
of revolutionary wars from 1776 to 1825, the first wars of national 
liberation (Anderson 1991: 191). 
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Chapter 2 
International relations theory 
This Chapter assesses the usefulness international relations theories for the 
analysis of national conflict in a transnational setting. Again, the central 
criterion for assessment is whether these theories can take account of 
political change at both the domestic and the international levels or 
whether they are primarily concerned with mapping out political 
tendencies at one or other level. The focus then, is on overcoming 
tendencies to dichotomise between 'domestic' and 'international' politics 
and to thereby develop an integrated theoretical framework for the analysis 
of national conflict. 
At the same time, in discussing the main strands of international relations 
theory, the Chapter illustrates how they are reflected in the contemporary 
debates about EU integration and about the national conflict in Ireland - 
focusing particularly on the differing conceptions of national or state 
sovereignty. As with the previous Chapter, these implications are briefly 
sketched out after each theoretical perspective is analysed. 
International 'relations theories are more clearly demarcated into 'schools 
of thought' than theories of nationalism. There are three such 'schools of 
thought' - realism, functionalism and marxist-influenced approaches - 
each founded on particular interpretations of human nature and different 
conceptions of politics and of the role of the state (Olson and Groom 1991). 
As will be outlined, the theoretical dispute between them centres not so 
much on these 'foundational' issues as on the resulting disagreements 
over what are deemed to be the primary actors in the international system. 
This determines the direction and focus of theory - as "much depends on 
what one chooses to treat as exogenous" (Cornett and Caporaso 1992: 249). 
44 
For realists sub-state and supra-state organisations are explained in terms of 
state-centric power politics. For the functionalist school the state is 
exogenous: substate and suprastate organisations are the main object of 
study and states are interpreted in the light of these sources of non-state 
power. Marxist-influenced approaches emphasise class interests and 
interpret both state and non-state institutions in terms of these interests. 
In what follows, each of the three broad 'paradigms' and variants within 
them are discussed in detail. As with the previous Chapter, there are two 
main concerns. First there is an attempt to highlight their relevance to 
contemporary debates at the EU level and in Ireland's national conflict. 
Second, each of the three perspectives are assessed as to how they can 
contribute to the analytical framework constructed in Chapter 3. Again, two 
main criteria are applied - namely - whether they integrate 'national' or 
'domestic' factors with inter- or trans- national factors and whether they 
seek to explain the reproduction and dynamic development rather than 
the origins of the global political system. 
Realism and Neo-Realism 
Realism defines international relations as the study of state behaviour in 
an international 'society' of states. 'Realist' theory rationalises state practice 
and was developed both as a legitimation of state behaviour and as a guide 
to action for state officials. It has its origins in concepts of statesmanship 
developed by Niccolo Machiavelli in The Prince (1532) and in concepts of 
absolute state sovereignty and of inter-state anarchy developed by Thomas 
Hobbes in the Lethiathan (1651). 
Societies are seen as existing in a constant state of disorder or 'state of 
nature', hence states are required to exercise absolute power within their 
territory and to maintain domestic order. Without an overall 'world state', 
global politics is defined as interstate politics - as constant conflict, disorder 
and anarchy between sovereign units. This 'realist' account therefore 
stresses the rational pursuit of state power, and has developed a range of 
ordering mechanisms to stabilise the anarchic society of states. This 
approach - which has been described as a form of social Darwinism writ 
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large (Halliday 1989) - has dominated theoretical thinking in international 
relations, especially since the Second World War. 
'Realism' is founded on three assumptions: first that the all-important 
actors in international relations are states; second that states have formally 
equal powers and third, that there is sharp distinction between domestic 
politics and international relations (Morgenthau 1956). These generate 
three guiding principles - that there is no authority above the state, that 
inter-state relations are competitive and that states can or should pursue 
power rationally. 
Realists argue that states are granted sovereign power by their citizens in 
return for maintaining security. As has been mentioned, this a priori 
privileging of security issues is founded on the Hobbesian vision of society 
as an anarchical 'state of nature' (Brewin 1982). As there is no authority 
standing above the international 'society of states', there is no equivalent 
mechanism guaranteeing state security. Consequently, states respond to the 
security threats embodied in the resultant anarchy by constantly guarding 
against attack or in extreme cases, by pre-empting attack, as not to do so 
would threaten their survival. 
International order can only be created out of this anarchy by the states 
themselves. The ordering conventions or 'institutions' of international 
politics - interstate conflict, the norms and conventions of diplomacy, the 
balance of power between states, the alliances and treaties struck by states - 
are developed out of many decades of trail and error as state elites 
attempted to secure international political stability. The problems that arise 
out of building these ordering mechanisms in the anarchic international 
society are examined by realist writers, who suggest that a 'rational' art of 
statecraft should shape state responses rather than any reliance on non- 
state institutions: attempts at building order on anything other than 
sovereign states, for instance, the League of Nations in the 1920's and 30's, 
are seen as non 'realistic' and dangerous. 
Realist thought in international relations falls into two broad categories - 
'classical' and 'neo-realism'. Both perspectives are founded on a "a theory 
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about constraint" - about the constraining and hence civilising effects of 
international order in an otherwise anarchic international 'state of nature' 
(Cornett and Caporaso 1992: 288). 'Classical' realists were primarily 
concerned with how states determined and pursued their interests in the 
international arena and consequently were inclined to define a sharp 
distinction between domestic and international society and to consign the 
former to the 'black box' of the territorial 'nation-state' (Mastanduno et al 
1989). 
'Neo-realism' adapted the realist 'billiard-ball' picture of international 
politics to suggest that the "anarchic" inter-state society generates its own 
rules and institutions to regulate state behaviour (Bull 1977). Neo-realists 
argue that regional organisations such as the EU strengthen - indeed 
express - existing state interests and extend state sovereignty. Regional 
regimes of capital accumulation and political decision-making are seen as 
part of the institutional structure of an international society dominated by 
states. Like diplomacy, international law, balance of power, and indeed - 
war - these regional regimes are primarily seen as a means of reconciling 
conflicting interests between the sovereign states. 
Writing from a neo-realist perspective, Kenneth Waltz (1979) contrasts 
how domestic society and international society are ordered to provide a 
theoretical grounding to distinctions between the two. He distinguishes 
three attributes of social structure - its ordering principles, the functions of 
its units and the distribution of capabilities between these units. The 
ordering principle in domestic society is hierarchial subordination, in 
international society it is anarchic coordination. Each unit of domestic 
society exercises different functions, in international society all of its state 
units exercise the same functions, expressed in their formal equality. In 
domestic society the capabilities of 'units' are shaped by this distribution of 
functions while in international society it is the differences in capabilities, 
alone, that shape relative power positions (Waltz 1979: 80-96). 
This political system is likened to an unregulated commodity market 
where states 'rationally' pursue self interest and thereby maximise overall 
utility. Hence state actors not only do, but should dominate international 
47 
politics. States are assumed to have similar utility-maximising motivations 
and although in the course of bargaining, alliances may emerge between 
these actors, these will be temporary and will not subvert the internal logic 
of the "coaction of self regarding units' (Waltz 1979: 91). 
Gilpin (1987) also develops an analogy between the realist theory of state 
action and the neo-classical economists' conception of the market, using 
distinctions between competitive and noncompetitive, oligopolistic or 
monopolistic market forms. He argues that the structure of post-war 
interstate economic cooperation depended on the existence of a hegemonic 
power willing to commit itself to maintaining global stability and to act as a 
systemic leader. If such a leader fails to emerge in the post-Cold War era 
there will be a slide into inter-state power-political competition, dissolving 
the structures built up during the period of hegemony (Gilpin 1971). 
Although the possibility of multilateral "pluralist leadership" is not ruled 
out, he does suggest that this would be unlikely, given the conflicting 
interests of states (Gilpin 1987: 365). Instead he highlights the protectionist, 
mercantilist tendencies in economic policy that have emerged with the 
gradual loss of the hegemonic 'leader', and have undermined the "political 
framework of transnational economic activity". As part of this process, he 
identifies a shift to "minilateralism" in regional associations - in which 
states, organised in regional groupings, compete as part of regions rather 
than cooperate as part of multilateral institutions in the global economy. 
Overall then, neo-realists argue that states define the 'rules of the game' 
that allow the growth of global economic interdependence. In doing so they 
increase their "authority over economic activities" and their powers are 
enhanced, not superseded (Gilpin 1987: 408). This neo-realist concept of an 
increasingly state-led "politicised economic world" reflects the earlier 
realist argument that states are the central actors in international relations. 
It is accepted that there are tensions between the economic and political 
organisation of international society but the outcome of these tensions - 
whether it is economic nationalism, multilateral transnationalism, or 
regionalised division - is shaped by the "diplomatic and strategic interests 
of the dominant powers" and extends, not diminishes, state power (Gilpin 
1971). 
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For neo-realists, the effects of transnational, institutional action are 
contained by state-to-state intergovernmental relations. The activities of 
international organisations are interpreted in the light of state capabilities, 
the distributions of different forms of power between states, and inter-state 
alignments. East-West conflict during the Cold War, interstate regional 
integration, anti-colonialism and North-South global conflict, for instance, 
are all seen as primarily interstate concerns that are managed on their 
behalf by international organisations. Such organisations directly represent 
states and with their consent may themselves come to participate as actors 
in the political system. But states maintain control and the interstate 
system remains the primary political system. 
In 'regime' theory for instance it is the spectre of conflict and uncertainty in 
international politics that is seen as the spur to international organisation. 
As it is rational for sovereign states to suppress their impulse to dominate 
other states and to cooperate in such institutions, regimes of interstate 
cooperation become permanent features of international politics and not 
contingent upon a coincidence of aims between dominant or hegemonic 
powers. There is a partial shift away from "the realpolitic ideal of the 
autonomous hierarchical state that keeps its options open" but the regimes 
of international regulation and coordination exist only as long as they 
continue to meet the needs of states (Keohane 1984: 259). 
Overall, in defining the global political system as no more than the sum of 
its state units, classical realist and neo-realist approaches are heavily 
reductionist. Power-political conflict in the pursuit of security is given an 
absolute priority over other dimensions of state activity in an ahistorical 
ideological syllogism which describes rather than explains state behaviour 
(Mansbach 1989). Realism therefore cannot account for the origins of states, 
nor can it account for their differences or even for their changes. Even on 
its own terms then, the realist model is simplistic and ahistorical. This 
enclosed theory allows realists to argue that the concept of state sovereignty 
that was formalised at the Treaty of Westphalia was then, and remains 
now, the central principle defining international relations. The structural 
positioning of states within the states' system is shaped as much by social 
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and revolutionary change in domestic and transnational society as by 
interstate conflict and the exclusion of these issues from the field of 
international political studies reduces rather than enhances understanding 
of the state actors that realists argue constitute international society. 
More important for the purposes of this enquiry, the realist approach 
defines the state as an all-encompassing territorial entity that includes the 
government and civil society as well as the state institutions. The domestic 
and transnational roots of political ideologies, such as nationalism, that 
may have a major impact on states' behaviour, are treated as exogenous to 
the theory as they disrupt its state-centricity. For instance, domestic socio- 
political cohesion is treated as a significant element but only in so far as it 
affects the relative power of states in inter-state politics (Buzan 1991: 114). 
As Walker argues, these conceptualisations rely on "an account of the 
character and location of political community in explicitly spatial terms" 
(1993: 127). Spatiality is conceptualised as homogenous, absolute space, in 
contrast with the personal space of "ordinary experience which is treated as 
merely apparent and relative" (1993: 129). This distinction establishes the 
foundations for representing absolute 'real' space, for instance, in 
cartographic mappings of an absolute topographical reality, in definitions 
of property possession (and dispossession) and in the parcelling-up of 
territory into national states, each with their national citizenry (and non- 
national 'aliens'). This concept of political space as state-space, of the state 
as the 'container' of 'domestic' political life, separate from the society of 
states, forces non-state political categories out of international politics. 
These "categories of class, nation, gender, and ethnicity, or categories based 
on region and locale" are simply written out of the script of international 
relations as constructed by the self-styled 'realists' and 'neo-realists' 
(Walker 1993: 131). This is distinctly unhelpful for any investigation of how 
these categories - in this case nationalism - relate with international 
politics. 
The conception of state sovereignty, which is central to the realist approach 
to international relations, reflects and is reflected in the political rhetoric of 
actors in Ireland's national conflict and in EU institutions. Realism 
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develops the concept of an international system that is defined not by the 
'low' politics of class interest or culture but by the so-called 'high' politics 
of states and state security. As with the statist conception of nationalism, 
this approach plays a central role in the rhetoric particularly of unionist 
politicians in Ireland who are anxious to defend existing state, 'sovereign' 
jurisdictions. The same is true of political actors who are concerned to 
maintain state powers within the EU and who define EU institutions as 
having an intergovernmental, inter-state rather than any transnational or 
supra-state role. 
Furthermore, theoretical debates between 'realism' and 'neo-realism' 
about the utility of inter-state structures for the preservation of 
international security directly mirror and are mirrored by debates in 
Ireland and at the EU level. Neo-realist arguments that trans-state 
institutions offer a potentially more stable political framework for societies 
only as long as such institutions are primarily state-led and state-controlled 
contrast with 'Classical' realist argument that such institutions necessarily 
threaten to undermine the personal and social security offered by state 
structures. The question of whether inter- and trans-state institutions for 
instance, the Anglo-Irish Maryfield secretariat in Ireland or the European 
Commission in the EU, undermine or simply adapt state power is central 
to debates on North-South institutions in Ireland, to British-Irish relations 
and to debates about a possible role for EU institutions in the national 
conflict. 
But the strait-jacketing of this debate into a state-centred theoretical 
framework profoundly constrains its usefulness other than for those who 
have an interest in defending existing state sovereignties. The 'nation' and 
domestic civil society disappear in the concept of the "nation-state", just as 
non-state global civil society disappears in the 'realist' concept of 
"international society". These non-state 'domestic' and 'international' 
contexts, that are crucially significant both for Ireland's national conflict 
and for developments in the EU as a whole, are therefore excluded from 
the discussion. 
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For a more enlightening insight into the relationships between domestic 
society and international politics - including the impacts of nationalisms 
and global transnational political relations - it is necessary to liberate theory 
from the restraints imposed by the theoretical assumptions of the (mis- 
named) 'realists'. This theoretical challenge is to some extent addressed by 
the 'functionalist' variant of international relations. 
Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism 
In contrast with realism, the second 'school of thought', functionalism, 
stresses that states are not an essential element of modern society. 
Functionalists argue that societies shape states, hence inter-state politics is 
shaped and indeed, constituted by sub-state and global, transnational 
politics. They therefore highlight the internationalisation of economic and 
social relations and growing interdependence between states which - it is 
argued - will dissolve the division between domestic and international 
political life, leading to the demise of the nation-state. 
This functionalist version of international relations can be traced to the 
late eighteenth century writings of free traders, such as Adam Smith's 
Wealth of Nations of 1776 and to political campaigners like Richard Cobden 
who in the 1840's argued that the growth of mutually advantageous 
trading relations would temper inter-state political conflict. In the 
immediate post World War One era, a more explicitly political 
development of this approach emerged, with the creation of the League of 
Nations. The failure of this first attempt at global inter-governmental 
collective security with the Second World War led to a revival of the more 
pessimistic, 'realist' version (See Carr 1984, first edition 1939). Nonetheless, 
functionalism retained its influence, to be re-invigorated by 
'behaviouralism' in the 1950's and 1960's. 
Unlike the largely ahistorical interpretations of realism and neo-realism, 
the functionalist variants of international relations theory stress the 
historically specific roots of state sovereignty, arguing that the concept of 
sovereignty has changed beyond all recognition since it was enunciated as 
the guiding principle of West European states system at the Congress of the 
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Westphalia in 1648 (Brewin 1982). The process of recognising rights to self- 
determination and managing the process of decolonisation, the presence of 
weapons of mass, global destruction, the definition of universal human 
rights, the threat of ecological crises, and the need for global and regional 
regulation of the increasingly globalised economic system have all forced 
an extension of inter-state cooperation into supra-state integration, 
stimulating a substantial revision in the meaning of state sovereignty. 
For functionalists, such as Mitrany (1975b, first published 1943), states are 
bound together by forces and institutions that they cannot control. Non 
state institutions - such as transnational corporations, cultural and media 
organisations, transnational organisations, intergovernmental 
organisations and campaigning organisations - increasingly influence 
global political change. Interdependence between 'domestic' societies 
requires greater inter-state cooperation and is seen as disrupting anarchical 
competition at the heart of the realist model. For functionalists this reflects 
sovereignty's changing functional utility to society, arguing that it is being 
dissolved in an interstate system that has moved from mutual recognition 
of sovereign independence, to the joint pursuit of common interests and is 
currently moving to the implementation of and submission to common 
rules and regulations. 
Most important, functional interdependence between states is seen as 
reducing the risk of war and therefore, in marked contrast with the realist 
position, functionalists suggest that these developments should be 
encouraged with the ultimate aim of creating a global government. State 
interests become more compatible and states increasingly act together, 
building trade-offs which extend integration into other realms of activity - 
a process of 'spillover' driven by the common 'non-political' goals of non- 
state interest groups that expands into overtly political initiatives. As the 
range of transnationalised tasks expands, increasing linkages between 
societies, the "cement of society" becomes increasingly integrated and states 
are forced to integrate at the political level (Cornett and Caporaso 1992: 237). 
In time, it is argued, this will develop into an institutionalised, self- 
interested harmony in a pluralist, 'liberal' global framework (Mitrany 
1975a, 1975b). 
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Neo-functionalism developed as a response to the neo-realist assertion that 
states remain 'in control' of international agencies and theorises about the 
experience of integration in international institutions, particularly at the 
regional level in the EU (Pentland 1975). Neo-functionalists argue that the 
process of co-ordinating and integrating political decision-making at the 
international level is not only transforming the way in which states 
operate as the earlier functionalists argued, it is also leading to the 
formation of alternative supra-national bodies that supersede the 
'national' states (Haas 1964,1975). Neo-functionalists focus on these 
political impacts and stress the autonomous power of international 
institutions as being more than just one step removed from interstate 
power politics as neo-realists may argue; instead they are seen as standing 
as separate power structures, maintaining behaviour patterns, integrating 
interests and attaining collective goals, independent of states (Groom 1978). 
This behaviouralist approach which stresses the learning process of 
combining together to pursue common goals within international 
organisations suggests that a dynamic, task-centred interaction between 
transnational actors increasingly prevails over the the static 
constitutionalism of state sovereignty. This concept of "linkage" politics, 
developed from some of the theories of decision-making behaviour in an 
institutionalised, organised society, spawned a range of theories of 
transnationalism, including for instance, realist orientated 'regime' theory 
(Rosenau 1969; Keohane and Nye 1977). It also opened a dialogue with the 
Marxist tradition as expressed in a newly defined school of 'international 
political economy', which rose to prominence in the 1980's (Strange 1988). 
Neo-functionalism then, suggests that rather than simply dissolving state 
authority in a harmonious global system, as argued by the functionalists, 
interdependence leads to the creation of new institutions exercising 
political authority that are 'above' or separate from the state. As 'national' 
decision-making fails in the face of increased transnational 
interdependence, political issues are increasingly vested in suprastate 
structures (Haas 1975: 71). Interdependency becomes more complex, less 
stable and more unpredictable and such institutions have unintended 
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effects. The institutional outcomes no longer directly express the common 
interests of states, and as they acquire their own momentum "the 
[international] regime generates its own autonomy" (Rosenau 1989: 72). 
The process of constructing such institutions is seen as overtly political - 
rather than technocratic because it involves the common management of 
consensus between participants. Contrary to the functionalist emphasis on 
the conflict-free pursuit of common interests in such organisations, neo- 
functionalist theorists suggest that the politics of these organisations is 
bound to be conflictual. It is argued that such conflicts are fought out 
within an agreed framework - in the offices of international institutions 
rather than on the battlefield - and lead to the formation of supranational 
institutions, the embryo of world government. Neo-functionalism thus 
differs from functionalism in emphasising the role of states in sowing the 
institutional seeds for their own destruction, which for functionalists are 
sown largely or wholly by the emerging transnational actors in civil society. 
Both strands of functionalism are committed to the political project of 
minimalising the role of state sovereignty in international politics and are 
founded on a distinction between conflictual interstate politics and non- 
political, functional elements of society-to-society interaction. For both, 
interdependent interest groups are seen as expressing a common, universal 
set of welfare priorities rather than conflicting interests and both 
emphasise that once interdependence dominates state behaviour it will 
generate interstate harmony rather than conflict and will lead to the 
creation of pan-state regional and eventually, world governments (Taylor 
1971: 57). Consequently, from a 'realist' perspective, both functionalism and 
neo-functionalism underestimate the significance of formal state structures 
and cannot account for the strengthening of state capabilities and increased 
inter-state conflict that may result from constructing international 
institutions (Harrison 1978). More significant, from a Marxian perspective, 
such an approach underestimates the degree of conflict between interest 
groups in a capitalist context, and fails to comprehend the implications of 
this both for conflicts in civil society and for state policies. 
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Perhaps most useful for the analytical framework to be constructed in 
Chapter 3, these variants of the functionalist approach define international 
politics as a social system - that includes the domestic and the transnational 
levels. This is important for the purposes of this study, as the theoretical 
insights of functionalism and neo-functionalism stem from the analysis of 
societal changes as well as of inter-state interactions. Hence they are an 
advance on realist approaches that accord an opposing theoretical priority 
to the states' system, although this insight is deployed primarily to argue 
that states are becoming less significant in international politics. While 
criticising the dominant 'realist' framework, its concerns are largely 
dictated by it and it fails to step out of the relatively stale debate as to which 
'level' of political authority is gaining the upper hand (Walker 1993: 136). 
Also useful are its linkages with the 'modernisation' theory of 
nationalism, which also draws on communications theory and 
behavioralism (see Chapter 1). Functionalists define the affective, value 
laden cultural systems of 'national' societies as the source of the power and 
persistence of the states' system. Like Gellner, they link this 'affective' 
dimension of 'national' values to the more structural dimensions of socio- 
economic change which, it is argued, increase contacts and 
interdependencies between 'national' communities and transform the 
conditions under which states exercise power. 
As with realism, the functionalist approach to international relations is 
reflected in the politics of Ireland's national conflict and predominantly by 
anti-nationalist and anti-unionist, cross-communal political parties, and 
also more recently, in the political positions of constitutional nationalists 
in Ireland, North and South. In the EU, functionalist readings of 
international politics have been a dominant, perhaps foundational theme. 
Politicians and officials in the Commission and in the Parliament 
invariably see themselves as hastening a move away from the national 
state sovereignty in the EU, towards more heterogenous, pluralist, forms of 
governance. These views tend to either favour the move to a 
predominantly non-state 'Europe of the regions', reflecting the 
functionalist approach or to a federal or confederal Europe - effectively a 
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new state form at the EU level - reflecting a more neo-functionalist 
approach. 
Marxist-influenced approaches 
The third, Marxist-influenced approach stresses the role of economic 
interests and the distribution of economic resources and classes, not states, 
are seen as the basic units of analysis in international politics. Class conflict 
is seen as driving political change and the role of states, and of the states' 
system, in expressing the interests of dominant classes is emphasised as a 
key causal element of international conflict. Lenin for instance, in his 
Imperialism (1916), argued these conflicts between imperialist states would 
make them vulnerable to challenge from revolutionary working class 
organisations, leading to the ultimate demise of the capitalist system. In the 
post-war era the success of anti-colonialist and national liberation 
movements strengthened the Marxist-influenced approach. In the 1970's, 
debates about the role of the state in global capitalism intensified, 
revitalising analyses of international relations from this perspective. 
As a result, Marxist-influenced interpretations have proliferated, some 
developing a 'world system' perspective, focusing on 'core-periphery' 
dependencies in the international political economy while others, 
following Gramsci, focusing on the role of the state and its 'relative 
autonomy', particularly in the states' system. "World system" theory, as 
developed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1980), inserts states and societies into 
the single systemic logic of international capitalist development. "Neo- 
Gramscian" approaches focus on political institutions and ideologies, 
suggesting, for instance, that global integration is leading to the formation 
of a trans-state, hegemonic class, integrated with "internationalised" state 
elites and relatively autonomous international institutions (Agnew 1994, 
Cox 1987, Gill 1993) 
In general terms, Marxist-influenced approaches offer a less 
compartmentalised approach to international relations than either realist 
or functionalist approaches. The distinctions between 'domestic', 'inter- 
national' and 'trans-national' relations that are central to theoretical 
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debates between realist and functionalist approaches are to a considerable 
degree dissolved. The global, integrated economic system is not necessarily 
counter-posed against the states' system as functionalists argue, but instead 
is seen as generating and encompassing state power. This is particularly 
useful for any investigation of the inter-relationships and linkages between 
national conflict and transnational integration. 
By stressing the primacy of a global 'system' that will not necessarily 
dissolve states but instead uses and in some way depends on them, 
Marxists are able to argue that states and the capitalist system may at times 
be mutually reinforcing, at other times, mutually contradictory and - 
further - that the degree of consistency or contradiction will vary across the 
different dimensions of state power. This theoretical openness allows for a 
less ideologically constrained investigation of the role of states in the global 
system and of their historical development. Charles Tilly (1975,1990) for 
instance, argues that the state can be seen as developing in tandem with 
capitalism, depending on it for tax revenue or for tribute while capitalism 
is seen as depending on the state to maintain the social and political 
conditions for accumulation, whether in terms of sponsoring mercantilist 
expeditions or, more recently, in terms of maintaining social control and 
ensuring social reproduction through the provision of 'reflexive' labour 
power. 
Marxist-influenced approaches therefore open up questions of the inter- 
relationships between states and civil society, in its sub-state and global 
form. This is of crucial significance for any investigation into national 
ideologies and trans-national integration as it transcends the debate 
between 'functionalism' and 'realism' over the question of which 'level' 
of political organisation - sub-state, state or supra-state - has ultimate 
political authority. The state can be seen as an institutional structure rather 
than the "national-territorial totality" favoured by realists, thus opening up 
a range of questions about the relationships between state and society, 
between state and government, between state and nation, that are simply 
ignored by 'realism'. In rejecting this dichotomy between state and non- 
state institutions, Marxist influenced approaches suggest that both should 
be seen as part of an all-embracing 'system' in which state and society are 
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'inter-constitutive', focussing attention on their "reciprocal interaction" 
(Halliday 1988). 
Unlike realism, Marxist-influenced accounts view the state as historically 
contingent, and unlike the functionalist school, they focus on the role of 
the state in meeting capitalist interests. States are seen as maintaining 
global inequalities both domestically, within 'national' economies and 
between global interest blocs. The tension between the pressures of 
capitalist competition and the need for capitalist collaboration are expressed 
in phases of interstate inter-imperialist competition -a central cause of war 
- and in phases of imperial collaboration, leading to the creation of global 
economic 'regimes' or 'hegemonies' between the most powerful capitalist 
states. 
Hence Marxist-influenced approaches embrace both the concept of state 
sovereignty and of interdependence between states. States are seen as 
servicing, but also acting-on an overall global system in which the process 
of capital accumulation defines the particular circumstances of socio- 
economic interdependence and of interstate power politics. States either 
express popular resistance to the process of incorporation into the circuit of 
global capitalist development or secure the conditions for capital 
accumulation and of the legitimation of the 'system' as a whole. This 
suggests a theoretical linkage between the unity of the global capitalist 
system and the fragmented political states-system - which parallels an 
ideological intimacy between nationalism and internationalism. 
This insight into the dialectical, dichotomising, counter-positioned 
development of the states system within a world economic system is 
particularly useful. Just as the deepening of capitalist relations in a 
universalised 'world system' sharpens social divisions, so, as the global 
economy becomes more integrated, nationalisms appear to be becoming 
stronger and national conflicts appear to be intensifying. In this respect, 
Marxist-influenced approaches can encompass and go beyond the insights 
of realism and functionalism by arguing that this 'double movement' is 
inherent in the process of capitalist globalisation. 
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The 'world system' theory developed by Wallerstein defines the states' 
system in terms of a globalised capitalist system. The process of capitalist 
accumulation, and of states' roles in it are conceptualised using a variant of 
'dependency' theory, which builds an explanation of international 
inequality out of a theory of unequal relations between 'core' and 
'periphery' (Frank 1978). For Wallerstein the global capitalist 'system' is, in 
the first instance, geared to meeting the needs of the dominant powers and 
is patterned by relations of socio-economic domination and subordination. 
Interstate relations reinforce these patterns of ownership and enable the 
continued exploitation of resources on terms dictated by the dominant 
powers. States are then, seen as part and parcel of the structural logic of 
capitalist development. 
Consequently international politics is patterned by a confrontation between 
the 'systemic' forces that maintain it and the exploited or oppressed 'anti- 
systemic' forces - often organised on a territorial 'national' basis - that are 
generated by the 'system' but seek its destruction (Wallerstein 1974,1980). 
This approach defines nationalism - whether in its reactionary or 
progressive forms - as quite logically paired with increased 
interdependency or trans-nationalism as both "have resulted from the 
historical tendencies of capitalist development" (Wallerstein and Phillips 
1991: 140-1). In more graphic terms, capitalist civilisation (in the singular) 
has bred modern nationalisms (in the plural) in "a dialectical vortex of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces" (Wallerstein 1974: 66). 
This raises the problem of tracing the connections between the two 
elements in this dialectical 'double movement'. Boyne (1990) for instance, 
has argued that it is the relationship between productive power and 
political power that is the crucial dimension shaping core-periphery 
relations rather than the relations between productive power and 
commodity exchange as emphasised by Wallerstein (1990). For him it is 
the cultural dimensions of the world system that establish relations of 
domination and subordination and "define a world of production which 
frames and structures, that is, sets limits and determines Wallerstein's 
core-periphery exchanges" (Boyne 1990: 73). 
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The question of how to connect the unifying forces of global capitalism 
with the disintegrative, fragmenting forces in international politics is more 
extensively explored by Robert Cox (1987). Cox focuses on the linkages 
between states and civil societies to specify the the role of states and of the 
states' system in maintaining the global system of production. He draws on 
Gramscian thought to study international politics in a discussion of the 
interactions between states, ideologies and class interests, using the 
Gramscian concept of 'historic bloc' to bind these three strands together 
and the concept of 'hegemonic' struggle, between dominant and counter 
hegemonies, to explain their historical development (Cox 1982). 
For Cox the state responds to the internationalisation of economic forces by 
reining them in order to maintain its hegemonic, coercive and 
legitimating functions. In the first half of the nineteenth century 
industrialisation and laissez faire doctrines of minimal state intervention in 
the market are seen as leading to a huge expansion of economic forces 
reflected in the emergence of global product markets. The state response to 
this increasingly anarchic structure of the world economy was first to build 
colonial, territorial empires, and then in the early part of the twentieth 
century, to become more interventionist in the domestic economy. States 
defined the concept of the 'national' economic interest and eventually, 
after the collapse of global currency regulation through the 'gold standard' 
in the inter-war years, pursued nationally orientated economic policies. In 
the immediate post war years dominant states are seen as responding to a 
much more extensive globalisation of capital markets and production by 
developing global inter-governmentalist regimes and greater institutional 
integration at the regional level. These arrangements are seen as striking a 
balance, or compromise, between the domestic priorities of dominant states 
and the system imperatives of an increasingly integrated global economy. 
These global frameworks broke down in the 1970's, leading to global 
recession, a restructuring of capital, and an accelerated, unregulated phase 
of global capitalist integration in the 1980's, partially offset by greater 
regional integration, for instance in the EU (Cox 1992a). 
In the current phase there is, in consequence, a diminution of global 
stability and a weakening of domestic cohesion as states are reduced to 
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"mastering the effects of causes beyond national control" (Keating 
1990: 193). As internationalisation is extended and economic, social and 
cultural life is increasingly defined at the global level rather than at the 
national-state level, greater pressures are placed on states. As global 
capitalism sharpens inequalities there is a widening gap between the 
"promise and the performance of the 'national' economy" and states are 
forced to accommodate and contain the disruptive effects of sharpened 
polarisation and fragmentation in the form of sharpened ethnic, 
regionalist, and class conflict (Camilleri 1984: 92). 
While still occupying centre-stage in the political arena, states have lost 
significant elements of their power, leading to particularly intense crises of 
legitimacy and authority (Strassoldo 1992: 45). The problems of 
accumulation on a global scale transform the state from less of a "bulwark" 
into more of a "transmission belt" between domestic and international 
society (Cox 1992a). Instead of constituting the central institutional 'places' 
where international politics is conducted, states become one of a number of 
different 'players' in a wholly different political game. This is seen as 
generating two state responses: first, an attempt at strengthening the state's 
ideological power in 'domestic' society, retrenching 'national' state powers, 
particularly in relation to social reproduction and social control and 
leading to intensified 'national' identification; second, an attempt at 
controlling or at least at influencing global capital through inter-state 
organisations both at the regional and at the global level. As states respond 
to global interdependency a closer society of states is established in which it 
becomes increasingly difficult to exercise powers at the 'national' state level 
in the name of a 'national' people. States roles are redefined as power at 
the global and interstate levels is increasingly exercised by non-state 
institutions - private economic organisations, intergovernmental 
organisations, transnational organisations, international courts and 
collective security arrangements - perhaps leading to what some have have 
described as a "new medievalism" (Bull 1977). 
The 'national' state becomes an increasingly ineffective means of 
defending the interests of EU capital and suprastate institutions are 
constructed at the EU regional level to provide the "minimum degree of 
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co-ordination of state regulation necessary to permit the international 
reproduction of capital" (Picciotto 1991: 53). The new supra-state 
institutions serve the often regionally defined needs of interpenetrated 
'national' capitals and are geared to marshalling the competitive resources 
of the 'national' economy, in concert with other states, to resist the 
encroachments of dominant capital external to the 'region'. This creates an 
ambivalence in state forms - reflecting the ambivalence of the post war 
global economic order between pursuing 'national' economic priorities 
and acting within a regional bloc to pursue the common interests of 
regional capital (Mandell 1970). 
Asside from the construction of new joint institutions at the supra-state 
level, the state is itself, more than ever, forced to gear its policies to the 
dictates of international capital. State elites and state policies are in effect, 
'internationalised' as states are put under great pressure to abide by the 
'beggar thy neighbour' rules of capitalist competition. As finance and 
production become more 'footloose', interstate and inter-regional 
competition forces states to deregulate markets and cut taxes, which creates 
fiscal crises and forces cuts in welfare provision. While state roles in 
meeting popular demands and maintaining class harmony are 
undermined, their roles in relation to maintaining the conditions for 
capital accumulation are strengthened - particularly in relation to 
enhancing competitiveness in global markets (Panitch and Milibrand 1992; 
Picciotto 1991: 46). The contact points between these 'national' (in fact 
'internationalised') state policies and regional or global organisations 
acquire a greatly enhanced significance, thereby strengthening the 
'national' state as a bureaucracy rather than as a vehicle for popular 
aspirations (Cox 1992b). 
Consequently, the proliferation of power sources in the international 
political economy short-circuits liberal democracy and is profoundly 
disempowering for those whose interests are not served by trans-national 
corporations or by supra-state organisations. But despite this, the state 
remains the main reference point for popular politics, putting a greater, not 
a diminished, premium on 'national' and nationalist politics. As Craig 
Calhoun notes, nationalism remains important because national 
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democracy remains the primary formal channel for popular aspirations, - 
"states remain the central organisational frameworks within which 
democracy can be pursued" (Calhoun 1993: 400). The state remains the 
central area for democratic struggles and the key agent for contesting 
economic power, but its powers have been dramatically curtailed and it has 
become by no means the only central actor in international political 
relations, especially in the EU. This sharpens and deepens asymetries in 
political and social power - leading to a global order in which popular, 
'national' sovereignty has increasingly diminished substantive meaning 
(Held 1991; Held and McGrew 1993). 
Marxist-influenced approaches offer an analysis of global politics in terms 
of a global 'system' encompassing domestic and international society. 
Wallerstein's 'world system' theory has been criticised as being primarily a 
theory of the monolithic logic of capitalist accumulation rather than a 
theory of its politics. Cox's approach explicitly tries to move beyond over- 
determined 'economism', to offer an explicitly political dimension that 
may be absent from Wallerstein's 'world system' model. His attempts at 
tying down the relationship between the states' system and the global 
capitalist system have in turn, been criticised as suggesting that state 
structures and hegemonic ideologies play a central and autonomous role in 
maintaining the global capitalist economy. As the dimensions of social 
order identified by Cox (1987) - material interests, ideological hegemony 
and state forms - are treated as autonomous entities with their own logic, 
there is a danger, identified by Peter Burnham (1991,1992), of drifting into 
methodological pluralism. The three dimensions of social order 
distinguished by Cox are seen as "mutually influencing one another" but if 
each is accorded an equal independent weight, this raises questions as to 
why only three dimensions have been distinguished and whether separate 
theories are required to analyse their individual trajectories, leading 
analysis into a disorientating theoretical eclecticism (Cox 1982, Burnham 
1992). 
This potential weakness of the Gramscian approach as developed by Cox 
can be avoided by stressing that states, ideologies and interests are 
constituted by capitalist relations and are shaped by class struggle. Each of 
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the three dimensions of social order may have their own internal logic, but 
this is subordinate to the overarching contradiction at the heart of the 
mode of production which sets the interests of those benefiting from 
capital accumulation against those suffering from it. This conflict is 
expressed in each of Cox's three dimensions of social order - in conflict 
over material interests, in ideological conflict and in conflict over state 
policy. The intensity of conflict between the hegemonic and counter- 
hegemonic forces varies in each of these dimensions and conditions 
change over historical periods. Although localised in their effects, strategic 
shifts in the logic of this hegemonic struggle across these three dimensions 
are increasingly linked-in to the logics of the global system overall, such 
that a change in the terms of struggle in one part of the system has 
destabilising reverberations elsewhere in the system. 
This adaptation of the Marxist-influenced approach then can also resolve a 
related, more fundamental theoretical blindness to the transformative 
potential of 'anti-systemic' or in Gramscian terms, 'counter-hegemonic' 
forces. Both Wallerstein's 'world system' theory and Cox's approach aim to 
highlight how such forces can emerge but the discussion rarely focuses on 
the opportunities for anti-systemic forces or for social transformation. By 
focusing analysis on discontinuities in capitalist development it is possible 
to demolish the conceptual monolith and thereby to point up the potential 
for social transformation. The overall logic of the capitalist states' system 
stressed by Wallerstein and the analytical dimensions identified by Cox are 
shaped by the process of contesting domination - through class struggle in 
the labour market, ideological struggle in the socio-political field and 
political struggle for control of the state. Developments in each of the 
dimensions identified by Cox - in material interests, ideologies and state 
policies - can be seen as the product of such conflict between the particular 
"systemic" and "anti-systemic" political struggles. The concept of a unified, 
'systemic' logic in the capitalist system - at the heart of Wallerstein's 
analysis - can then, be adapted to focus on the conflict between dominant 
and subordinate groupings, in which successful popular intervention 
becomes possible. 
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Overall, Marxist-influenced approaches offer a way of explaining 
international politics in terms of the systemic tendencies of the capitalist 
world system. They go beyond both the realist and the functionalist 
paradigms in providing theoretical tools for analysing the reproduction 
both of 'national' states and of transnational capital, rather than simply of 
one or the other. They also allow for a recognition of the dual, 
interdependent or dialectical relationship between a globalising capitalist 
system and a fragmented inter-state system. This avoids an artificial 
theoretical separation between levels of analysis, integrating analysis of 
'domestic' society with analysis of international society and offering. the 
theoretical space required to discuss nationalism and national conflict in a 
transnationalised setting. 
Marxist-influenced approaches to developments in international politics 
have many echoes in Ireland's national conflict and in the development of 
the EU. While rarely adopted by mainstream political actors, they have 
been used by political commentators to conceptualise the clashes between 
nationalisms in Ireland and to analyse the emergence of the EU 'global 
region'. 
Chapter Conclusions 
'Realism' limits analysis of international politics to interactions within a 
states-system and cannot offer a theoretical framework for analysing 
national conflict in a transnationalised setting. 'Functionalist' 
international relations theory is helpful as it covers wider social relations 
both at the substate and suprastate levels. However it is very weak at 
analysing conflicts of interest, whether for example at the material level 
between economic interests, at the ideological level between between 
different national' groupings or at the political level between states. 
Furthermore, and equally important, 'functionalist' international relations 
theory is tied to the political project of moving away from statehood to 
what are assumed to be less conflictual political relations in a political 
system without states. 
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Both bodies of theory share a common concern with the future of state 
power and this shapes both the type and direction of developments in 
global politics that are identified. There is then, a certain sterility in 
'functionalist' as well as in 'realist' analyses of global politics as, in being 
counterposed, they establish a relatively exclusive discourse of 
international relations theory. These "familiar controversies about 
whether states are obstinate or obsolete" have an air of unreality about 
them, leaving them with very little, if anything, to say about the 
persistence of nationalism (Walker 1993: 6-7). 
It is argued here that Marxist-influenced interpretations offer a more 
appropriate theoretical framework for analysing the connections between 
of transnational integration and national conflict. As with approaches to 
nationalism that stress the uneven impact of capitalist development, 
Marxist-influenced approaches to international relations have a theoretical 
breadth that spans both domestic and global 'levels'. They also focus on 
how the existing system is maintained in spite of intermittent disruptions 
and therefore offer a more appropriate framework than either realism or 
functionalism. 
In particular, the three-pronged approach developed by Robert Cox 
provides the basis of the analytical framework. This is combined with the 
insights of Wallerstein's 'world system' approach and with Burnham's 
critique of Cox. The result retains Cox's three-stranded approach, focusing 
on conflicts of material interests, ideological conflict and conflicts over 
public policy. The next Chapter develops these analytical categories, 
combining them with the insights into uneven development and the 
reproduction of nationalism outlined in Chapter 1. This is aimed at 
building the analytical framework required to shape the case study which 
analyses Ireland's national conflict in a transnationalised setting, exploring 
the the apparent paradox that - as Calhoun notes - globalisation "is likely to 
call forth new and different nationalisms" (Calhoun 1993: 407). 
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Chapter 3 
Nationalism and Transnationalism: 
an analytical framework 
This Chapter has two main sub-sections. The first builds a theoretical 
approach to nationalism and inter- or trans-national relations for the 
analysis of historical and contemporary tendencies in Sections 2 and 3. It 
draws together some of the theoretical strands discussed in Chapters 1 and 
2, primarily drawing on the 'uneven development' approaches to 
nationalism and the Marxist-influenced approach to international 
relations, particularly relying on the theorisations of Tom Nairn (1977) and 
Robert Cox (1987). These are used to construct a three-part analytical 
framework for analysing the 'structural' relationships between 
nationalism and trans-national integration. Attention is focussed on three 
main aspects - political conflicts of material interests, ideological conflicts 
and conflicts over state policies. Each of these aspects is investigated in 
some detail with some discussion of the linkages between them, drawing 
on a range of theoretical insights that have been introduced in the 
previous Chapters. Later, in Sections 2 and 3, this framework is used to 
investigate the historical and contemporary dynamics of Ireland's national 
conflict in the context of EU integration. 
In the second, shorter, sub-section the theoretical basis for Section 4 is 
mapped out. Section 4 addresses the question of how political actors 
themselves reconcile nationalism with transnational integration and 
suggests that they are forced to re-position themselves when confronted 
with the political conflicts and dilemmas that result. This involves a 
methodological shift and raises questions about the importance of 
investigating political 'agency', relative to more 'structural' analysis. 
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Analysis of historical and contemporary tendencies 
Building on the critique of theories of nationalism and international 
relations outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, this sub-section develops an 
analytical framework that inter-twines elements from both. This 
framework draws on the tools of a political economy-based analysis of the 
international system in combination with theories of nationalism. The 
intention is to derive a broad conceptualisation of the process whereby 
national identities and national conflict are reproduced in the modern 
global political system, in doing so, contributing to the debates between the 
various approaches to nationalism and to international relations, as well as 
laying the theoretical groundwork for the case study developed in later 
Sections. Drawing on the work of Marxist-influenced approaches to 
international relations, the framework comprises three analytical strands, 
focussing on material interests, ideological conflict and state policies. These 
are constructed on three central propositions. 
First, it is argued that nationalisms express linkages between class interests 
and cultural divisions and that capitalist development creates national 
divisions and class divisions simultaneously, yielding a sharply uneven 
spread of national development across the globe. This draws on theories of 
nationalism that explain how class conflict creates divisions along lines of 
cultural difference and rejects any suggestion that 'ethnic' consciousness 
has an autonomous logic of its own. As such, Gellner's stress on the impact 
of industrialisation and Smith's insistence that national groups are simply 
ethnic groups "writ large", are given less credence than theories of uneven 
development developed by Nairn. 
Second, it is argued people become consciously 'national' through social 
and ideological struggles that express these organic linkages. As argued by 
writers such as Hroch and Anderson, these struggles politicise peoples into 
a 'national' identity that, as suggested by Wallerstein and Cox, express 
broader global divisions. The logic of ideological and political struggle in 
forming a national class alliance and the role of class conflict in defining 
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national interests and national development as stressed by Blaut and 
Amin, is also emphasised. 
Third, it is suggested that the state and the states' system plays a central role 
in the reproduction of nationalism in international politics. Following 
Breuilly and Anderson, it is argued that both the mass aspiration to 
popular sovereignty and the elite aspiration to 'national' autonomy 
generate and sustain nationalism. The state's ability to draw together and 
maintain a 'national' class alliance, as stressed by neo-Gramscian writers 
on international relations, is seen as a crucial element in the reproduction 
of nationalism. The role of the state in defining the "national" community 
is analysed as a product of hegemonic conflict, as stressed by Hobsbawm 
and Breuilly - rather than as a by-product of state structures required in the 
"modern" era, as suggested by Gellner and Smith. 
This three-pronged approach attempts to avoid reducing social relations to 
social structures. Each of the three aspects are seen as developing in a 
dynamic process patterned by conflicts arising out of exploitation and 
oppression. The three elements - linking material interests, ideological 
conflict and state policies to the politics of nationalism - are bound together 
into a single 'movement' by the overarching contradictions that fuel the 
engine of capitalist development. This socio-economic 'glue' binding 
together the three strands of analysis is seen as fragmenting international 
politics at the same time as it unifies it. This perspective is drawn from the 
insights both of the 'world system' theory of Wallerstein which stresses the 
unifying logic of the global system and from theorists such as Said, Nairn 
and Amin, who stress the national fragmentation that results. 
In what follows, each of the three analytical strands are discussed. Material 
interests, are discussed first, and are seen as relating to - although not 
determining - ideological conflict, which is discussed second. State policies 
are examined last, again, not as a product but as reflecting and shaping the 
previous two aspects. This is followed by some more detailed discussion of 
how the three aspects inter-relate. 
Material interests 
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The analysis of nationalism must account for a material interest in the 
'nation' if it is to explain the dynamics of nationalism. To do this it has to 
understand economic change as a force which differentiates people along 
lines of culture, for example, or gender, age or sexual orientation, - as well 
as a force which homogenises people into classes. The transformation of 
social differences into social divisions has to be seen as an integral element 
of economic change, in constant interaction with the reproduction of class 
division. The outcome should be an approach to nationalism that hinges 
on an understanding of the uneven and unequal process of global capital 
accumulation as well as its unifying, systemic logics (Wallerstein 1991: 157) 
The process of reproducing national division is linked to the process of 
maintaining the relations of production and the struggle between the 
interests of labour and the interests of capital simultaneously reproduces 
both classes and nations. As a result, the central contradiction moving 
society forward drives national struggle as well as class struggle. Hence 
national division has to be seen to actively "condition the form and scope 
of the class struggle" and not just be seen as a pre-capitalist hangover that 
in time will be dissolved by the circuit of capital (Benner 1988: 9; Warren 
1973). 
The pressure to integrate peoples into uniform classes with an 
internationalist cosmopolitan consciousness has to be set against the 
pressure to differentiate between peoples as a means of sidestepping - or 
undermining - the impact of class struggles. Where labour wins 
concessions from capital, for instance in the 'historic compromises' 
negotiated in post-war western European states, production and finance 
seeks out new locations in more capital-friendly environments. In this 
search for new sources of surplus value, capital "amplifies existing 
schisms" between cultural groupings and sharpens national divisions 
(Palloix 1977: 22-3). National division is created in the same instance as 
class division and by combining the dual logic of integration and 
fragmentation, capitalist development simultaneously has an oppressive 
and an exploitative impact, as the reproduction of national division is 
"inscribed in the very movement of capital". 
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At the same time, by enabling the formation of national class alliances, 
such national' differentiations are a crucial, deciding factor in permitting 
the continued exploitation of subordinate classes and in maintaining the 
political stability of the capitalist system. The almost 'common sense' 
national loyalty that results is a central factor in keeping revolutionary 
social transformation off the political agenda in what has become a 
globalised capitalist system. In effect, nationalism became - and remains - 
"one of the forces by which the seemingly irreconcilable clash of interests 
between classes within the international community [is] reconciled" (Carr 
1984: 231). 
These linkages are strengthened by the clash between modes of production 
on the "periphery" which may reinforce pre-capitalist divisions to allow 
"super exploitation" of the immediate hinterlands (Bradby 1975; Dore and 
Weeks 1979: 84). Further contributory elements to this "development of 
underdevelopment" may include the need to construct a "reserve" army of 
labour in the peripheries to hold down the cost of labour power in the core, 
unequal exchange relations between core and periphery, or the competition 
between territorially defined fractions of monopoly capital (Frank 1978; 
Foster Carter 1978: 60). 
This interpretation of capitalist development can be used to analyse 
nationalism and national struggle as being bound into the logic of class 
struggle. The contradiction between global class relations and the forces of 
production that generates social change - the "central contradiction 
between the forces and relations of production that.,. moves society 
forward" is seen as reproducing social division as much as class division 
(Dore and Weeks 1979: 81). Thus, even as capitalist relations of production 
"spread worldwide to unify human society", they "engender a perilous and 
convulsive fragmentation of society" (Nairn 1977: 34). 
Within this model national divisions do not define class divisions, just as 
class divisions do not define national groupings (Leifer 1981). The 
reproduction of cultural division cannot be separated from the 
reproduction of class division and vice versa. The process of defining the 
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national interest has a direct impact on the day to day interests of the 
national community and in a society divided into classes, these interests, 
espoused in the name of the nation, can never be class neutral (Benner 
1988). Some classes or sections of classes stand to benefit more than others 
from the national movement, hence rather than seeking to identify the 
social classes or groups that tend to lead nationalist movements, the focus 
should be on explaining the interests which divide classes between a 
national and a non-national or anti-national orientation. 
This perspective forms a key element in Breuilly's discussion of the state 
and nationalism and of Anderson's uneven development perspective as it 
allows analysis of wider socio-political tendencies that weld together the 
different class fragments into a national constituency. As emphasised by 
Hroch, nationalist movements are founded on particular material 
circumstances and these circumstances change over time. At its inception 
for instance, a nationalist movement may have bourgeois connotations 
which at a later date may be displaced by working class or peasant based 
connotations (or vice versa). By taking this approach, analysis can focus on 
the conflicts between classes to define and control the 'national interest'. 
This, the class dynamic of a "national" movement - whether it welds core 
to periphery within the existing state apparatus or challenges the state 
apparatus by demanding independence for the periphery - is located within 
the movement itself as well as between the nationalist movement and 
other political configurations. 
This interpretation of material interests and nationalism can be explored 
using first, a model of "reactive" group formation that sees nationalist 
movements as emerging out of a "cultural division of labour" (Hechter 
1975) and second, a model of "interactive" group formation that predicts 
the emergence of nationalism out of a "segmented" division of labour 
(Hechter and Levi 1979). The "reactive" model states that the 'national' 
perspective is shaped by reaction to a cultural division of labour. This 
process of reacting against discrimination in the "core" labour market is 
seen as the central factor in determining the class connotation of the 
'national' movement. In adapting this, the "interactive" model suggests 
that competition between classes in the 'national' segment is as important 
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for the development of nationalism as the relationship between this 
segment and the "core" labour market. Competitive conflict within the 
'national' constituency is seen as playing a key role in the definition of the 
policies that are pursued in the national interest and hence come to define 
the class connotation of the national movement. 
While the second model stresses the role of class conflict within the 
'nation' in defining the ideological appeal of each particular nationalism, 
both explain national division as the outcome of either absolute or relative 
deprivation and thus can be linked to neo-Marxist interpretations of the 
global capitalist 'system'. For instance, territorial politicisation of 
peripheral communities in Western Europe during the 1970's was 
intimately linked to class interests as well as to communal attachments - 
nationalist and regionalist political movements - for example, in the 
Basque country, in Scotland and in the Breton region - were "forced to 
address class issues" in competition with state-centred political parties 
(Keating 1988: 172). 
Nationalism though cannot be explained solely in terms of relative 
deprivation. This model can offer little explanation of the enduring 
strength of integrationist nationalism in economies with high regional 
deprivation (Northern Ireland for instance) and the strength of secessionist 
nationalism in relatively advantaged regions (the Basque region of 
Northern Spain) where national movements may be mobilised in defense 
of or against the existing state apparatus, in apparent contradiction with 
patterns of relative deprivation. Over-emphasis of the role of class interests 
may ignore altogether the central issue of why classes or class fractions 
mobilise along nationalist rather than internationalist lines. It can also lead 
to a dependence on psychological concepts of false consciousness wherever 
a direct class interest in the nation cannot be detected (Avineri 1990). 
It is only in interaction with definitions of cultural differences, including 
historical and institutional differences, that the class dynamic assumes a 
national form and, it is only in the context of ideological conflict and in the 
context of claims to 'national' state sovereignty, as stressed by Breuilly, that 
these 'national' movements are mobilised. These lines of cultural 
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difference along which employers discriminate and which become the 
cultural markers in a "national" division of labour play a key, even central, 
role in the definition of a national movement. 
As the lines of class exploitation are blurred with the lines of 'national' 
oppression, no historical priority can be accorded to cultural or to 'ethnic' 
differences, contrary to Smith; and 'national' struggles are not simply 
interpreted as class struggles, contrary to Blaut (1987). In the context of 
cultural difference, the class dynamic is both exploitative and oppressive 
and hence it defines national divisions as well as class divisions. Effectively 
the interaction between class and ethnicity in the definition of a national 
constituency is seen as a two-way interaction that reduces the "autonomy" 
of both (Liefer 1981). 
The focus is on "the relations which are established between classes in the 
determination of the nation" (Munck 1986: 157) and on the tension between 
class fractions whose interests are defined in a transnational setting and 
those whose interests are largely defined within the 'national' framework. 
As Nairn argues, this tension between cosmopolitan, transnational class 
formations and 'national' class formation is a consequence of the clash 
between the unifying logic of the forces capitalist development and the 
fragmenting logic (or rather illogic) of capitalist relations of production, 
which pit one culturally defined 'national' group against another in the 
struggle to maximise capital accumulation. 
This perspective on the relationship between national struggles and class 
struggles under capitalism and its role in defining a material interest in the 
nation forms a key element subsequent Sections. Chapter 4, which offers an 
historical account of Ireland's national conflict, focuses first on material 
interests and suggests that linkages between cultural division and class 
division led to uneven North-South economic development during the 
nineteenth century that to a degree was reversed in the mid-twentieth 
century, with significant implications for the stability of national class 
alliances, particularly in Northern Ireland. 
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This theme re-emerges in Chapter 7, which is devoted to examining the 
material impacts of EU integration on the conflict. It is argued that tensions 
are emerging between national class alliances and an emerging 
transnational all-Ireland class formation, which are likely to force a re- 
constitution of Ireland's national class alliances. The Chapter investigates 
the various EU-related pressures for trans-national North-South economic 
integration in Ireland, counterposed against the pressures for continued 
and in some respects, sharpened North-South national division. The 
relative strength of pressures for all-Ireland capitalist collaboration and for 
North-South competition are assessed and are linked to the analysis of 
ideological conflict in Chapter 8 and state policies in Chapter 9. 
Ideological conflict 
Material interests define national constituencies but they are in themselves 
insufficient to explain national consciousness. To develop an 
understanding of nationalism's "popular resonance" these material 
interests must be linked to social and political conflict (Hobsbawm 
1990: 264). This takes analysis into the field of ideological conflict, both 
within the 'national' community over the definition of 'national' interests 
and between dominant and subordinate 'national' communities over the 
power to define and control political or social development. 
In the field of political conflict, the "mask justifying man's exploitation by 
man", instead of being carried by the commodity form as in economic 
conflicts, is vested in an ideological domination that unifies the dominant 
class, neutralises opposition (Lefebvre 1966: 31) and in the process, defines 
whole swathes of civil society as uncontested territory "free from politics" 
(Habermas 1976: 22). To do this, a form of 'common sense discourse' 
emerges which presents the sectional interests of the dominant elites as no 
different from the wider interests of the 
, 
mass of the population (Larrain 
1989). Ideological "means of legitimation" are mobilised to suppress the 
reality of inequality and so construct a collective - often 'national' 
consciousness that submits to the prevailing order (Femia 1981: 33). This 
"free subjection" that sees the individual "interpellate" her or himself - for 
instance as a "national" subject - influences behaviour and plays a key 
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material role in maintaining the relations of production (Adamson 
1991: 64; Althusser 1984). 
But ideologies are not uncontested. Dominant ideologies constructed by 
class-fractions organised into a class alliance - whether it is for example, 
between landed aristocracy and a mercantile bourgeoisie or between a 
skilled segment of the working class and a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie - are 
necessarily partial to the interests of some social groupings over others. 
The particular day-to-day experience of inequality and suppression 
maintains the "resistance embedded in the existing forms of popular 
culture and subjectivity" and ensures that bipartisan 'common sense' is 
not easily constructed (Schwarz 1986: 179). 
The direct experience of the "excluded" groups and also those which have a 
relatively weak bargaining position within the class alliance will develop a 
consciousness which rejects the interpretation of events supplied by 
dominant ideologies. Hence, civil or 'national' society will rarely - if ever - 
be fully subordinated to the hegemony of the 'nation-state'. Subordinate 
groupings emerge which construct a competing concept of political 
legitimacy and challenge the definition of what is and what is not a 
'political' issue. By offering an alternative interpretation of 'the political', 
they can claim legitimacy for a new class alliance challenging the dominant 
hegemony. Hence, "the ideological domain becomes the major focus of 
class struggle" in a civil society that is fractured between acceptance and 
rejection of the current hegemonic definition of 'the political' (Adamson 
1991: 69). 
Nationalism stands at the centre of these ideological struggles. Whether 
national movements are seeking to redefine the 'national interest' or 
whether they are seeking to contest the legitimacy of current 'national' 
rule, they must build a bipartisan class alliance that can claim to speak for 
'the nation'. This is reflected in many anti-systemic movements which 
quickly reconcile themselves to the 'national' framework. For instance, the 
history of the international labour movement - from Marx's insistence that 
workers must become the "leading class of the nation" to the Soviet 
declaration of "socialism in one country" and - somewhat less 
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momentously - to the British Labour Party leader's insistence that he be 
photographed in front of the Union Jack (in 1984) - is replete with 
concessions to the national principle (Barnett 1989: 141). As the entire 
concept of "popular sovereignty" is locked into the state framework, any 
class trying to gain the lead in an hegemonic conflict must in some way 
define itself as "the unique true expression of the nation" (Gramsci 1971: 52; 
Barnett 1989: 148; Munck 1986). 
There are however, indications that social and political movements are 
increasingly orientated to a transnational, often global, framework of 
ideological conflict (Wallerstein 1991: 111). The tension between a 
transnational and a national focus for social and political conflict reflects a 
broader tension in contesting the ways in which global capitalism - as 
Nairn puts it - takes societies 'by the throat'. One way of resolving this 
tension, as has been described, a route taken by many anti-systemic 
movements is to establish a 'bridge-head' at the 'national'-state level. But 
as the development of global capitalism begins to have trans-national 
regional and global consequences that override individual state initiatives, 
the act of contestation has become increasingly transnational. 
There are signals that such a transnational and in many instances, global or 
supra-state regional political awareness, founded on a shift in perceptions 
of material interests, potentially disruptive of 'national' political 
ideologies, is emerging. But the ideological blockages to this trans- 
nationalisation, stemming from the persistence of the 'national' 
framework for social and political struggle, are significant. Class conflict is 
no less linked to 'national' conflict, political struggles have, for the most 
part, been fought at the 'national' state level and political consciousness 
tends to remain focussed on the 'national' state framework. 
This is no less true of Ireland's national conflict. Chapter 4 investigates 
how these ideological conflicts have been fought out in recent history, 
between Britain and Ireland and within Ireland. At the EU level, also, 
there is intense ideological conflict between national states and the EU 
institutions pursuing an EU regional framework for politics, which are 
discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 8 brings these together in examining the 
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tendencies towards a transnational framework for political conflict, related 
to transnational integration in the EU, over issues relating to all-Ireland, 
North-South development. 
It is argued that this is leading to a heightened ideological commitment to 
such transnational political frameworks, particularly by Nationalist and 
increasingly by Republican politicians, as they are seen as helping to re- 
integrate Ireland, while Unionist and Loyalist politicians have generally 
been more cautious, seeing such transnational integration as threatening 
British sovereignty in Northern Ireland. Despite these uneven ideological 
responses, it is suggested that, as ideological conflict is pressured into a 
regionally defined all-Ireland framework, in the context of EU integration, 
this signals at least a partial re-alignment of Ireland's national conflict. 
State Policies 
The concept of the 'national' state and of the 'national' interest, expressed 
in state policies, is central to the development of nationalism. The 
universal claims of nationalist ideology - the claim to 'sovereign' 
legitimacy and to a monopoly of legitimate violence within the 'national' 
territory - pattern conflict in civil society and serve the specific interests of 
the dominant national class alliance. 
As state legitimacy became increasingly populist - whether due to print 
capitalism (Anderson 1991), the spread of Liberalism (Kedourie 1966), the 
need for state education (Gellner 1987), or the linkage between class and 
cultural consciousness (as argued here) - the sovereign state was forced to 
become more pluralistic. The state became the "framework for citizens' 
collective aims" by virtue of its claim to universal secular power over a 
population (Hobsbawm 1983: 264). Only the state could unify a concept of 
universal sovereignty with a concept of the "nation" and so satisfy the 
demand for popular sovereignty and only with nationalism could the idea 
of popular self determination become a possibility and so give popular 
legitimacy to the concept of the 'nation-state' (Anderson 1986; Knight 
1983: 118; Breuilly 1982; Seton-Watson 1986). 
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But capitalist states, by definition, primarily serve the interests of capital, 
rather than the interests of their 'national' citizenry. In the first instance, 
state legitimacy is crucially dependent upon an ability to siphon off 
resources from civil society and transform them into structures that 
maintain the unity of an hegemonic bloc. Just as a dialectical relationship 
within the absolutist state can be traced between the dynastic ambitions of 
warring monarchs and the prosperity of a mercantile bourgeoisie, so the 
modern state is dependent on private industry and the continued 
accumulation of capital (Tilly 1975: 613; Anderson 1974). 
State structures are "constituted with and by class contradictions" and are - 
in essence -a "condensate of a relation of power between struggling classes" 
(Poulantzas 1978: 72-74). State policies then, are necessarily partial and 
aimed at constituting a hegemonic class alliance in civil society. The claims 
espoused by the state - to guarantee economic growth, to dispense justice, to 
educate according to merit, or to provide democratic control over the 
'political' arena - all exist in contradiction with the perpetuation of an 
unequal society. Hence, state sponsored nationalism masks "selfish vested 
interests" and the state's autonomy as the embodiment of 'national' 
aspirations - its claim to political legitimacy - is punctured (Carr 1984: 88). 
In effect, the state is tied to the contradictory role of shoring up a class 
alliance whilst securing mass consent. The state attempts to define a people 
as 'subject' to a prevailing order and to be effective, it must fuse a range of 
interests into a class alliance capable of securing consent from a 'subject' 
population -a process of manufacturing consent that contrasts with the 
purely repressive aspects of social control which only yield co-operation 
through domination (Hall 1986: 67). Consequently state policies delineate a 
boundary between consent and repression that reflects the division 
between those benefiting and those suffering from the effects of state 
hegemony - effectively those 'inside' the those 'outside' the 'national' class 
alliance (Gramsci 1971: 106). 
As the 'national' community is held together by linking cultural difference 
and class interest, so the 'national' interest as pursued by the state has to 
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constantly reaffirm this linkage. 'National' states must devise policies that 
serve the interests of the various segments of the 'national' class alliance, 
and clearly define 'insiders and 'outsiders', if they are to retain legitimacy. 
As they are applied in the context of a dynamic interaction between 
cultural division and class conflict, these policies are immediately 
understood within a political framework that has both class and national 
connotations. Indeed, the strength of the political doctrine that the state can 
and should be the personification of the people - the political doctrine of 
nationalism - resides in this ability to express the combined impact of class 
conflict and 'national' social division at the level of state hegemony. In 
effect, the state must be capable of shoring-up the 'national class alliance on 
which it depends. 
This imposes an internal logic on state policies that is exacerbated by the 
confrontation of national states in international politics (Rokkan and 
Urwin 1983: 119). Every effort at forming or strengthening a state sponsored 
nationalism is contradicted by the necessary partiality of state policies and, 
just as significant, by the response of other state sponsored nationalisms 
(Watson 1990: 209). Indeed, ironically, increased socio-economic integration 
on the 'national' state model accords greater significance to territorial 
authority over resource distribution, highlighting lines of domination and 
transforming regions into objects of political struggle (Keating 1988). 
The very policies designed to address regional disparities often bind 
peripheries into a closer dependence on the core and highlight lines of 
cultural subordination. If the state raises public expenditure in 
disadvantaged peripheries or colonies it merely confirms dependence as 
interventions are multiplied in response to disequilibria in the periphery 
(Rivera-Ramos 1990). Attempts at welding peripheral cultures to the 
"national" state - for instance by creating "national pilgrimages" (Anderson 
1991: 121) or by inventing "national" memorials and events (Hobsbawm 
1983) are as likely to reinforce the cultural dimensions of peripheral 
nationalisms. Indeed, they fail to shore-up state-centred national loyalty 
precisely because they are carried out by a politically biased 'national' state. 
This impasse results in a political 'sclerosis' that in liberal democracies 
produces an irreconcilable contradiction between class-based political 
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parties linked to 'official' nationalism in the 'core', wielding majority 
control, and minority regionalist or nationalist parties based in the 
'periphery'. The transnational dimension offers a possible positive-sum 
avenue out of this impasse as, if states are able, jointly, to devise and 
implement policies then these, by definition, would operate outside of the 
'national' framework. 
This interpretation of state policies as servicing a class alliance while 
formally committed to serving the general needs of the 'nation' is used to 
guide Chapter 4's historical analysis of state policies in Ireland. As 
illustrated by the EU experience, which is analysed in Chapter 5, the 
policies of inter-national organisations are also necessarily partial, in 
serving the interests of a trans-national class alliance, and in constructing 
an EU hegemony linked to non-state institutions which, with time, has 
become a focus for political struggle. Chapter 9 brings these two strands of 
analysis together to examine the pressures for North-South institutions in 
Ireland to express the transnational interests of Ireland as a region in the 
EU. Like EU structures these transnational bodies would be both an 
instrument of dominant interests in civil society and would serve the 
general, regional interest and like the national states before them, would be 
subject to popular political pressure. Although trans-national elites may 
attempt to stand above society and attempt to insulate transnational 
institutions from popular politics, they would never be fully autonomous 
of broader social forces, raising the question of how such trans-national all- 
Ireland institutions are likely to affect national identifications and the 
national conflict. 
Relating the aspects of analysis 
Three aspects shaping the analysis have been distinguished. These do not 
have an independent existence but instead are patterned by each other. 
They are not conceptualised as existing in a hierarchy in which 
'superstructure' is determined by the 'base' -a "problem of the relations 
between structure and superstructure" that has to be resolved not by 
concepts of hierarchy and priority but by concepts of interaction, reciprocity 
and immanence (Gramsci 1971: 177,366). Each has 'relative autonomy' from 
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the other, with for example, state policies and ideological conflict affecting 
conflicts over material interests as well as material interests shaping 
ideological conflict and state policies (Gramsci 1971: 175). 
Unifying each aspect is an overarching conflict between hegemonic and 
anti-hegemonic forces. The three aspects are bound together in an organic 
"movement", locked into a dynamic that "depends on the existing social 
relationships" (Cox 1982: 182; Lefebvre 1966: 124). This is embodied in a 
contradictory logic, derived from the dual imperatives of capitalist 
development, between the forces of productive capability and the relations 
of productive ownership. This stems from a direct clash of interest in the 
capitalist labour process, between the interests of capital and the interests of 
those producing surplus value, which is most sharply exposed in the 
contradiction between the formal exchange of equivalents (wages for 
labour at the point of production and wages for products at the point of 
sale) and the expropriation of surplus product that is the object and result 
of the labour process (Sweezy 1942, Lefebvre 1966). This contradiction must 
be seen as patterning each of the three aspects of analysis - allowing society 
to be analysed as a whole rather than as a series of parts (Gramsci 1971: 450). 
In material interests the doctrine of equal exchange clashes with the reality 
of unequal distribution; in ideological conflict the universal claims of 
ideology are undermined as soon as they are articulated in an unequal 
society; and in drawing up and implementing its policies, the state is 
necessarily partial, no matter how broadly-based its hegemonic bloc. 
The terms of these conflicts shift over time, according to the different 
conditions of capital accumulation, preventing a lapse into ahistorical 
analysis. For instance, as a crisis in accumulation emerges, so "terrain 
more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought and 
certain ways of posing and resolving questions" may be opened up 
(Gramsci 1971: 180-4). As the "material productive forces of society come 
into conflict with the existing relations of production" the nature of politics 
is transformed in its ideological aspects and in its state-political aspects as 
much as in its material aspects (Marx 1971: 21). Hidden contradictions are 
unveiled to expose an entirely new domain of political and "cultural 
struggle" (Mattelart 1980). On entering this political terrain, wars of 
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position in the material, ideological and state-political aspects, in which 
only the terms of conflict can be modified via a form of "passive" 
revolution, become wars of manoeuvre where entire structures of 
domination can be overturned (Gramsci 1971: 106). 
This concern to trace the common inter-connections between the three 
aspects of analysis is reflected in the structure of Chapters 6,7 and 8. The 
Chapters focus on tensions between increasingly trans-nationalised forces 
of production and still largely nationalised relations of production. The 
political opportunities exposed by these tensions are explored in Section 4. 
Consequently, this Section employs a different mode of analysis from 
Sections 2 and 3, partly reflecting its source materials. This is briefly 
discussed here, as an outline of some of the issues that are discussed in 
greater detail in the Methodological Appendix (Appendix 1). 
Analysis of Political Action 
To conceptualise how nationalism is reproduced in an increasingly 
transnationalised context it is necessary to go beyond analysis of historical 
and contemporary tendencies to investigate how the political actors 
themselves actively re-constitute their political positions. This 
problematises the processes of reproducing nationalism in the context of 
transnationalism and is aimed at highlighting immanent tendencies or 
momentums to point up likely developments in the conflict. 
As is outlined in the subsection above, the historical and contemporary 
relationships between nationalism and transnational integration can be 
examined using analytical distinctions between the various aspects of 
socio-political life. This approach is less relevant for the analysis of political 
action as the positions adopted by political actors are not easily reducible to 
analytical categories. Consequently there is an attempt to step beyond 
'structurally' orientated analysis, to allow a more open-ended investigation 
of political discourse. Though this involves only a relative shift in 
methodology, there are tensions between the different approaches, arising 
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from the source material, raising issues of agency and structure which 
reflect broader debates between 'relativism' and 'essentialism'. 
Interview material clearly requires a different form of analysis than other 
source material. Unlike analysis of written material, interview discourse is 
highly contingent - interviews are one-off events influenced by the 
interviewer as much as the interviewee and different interviews held at 
different times or by different interviewers would be likely to yield 
different results. Interviews are a type of "social action", they are inter- 
subjective events which allow a "joint construction of meaning", 
illustrating historical relationships and tendencies (Potter and Wetherell 
1992: 41,1991). Thus they can be used to highlight how such relations are 
maintained, allowing a focus on the process of explanation and argument - 
the "laws of becoming" - as much as on their content (Hammersley 
1989: 73). This is particularly useful here as it allows analysis of how actors 
reconcile or manage the competing logics of national conflict and 
transnationalism as in a real sense, politicians live through and attempt to 
reconcile the resulting contradictions and ideological dilemmas (Billig 
1988: 202). 
This approach to interview analysis rejects a firm distinction between 
'structure' and 'agency'. On the contrary, they are seen as "existentially 
interdependent" (Secord 1982: 33). Both are implicated in the analysis of 
interview material, just as both enter into earlier analysis of historical and 
contemporary written material. For instance, although there is clearly 
greater emphasis on political 'agency' in Section 4, the analysis is clearly 
shaped by earlier discussions of historical tendencies. Structural context 
and social agency are thus intertwined, stemming from the conviction that 
'structure' and 'agency' are inter-determining. Social change is seen as the 
outcome both of structural tendencies and of the viewpoints, decisions and 
actions of those who are part of those structures: political consciousness has 
a material impact on the way people behave; the way people behave shapes 
and re-shapes social structures; and social structures influence political 
consciousness. 
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What this methodological shift does imply though, is a distinction between 
the researcher as a participant in the research process, constructing 
theoretical frameworks and historical analysis and the researcher as part of 
the research process, as an interviewer in an interactive dialogue. This 
methodological distinction is reflected in the shift of emphasis in Section 4, 
from the three-part analytical framework to a more flexible approach 
aimed at developing typologies of the various political positions - content 
analysis that is complemented by discourse analysis aimed at investigating 
how political positions are realigned or maintained. 
Chapter conclusions 
As outlined in the Introduction, this study investigates the apparent 
paradox that transnational forces appear to sharpen national divisions. To 
do this analysis focuses first on material interests and on how 'national' 
divisions are reproduced by linkages between cultural difference and class 
interests. Second, it examines ideological conflict, highlighting how social 
and political conflicts reproduce national or nationalist ideologies. Third, 
state policies are investigated, to map out how 'national' state elites devise 
policies which reproduce, or adapt, 'national' constituencies. 
This three-part analytical framework is patterned by an over-arching 
tension between the fragmented 'national' states' system and the single, 
integrated, global capitalist system. Indeed, this dual logic of globalisation 
and national fragmentation is inscribed into the process of capitalist 
development. Paradoxically, global integration and national division are 
bound together in an interdependent relationship: as transnational forces 
are strengthened there are perhaps greater pressures to define material 
interests in national terms, for ideological conflict to be dominated by 
nationalism and for state policies to be aimed at serving nationally-defined 
interests. 
Sections 2 and 3 use the three-part analytical framework to analyse the 
interaction between national conflict and transnational integration: Section 
2 analyses the historical context of national conflict in Ireland and of 
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transnational and international integration in the EU. Section 3 brings the 
EU and the conflict together, in an analysis of recent historical and 
contemporary developments. 
Section 4 uses interview material to focus more explicitly on the 
interaction between national conflict and transnational integration. The 
Section examines the dilemmas faced by political actors when they are 
forced to reconcile or manage the competing demands of national politics 
and transnational integration and draws up typologies of political positions 
to contrast how they respond. 
In the following Section then, the case study begins with an historical 
overview - of the national conflict in Chapter 4 and of the process of EU 
integration in Chapter 5. 
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Section Two 
Historical Roots 
Section Introduction 
This Section uses the framework developed in Chapter 3 to analyse the 
historical relationships between national division and transnational, 
regional integration in Ireland, North and South (Chapter 4) and in the EU 
(Chapter 5). It analyses in separation what is later - in Sections 3 and 4- 
analysed together. It thus serves as an introduction, contextualising later 
discussions. The competing pressures to national division and to 
transnational, regional integration are mapped out both for Ireland and the 
EU, before examining the more specific relationships between them. 
Both Chapter 4 and 5 focus on the tension between the logics of 
nationalism or national statism and the logics of transnational integration. 
They begin with a brief outline of earlier historical developments before 
using the analytical framework to focus on developments since the 1960's. 
In each, material interests are examined first, followed by some 
consideration of ideological conflict and finally, some analysis of state 
policies and regional policies at the substate and EU level. 
Each of the three aspects of analysis is shaped by tensions or contradiction 
between the globalising, homogenising tendencies of capitalism and its 
fragmenting, divisive tendencies which, it is argued, pattern social order at 
every level of the global political economy. There is generally an historical 
'lag' between the changes in the definition of material interests and 
reciprocal changes in the definition of ideological conflict and in the role of 
the state. While semi-autonomous from each other, each of the three 
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aspects are also interdependent and such mismatches lead to discontinuity 
and disruption of political relations. It is suggested that as a result, there are 
similarities between tendencies in Ireland and in the EU, which are briefly 
highlighted in the Section Conclusions. 
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Chapter 4 
National divisions in Ireland 
This Chapter begins with a short account of north-south divergence and 
national conflict in Ireland, from the 1801 Act of Union to Partition in 1921, 
focusing on uneven development and socio-economic divergence in the 
late nineteenth century. This is followed by a more in-depth analysis, using 
the three-part framework developed in Chapter 3, to examine North-South 
convergence in the mid to late twentieth century, leading attempted 
North-South rapprochement in the 1960's and again in the 1990's. 
Following the arguments outlined in Chapter 3, it is argued that North- 
South division in Ireland emerged out of three complementary 
developments: first, a combination of uneven economic development and 
sectarianism in the labour market; second, political action by unionists and 
nationalists; and third, state policy (Stewart 1992). Discussion of the 
pressures for North-South convergence then, focuses on the degree to 
which there has been a reversal of uneven development and an associated 
removal of sectarian labour relations; a realignment of political 
consciousness and associated political action by social and political actors, 
North and South; and a reorientation of state policies to express increased 
North-South convergence. 
Historical Background - uneven development and regional divergence in the 
nineteenth century 
Nineteenth century Irish history is dominated by sharp economic decline 
over much of the island, except in parts of the north, which became highly 
industrialised. The 1801 Act of Union, which was imposed after the 
"United Irishmen" had been repressed integrated the relatively weak Irish 
economy into the circuit of British-based capital and led to industrial 
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collapse and rural depopulation across much of Ireland (Murray 1903: 416). 
Free trade under the Act gave British exporters unlimited access to the Irish 
economy, while monetary union between Sterling and emerging Irish 
currencies, also in 1801, systematically constrained Irish growth patterns. At 
the same time domestic Irish purchasing power was undermined by British 
taxation policy. Before the Union Ireland contributed £2.5 million in taxes 
to the British Treasury. After the two taxation systems were merged in 
1817, this doubled to £5 million and by 1896 Ireland was contributing £7 
million despite a halving of the Irish population over the same period 
(due to emigration and the mid-century famine) (Murray 1903: 399; Strauss 
1951). 
The result was a process of "arrested development" (Riordan 1920: 280). The 
depression of the mid 1820's that immediately followed the removal of 
tariff protection for the Irish cotton industry led to the closure of half the 
cotton factories in Ireland and woollen producers were reduced to 10% of 
the Irish market (Cullen 1972: 13). Where British products had penetrated 
the local economy, British railway capital followed, with an extensive 
railway building programme - linking all the major garrison towns by 1855 
and adding a further 100 miles by the 1870's (Lee 1973). When the world 
economy entered the next slump (in the mid 1870's), industries producing 
consumer goods, which had to some extent re-established themselves, 
were particularly affected, as cheaply produced British goods flooded into 
the now easily accessible Irish market. 
The destruction of all but the sturdiest sectors of southern industry from 
the 1820's was paralleled by an expansion in commercial agriculture, on the 
back of increased British corn prices, fuelling a rapid growth in rural 
population and leading to extensive subdivision of landholdings 
(Kennedy 1988). With the abolition of the Corn Laws (1846) and rising 
British beef prices, exports of livestock that had remained unchanged for 
160 years, rose 600% between 1820 and 1870 (Mjoset 1993: 215). Landowners 
converted land holdings into vast tracts of pasture that some have likened 
to the Latin American 'latifundi' (Probert 1978). By 1850 the amount of 
smallholdings in Ireland had been halved and dispossessed tenants flocked 
to northern Irish and British to find work. By the 1860's one tenth of the 
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navies in Britain and a quarter of the population of Liverpool were Irish 
(Hunt 1981). Many others emigrated to the US while those left behind filled 
the workhouses (in 1851 there were 102,818 in Irish workhouses). Later in 
the nineteenth century an international depression in the prices of 
agricultural produce (the price of beef fell by a third between 1876 and 1885) 
and the progressive penetration of British meat and dairy markets by 
overseas competitors once again undermined the Irish economy: the total 
value of agricultural exports from Ireland to Britain fell by a third and 
again the pace of Irish emigration increased (Solow 1971: 171). 
For much of the nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, the Irish 
economy had become dependent on highly unstable British markets for 
agricultural products - an "entirely inadequate... sheet anchor for the Irish 
economy" (Strauss 1951: 174). With domestic industry unable to provide 
new jobs and emigration failing even to supply a short term solution to 
rural poverty, the demand for a. more equitable spread of landownership 
became the dominant political issue. Reflecting the distorted nature of the 
Irish economy, this "struggle to retain control of the land for those who 
worked it" (Mitchell 1974) pivoted on a class alliance between an 
impoverished tenant class and an Irish middle class concerned to protect 
the Irish economy from British exports and gave birth to a nationalist 
movement aspiring to self determination and national independence from 
the British state (Strauss 1951). 
The pattern of industrial decline, rural poverty and crucially, middle class 
alienation from the British state was not true of the whole of Ireland in the 
nineteenth century. Industry in the northern towns of Ireland resisted 
competition from large British producers and by the end of the nineteenth 
century the region had become the world's largest producer of linen and 
possessed the world's largest shipyard (owned by Harland and Woolf). 
Explanations of this uneven development have been hotly contested, not 
least because of their contemporary implications. Leaving aside sectarian 
arguments that the Protestant communities of northern Ireland possessed 
a higher level of business acumen than their Catholic counterparts (See 
Rosebaum 1912), three broad explanations can be identified. The first 
centres on what is said to be a unique structure of land holding in 
92 
Northern Ireland which, it is argued, granted Protestant tenants security of 
tenure and fair rents - an "Ulster custom" - which contrasted with 
conditions elsewhere in Ireland where there was little or no security of 
tenure (Probert 1978; Boserup 1972: 159). This view has been challenged on 
the basis that the so-called "custom" made very little difference in practice, 
not least because agricultural land in Northern Ireland was peculiarly non- 
productive (Solow 1971: 31). 
A second explanation focuses on the labour market in the north, which, it 
is argued, allowed the super-exploitation of 'unskilled' labour. While 
'skilled' work in textiles, shipbuilding and engineering attracted wage rates 
significantly higher even than equivalent jobs elsewhere in the UK, wage 
rates for unskilled occupations were driven well below the worst UK rates 
of pay (Bell 1987; Patterson 1980; Armstrong 1951). It is argued that this 
reflected sectarianised labour markets in the north, combined with large 
inflows of unskilled labour from the south. As it was forced off the land, 
labour flocked to the cities and Belfast grew from a small town of 20,000 in 
1835 to a city of 100,000 by 1850, with the fastest growth during the linen 
boom which coincided with the decline of tillage in favour of pasture on 
the land. The middle classes and the skilled labouring classes, dominated 
by Protestants able to restrict access to occupational and professional 
privilege, were relatively insulated from this reserve army of migrant 
labour - unlike unskilled Protestants and Catholics. The result was sharp 
social inequalities in the north, combined with rapid industrialisation as 
overall labour costs were kept well below British levels. One problem with 
this approach is that the southern towns also experienced an influx of 
migrant labour willing to work for low wages, which points to the 
possibility that the north's middle class were particularly well placed - 
geographically and socially - to take advantage of these labour market 
conditions (1). 
This third explanation centres on the uneven access to overseas markets 
via Glasgow and Liverpool and to sources of British-based finance. As Irish 
cotton manufacturers lost their domestic markets to British producers 
those in the north re-invested to produce linen for international - 
particularly US - markets. The industry was organically tied to British trade 
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routes, by 1861 75% of Irish linen was exported (70% to the US), and the 
'cotton famine' caused by the American Civil War accentuated this 
dependence as linen exports expanded from £6m to £lOm in the space of 
one year (1863-4) and employment rose to 57,000 by 1876, peaking at 69,000 
in the 1890's. This rapidly expanding linen industry, centred on Belfast, 
gained economies in handling, insurance and finance that were not 
available elsewhere in Ireland, and Belfast became Ireland's entrepot. By 
1900 two thirds of all Ireland's exports were routed through the city, 
boosting the city's shipbuilding and machine production industry, with 
employment in the industry rising to 30,000 by 1915, supplying ships 
primarily for British mercantile capital. 
Whatever way uneven development is explained, there can be little doubt 
that it led to the creation of a northern bourgeoisie organically linked to 
British capital. While Belfast was dominated by the shipbuilding and linen 
industries, the rest of Ireland was left behind. In 1890 shipbuilders, linen 
magnates and the export oriented elite of Belfast jointly employed 35% of 
the northern workforce, contrasting with the southern bourgeoisie which 
directly employed only 13% of the southern workforce, primarily in food 
processing and distribution tied to Irish internal markets (with Dublin 
brewing as the exception) (Kennedy et al 1988: 8). Dependence on British 
trade routes and British sources of finance bound the interests of northern 
capital to British political parties and industrialists - against a much weaker 
southern bourgeoisie concerned to protect its potential industrial base in 
the face of overseas competition. 
The class interests of northern workers were also interwoven with the 
politics of nationalism and unionism. As Belfast's Catholic population 
increased from 10% in 1800 to 33% in 1850 and 43% by the end of the 1860's, 
Protestant patronage gained a heightened significance (Gibbon 1975: 96; 
Pringle 1985: 11; Rumpf and Hepburn 1977). Patron-client relations became 
the key to gaining employment in the cities; the Orange Order which had 
played a key role in repressing the United Irishmen, and for some years 
had been in decline, reemerged, acting as an 'employment agency' for 
migrant Protestants bearing "Certificates of Character" from their landlords 
(Buckland 1973: 22; Boserup 1972: 16; Pringle 1985: 209; Gibbon 1975: 16). 
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Meanwhile, inter-communal competition between less advantaged 
Protestants and Catholics boiled over into a "whole series of riots" that 
transformed the nature of politics in Northern Ireland (Rumpf and 
Hepburn 1977: 165). From the 1850's riots became less localised and more 
segregated along occupational fault-lines (Gibbon 1975). Riot became a 
political act with deep roots in the dual labour market that was emerging in 
Belfast's linen and shipbuilding industries. Skilled Protestant workers 
from the new shipyards and engineering factories quickly became the elite 
of anti-nationalist extremism, expressing emerging political divisions in 
the unevenly developed Ireland of the nineteenth century. Riots in 1864 
for instance, on the day a statue was dedicated to O'Connell in Dublin, led 
to the first attempts at expelling Catholic labour from Belfast's shipyards. 
After similar riots during the 1892-3 Home Rule crisis, Harland and Woolf 
sacked 190 of the 225 Catholic workers and the remainder were expelled in 
1912 (Goldring 1991: 61) (2). 
Hastened by the Home Rule crises of 1886 and 1896, this new variant of 
working class unionism became allied with the increasingly strident 
unionism of the northern bourgeoisie. This political alliance between 
workers, tenants, factory owners and landlords was' expressed in the Ulster 
Unionist Party, which was founded in 1912 and gave political force to the 
logic of uneven economic and social development that had been been 
etched into Irish society. 
These patterns of uneven socio-economic and political development, 
north and south, and the degree to which they were reversed in the mid- 
twentieth century are examined in what follows, using the theoretical 
framework drawn up in Chapter 3. 
Material Interests 
Exponential divergence between north and south in Ireland during the 
nineteenth century culminated in the Partition of 1921 and during the 
1930's and 40's the South pursued its separate development path while the 
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North sought greater integration with the British economy. Blocked 
economic development in both parts of Ireland during the 1950's was 
followed by a brief period of convergence. Both North and South sought to 
attract global capital investment, leading to a rapid reorientation of 
economic development from heavy producer industry in the North and 
from agricultural commerce in the South to mutual dependence on 
externally-owned, consumer-orientated manufacturing industry. The 
weakening of this strategy in Northern Ireland, largely due to political 
inflexibility and sharpened conflict in the North's particularly brittle 
political system during the 1970's and 1980's, led to renewed economic 
divergence, until the 1990's when mutual integration into the SEM offered 
a new agenda for North-South convergence. This sub-section examines 
these economic shifts and associated material interests. 
North-South convergence 
Nineteenth century economic divergence between north and south was 
exaggerated by Partition and was sustained until the 1950's when a process 
of North-South economic convergence began to emerge. The nineteenth 
century had seen the growth of an indigenous industrial base in the north 
but deep interdependencies between the three leading sectors of the 
northern Irish economy - linen, engineering and shipbuilding - made it 
particularly vulnerable to structural shifts in the world economy. Even in 
the 1890's the linen industry in Northern Ireland was "capturing a larger 
share of a declining market" and fifty years later both the linen and the 
shipbuilding industry were to face terminal decline (Cullen 1972: 159). At 
the same time conditions on the periphery of the British economy 
rendered Northern Ireland incapable of diversifying its highly vulnerable 
industrial base. There were two reasons for this. 
First, there were labour market constraints. As noted earlier, exceptionally 
high rates of pay for skilled labour and unusually low rates of pay for non 
skilled labour had been a feature of the economy since the mid nineteenth 
century (3). Northern Protestants maintained a relatively secure 
domination of these skilled occupations with 34% of all Protestants in 
Northern Ireland employed as skilled labourers in 1911 (the corresponding 
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figure for Catholics was 24%). This short-circuited militant trade unionism 
and maintained stability in the Protestant class alliance until the 
shipbuilding and linen industries collapsed in the 1950's. 
Industry was unable, to reorientate itself to changing conditions without 
challenging the job security of its largely Protestant skilled workforce in the 
'new wave' industries of chemical engineering, synthetic fibres and 
electrical engineering, all of which required a labour process that did not 
rely on the 'skilled' labour of a minority of employees and by 1971 only 
19% of Protestants were skilled labourers (17% of Catholics) (Bew et al 
1979: 167). This was partially resolved by an increase in white collar 
employment but there were many less skilled, less well connected 
Protestant workers who lost out, thereby destabilising the Unionist political 
bloc. 
Second, there were financial constraints. Without access to a large local 
market, industry lacked a guarantied rate of profit and was unable to 
finance re-investment. The structure of banking and finance together with 
the deficit on the trade balance with Britain made sure that Northern 
Ireland capital was constantly drained off into the wider UK economy. 
Most of Northern industry was privately owned (60% in the 1950's as 
compared with 36% in the UK) and hence was dependent upon Northern 
financial markets that were rarely in a position to create the required credit 
(Stormont 1957). This provided an almost water-tight guarantee that the 
Northern economy would be unable to modernise itself as, in spite of a 
steep rise in British government expenditure in Northern Ireland, rising by 
600% between 1946 and 1963, capital flows into the region were dwarfed by 
capital outflows (4). The result was under-investment in existing and new 
capital ventures, leading to falling productivity. Capital formation slumped 
by over a third in the 1950's and British based multinationals such as ICI, 
Viyella and Cortaulds sidelined the declining linen industry and invested in 
labour shedding sythetic fibres. There was a 28% cut in manufacturing 
employment, 10% more than in Britain between 1950 and 1961, and 
unemployment rose to 7.8% while in Britain it remained at 1.8% 
(Stormont 1962: 70). 
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This stimulated a reassessment of economic policies in the early 1960's. 
The result was a programme of state expenditure designed to improve 
social and economic infrastructure and to revitalise the local economy by 
attracting multinational capital to the region. 
In the South there were similar shifts in economic orientation. From 1932 
De Valera's Fianna Fail government introduced a policy of economic 
autarchy aimed at increasing industrial growth through import 
substitution. High tariffs led to a 40% rise in industrial production from 
1932 to 1936 while industrial employment rose from 60,000 to 100,000 
between 1926 and 1938 and continued to rise, to 184,000 by 1951. But given 
limited domestic demand, this strategy had its limits and by 1939 growth in 
industrial output had declined to single figures. Reflecting this, industrial 
employment began to decline after 1951, falling to 172,000 by 1960. 
As in the North, this stimulated a shift in economic policy towards 
attracting international capital and towards export orientated growth. 
Under pressure from the US and from the Organisation of European 
Economic Cooperation there had been some liberalisation of Irish trade 
during the short-lived Fine Gael governments of 1949-51 and 1954-57 and 
some attempt at attracting overseas capital - from 1949 with the creation of 
the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) which had only limited 
powers until the Industrial Grants Act of 1956. Economic openness though, 
only hastened the decline in industrial employment as increased trade 
liberalisation was coupled with a non-interventionist industrial policy and 
deflationary monetary policies. 
It was only in the late 1950's that the Republic adopted a more outward- 
looking economic policy in full, leading to a rapid reversal of the 
immediate post-1921 divergence in economic orientation between the 
Republic and the North. The new Fianna Fail government of 1959, with 
Sean Lemass as Minister for Trade and Commerce, introduced a range of 
expansionary measures - similar to those that were to be introduced in the 
early sixties by the Northern O'Neil government - to attract international 
capital and to increase exports: the IDA's grant giving activities were 
extended; from 1964 there were no controls on profit repatriation or on 
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overseas ownership and control; and from 1958 a tax holiday on export 
revenue were introduced. 
The Republic applied for membership of GATT in 1960 and of the EEC in 
1961 (immediately after Britain) and in 1963 began reducing tariffs, 
culminating in the Anglo-Irish free trade agreement of 1965. This rapidly 
bore fruit with a doubling of the total volume of exports and imports from 
1958 to 1972 (O'Brien 1993). While competition for domestic markets in the 
Republic led to some 30,000 job losses, increased sales by existing companies 
overseas as well as increased international investment created an 
estimated 75,000 jobs between 1960 and 1974, leading to a significant overall 
net increase in industrial employment - to about 217,000 by 1974 (Walsh 
1979). 
In both parts of Ireland there was an attempt to "hook on to" the "Fordist" 
wave of production from which both had been excluded (Mjoset 1993: 272). 
As the South moved away from economic autarchy and the North shifted 
from the single-minded support of existing declining industries, the two 
parts of Ireland began competing for international capital on a very similar 
development path. There was rapid convergence in economic orientations 
and employment structures as Ireland, North and South, gained a large 
multinational-controlled sector producing consumer goods for export. 
Renewed North-South divergence 
In contrast, from the early 1970's, with global recession and sharpened 
political and military conflict in the North there was increased divergence. 
The Northern economy went into rapid decline and became increasingly 
dependent on British state subsidies, while the South sustained a thriving 
overseas sector and became increasingly dependent on overseas markets 
and multinational corporations. 
In Northern Ireland manufacturing employment had increased - by 50,000 - 
in the years from 1961 to 1971 but in the following ten years it "suffered an 
astonishing" decline of some 20,000 jobs (Kennedy 1989: 26). Industry shed 
40% of its labour force between 1973 and 1982, due to ongoing structural 
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decline in shipbuilding and textiles, also partly due to decline in the 'new' 
multinational sectors - such as synthetic textiles. In place of these jobs, 
Northern Ireland attracted an increasing level of Treasury funds, and the 
public sector grew from employing 25% of the workforce in 1971, to 38% by 
1983. Equally significant, following the sharp depression of the early 1980's, 
Northern industry failed to participate in the economic recovery of the mid 
to late 1980's and by the end of the decade a further 42,000 manufacturing 
jobs had been lost (Munck 1993: 137). 
A major factor in this was the dramatic decline in inward investment, 
which proved to be highly sensitive to phases of political conflict. 
Northern Ireland attracted about 15% of UK-bound FDI between 1966 and 
1970, falling to 6% between 1970 and 1975. With relative political stability 
in second half of the 1970's, inflows rose to 10% of the UK total, only to 
plummet virtually to zero during the period of intensified conflict in the 
early 1980's. There was a partial recovery during the short-lived UK 
economic recovery in the late 1980's, again coinciding with some 
diminution in the intensity of the conflict (Fothergill and Guy 1990; 
O'Malley 1985) and there were expectations of a more sustained revival of 
overseas investment in the wake of the 1994 'peace process' (5). 
This was combined with a gradual decline in employment in existing 
multinational plants and in locally-owned industry due to the effects of the 
oil crisis and recession from 1972, intensifying throughout the 1970's and 
culminating in widespread disinvestment as Sterling became overvalued 
and monetary restraints were imposed on the UK economy from 1979 to 
1983. In 1986 the proportion of manufacturing jobs in externally owned 
firms stood at 39% - comparing with 53% in 1973 - and remained at this 
level into the 1990's (Hamilton 1993: 203). Between 1973 and 1986 
multinational branch plant closures cut Northern Ireland's industrial 
workforce by a quarter and by the mid 1980's over a half of the jobs that had 
been created by attracting overseas capital in the early 1960's - diversifying 
the North's industrial base into in synthetic fibres, mechanical and 
electrical engineering - had disappeared. 
The resulting job losses - 
amounting to 36,000 lost between 1973 and 1986 - have been cited as the 
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"main explanation" of the North's poor industrial performance in 
comparison with the Republic (Hamilton 1993: 206). 
This occured despite government attempts to attract and retain overseas 
capital and to support locally owned industry, through the Industrial 
Development Board, which spent £lbin supporting industry in the 1980's 
(set up in 1976 as the Northern Ireland Development Agency). British 
government concern at the apparent failure of its economic policies led to a 
re-think in the 1987 "Pathfinder Process" which was aimed at building a self- 
reliant economy for the North, thereby reducing its dependency on the 
British Treasury -a perhaps unrealistic goal given that the British 
subvention accounted for 30% of regional GDP. Partly because of the failure 
to attract large overseas employers, the "Path" chosen was one of 
stimulating increased local competitiveness and productivity, particularly 
through smaller-scale private sector "enterprise" with minimal state 
interference, ignoring the importance of the public sector in the North 
(Munck 1993: 63). The subsequent policy document "Competing in the 
1990's" similarly relied on ill-defined notions of competitiveness as the 
main criteria for IDA grants, again neglecting the option of marshalling 
public sector finance and governance to redevelop the Northern economy 
(Clulow and Teague 1993). 
Reflecting the exponential growth in net public expenditure, from 14% of 
total domestic expenditure in 1970, to 23% in 1979,27% in 1984 and close to 
30% in 1993, there was substantial growth in the private sector during the 
1970's and 80's, but not in manufacturing industry or for the export trade as 
traded services sectors, including retail and financial services expanded to 
meet the needs of public sector employees. In 1974 distribution, hotels, 
catering and repairs accounted for 9% of total regional GDP by 1992 they 
accounted for 12%; more spectacularly, finance, banking and real estate 
accounted for 6% of GDP in 1974 and 15% in 1992. This contrasted with 
manufacturing industry, which accounted for 31% of GDP in 1974, falling 
to 19% by 1992 (Smyth 1993: 135-8) (6). 
Despite deindustrialisation and substantial growth in the public sector, as 
illustrated in Table 4.1 (below), the Northern labour market remained 
101 
highly and in some respects increasingly sectarianised. There was some 
increase in the proportion of Catholics employed in managerial and 
professional occupations, but this was offset by an increase in the Catholic 
population as a proportion of the total workforce and contrasted with a 
parallel increase in the proportion of unemployment accounted for by 
Catholics. 
Table 4.1: Catholics in the Northern Ireland Labour Market, 
1971 and 1991 
Economic Activity 1971 1991 
Catholics looking for work 
Percentage of total economically 
active population 28 35 
Percentage of Unemployed 
- Female 41.4 46.4 
- Male 47.0 52.4 
Catholics in senior positions 
Percentage of Managers in 
- Extra large establishments - 21.6 
- Large establishments 10.4 23.9 
- Small establishments 18.1 26.8 
Percentage of Supervisors 
- Blue Collar 20.7 30.2 
- White Collar 20.6 32.0 
Percentage of Professional Employees 11.9 26.6 
Percentage of Self Employed 
- Without employees 25.6 33.4 
- With employees 32.6 35.0 
Source: 1971,1991 Census, CSO 
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Catholics had become more represented in management, supervisory and 
professional roles, forming a new middle class heavily concentrated in the 
public sector (Cormack and Osborne 1994). In 1991 for instance, Catholics 
accounted for 41% of teaching professionals and 31% of health 
professionals but only 22% of engineers and technologists. In contrast, 
over the twenty years from 1971 to 1991 the Catholic working class had 
become more heavily disadvantaged. In 1971 Catholics had made up 28% of 
the "economically active" workforce and 47% of Northern Ireland's male 
unemployed were Catholic. By 1991 35% of the Northern Ireland workforce 
was Catholic and Catholic males comprised 52% of total male 
unemployment. 
Under conditions of greatly increased overall unemployment this 
translated into a widening unemployment differential between the two 
communities, as illustrated in Table 4.2 (below). 
Table 4.2: Percentage unemployed in Northern Ireland, 
1971 and 1991 
1971 1991 
Catholic 
- females 6.9 14.5 
- males 17.2 28.3 
Non Catholic 
- females 3.8 8.8 
- males 7.5 13.9 
Source: 1971,1991 Census, CSO. 
In particular, the differential between Catholic male unemployment and 
non-Catholic male unemployment widened from 9.7% to 14.4%, while for 
Catholic and Non-Catholic women the differential widened from 3.1% to 
5.7%. 
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This increased disparity, experienced primarily by working class Catholics, 
was compounded by sharpened income disparities. Northern Ireland's 
middle class became significantly better off while the incomes of male 
unskilled or unemployed workers, which were still disproportionately 
Catholic, stagnated. Overall, the poorest ten percent of the population 
earned on average £53 in 1979, rising in real terms to £56 in 1988, 
significantly lower than other regions in the UK. This compared with the 
richest ten percent, whose average weekly income rose to same average 
level as the rest of the UK - at a rate of increase unmatched elsewhere in 
the UK (Ditch and Morrissey 1992). 
In general terms, with close to 40% of employees employed in the public 
sector at UK rates of pay, and with 20% of Catholics and 10% of Protestants 
unemployed, the "gap between the haves and the have-nots [was] very 
wide indeed" (Smyth 1993: 138). The on-going sectarian divisions in 
Northern Ireland's labour market, combined with sharpening income 
disparities, in an economy dominated by a public sector and fuelled by 
conspicuous consumption of the fortunate few, had reshaped material 
interests and economic orientations in the North in quite different away 
from the Republic. 
In contrast to Northern Ireland, the Republic's industrial policy was 
relatively successful into the late 1970's. The Republic's entry into the EU 
confirmed a rapid diversification of trading relations away from British, 
towards continental EU markets. The rapid growth in Southern, mostly 
multinational, exports to these outweighed Irish-British trade, which in 
relative terms fell during the 1970's, a reorientation away from the British 
economy which was confirmed with the Republic's entry into the EU 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979 (NIF 1984a: 116). 
Southern industry was dominated by multinational corporations. The 
foreign owned sector grew from employing 27% of the manufacturing 
workforce in 1973 to employing 43% in 1986 and 45% in 1990. These firms 
were concentrated in relatively advanced industrial sectors - primarily in 
engineering and to a lesser extent in chemicals and man-made clothing 
(Hamilton 1993: 203). Overseas owned plants were largely delinked from 
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the economy as tax breaks for exporters remained in place and plants were 
often located away from concentrations of domestically owned industry. 
Partly as a consequence, there was little indigenous development in the key 
sectors of auto, steel, electrical goods or durable consumer goods: Irish 
indigenous production in these sectors stood at 15% of industrial 
employment in 1978 while in the EU as a whole it stood at 56% (Mjoset 
1993). While employment in overseas owned manufacturing grew by some 
22% in the period from 1973 to 1980 (to 80,000), employment in 
indigenously owned sectors declined by some 7% over the decade as a 
whole (to 102,000), partly due to intensified competition in Irish domestic 
markets (NESC 1983: 299,360). Reflecting the relative decline of indigenous 
industry, profit repatriation as a proportion of total industrial profits rose 
dramatically from 15% in 1975 to 30% in 1980 and then to 50% in the mid 
1980's (Bradley et al 1993). By the 1980's multinationals accounted for over 
80% of all non food exports, half of which were in electronics and 
chemicals and in the space of ten years, as the OECD put it in 1985, the 
Republic had become the "'export platform' for multinational trade into 
the EEC" (OECD 1985: 47). 
This pattern of dependent industrialisation was highlighted in the early 
1980's as international recession sent domestically-owned firms into rapid 
decline. A fall-off in inward investment, higher capital-intensity of 
incoming multinational plants, rapid deflation in UK markets and a fiscal 
squeeze in the Republic all contributed to this economic collapse which led 
to a 20% reduction in manufacturing employment between 1982 and 1987. 
In the later 1980's, fiscal stability and a return to consensual corporatism 
(that had broken down in the late 1970's), combined with international 
economic recovery to create a partial recovery. The Programme for National 
Recovery of 1987-90 constructed an explicit package of trade offs between pay 
policy, welfare and taxation - although it failed to address the on-going 
problem of virtual tax exemption for exporting companies - both 
indigenous and multinational - and low rural taxation. Inward investment 
increased and manufacturing employment rose by some 15,000. Only 2000 
of the new jobs were based in indigenous industry and profit repatriation 
again increased as a proportion of total industrial profits, to 60% by 1989 
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(O'Hearn 1993). The balance of payments moved into surplus, GNP grew 
and unemployment fell - but only by four percentage points, from 18% in 
1987 to 14% in 1990. The Republic entered the 1990's with a manufacturing 
sector equalling 19.2% of the workforce - at the same relative size as in 1973 
(Bradley et al 1993, OECD 1991: 57). Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
lagged behind growth in exports - so that by 1993 exports accounted for 56% 
of GDP, in contrast with an EU average of 22% (O'Donnell 1993a: 25). 
Furthermore, with a decline in multinational employment as well as 
indigenous employment in the 1980's, this dependence condemned the 
Republic to high, and apparently permanent, levels of unemployment at 
over 15% of the workforce. 
Lacking a domestically-owned industrial base, the Republic faced the 
prospect of maintaining high levels of inward investment to compensate 
for job losses as earlier waves of overseas capital relocated or simply closed 
down, reflecting wider shifts in global and EU production (Mjoset 1993: 386). 
Government awareness of the lack of Irish owned industry was reflected 
in the Telesis Report of 1983, which argued that a "successful indigenously- 
owned industry is, in the long run, essential for a high income economy" 
(NESC 1983: 185). The Report spoke of the need for an "integrated 
indigenous Development Charter" and suggested that the government 
reduce the grants given to multinational firms and increase the proportion 
allocated to indigenous exporters from less than 40% to 75% by 1990 (NESC 
1983: 36). 
Ten years later, the failure to re-focus industrial policy was highlighted in 
the Culliton Report (DSO 1992a). It drew remarkably similar conclusions as 
the Telesis Report, leading some observers to suggest that by the 1990's 
there had emerged a "widespread agreement that Ireland must develop 
competitive indigenous activity on a significantly larger scale if it is to meet 
its long term income, social and employment aspirations" (O'Donnell 
1993a: 96). There were some indications that such concerns about 
indigenous development were translating into new public sector responses 
- embodied in the Republic's National Development Plan of 1994-1999, which 
envisaged spending approximately half of the total allocated for industrial 
assistance on locally-based employment strategies, focused on the 
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development of community infrastructure, to address the problem of long 
term unemployment (7). Nonetheless, the remaining fifty percent of 
industrial assistance - roughly the same proportion as in the early 1980's - 
was still to be spent on attracting and retaining multinational capital. 
Perhaps more important, such initiatives were overshadowed by the neo- 
classical, 'enterprise' orientated Programmine for Competitiveness and Work, 
1994-7 which explicitly linked rates of growth of pay to inflation rates as the 
Republic sought to compete as a "labour-intensive, low-cost, low-wage 
production centre" on the EU periphery (Hazelkorn and Patterson 1994: 65). 
Despite the relative success of neo-corporatist programmes in the South - 
in comparison with market orientated, 'enterprise' initiatives in the North 
- the economy remained unable to develop a viable indigenous sector. The 
policy of economic 'openness' - the removal of trade barriers, of restrictions 
on foreign ownership of industry and of financial regulations - continued 
to constrain economic policy (Bradley et al 1993). Dominated by 
international capital and dependent on export markets, the Republic had 
great difficulty in developing the "national system of innovation" that was 
required if the economy was to sustain an indigenous sector and stimulate 
"autocentric" growth. Instead, the Republic more closely fitted into an 
"extraverted" growth pattern -a pattern of economic growth without 
economic development (Mjoset 1993: 386; Amin 1981). This is clearly 
illustrated by figures for the Republic's relative per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and its Gross National Product (GNP). As a measure of total 
national income, GDP includes the repatriated profits of overseas-owned 
companies and therefore overestimates income levels in the South. As 
illustrated below in Table 4.3, there was a dramatic increase in net outflows 
of property income from 1980 to 1990, that was only partially offset by EU 
subsidies. As a result, national product (GDP net of profit repatriation) fell 
as a percentage of GDP, from 101% in 1970 to 89% in 1990. 
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Table 4.3: Gross GDP and GNP: the Republic of Ireland, 
1970,1980 and 1990 
(IRE, millions) 1970 1980 1990 
GDP 1620 9361 27093 
(Market prices) 
Net property income +26 -391.8 -3131 
from abroad 
EU subsidies zero 348.5 1306 
GNP 1648 9002 23961 
(Market prices) 
GNP as a percentage 102% 96% 88% 
of GDP 
Source: National Accounts, aggregates, 1970-1990 Eurostat, 1993; National 
Income and Expenditure, Dublin Stationery Office, 1993. 
Overall, the Republic fell "into the twilight zone for both economic and 
political reasons" (Gillespie et al 1992: 30). The economy was, as has been 
outlined, incipiently dualistic, and was seriously malfunctioning in some 
respects while in others it was dramatically out-performing its economic 
partners - reflected in the success of multinational companies, contrasted 
with the decline of indigenous industry. Politically, as an enthusiastic EU 
member state, the Republic sought independence from the orbit of Britain, 
yet was tied to Britain, not only in its cultural and economic relations but 
also in its aspiration to unity with the North. These economic and political 
dualities - which expressed a tension between the logic of transnational 
regionalisation and of state-centred nationalism - are further explored in 
Chapter Six. 
In the two parts of Ireland, the 1970's and 1980's saw a marked divergence 
in patterns of development and dependency. The end of the post-War 
boom in Western Europe disrupted the process of economic 
'modernisation' in the two economies. As a result of intensified conflict 
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against a background of economic recession, the North reverted to 
deepened deindustrialisation and to sharpened dependency on Britain; the 
South for its part, sustained its programme of industrialisation with a 
temporary surge in labour-intensive transnational investment, becoming 
more dependent on non-British product markets and sources of capital. 
By way of contrast, in the early 1990's there was a potential return to 
convergence. In both parts of Ireland there was a partial rejection of the 
externally-orientated strategy for economic development. In the North the 
strategy had failed to reverse deindustrialisation after the upsurge in 
conflict from the early 1970's; while in the South it had failed to foster 
indigenously owned advanced industry in the face of sharpened economic 
recession in the 1980's. With British intimations that state subsidies would 
not always be available to prop up the Northern economy, and Southern 
concerns at the collapse of indigenous employment and the fall-off in 
inward investment during the 1980's and 90's, there was an increasing, 
common awareness of the necessity for policies aimed at generating 
indigenous systems of innovation (DSO 1992a, Mjoset 1993). This shifting 
orientation in the latter years of the twentieth century, in the context of EU 
integration, is discussed in Section 3 and especially Chapter 6. 
Ideological conflict 
Regional economic divisions in Ireland were associated with a variety of 
ideological and political divisions. These were a major factor in the 
Partition of the island into two separate jurisdictions in 1921. Similarly, in 
the late 1960's and early 1970's, ideological conflicts centred on the 
nationalist-unionist divide in Northern Ireland, became a major factor in 
renewed divergence between North and South. 
Unionism and Loyalism 
The political alliance between working class loyalism and unionism 
dominated by a bourgeois and landed elite - expressed in the UUP - was 
preserved until the 1960's. The relations of production in the North - 
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which rested upon ties of patronage in the Protestant community - were 
increasingly undermined by the forces of production. The ideological unity 
of the Protestant bloc was undermined as industrialists and their 
employees in the declining sectors and local government officials came out 
in firm opposition to the liberal Unionist would-be 'modernisers', leading 
to intense ideological conflict within the Unionist Party. As the collapse of 
Northern industry dissolved the mechanics of patronage, the working class 
allies of elite Unionism took to the streets with increasingly insistent 
assertions of Protestant ascendancy - that "took place in the absence of 
visible nationalist irredentism" (O'Leary and Arthur 1990: 35). 
The non-sectarian employment practices of foreign owned firms, closing 
the divide between the 'skilled' Protestant and the 'unskilled' Catholic 
labour force has been cited as a possible explanation for this (Probert 1978). 
But both the non-sectarian employment practices of multinational 
companies and the deskilling of the workforce would have little impact on 
Protestant privilege as the growth areas announced under the employment 
expansion plans were located in Protestant districts (the 'Mathew' plan). 
Indeed, there is more evidence that the restructuring of industry 
accommodated rather than challenged sectarian divisions in the Northern 
labour market - for instance, ninety percent of the new vacancies were 
filled privately rather than via the employment exchange and Catholic 
unemployment remained substantially higher than Protestant 
unemployment (O'Dowd 1980a, 1980b; Bew et al 1979: 189). Indeed, the 
explosion of Protestant extremism in declining urban communities like 
the Shankill and Woodvale came when economic recovery had begun to 
increase employment opportunities for this class of workers. A more likely 
explanation then, is that assertions of working class loyalism emerged as a 
response to the feared - rather than actual - consequences of dismantling 
Northern industry, in terms of its implications for Protestant political 
hegemony as well as for the privileged position of some skilled Protestant 
workers - an interpretation that accords a key role to ideological conflicts 
and conflicts over state policies, as opposed to material conflicts. 
Initially the dissent of Protestant workers was expressed through the 
Northern Irish Labour Party (NILP) that from 1949 had become a pro- 
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Partition Party. Throughout the 1950's the NILP acted as a 'loyal' 
opposition in Stormont, campaigning against the Unionist government on 
social issues and when redundancies in declining industries started to 
accelerate in the late 1950's, the Party was the natural beneficiary of 
working class Protestant dissent (8). From the 1961 it had to compete with 
the "Unionist Associations" that championed the right of "loyal" (ie 
Protestant) workers to preferential employment in Northern Irish 
industry. Linking their politics to the defence of the 'Union', these 
associations were unapologetic in their determination to extend Protestant 
ascendancy and were fully able to take their politics onto the streets. 
Protestant leaders like Ian Paisley and the Unionist MP for the Shankill - 
Desmond Boal - worked within the "Committee for the Defence of the 
Constitution" to pressurise the Unionist government into addressing the 
demands of Protestant workers. While Paisley campaigned for continued 
preferential allocation of Council housing to Protestants, Boal campaigned 
against the Prime Minister - Lord Brookeborough, to honour 
commitments to Protestant workers. Partly as a result, in 1963 
Brookeborough was replaced by O'Neill, who was soon challenged by the 
Committee to demonstrate his commitment to Protestant ascendancy. In 
1964 for instance, when the Committee called for the R. U. C. to remove a 
tricolour displayed in the window of a Nationalist Party campaign 
headquarters in West Belfast and when O'Neil hesitated, a series of 
demonstrations were staged, leading to the worst rioting Belfast had seen 
since 1935. Recognising the necessity to retain the support of dissaffected 
Protestant workers, O'Neill bowed to pressure from the Committee and 
ordered the R. U. C. to remove the tricolour. 
Changing economic circumstances had forced Protestant workers away 
from the UUP as it was no longer seen as serving their interests. Their 
dissent was expressed through the politics of sectarianism and found its 
most violent expression in the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Revived "to 
execute known IRA men", the UVF shot four Catholics in three separate 
incidents in May 1966. Through the summer of that year Catholic houses 
in Protestant districts were petrol-bombed by Loyalist youths and by 1969, 
after three summers of sectarian riot, Paisley's "Protestant Unionist Party" 
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(PUP) was drawing Protestant voters away from the Unionist Party. In 
West Ulster (Derry) the PUP gained 20,000 votes and after O'Neil resigned 
Paisley was voted in as the Stormont MP for Bannside. In 1970 Paisley 
gained a Westminster seat in North Antrim, Boal left the Unionist Party to 
join Paisley and in 1971 the Party was renamed the "Democratic Unionist 
Party" (DUP). By the early 1980's it was gaining a 20% share of the votes cast 
in Northern Ireland and Paisley's brand of unionism had established itself 
as the most vocal expression of Protestant disaffection in the North. 
This, to a degree, was reflected in substantial differences on the national 
question. The DUP argued that the conflict would only be resolved when 
Northern Ireland had its own devolved Assembly, preferably dominated by 
the majority, Unionist Parties, on the Stormont model. In contrast, the 
"official" Unionist Party argued that the national conflict would only be 
solved when Northern Ireland was fully part of the British state. The 
anomalous status of Northern Ireland - ruled by the Westminster 
Parliament but not fully integrated with Britain - was seen as an 
encouragement to those pushing for a reunited Ireland. So too was the 
implication in British constitutional legislation that Northern Ireland need 
remain part of the United Kingdom only so long as a majority in Northern 
Ireland wished it (Coughlan 1992). 
This 'integrationist' agenda was particularly associated with James 
Molyneaux and formerly Enoch Powell, although, in the face of pressure 
from the 'devolutionist'- strand of unionism during the 1980's, 
'integrationists' began to accept the possibility of 'decentralisation' in the 
UK - but only as long as the decentralised authority for Northern Ireland 
was part of a wider decentralisation of the UK state, with similar 
provisions for Wales and Scotland. This adaptation of the 'integrationist' 
approach - as reiterated by Molyneaux in May 1992 - maintained the 
essential argument that only the full exercise of British sovereignty would 
resolve the conflict (9). 
The UUP and the 'liberal' Unionist Alliance Party remained largely 
representative of the "Ulster British" wing of unionism which emphasised 
its cultural links with Britain but was also willing to see itself as in some 
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senses Irish. This contrasted with the DUP and other Loyalist organisations 
such as the UDA which were actively hostile to the South and expressed a 
more "Ulster Loyalist" political identity, whose primary loyalty was to the 
Northern Ireland political order rather than to Britain (Todd 1987). The 
UDA argued that both the British and the Irish states should forgo their 
claims to sovereignty over the North and allow the creation of an 
independent sovereign Northern Ireland (O'Leary and McGarry 1990). 
Unionist and Loyalist politicians remained unified on the single central 
issue of opposition to Irish unity and often worked together - most notably 
in 1974 when the British government resigned itself to surrendering its 
monopoly of force in Northern Ireland to an alliance of the Ulster Workers 
Committee, the United Army Council of the UDA/UVF, the DUP and the 
UUP, which orchestrated a 14 day stoppage against the Sunningdale 
Agreement (Millar 1978; Fisk 1975). Similar alliances, in 1979 against the 
Constitutional Convention and in 1986 against the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
(AIA), were less successful (although it could be argued that united DUP- 
UUP opposition left the AIA, as Jim Molyneaux, leader of the UUP put it, 
to "wither on the vine"). 
In the 1990's then, Unionist politics was dominated by two main Parties - 
the Unionist Party claiming approximately 30% of the Northern vote and 
the DUP claiming about 20%. A third Party - the Alliance - which emerged 
in the early 1970's, defining itself as inheriting the 'liberal' modernising 
strand of Unionism, claimed about 8% of the Northern vote. Political 
dispute between the three parties centred on the lengths to which they 
were willing to go to defend the 'Union', defined in terms of their 
willingness to accept power-sharing with the nationalist community and to 
tolerate linkages with the South. Changing Unionist positions on this last 
issue are discussed in some detail in Section 3, especially in Chapter 7. 
Nationalism and Republicanism 
Nationalism and Republicanism developed their own relatively separate 
ideological dynamic in the nineteenth century. After the Act of Union, the 
thirty years of pressure for Catholic emancipation radicalised a Catholic 
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middle class and placed it at the forefront of Irish nationalism. This was 
fueled by the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1868, the growth 
in Catholic-run education from 1879 and a three-fold expansion in the 
Catholic clergy that led to a rapid spread of English literacy. 
Simultaneously, rent strikes against absentee landlords through the "Land 
League" led to evictions by the British army and quickly developed into a 
more explicitly nationalist movement through the "Home Rule League". 
Dispossessed rural tenantry, a growing Catholic clergy and an urban middle 
class joined together in an an inherently conservative, anti-socialist 
alliance seeking national independence expressed in the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (10). 
Attempts at defusing Irish nationalism through the Wyndam Acts failed to 
prevent the emergence of a more urban and working class based national 
movement in the early part of the twentieth century, demanding an end to 
British domination of Irish culture, administration and politics, which was 
further radicalised by the British repression of the 1916 uprising. Bolstered 
by an anti-conscription campaign and following the Russian revolution, 
Sinn Fein, which was founded in 1905, began to receive mass support and 
by the election in 1919 the Party had increased its representation in the 103 
seat Irish Parliament from 7 to 73. Three years of armed conflict in defence 
of the 'Underground Republic' between the Irish Republican Army and 
British forces followed, during which Sinn Fein support was confirmed, in 
Council, County and Parliamentary elections, and by 1921 the Party 
occupied 130 of the Parliament's 180 seats. The war of independence ended 
with the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921, with "Dominion" status 
similar to Canada, leading to the civil war of 1921-3. 
Partition led to North-South divergence between a Northern nationalist 
community still committed to North-South unity and an increasingly 
stable and 'completed' nationalist community in the South. From 1922 the 
Northern nationalist community had "watched their fellow Irish 
nationalists abandon them bit by bit": while for the Northern parties 
North-South unity was a central issue, for the Southern-based parties it 
was only of primary concern during periods of particularly extreme 
political violence in the North (11). 
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This reflected the origins of Irish nationalism as a movement primarily 
concerned with power relationships between Ireland and Britain rather 
than between North and South in Ireland. Ideological conflict over the 
Republic's relationship with Britain shaped political forces in the post- 
independence period and continued to dominate politics in the Republic 
until the late 1960's. The Party political system in the South developed out 
of the civil war focused on the pro-Treaty (Fine Gael) and anti-Treaty 
(Fianna Fail) factions of the Irish Nationalist movement. With the 1937 
Constitution the political boundaries of the Irish Nationalist project had 
been, for the most part, defined. Although there remained a question-mark 
over Northern Ireland - expressed in Articles two and three of the 
Constitution - this was a largely peripheral concern to the main project of 
establishing an Irish political culture free of British domination. As a result 
there was considerable ideological consensus between the two main wings 
of the Republic's political system -a consensus that was silent on issues of 
North-South unity and equally important, prevented significant political, 
left-right, capital-labour conflict. 
Indeed, the incorporation of a Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland into 
the Republic was never a desirable objective for those who gained from the 
creation of an autarchic, 'national' economy and a conservative 'national' 
society. Rural, export-orientated commerce, and those that depended on it 
backed the Fine Gael Party that took power in the immediate post-Partition 
period. Despite the party's fascist roots, successive Fine Gael governments 
attempted to liberalise the Southern economy. In the 1980's under Garret 
Fitzgerald the Party made some attempt at modernising some of the more 
restrictive aspects of Irish social legislation, for instance, in the 
unsuccessful referenda on decriminalising reproductive rights (1983) and 
divorce (1986). On the national question, the Party was committed to 
substantial revision of the Irish constitutional claim to sovereignty in the 
North and under Garret Fitzgerald it maintained a largely anti-Republican 
perspective, arguing for North-South unity on the basis of shared 
sovereignty in the EU -a "non magical, lawyers, pragmatic nationalism" 
(12). 
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Meanwhile, the more populist and pro-nationalist Fianna Fail Party Party 
that emerged in 1932, drew support from farmers, traders and workers 
dependent upon domestic markets and, under De Valera, dominated Irish 
politics for the 1940's and 50's. The Party attempted to mould mass 
national unity -a "vision of the Republic as a moral community" - with it 
as the 'natural' Party of government (13). This was pursued first, through 
national autarchy and, from 1958, under Sean Lemass, through state 
intervention and economic liberalisation - model that shaped its policies 
into the 1990's. The Party combined a broadly pro-unification perspective 
with this consensual model of Southern society and it was more willing 
than Fine Gael to support the Republic's Constitutional claim to 
jurisdiction in the North, although in government, like Fine Gael, it did 
very little to make it a reality (14). 
There was then, a clearly defined divergence in constitutional nationalism, 
between the Southern-based Fine Gael and Fianna Fail parties and the 
Northern Nationalist Party which became the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party in 1971. This was also, to a great extent true of the Republican 
movement which split between a Northern-based 'Provisional' IRA and 
the 'Officials' in 1969, which later formed the Workers Party (which itself 
split in 1992 with the formation of the Southern-based Democratic Left). 
Increasingly though, from the 1970's, ideological conflict along a range of 
new political spectrums began to penetrate political life in the Republic and 
began to disrupt the two main political blocs. The Fine Gael - Fianna Fail 
divide between bourgeois nationalism and populist nationalism was 
increasingly cross-cut and undermined by a multitude of new political 
divisions. These new strands of political conflict focused not only on neo- 
liberal versus social democratic economic and welfare issues, but also on 
issues of gender and the family, sexuality and religion that had previously 
been kept off the political agenda by the nationalist consensus between Fine 
Gael and Fianna Fail dating back to 1937. 
In the 1980's, under Haughey's leadership, the more anti-nationalist and 
neo-liberal minded, right wing of the Fianna Fail Party departed to form 
the Progressive Democrats. After the 1989 election this forced Fianna Fail 
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into a Parliamentary coalition for the first time in its history, leading it to 
discard its pretention to express the 'national' political will 'above' party 
politics. Partly as a result of these and other political pressures, the 
candidate supported by Fianna Fail was defeated in the 1990 Presidential 
election and Mary Robinson, the Labour supported candidate was voted in. 
In 1992 the Irish Labour Party was able to double its popular vote to 19% 
and increase its representation in the Dail from 16 to 33, at the expense of 
Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, in an election that also saw the Progressive 
Democrats increase their representation by four seats (15). Furthermore, in 
the European election of 1994, the Irish Green Party gained a seat in the 
European Parliament and the Democratic Left had a by-election victory, in 
a further disruption of political relations in the Republic. 
In parallel with this destabilisation of Southern politics, there was an 
increased orientation towards Northern concerns largely due to 
intensifying political and military conflict in the North. In the mid 1960's 
Protestant extremism had re-emerged at a time when Nationalists and 
Republicans had been reconciling themselves to politics in the North: the 
IRA effectively abandoned the armed struggle after the failed "Border" 
Campaign of 1959 and in 1965 the Northern Nationalist Party ended 
abstentionism and entered Stormont as the- 'official' opposition. 
Heightened cross-community political mobilisation on social and political 
issues through the civil rights movement - with the the "Campaign for 
Social justice" of 1964, the "Campaign for Democracy in Ulster" in 1966, the 
"Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association" in 1967 and "People's 
Democracy" in 1968 - destabilised the Northern government's attempts at 
economic 'modernisation' and highlighted the political and social 
exclusion of the Northern nationalist minority. The upsurge in police 
violence against the Northern nationalist community, in particular the 
RUC attack on Derry's Bogside in February 1969, and the wave of sectarian 
attacks against Catholics in Belfast in the summer of 1969, which saw 
Catholic families from Belfast arriving in Dublin with what possessions 
they could carry, to some degree forced Southern nationalist politicians to 
reverse their inward-looking political strategy (16). 
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Politicians from the Republic worked with the newly emergent SDLP in 
the North in encouraging the British government to construct North- 
South political institutions under the Sunningdale agreement of 1973 and 
from the early 1970's Nationalist political parties, North and South began 
to reformulate their central demand for Irish unity (Coughlan 1990). 
Proposals tended to converge on the possibility of establishing all-Ireland 
quasi-federal structures: in 1972 both the SDLP's Towards a new Ireland and 
the PIRA's New Ireland programme proposed a degree of autonomy for the 
North within a reunified Ireland: in the same year, Garret Fitzgerald's 
book, also titled Towards a new Ireland, took a similar approach and in 1979 
Fine Gael formally adopted federalism in its policy paper - Ireland: our future 
together. 
The Republican movement forced the pace of this North-South re- 
orientation with the IRA's decision in 1981 to relaunch Sinn Fein as an all- 
Ireland political organisation, on a wave of politicising campaigns focussed 
on the treatment of Republican prisoners in British jails. This led to re- 
emergence of a radical, populist movement dedicated to Irish national 
liberation as an alternative to the constitutional Nationalism and within 
two years Sinn Fein was drawing close to 40% of the Northern nationalist 
vote, directly threatening the survival of the SDLP. In response, 
constitutional Nationalists - the SDLP, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail - 
established the New Ireland Forum (NIF) as a means of re-claiming their 
right to speak for the Irish 'national' community. As a result, for the first 
time since Partition, constitutional Nationalists, North and South, were 
unified behind a common, constitutional agenda for Irish national 
reconciliation and reunification, as an alternative to the radical Republican 
agenda pursued by Sinn Fein. 
The Forum demonstrated how Nationalists and Republicans in Northern 
Ireland and the Republic had focused on the issue of North-South 
structures to more effectively guarantee the rights of nationalist 
communities in the North. This was expressed in the range of schemes 
that were proposed for achieving North-South political accommodation: 
devolution for Ulster and possibly also the other three provinces in a 
reunified Irish state favoured for some time by De Valera and until 1981, by 
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the IRA; a federal Ireland cantonised into 32 counties as proposed by Sean 
MacBride at the Forum; a federation or confederation of two units - North 
and South - which was Fine Gael policy since 1979 and was presented by 
Garret Fitzgerald and by the SDLP at the NIF; the option of consociationism 
involving the recognition of a distinct unionist identity, the construction 
of power sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and the abandonment 
of the Irish nationalist objective to create an all-Ireland state (favoured by 
liberal unionists and 'revisionist' nationalists); and finally, the option of 
unitary statehood, which was presented as the Forum's favoured option 
(NIF 1984b). 
By refocusing constitutional nationalism, North and South, the NIF 
helped to put North-South instititions back on the political agenda in 
Northern Ireland after the consociational experiments of Atkins and Prior 
(in the Constitutional Convention of 1979 and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly of 1982-6). In doing so, it assisted Anglo-Irish cooperation, which 
culminated, under the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985, in the 
creation of intergovernmental institutions with the promise of North- 
South institutions should Northern Unionists fail to agree on power- 
sharing devolution. 
By the late 1980's, following the NIF and the AIA, the three main Southern 
parties - Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Labour Party had accepted what was 
effectively SDLP leadership on North-South issues. The SDLP stress on the 
need for a North-South 'dimension' to Irish politics, expressed in its 
support for the Sunningdale Agreement, was strengthened in the 1980's, 
with an increased commitment to the process of European integration. The 
Party linked EU integration to national integration in Ireland, arguing for a 
redefinition of Irish and British state sovereignty with a wholesale 
transformation of civil authority in the new EU framework. In its view, 
the nation state was being eroded 'from above' by transnational EU 
structures and undermined 'from below' by sub-state regional pressures -a 
dual development that would remove the main basis of the national 
conflict in Ireland. 
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Meanwhile, in the face of political deadlock, Sinn Fein was also redefining 
its political position in the late 1980's. In particular the Party began to move 
away from arguing that all-Ireland sovereignty was a non-negotiable 
absolute requirement for peace in Ireland. Its position was increasingly 
recast as a positive sum aspiration to unitary sovereignty in which there 
was recognition of the numerous obstacles - in particular of the need to 
accommodate Northern unionism in social, cultural, economic and 
security terms. This position was outlined in its policy document, "Toward 
a lasting peace", published in 1992, which signalled a shift away from the 
all-or-nothing discourse of military conflict to the more compromising 
discourse of democratic politics. This shift, when accompanied by IRA and 
Loyalist ceasefires in the summer of 1994, began a 'peace process' that for 
the first time linked Republicanism and constitutional Nationalism. This 
had the highly significant effect of shifting the political agenda away from 
issues relating to the military conflict - issues that had dominated political 
debates on the conflict, not least in the Republic - refocusing it on the key 
question of North-South political structures (17). 
Overall then, ideological conflict in Ireland since Partition had to a large 
degree focussed on issues of North-South integration. Despite political 
divisions within the Northern unionist community, expressed in the 
emergence of the DUP and the Alliance, politicians from all three Unionist 
Parties competed for political support in the North within a broad 
consensus on the need to defend the Union and oppose North-South 
unity. Similarly, despite political divisions between Republicans and 
constitutional Nationalists and a significant degree of political distance 
between the SDLP in the North and other constitutional Nationalists in 
the South, a degree of common purpose between Republicans and 
Nationalists, North and South was maintained and indeed rebuilt - first 
with the New Ireland Forum bringing constitutional Nationalists together 
and second the Hume-Adams-Reynolds 'Peace Process', bringing 
Nationalists and Republicans together. 
In the context of European integration there were some indications that 
this process of reconciliation and political convergence was extending to 
the Unionist Parties. This, and other EU-related pressures countering 
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North-South ideological convergence, is examined in Section 3, 
particularly in Chapter 7. 
State policies 
After Partition uneven development between North and South and 
ideological conflict between unionism and nationalism were exacerbated by 
divergent state policies. From 1921 state building, North and South, took 
place at the expense of pan-Irish nation building as the island was 
partitioned into a Northern segment with a Protestant majority - from its 
inception an exercise in "domination" - and a Southern state, linked to 
Britain through the Commonwealth and later fully independent (O'Leary 
and Arthur 1990: 35; O'Leary and McGarry 1990: 272). Northern Ireland was 
given a "quasi federal" status within the UK, conditional on continued 
support for the 'Union', while the Republic defined itself as a separate 
sovereign state (Jay 1989). Constitutional division underscored socio- 
economic and ideological divisions, allowing separate North-South 
development and sharpening division between 'loyal' unionists and 
'disloyal' nationalists in Northern Ireland. 
The North 
In the North, political control was handed over to a Unionist Party that 
was the political manifestation of Protestant ascendancy. Throughout its 
existence Stormont was dominated by the UUP -a Party led by 
'Orangemen' (18). Manipulation of elections maintained its control of the 
Political system and the "loyalty to the crown" oath effectively excluded the 
nationalist community from the Northern Ireland Civil Service and local 
government departments (19). This had a direct effect on access to public 
services. In the 1930's, for instance, Catholic families were systematically 
denied 
poor law relief and during the house-building programmes of the 1950's and 60's, public housing was allocated in the first instance to the Protestant 
community (Farrell 1976). 
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Meanwhile, Stormont's industrial policies focused on meeting the needs of 
existing industry - unsurprising given that twelve out of Belfast's fourteen 
Stormont MPs in the early 1950's were Managing Directors from 
established industry (Harbinson 1973). Linen and Shipbuilding was assisted 
through the Industrial development Act, the Re-equipment of Industries 
Act and the Capital Grants to Industry Act. A "coal subsidy" was created 
and in 1959 when de-rating for industry in the British "development 
areas" was reduced to 50%, in Stormont it was retained at 75%. 
This bias was challenged in the mid 1950's with the publication in 1957 of 
the "Isles and Cuthbert" Report which argued that state assistance to 
existing industries was damaging the economy and that only an influx of 
new capital to diversify the industrial base could raise industrial 
productivity. The Report suggested that a "Development Corporation" 
should be created to attract new industries to the region and that industrial 
assistance should be re-orientated to meet their needs. But subsidisation 
continued and between 1955 and 1961 £123m was spent on keeping existing 
firms afloat. In the same period employment in textiles fell by 16,000 to 
56,000 and in 1961 8000 workers were laid off from the shipyards, reducing 
the workforce to 16,000. In 1962 the government was again criticised for 
"maintaining employment rather than creating jobs" and there was further 
confirmation of its failure as, between 1961 and 1964, another 40% of 
Belfast's shipyard workers were laid off (Stormont 1962: 58; Bew et al 
1979: 134). 
The economic proposals of the O'Neill government, outlined in the 
Wilson Report of 1964, were aimed at reversing this industrial decline. 
Paralleling the policies of the British Labour government, the proposals 
put great faith in planning for the "expansion of industry, housing and 
public services", leading to the creation of a 'Housing Trust' with authority 
over local housing and a centralised 'Ministry of Development' which 
removed key powers over transport, health and planning from local 
government (Stormont 1964: 133-40). This centralised planning framework 
led to a series of specific development plans - for eight "growth centres", 
some of which were to be "new towns" served by new or improved roads 
and by new public housing schemes under the Matthew Plan, for an 
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improved rail system under the Benson Plan and for a second Northern 
Ireland university under the Lockwood Report. The political will to 
implement the Wilson plan had been born out of a UUP backbench revolt 
against Brookeborough amongst Unionists who were seeing the bedrock of 
working class unionism slipping away from them to the Protestant 
Workers Association and the government's sensitivity to these political 
constraints was clearly reflected in the sectarian way the various Reports 
were implemented (20). 
Nonetheless, while having the desired economic effects, Protestant 
working class dissatisfaction with the Unionist leadership continued 
unabated and was matched by active opposition amongst the local 
administrative elite that had been robbed of their sources of power and 
patronage (O'Dowd 1980a: 42). The threat to local administrative hegemony 
was compounded by the threat to vested interests in declining sectors of 
industry, as, in spite of a persistent campaign waged by employers in the 
linen and shipbuilding industry, Stormont refused to introduce an 
employment subsidy and instead introduced grants for firms creating jobs 
and spent large sums of public money on improving infrastructure for the 
influx of new capital. 
Furthermore, these sections of the unionist elite and the "plebian grass 
roots" of the Protestant class alliance gained a "veto over what slight 
tendency the bourgeois leadership had to make pragmatic concessions" to 
the increasingly assertive civil rights movement (Farrell 1983: 288). The 
O'Neill government was reduced to making "symbolic gestures" of 
reconciliation with the South - for instance meeting the Taoiseach, Sean 
Lemass, in 1964 and persuading the Nationalist Party to join Stormont in 
1965 (Bew et al 1979: 13). But he could not refuse Paisley's demands in 1964; 
nor could he do anything more than condemn the Ulster Volunteer Force 
for its "strategy of tension" after it had declared that "known IRA men will 
be executed" in 1966. 
Under pressure from the civil rights movement, O'Neil introduced a new 
system of housing allocation on the basis of need, reviewed the Special 
Powers Act and established a new Derry Corporation. But he 
failed to accept 
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the movements' central demands - for universal suffrage in local elections, 
a redrawing of election boundaries and a review of the RUC - demands that 
struck at the heart of Unionist-Orange hegemony. His impotence was 
underlined when in February 1969 he failed to criticise the RUC attack on 
Derry's Bogside or halt anti-Catholic pogroms in the summer of 1969. 
Despite this, the UUP lost working class support and after the Ulster 
Volunteer bomb attacks in April 1969, O'Neil resigned, in a move that 
presaged the collapse of Stormont and Direct Rule from Westminster in 
1972. 
The South 
As has been pointed out, under Articles 2 and 3 of its Constitution, the 
Republic claimed jurisdiction over the North. Despite this and in contrast 
with the often strident Party rhetoric, the Irish state was only in a limited 
sense committed to substantive North-South integration. It tended to 
adopt a largely reactive, 'hands off' approach on such issues - as the former 
Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, stressed in 1993, the Irish state was more 
concerned to maintain order and stability in the 26 Counties than to 
remove British sovereignty in Northern Ireland (21). 
As argued earlier, Southern politicians generally focussed on the 
relationship with Britain rather than on North-South relationships. The 
North-South Council set up under the Government of Ireland Act, for 
instance, was viewed with" some hostility as it was seen as linking the 
Southern state to Britain and involving an implicit recognition of the 
Northern statelet. The South maintained a degree of distance from the 
Northern administration, partly due to political hostilities, but also due to 
the jurisdictional logic of Partition as, from 1921, Southern politicians were 
elected by voters in the 26 Counties and were primarily responsible to 
them, not to voters in the North. Consequently, whenever Southern state 
priorities conflicted with North-South unity, the former generally 
prevailed. 
The Southern government waged a civil war until 1923 with Sinn Fein 
which had argued that the South should repudiate the 1921 Treaty, leave 
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the British Empire and become a Republic. The anti-Treaty, non- 
abstentionist Fianna Fail Party that was elected into government in 1932, 
was also relatively unconcerned with the North. The government focused 
on political conflicts with Britain - for instance over land annuities and the 
use of ports - leading it, for the most part, to ignore North-South relations. 
The Constitution, agreed by Referendum in 1937, focussed on the issue of 
leaving the Commonwealth, ceasing the oath of allegiance to the British 
monarch and removing the British Governor-General from Dublin and 
while it laid claim to jurisidiction in the North, there was little attempt to 
exercise this: extension of this Republic Northwards was in theory desirable 
but in practice would disrupt relatively stable political orientations in the 
South. Partition then, focused Southern politics on constructing a 
'national' Irish culture against a history of British domination, enabling 
the two main political parties - Fine Gael and Fianna Fail - to insulate 
themselves from the difficult questions of North-South Irish unity. This 
was reflected in state administration as De Valera constructed a highly 
centralised, corporatist administrative apparatus, expressing the myth of 
national unity. Representative politics was conducted on the fringes of 
these state-centred consensus-forming institutions, rather than around 
social cleavages in civil society. 
As argued earlier, civil rights agitation in the North and the collapse of 
Stormont to a degree refocused political attention onto North-South 
relations. From 1969 the Republic sought to persuade Britain to grant it a 
role in Northern administration. While initial concerns at sectarian 
violence were rebuffed in 1969 by the British Labour government, the 
Southern government was later granted a limited role through the 
Sunningdale Agreement of 1973-4 and through the Anglo-Irish 
intergovernmental 
consultation process, 1977-85, which culminated in the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. This increased Southern involvement in 
Northern issues led some to argue that the Republic should take the 
initiative 
and "work the Anglo-Irish accord", to achieve greater North- 
South integration (22). During 1993 this agenda was, to a limited extent, 
pursued by the Southern government, with the Foreign 
Minister, Dick 
Spring, investigating how the agreement could "best be developed and 
adapted" (23). Meanwhile, the Reynolds-Major Declaration of 1993 and the 
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'Peace Process' of 1994 explicitly involved the Republic, with the North and 
Britain, in the negotiating framework for "national reconciliation" in the 
island as a whole. 
Despite these political involvements, there was little substantive 
reorientation of socio-economic policies in the Republic and it remained 
firmly committed to development in separation from the North, rather 
than in tandem with it. Economic policy was increasingly orientated 
towards continental EU states - demonstrated for instance by the decision to 
join the ERM in 1979 - and social policy remained deeply restrictive - 
demonstrated for instance by the failure of the abortion and divorce 
referenda and by the on-going domination of the Catholic Church in the 
provision of social services and in primary and secondary education (24). 
Direct Rule and North-South relations 
Meanwhile, British state policies dominated Northern Ireland after 1972. 
Unlike the Unionist dominated Stormont, the British state cast itself in the 
role of neutral arbiter between nationalist and unionist aspirations in the 
North (sketched out in the government White paper on Northern Ireland 
in 1972) (25). This was combined with, and contradicted by a determination 
to maintain British sovereignty in the North as long as the Northern 
unionist majority desired it. 
The Sunningdale Agreement of 1974 clearly expressed these tensions (25). 
The North-South Council set up under the Agreement was composed of 
an equal number of Northern and Southern representatives with a British 
appointed official - effectively an 'arbiter' - to oversee the sharing of British 
power with the Republic. Revealingly, the entire Council framework was 
to be subject to the authority of the British Secretary of State, including the 
power to appoint members of the executive, and furthermore, key 
'sovereign' powers involving the central issues in the Northern Ireland 
conflict - electoral arrangements, security, policing and justice - were all to 
be reserved for the British government. 
126 
This approach to Direct Rule was also reflected in political and 
administrative structures as the government made a concerted attempt at 
depoliticising the machinery of government in Northern Ireland state, 
transforming it into a technocracy of state officials headed by an English 
Secretary of State. Direct Rule was managed through ostensibly non- 
political officials of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, acting in concert 
through 'Political Co-ordination' committees; the role of local government 
was heavily circumscribed and finances were distributed through 
appointed Boards such as the Police Authority (wholly appointed), 
Education Area Boards (40% councillors), Health and Social Services 
Boards (no councillors) and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (30% 
councillors) (Connolly 1992). 
It was intended that this administrative apparatus and its array of semi- 
autonomous agencies would promote social and political equity between 
nationalists and unionists, integrating the nationalist minority as part of 
an inclusive Northern Ireland identity and providing a common basis for 
British citizenship in Northern Ireland. But, unavoidably, this 
inclusiveness was more often contradicted by Britishness as British state 
power in Northern Ireland was, in the last resort, designed "to incorporate 
the population and underpin the union" (Ditch and* Morrissey 1992). 
Consequently, state initiatives were inevitably shaped by the logic of 
maintaining political stability and state hegemony in the North. In 
particular, the political priority of maintaining Unionist support required 
that it leave sectarian labour relations in place and minimise North-South 
integration. At the same time, the British state had its own priorities - 
especially in relation to policing the republican community - which sharply 
conflicted with the process of building inclusive political institutions in 
Northern Ireland. As a result, Direct Rule was unable to supersede the 
economic, cultural and political causes of the conflict - largely as they 
emanated from the structural logic of the British state itself (Ruane and 
Todd 1992). 
As part of the process of de-sectarianising Northern Ireland society, in 1976 
the government established a "Fair Employment Agency" (FEA) to stamp 
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out Catholic disadvantage in the labour market. The Agency's 
"Declaration of Principles" on fair employment were condemned by the 
Unionist Council in 1977 and were largely ignored until 1981 when local 
government contractors were forced to adopt the Declaration. By 1987 6335 
firms had signed the Declaration - rising from 24 in 1981 - although not one 
of these firms was found to have infringed its provisions, no doubt partly 
because the Agency could not require them to supply employment figures 
broken down into Protestant and Catholic until 1989. It was only in 1990, 
under the Fair Employment Act, that employers were encouraged to work 
towards fair employment, on pain of losing government contracts. 
This weakness reflected the government's priorities, indeed, it was directly 
involved in maintaining security in Northern Ireland, the British state was 
directly involved in maintaining sectarianism in the northern labour 
market. Nationalists continued to be excluded from employment as they 
were seen by unionists and by the British government as, by definition, 
'disloyal'. Falling Catholic employment in the security forces for instance, 
was not seen as discrimination, but as a logical consequence of nationalist 
antipathy to the Northern state and of the republican security threat. This 
was reflected in government policy, outlined in the 1976 Commons 
Statement establishing the FEA, where it was clarified that the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of political belief would not extend to those 
whose opinion would lead them to the "approval or acceptance of the use 
of violence for political ends" (26). Unionist politicians and employers 
adapted this to include all those who might conceivably support 
Republican aims - in effect all Catholics - an interpretation that was 
legitimised by the British state when in 1988 the Secretary of State banned 
the FEA from investigating the exclusion of Catholic contract workers from 
the Kilroot power station (Doyle 1994) (27). 
In other fields of social policy, such as housing, the picture was no less 
bleak. Like the FEA, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) was 
granted wide ranging powers - to allocate housing on the basis of need and 
to manage housing estates in the interests of all tenants. While the 
executive was effective in moving Catholics away from Protestants and 
vice versa, it signally failed to persue the perpetrators of sectarian violence 
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and criminal damage. In April of 1986 for instance, during Unionist 
protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreement, there were 337 complaints of 
harassment or assault and 79 arson attacks, followed by a further 114 in July 
of the same year. Many Catholic householders were moved to alternative 
accommodation but the Housing Executive took no action against 
perpetrators, many of whom were known to be NIHE tenants. Effectively 
this rewarded sectarian violence and created new ghettos, further 
exacerbating Catholic-Protestant divisions in Northern Ireland (Graham 
1992). 
In cultural policy, too, there were deep tensions between stated and 
unstated policy objectives. After the Anglo-Irish Agreement the Northern 
Ireland Office became publicly committed to encouraging a pluralist culture 
in the North, in which the "two traditions" of nationalism and unionism 
could coexist (Knox 1992). This was expressed in a variety of Community 
relations initiatives, which were aimed at increasing mutual cultural 
awareness with the added bonus of improving the British state's image, 
both in Northern Ireland and abroad, further stabilising its legitimacy in 
the North. Partly as a consequence, cultural policies were also used to 
further marginalise and weaken expressions of mass, often politicised, 
cultural Irishness in a process of cultural exclusion that subjected Gaelic 
games organisations, voluntary organisations and parts of the Irish 
language movement to intensive monitoring and political vetting in order 
to ensure that the government could not be accused of assisting Republican 
organisations (Ruane and Todd 1992). In contrast, cultural organisations 
from the Loyalist community were unquestioningly deemed to be 
legitimate expressions of Northern culture. 
Furthermore, British anti-sectarian initiatives were established hand-in- 
hand with the denial of basic human rights in Northern Ireland. The 
British government actively encouraged an increasingly Protestant- 
dominated RUC and UDR to systematically repress 'disloyal' Republican 
communities. Throughout the first twenty-five years of Direct Rule the 
government failed to take action either to reform or to disband elements of 
the security forces that had failed to secure broad acceptance in nationalist 
and republican communities. Indeed, such forces became more, not less 
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powerful, as under direct rule, they were made responsible to a single 
Junior Minister appointed by Westminster often for a short period of time 
and with no political base in Northern Ireland. 
Meanwhile, the Northern Ireland legal framework was reformed in a way 
that increased the number of people prosecuted for "terrorist" crime. The 
Emergency Provisions Act which replaced the Special Powers Act in 1973 
established the no-jury Diplock" Courts which were only required to rule 
confessional evidence as inadmissable if it could be proved that it had 
resulted from "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment". This was a clear 
incentive for the RUC and the army in the North to pressurise prisoners 
into either incriminating themselves or others, with the result that 85% of 
convictions for "terrorist offences" from 1973 were obtained on 
confessional evidence (Rowthorne and Wayne 1988: 53-55). Unsurprisingly, 
by 1992 Northern Ireland had a per capita prison population unrivalled 
anywhere in Western Europe (and in Eastern Europe only matched by that 
of Hungary), while it had one of the lowest per capita prison populations 
for "non scheduled", non "terrorist" crime (28). 
Furthermore, the UK became the only EU state to seek permanent 
derrogation from the European Convention on Human Rights, under 
Article 15, declaring that a 'national emergency' existed in the UK. 
Although in 1976, due to adverse publicity, the Convention was adopted in 
full, by 1988 the European Court's finding that the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act breached the Convention forced the government again to apply for 
exemption (29). Furthermore, after Sinn Fein's decision to contest elections 
the government's legislative armoury was further extended into political 
life: prisoners were banned from candidature in 1981; Republicans elected 
to the Northern Ireland Assembly were banned from entry into Britain in 
1982; and in 1988, Republicans were prevented from speaking on UK 
television and radio. These and other measures made a nonsense of bodies 
such as the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, set up in 
1973, and the Police Complaints Authority, set up in 1987. Despite British 
government assurances that such bodies would ensure that "emergency" 
powers and security concerns would not undermine civil rights, no 
prosecutions resulted from their deliberations and these agencies could not 
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even act as 'window-dressing' as in over 50% of cases the army and the 
RUC refused to allow soldiers or police officers to participate in their 
inquiries, ostensibly for 'security' reasons. (Rolston 1987). 
Despite Direct Rule, the British government was unable to secure political 
stability in the North and from the early 1980's it returned to the option of 
seeking the South's assistance in maintaining stability, an approach that 
had been abandoned after unionist opposition to Sunningdale. 
Cooperation with the South was used as a means of isolating an 
increasingly successful Sinn Fein and discussions between the two 
governments focussed on a range of proposals, including a joint security 
commission and a police force for the whole island; an Anglo-Irish 
ministerial Commission to deal with socio-economic and EU-related 
issues; and legal harmonisation, with a Bill of Rights, 'mixed' courts and a 
legal Commission (Fitzgerald 1991: 513). In return the Irish government 
was willing to recognise de facto British sovereignty in Northern Ireland, 
on the basis of Northern Irish popular consent. 
The British government was caught between its own restricted concept of 
state sovereignty and the need to offer some role for the Republic in the 
affairs of Northern Ireland (Fitzgerald 1991: 505). After some three years of 
protracted intergovernmental discussions, the Thatcher government drew 
a fine distinction between consultation with a degree of joint responsibility 
on issues of common North-South concern - which it was felt would not 
impinge on British sovereignty - and joint authority, which would require 
a sharing of sovereignty between the two states. Indeed it could be argued 
that rather than undermining the constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland, such limited cooperation with the Republic would bring it closer to 
the British government position, away from the influence of the 
Republican movement. In 1985, following Mrs Thatcher's condemnation 
of the New Ireland Forum Report, the government opted for this 
minimalist approach, carefully stipulating that any joint arrangements 
would have to be refered to as an Anglo-Irish "Conference" rather than as a 
"Commission" (which the British felt would have an undesired resonance 
in the EU). 
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In effect, Britain had admitted failure in building an internal settlement 
based on consociationism in Northern Ireland and had recruited the South 
as a partner to restabilise political relations in the North and to restore its 
tarnished international reputation (30). Meanwhile, the South gained a 
diplomatic coup, enabling it to maintain Northern Ireland at arms length 
while claiming to fulfil its obligations to Northern nationalists. At the 
same time it enabled both states to more effectively - and more efficiently - 
prosecute the war against the IRA, which by 1993 had cost the Republic in 
excess of IR£2.5B1n, triple the per capita cost of the British government's 
anti-insurgency measures (31). 
This "direct rule with a green tinge" established a form of institutionalised 
consultation, linked to 'implementing measures' that committed the 
British state to improving consociational arrangements in the North 
(Article 6) (O'Leary and McGarry 1990: 279-281). On North-South issues 
there was to be improved cooperation in security matters, with the two 
separate police forces reporting to their respective governments. Only on 
matters relating to economic, social or cultural cooperation - not policing 
or judicial affairs - was there to be discussion of North-South cooperation, 
through the Anglo-Irish Council. This clearly demarcated space for North- 
South policy-making was itself to be created only "if it prove(d) impossible 
to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which secures widespread 
acceptance in Northern Ireland" (Article 10). This political bribe was aimed 
at persuading Unionist politicians to accept power-sharing in the North 
although it also recognised' that such structures would be needed even in 
the event of devolution (32). 
Britain's overall approach was outlined by the British Ambassador to the 
Republic - Sir Nicholas Fenn - in 1989. In the first instance, he argued, as 
the government had been claiming since 1972, that it was neutral arbiter in 
the conflict and did "not seek to impose a blueprint on the ultimate destiny 
of Northern Ireland". Nevertheless, the government was fully prepared to 
protect the democratic rights of the Unionist majority and to "look at the 
law where it is open to abuse" - for instance in the right to silence, the 
freedom of expression and in requiring those in public office to sign a 
statement renouncing violence. At the same time, he argued, the 
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government would seek to maintain normal political relations in the 
North - through fair employment legislation, community relations 
policies, fair housing allocation and even-handed policies on the 
administration of justice (Fenn 1989: 57). 
This combination of repression and reform expressed the inevitably 
contradictory pressures on the British government after Direct Rule. In the 
early 1980's, with the political success of Sinn Fein, these shaky 
foundations for political order began to break down and the British 
government was forced into accept a greater role for the Republic in 
legitimating the political and social order in the North. This perhaps 
signalled a sea-change in state policies, North and South, and was a 
significant conditioning factor in the emerging negotiating agenda of the 
'peace process' in the 1990's. 
Overall, then, there was sharp divergence in state policies, North and 
South in the first forty years of Partition. There was some symbolic and 
tentative convergence in the 1960's as both governments developed 
externally orientated economic policies - that was reversed with political 
implosion and Direct Rule in the North after 1972. British political 
priorities and British government finance came to dominate Northern 
government, while, despite a reawakened interest in Northern issues, the 
South remained subordinate to the British and, having its own interests to 
pursue, was only able to make limited commitment to the resolution of 
the conflict (Ruane and Todd 1992). 
Nonetheless, as successive British governments sought to construct 
political stability in the North, they were forced, increasingly, to accept a 
political role for the Republic in Northern affairs. This opened up new 
North-South political channels, expressing the Republic's renewed concern 
for political developments in the North. Despite having little substantive 
effect on North-South linkages, these channels had significant symbolic 
impacts for both states that, it can be argued, would make possible further 
adjustments of state policies, North and South, if encouraged by economic 
and ideological pressures for closer North-South integration. The EU 
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context for such a shift in state policies, North and South, is discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
Chapter Conclusions 
In the South the economy was deindustrialised in the nineteenth century 
and partly as a consequence, the Southern state that emerged in the 1920's 
was dominated by a rural-based conservatism that shaped a protectionist, 
autarchic economic policy until the late 1950's. The North industrialised in 
the late nineteenth century, producing for export on the basis of 
sectarianised labour relations and the Northern statelet that emerged in 
1921 was defined by continued membership of the UK and by the socio- 
political domination of a nationalist minority. 
This North-South divergence persisted until the late 1950's as the "carnival 
of reaction" in both the North and the South, that James Connolly had 
predicted would follow the partition of Ireland, delayed the transition to 
more technically advanced forms of production (Mjoset 1993: 249). When 
both parts of Ireland were forced to reassess their economic orientation in 
the early 1960's the result was a dramatic shift away from mutually 
incompatible economic and social policies, towards converging policies 
that required political shifts in the Republic and most especially, in 
Northern Ireland. 
But any challenge to the uneven development of Ireland inevitably 
challenged sectarian relations in the North and undermined the Northern 
Ireland statlet. The result, in the 1970's, was a period of sharp political 
divergence. In the North the Loyalist DUP split off from the more liberal 
Unionists, and the repression of the civil rights movement radicalised 
Northern nationalists, leading to the re-emergence of an IRA committed to 
armed struggle. The imposition of Direct Rule, accompanied by the 
wholesale collapse of the Northern economy, and related dependence on 
the British Treasury, tied the North more closely to Britain. Meanwhile the 
relatively peaceful South pursued an EU-orientated growth path and 
became increasingly dependent on EU markets and external capital. 
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With the 1980's and '90's there were some, highly uneven signals that this 
divergence was becoming unsustainable. Facing the decline of 
indigenously-owned industry, economic elites, North and South, began to 
suggest that the answer to Ireland's viscous circle of dependency and 
unemployment lay in greater North-South integration. The realisation 
that Irish nationalism and republicanism had to re-forge a new all-island 
perspective was expressed in the deliberations of the New Ireland Forum 
and the Hume-Adams 'peace process' -a process of 'national 
reconciliation' that had the potential to encompass the Northern 
unionists. Finally there was increasing awareness that the British and Irish 
governments had a joint interest in containing the conflict and that both 
would benefit from establishing Anglo-Irish and North-South institutions 
to manage their common political agendas. 
In the 1990's, in the context of accelerated EU integration, each of these 
three pressures for a strengthened North-South context for material 
interests, ideological conflict, and state policy, were increasing. These 
pressures are examined in the three Chapters of Section 3. Before doing so, 
Chapter 5 provides some specific historical background to the process of EU 
integration. 
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Chapter 5 
Integration in Europe 
As transnational integration has accelerated states have attempted to 
maintain political control over increasingly globalised economic and social 
forces by acting jointly in 'global regions' (Hine 1992). As a result states 
have been transformed from 'bulwarks' against external influences into 
'transmission belts' between 'external' global and 'internal' regional levels 
(Cox 1992). States increasingly mediate between domestic 'national' society 
and transnational or non-national forces. Rather than "representing a 
'national' society and capital to the world" they "enforc(e) on the domestic 
economy and society the imperatives of a global economy" (Harris 1991: 80). 
These changing state roles form the wider context, indeed driving force, 
behind contemporary attempts to create a more integrated EU (Tsoukalis 
1991). European integration is riven by tensions between the politics of sub- 
state regional development and regionalism and the politics of states and 
nationalism. As 'national' societies are integrated into the EU 'macro- 
region' there is a greater emphasis on economic development at sub-state 
'micro-regional' levels and an increase in linkages between sub-state 
regions across state boundaries (Cox 1992b: 34). Macro and micro 
regionalism are mutually reinforcing and have generated new political 
forces as states in the EU lose elements of traditional national sovereignty 
in the less nationally-orientated West European socio-economic system. 
These linkages between 'macro' and 'micro' regional development, 
combined with fears of greater peripheralisation in the Single European 
Market, have stimulated a reassessment of politico-economic orientations 
in Ireland, North and South, which, as argued in Section 3, have 
significant implications for the national conflict. 
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At the same time the EU bolsters, even extends, the exercise of state 
sovereignty and reflecting this, political identification with regions 
remains much less powerful than national affiliation (Taylor 1983). Indeed, 
common EU policies, projected 'outwards', strengthen state powers 
suggesting that "the increasing density of global society gives states new 
geopolitical roles" (Mann 1993: 158). EU institutions express the state- 
centred constitution of the regional EU polity and "sit uneasily between 
being intergovernmental and being genuinely supranational" (Cochrane 
and Doogan 1993: 94). Again, this is reflected in Ireland, where the impact of 
diverging state policies, pursued by the UK and the Republic of Ireland 
acquire a greater significance in the integrated EU context. 
Using the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 3, it is suggested that 
this tension can be examined by focusing on three dimensions of the 
emerging EU social order. The re-definition of material interests as 
'regional' rather than as exclusively 'national' interests; the recasting of 
ideological conflict in regional as well as 'national' forms; and the 
emergence of institutions and policies designed to meet regional needs are 
all examined to illustrate the tension between 'macro' or 'micro' 
regionalism and state-centred nationalism in the EU. First though, the 
historical background to the emergence of EU institutions in the post war 
era is outlined. 
Historical development 
A number of interstate institutions were established in Western Europe in 
the aftermath of the Second World War. These forerunners of the EU 
began a process of integration aimed at creating a transnational West 
European polity, which would guarantee prosperity, underpin liberal 
democracy and maintain political stability. Initially these aims were linked 
to a post-War determination to heal divisions across Europe and to make 
war an impossibility. It was partly for this reason that the US government 
required West European states to distribute its Marshall aid collectively, 
through the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. This was 
quickly overtaken by more 'externally' driven concerns, first to build a 
common West European political bloc in the face of Communist economic 
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integration (the COMECON was set up in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955). 
In the late 1960's this was overtaken by a concern to preserve and extend 
EU economic capabilities in the face of growing "Americanisation" of 
global and West European markets, stimulating a wave of renewed 
integration in the early 1970's. By the 1980's similar concerns at 
competition from the economies of East Asia as well as from the US, 
inspired an extensive programme of integration, leading to the Maastricht 
Treaty and the creation of the European Union in 1993. 
The pace of regional integration in Western Europe has therefore, been 
driven by the fear of being 'overtaken' or 'outmoded' by external forces. 
Although it was initially established on more positive precepts and 
remains associated with 'functionalist' and 'neo-functionalist' attempts at 
creating a supra-state entity, these aspirations have, in practice, been 
combined with more negative fears of 'external threats'. This combination 
of aspirational and pragmatic, ad hoc motivations helps explain the 
disjointed emergence of EU institutions as a 'halfway house' between 
regions and states. State authority is uneasily juxta-posed with regional 
authority and EU policies invariably stand somewhere in-between the EU 
region and its member states. 
This tension was illustrated as early as 1951, with the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC), which put all production 
of coal and steel within six member states under the control of a 
multilateral "High Authority". For the more federalist minded European 
politicians it was seen as building the "foundations for... a federated 
Europe". Its six. members had access to considerable powers but they were 
all state appointees (Article 4) and could exercise executive powers on 
behalf of the member states only if they did not "restrict or distort normal 
competition within the common [coal and steel] market" (Article 57) (1). 
These themes of state cooperation and limited regional integration re- 
emerged as more ambitions proposals were tabled in 1952, under the 
'Pleven' plan for a European Army and a European Defense Community 
(EDC) with a European Political Community composed of state 
representatives that would establish a federal European Parliament. The 
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entire structure was to be subject to "safeguarding and appropriate 
representation of states" (Article 38 of the Treaty establishing the EDC, 
1952), but when they still failed to pass through the French National 
Assembly, the plans were shelved (2). 
Reacting to this failure, efforts at achieving integration were channelled 
into less directly political, more socio-economic measures. These came to 
fruition in the mid to late 1950's as political elites feared that individual 
European states were becoming enfeebled in the face of an over-bearing US 
economy, a fear that was only enhanced by the Suez conflict of 1956. In 1955 
the six ECSC member states agreed to establish a Committee of Enquiry to 
examine the means of harmonising economic, monetary and social 
policies, as well as of removing restrictions on the movement of capital 
and commodities in European markets. The Committee was heavily 
influenced by the ECSC and by the experience of Benelux, and its Report 
laid the basis for the Treaty of Rome, signed by the Six in 1957 (3). 
The Treaty was aimed at establishing a liberal trading regime within which 
states could pursue 'national' Keynesianism, a "symbiosis" that restricted 
the EU primarily to deregulative measures (Tsoukalis 1991: 29; Milward 
1993). Even in agricultural policy for instance, market regulation through 
the Common Agricultural Policy was seen as a means of ensuring that the 
creation of a 'free' market between the 'six' did not destabilise agricultural 
supply or farmers' incomes (Article 38). Pan-EU regional authority was 
made conditional on inter-state cooperation and, mirroring institutional 
arrangements for the ECSC, an appointed Commission was to work jointly 
with member states, represented in the Council of Ministers, in defining 
EU-wide priorities. 
In the late 1960's renewed attempts at integration were again stimulated by 
fears of external competition, and in 1969 the EC Commission proposed a 
move to "economic and monetary union... so that [the EC] can stand on an 
equal footing with the other great world powers" (4). The heads of state, 
meeting of 1969, agreed to relaunch the EC and establish a new timetable 
for integration. This was embodied in the Werner Report of 1970, agreed by 
the Council of Ministers in 1971, which proposed that "the principal 
142 
decisions of economic policy [will] be taken at the Community level and 
therefore that the necessary powers will be transfered from the national 
plane to the Community plane" (CEC 1970). 
This proved over-optimistic as the global regulatory framework, which had 
under-written convergence of domestic EC policy priorities, began to 
collapse in the early 1970's. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods System 
was followed by the successful restriction of oil supplies by OPEC which 
sent prices and wages spiralling in most EC countries. The resulting global 
recession led to divergence in the economic performance and economic 
policies of EC member states, in contrast with the 1960's. Some member 
states attempted to shadow the EC's most stable currency - the 
Deutschmark - while others, such as the UK and Italy, pursued a policy of 
competitive devaluation. There was a steep increase in protectionist 
measures, derogating from the GATT framework, and the EC began to act 
more confidently as a regional trading bloc in global fora such as in the 
Tokyo round of the GATT in 1975-9 (Tsoukalis 1991: 38; Laffan 1992: 53-5) (5). 
This divergence stalled the proposals for renewed integration. As the 
Commission pointed out, there was "no agreement on how to achieve a 
common economic and monetary policy", concluding that "in the present 
state of affairs no real progress can be expected" (CEC 1976: 21; Holland 
1992: 64). The only substantive outcome of this integrationist urge, eight 
years after the collapse of the US Dollar in the Bretton Woods exchange 
rate system, was the formation of a European Monetary System (EMS) in 
1979 which formalised the French and later, Italian shadowing of the 
Deutschmark by managing exchange rates in an 'adjustable peg' system 
known as the "Exchange Rate Mechanism". 
The third attempt at EU regional integration emerged in the 1980's, leading 
to revisions of the Treaty of Rome under the Single European Act of 1987 
and under the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, both aimed at stimulating 
heightened regional integration. This phase of integration - which was 
more successful than its forerunner in the early 1970's - had serious 
implications for Ireland's national conflict. It therefore forms the focus for 
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discussion in the following three strands of analysis, which begins with an 
examination of material interests in the EU 'macro' and 'micro' regions. 
Material Interests 
Economic or material interests played a key role in the development of the 
EU with phases of integration reflecting phases of economic growth. 
Growth of GDP in member states rose to about five percent per annum for 
the years after the Treaty of Rome until 1972, faster than US growth rates, 
thereby encouraging member states to pursue heightened integration in 
the early 1970's (6). The post-1971 collapse of US-sponsored economic 
regulation and of the post-War boom led to a decline in OECD growth 
rates, especially in Western European economies - and was a central factor 
in persuading EC member states to embark on the phase of renewed 
integration in the late 1980's and early 1990's (7). 
From its inception the EC was a national, political response to perceived 
common West European regional economic interests. There was a partial 
shift away from the 'national' economic framework with the integration of 
distribution and exchange in a common market (EEC) and with integration 
of the 'commanding heights' of industry in the ECSC and EURATOM and 
of commercial agriculture in the CAP. But further integration beyond 
financial compensation mechanisms in structural funding including, from 
1977, the European Regional Development Fund, and some limited 
exchange rate coordination from 1979, did not occur until the mid 1980's in 
the face of deep economic recession and renewed perceptions of economic 
insecurity. 
The EC had largely been a mechanism permitting the regional co- 
ordination of nationally orientated economic policies. Consequently there 
was a constant tension between nationally and regionally defined material 
interests that sharpened in the context of accelerated integration in the mid 
1980's. This tension is examined-by analysing the implications for material 
interests, first at the 'macro'-regional EU level, and second, at the 'micro'- 
regional substate level. 
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The EU 'macro'-region 
In the face of heightened competition from North American and East 
Asian economies in the 1980's states increasingly put their faith in greater 
"action at the community level" (8). EU integration was seen as offering a 
lifeline to fragmented national economies - as Helmut Kohl, the German 
Chancellor put it in 1993 - "Europe can hold its own in worldwide 
competition with Japan and North America only if it acts as one" (9). In the 
belief that there were "no national solutions to economic issues", a 
consensus developed on the need for exchange rate stability, balanced fiscal 
and monetary policies, labour market flexibility, and market integration 
(10). This generated a programme of accelerated neo-liberal integration 
managed by strengthened EU institutions in the late 1980's and, as with 
previous attempts at integration, there was a partial re-regulation at the EU 
level to foster "European champions" able to compete in global markets 
and a "neo-mercantilism" as the EU competed with other global regions in 
international fora (Cornett and Caporaso 1992: 228) (11). 
From the 1970's, 'national' capital in Western Europe and elsewhere was 
increasingly transnationalised in a shift away from the integration of 
national capital to the integration of capitals across different states, 
loosening their ties with states and territories. This internationalisation of 
capital in the world economy rendered the levers of 'national' economic 
policy increasingly inadequate, creating a 'trans-state' capitalism which still 
needed the state but also increasingly controlled it (Gill and Law 1989). This 
emergence of transnational material interests at the macro regional EU 
level can be outlined in terms of finance, trade and production. 
First, there was a marked increase in financial interdependence. EU states 
received 88`%% of all foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing to developed 
countries. A high proportion flowed either to or from EU states, suggesting 
a high degree of economic integration between them (49% of the UK FDI 
was EU-based in 1992). Both inflows and outflows of FDI grew 
exponentially in the mid to late 1980's (from £4 to £20 billion in the UK), to 
account for approximately 10% of EU GDP by 1992 (Agnew 1993; Das 1993). 
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As 'domestic' finance was globalised, resources were increasingly 
distributed according to global rather than 'national' rates of return. By the 
end of the 1980's commercial banks in OECD countries held 17% of OECD 
GDP in foreign financial assets, rising from 1.5% in 1980, while total yearly 
capital outflows were equivalent to 25`%, of OECD GNP contrasting with 5% 
in 1973 (12). International trading in equities had risen on average by 18% 
per annum between 1979 and 1988, totalling US$ 1.2tr by 1988, leading to 
enhanced financial interdependence, and to closer global correlation of 
stock prices, during both boom and bust (such as in the 1987 stock market 
crash) (Das 1993; Frieden 1991). But, rather than equalising global rates of 
return, this integration was highly destabilising as "improved liquidity and 
trading technology... [allowed] investors to move quickly into and out of 
domestic and international investment positions" and investment 
portfolios focussed on the more profitable shorter term markets (13). 
To a significant degree the logic of financial integration, expressing 
interests defined in an EU or global framework "diverged from the 
interests of specific nationally based industrial sectors" (Frieden 1991: 440). 
After 1945 EU states had introduced controls on capital flows to "deflect 
blows of international competition" and permit Keynesian demand 
management (Goodman and Pauly 1993: 79). In the 1970's and 1980's global 
finance flows encouraged states to deregulate capital markets - in Japan 
(1980), in the FRG (1981) and in Italy and France (1989). Only in the UK, 
when controls were removed in 1979, did this measure form part of a 
government's programme (Frieden 1991: 434). Without such controls and 
in the context of an exponential growth of the global capital market, the 
effectiveness of 'national' economic policies was greatly diminished. 
EU states sought to reconcile this clash between national priorities and 
global integration by acting together to strengthen exchange rate regulation, 
within the EMS and the ERM. But as these failed to address the issue of 
capital controls they were overwhelmed by capital speculation in the wake 
of the international recession of the early 1990's. Provisions were written 
into the 'Maastricht Treaty' for minimising government debt and inflation 
rates as a means of harmonising economic conditions, to achieve 
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'nominal' cohesion across EU economies rather than for strengthening 
'real' cohesion through competition policy, regional policy or employment 
policy. These 'convergence criteria' and the move to Delors 'Stage 2', with 
the proposed creation of the 'European Central Bank' (ECB) to monitor 
economic policies, institutionalised global financial constraints and tied 
them to agreed structures, effectively internationalising 'national' state 
policies. 
Second, EU trade was highly integrated. Exports accounted for an 
exceptionally high percentage of national income in EU states - in the 
decade from 1981 to 1990 exports accounted for an average of 28.5% of EU 
income - from 30.0% in Germany, 26.6% in the UK, to 59.1% in the 
Republic of Ireland, comparing with 13.2% of GDP in Japan and 8.2% of 
GDP in the US (European Economy 1992: 252-3; Cameron 1992: 37). This 
difference reflected high levels of intra-EU trade: in the 1980's 14.7% of the 
combined incomes of the twelve EU states, or 51'Yo of all exports in the EU 
were destined for other EU economies. This level of dependence on EU 
export markets varied between EU member states - from 34% for Spain, 
35% for the UK, to 53%º for Germany and 84%º for the Republic of Ireland - 
but the overall picture was of high, and increasing, trade integration in the 
regional, EU market. Again, this contrasted with Japan which was 
dependent on the Asia-Pacific region for only 36% of its export earnings, 
equivalent to 4.7% of Japanese GDP, while the US was dependent on the 
Americas for 35% of its export earnings, equivalent to 2.8% of US GDP 
(European Economy 1992: 253; Hine 1992). 
Following the Treaty of Rome, customs duties between the six members of 
the EEC were reduced by half and in successive EC enlargements this was 
extended to the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark (from 1973); to 
Greece (from 1981), to Spain and Portugal (from 1986); to the former East 
Germany (from 1990) and to Sweden, Austria and Finland (from 1995). 
Largely as a result of the increased volume of EC trade, imports from 
outside the Community fell as a proportion of total imports, from 55% in 
1960 to 43`%o in 1970. But from 1973 imports from non-EU states began to 
grow at a faster rate than intra-community trade, rising from 43% of total 
imports in 1970 to 45% in 1980, prompting concern in the late 1970's and 
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early 1980's at an economic and political "Euro-sclerosis" as national 
Keynesianism disintegrated in the face of intensified international 
competition. Economic recovery in the late 1980's, on a wave of market 
deregulation, partly stimulated by the Single European Act of 1987, led to a 
fall in the proportion of imports from outside the Community to 37% by 
1990 and intra-EU trade rose from 44% of total EU imports in 1980 and to 
51% by 1990 (European Economy 1992). 
Reflecting levels of competition from non-EU economies this phase of 
market integration had deeply uneven impacts. In terms of individual 
sectors, there was predictably, a substantial drop in intra-EU trade in 
clothing and textiles (from 70% in 1971 to 45% in 1989) and a marked 
decline in iron, steel and motor vehicles. Intra-EU trade in manufactured 
goods recovered in the 1980's, and, reflecting the CAP, trade in foodstuffs 
became consistently more EU orientated (rising from 301% in 1961 to 65% in 
1989) (European Economy 1992; Lloyd 1992) (14). 
Third, there was increased integration of productive capital. By 1991 one 
third of global private capital was owned by multinational or transnational 
corporations and their sales accounted for 25% of global GDP (United 
Nations 1993). There was a rapid increase in cross border, often intra-firm 
sourcing of 'intermediate' products, leading to a hollowing out of 
'national' firms as companies began to act less as 'national champions' and 
more as transnational or "global organisations" (United Nations 1993). 
This increased the mobility of productive capital as supplier contracts were 
significantly more 'footloose' than productive assets, allowing global 
conglomerates to switch their operations across national and regional 
borders to circumvent state or regional regulations. 
The phase of accelerated EU integration in the 1980's was aimed at enabling 
EU companies to compete in a larger, regionalised market-place - at 
creating "an economic environment within which European champions 
(were) better able to compete with their Japanese competitors" (Amin et al 
1992: 320). The SEM was seen as directly benefiting these pan-EU companies 
and, by direct implication, to the longer term survival of the wider EU 
economy. Production in the EU became increasingly concentrated as from 
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the mid 1980's, company funds were focussed on pan-EU takeovers and 
mergers, undermining product and process development, encouraging 
integration of goods markets rather than geographic specialisation and 
removing competitive pressures, leaving final goods markets and 
consumption patterns relatively untouched. Consequently, the bulk of 
trade creation in the 1980's involved trade in 'intermediate' goods between 
firms: from the early 1970's to the mid 1980's imports of such goods rose by 
101% to 30% in West Germany; by 18% to 381% in France; and by 20% to 37% 
in the UK. Again, reflecting the highly advanced integration process in the 
EU, this contrasted with only slight increases in external sourcing in the 
US, rising 5% to 10% and Japan, rising 11% to 5%) (15). 
Rationalisation, reorganisation and relocation generated an EU "system of 
production" and stimulated a boom in corporate profitability in the late 
1980's, leading to the development of "a more unified and articulated 
European economy", that was increasingly in the hands of an EU corporate 
elite of favoured oligopolists (Rosewarne 1992: 96). Between 1983 and 1989 
mergers and takeovers registered at the Commission quadrupled (from 155 
to 662, falling to 455 in 1990) and in 1991 the Commission sounded a note 
of caution, commenting that there had been a "remarkable expansion" of 
international merger and takeover activity in the' late 1980's, expressing 
some concern that they appeared to be aimed at strengthening market 
positions (CEC 1991a: 417) (16). 
There were increasing fears" that EU companies would play off the regions 
and the states of the EU against each other, encouraging a rush to the 
unregulated, de-skilled end of the labour market, a process of 'social 
dumping' in which short term profitability would override longer term 
development strategies. In the 1990's these fears began to be substantiated. 
In the Irish Republic for instance, the electronics firm - Digital - relocated, 
leaving a public infrastructure that had been tailored to their needs (17). In 
the UK the EU-owned Hoover company relocated from Dijon to Scotland in 
search of lower wages and - ironically - Nestle Rowntree relocated from 
Glasgow and Newcastle to "more modern facilities" at Dijon (18). As a 
"relocation specialist" with Ernst and Young Accountants confirmed in 1993, 
manufacturing firms had ceased to be concerned with competing in their 
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national market and instead had begun to focus on achieving scale 
economies in the EU economy as a whole (19). The European Commission 
viewed this beggar-thy-neighbour competition as particularly damaging to 
EU economic prospects and argued that harmonisation of labour market 
policies was the main means of preventing it. In 1993 for instance, the 
Commissioner for competition policy proposed, in his annual Report, a 
strengthening of common EU social policies as a counter-weight to 
increased company power in the increasingly deregulated SEM (20). 
Overall, economic integration was leading to a "decay of that older 
relationship between national capitalism and national solidarity" (21). 
Integration, in finance, trade and production struck against the interests of 
the lesser, 'national' or substate, regional 'champions', and threatened to 
widen inter-regional disparities and undermine social cohesion in the EU 
(Kay 1992). As EU economic integration lifted capital out of the 'national' 
framework, this uneven development between substate regions 
undermined state structures from within. A major disjuncture emerged 
between the impacts of corporate decisions, often taken at the EU level and 
influenced by EU-wide, more often, global economic factors, and the 
localised effects of plant closures or plant relocations. The lack of state or of 
EU institutional mediation of this local-global interface, except in terms of 
retraining packages and social assistance to cushion the impacts, reflected a 
widening power-gap between the owners of capital and the people that 
produced it (Benington 1990: 16). To some degree, from the 1980's this 
power gap was being filled by sub-state regional elites as they reacted to 
widening disparitities in the emerging Single Market. 
'Micro-regions' - regional disparities 
Integration into the SEM was encouraging substate micro-regions to seek 
greater local economic powers. As the tools of 'national' economic 
management were weakened, development strategies at the substate - 
regional - level became more significant and political autonomy was 
increasingly perceived as an urgent economic necessity. This largely 
reflected increased divergence in regional fortunes that had begun after 
economic collapse in the 1970's and had been exacerbated during a partial 
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recovery under deregulated, neo-liberal policies in the late 1980's and early 
1990's. 
The 'long boom' that had been built on the basis of national Keynesianism 
from the late 1950's to the early 1970's had led to increased convergence 
between the regions of the EU. The period of economic stagnation from 
1972 to 1985 saw a rapid divergence between these regions, as economic 
growth declined and was increasingly concentrated in the already 
economically advanced EU regions. In the UK the heartland-periphery 
division of labour, between the consumer industries of the Midlands and 
South East and the heavy industry of Northern England, Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland, that had emerged in the immediate post-war era, 
was translated into a divide between expanding producer services, 
especially financial services, in the South-East, and deindustrialisation 
elsewhere. 
Restructuring had a similar impact in West Germany, where economic 
divisions emerged between North and South, with Baden Wurttemberg, 
Heidelberg and southern Bayern, including Munich developing a role as 
research and production centres for mechanical and electrical engineering, 
especially in the auto and defence industries, while the older industrial 
regions of Northern Germany, such as in Nordrhein-Westfallen, became 
the German equivalent of the UK's peripheral 'rust belt'. In France there 
was also sharp economic collapse in the industrial heartlands of Nord pas 
de Callais, Lorraine and Ile de France while a new development pole 
emerged in the South, in the Rhone-Alpes, centred on electronics, 
computer production and aircraft industries. Meanwhile, in Italy there was 
industrial collapse in the North, partially mitigated by an industrial revival 
in Lombardy and Piedmont, serving to sharpen North-South differentials 
as the South continued to fail to develop. Spain experienced a similar 
collapse in its industrial regions, particularly in the North, centred on the 
Basque country, but also in Catalonia and specifically, Barcelona while, in 
contrast, from the 1970's the Ebro valley, Catalonia and Madrid emerged as 
centres for international investment, industrial production and producer 
services. 
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The contrast between deindustrialised regions, unindustrialised regions 
and regions that were in some sense 'internationalised', with access to 
transnational capital and integrated into transnational divisions of labour, 
sharpened in the 1980's and 1990's (Campagni et al 1991: 308-10). This 
occured despite EU regional policy which was increasingly directed at 
narrowing economic differentials between EU regions rather than between 
EU national economies. Although funding was doubled in 1988 and was 
focused on those most 'in need', it still stood at a mere 0.9% of EU GDP or 
0.46% of EU capital formation, comparing unfavourably with the supposed 
efficiency gains of the single market, widely expected to accrue to core 
regions (Perrons 1992: 187; CEC 1987). This also contrasted for instance, with 
an average 91% fiscal redistribution in the US Federal budget, where 
maximum per capita GDP disparities stood at 140%, comparing with 240% 
in the EU (Suarez-Villa and Roura 1993). 
In general terms, as highlighted by successive Commission Reports on 
regional development, national economies had become more 
'regionalised' in the 1990's (CEC 1979,1984,1987 and 1990). The First and 
Second Reports drew extensively on the forty variables measuring regional 
development collated by EUROSTAT - to develop a typology of EC regions 
and the six categories yielded by the Third Report were used as the basis of 
the reformed EC regional policy that was agreed in 1988 - distributing 
structural funds to each of the six types of region - those "lagging behind"; 
regions with declining industries; agricultural regions; declining urban 
regions; frontier regions; and peripheral regions. 
More significant though, the Third Report of 1987 - before the '1992' 
programme began - argued that interregional disparities were becoming 
more important than interstate disparities and concluded that "divergences 
in unemployment cannot be traced back chiefly to differing national 
trends" (CEC 1987: 63) Whilst the latter had remained relatively constant, 
inter-regional inequalities were shown to have widened at an alarming 
rate. The difference between the twenty-five regions with the highest 
unemployment rate and those with the lowest unemployment rate within 
the 11 EC states (excluding Greece) had widened from at 5.7% in 1976 to 
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14.6% in 1985 and for the nine member states of 1974 the gap had widened 
from 4.3%, in 1970 to 11.4% in 1985 (22). 
Concerns about the possible negative effects of integration on regional 
development had been raised as early as 1970 - when the 'Werner Report' 
on economic and monetary union argued that an EC-wide regional policy 
was a necessary component of any move to accelerated integration (CEC 
1970). In 1990, two years before the official 'completion' of the Single 
Market and during negotiations over closer monetary and political union, 
the Fourth regional report showed that unemployment disparities had 
remained relatively constant - at 14.1% for the 11 EU member states, 
compared to the figure of 14.6% for 1985 - despite the increased expenditure 
on EU regional funds (CEC 1990, Tables A and C). 
The report speculated that the integration process was causing these 
disparities, but rather than calling for more effective measures to correct 
this - beyond very limited fiscal redistribution - it sought consolation for 
the weaker regions in the notion of 'specific regional competitive 
advantages' within the SEM. Drawing on the more optimistic versions of 
the 'post-Fordist' future, it asserted that the distinction between "high" and 
"low" technology was disappearing and that "flexible specialization" would 
reduce the importance of 'scale economies', allowing the less advantaged 
regions to become more prosperous by producing specialised products for 
'niche' markets, even when dependent on low growth sectors of industry 
(CEC 1990: 80-1). 
This perspective was central to Europe 2000 - the Commission's discussion 
document on regional development in which it was suggested that "new 
location factors" were opening up economic opportunities for peripheral 
regions in the SEM (CEC 1991b: 53). It argued that "flexible production 
systems" were making firms more mobile and that their location decisions 
were increasingly influenced by qualitative 'lifestyle' factors.. Drawing on 
the experiences of 'Silicon Glen' in Scotland, Rennes in France, the Pais 
Vasco in Spain and noting the potential of information technology and 
telecommunications for altering 'comparative advantage', it argued that 
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increased mobility could help the 'periphery' and "promote a more 
balanced distribution of economic activity" (CEC 1991b: 199). 
This upbeat conclusion underplayed the continuing, indeed sharpening 
difficulties faced by peripheral economies, reflected in sharpened inter- 
regional disparities in unemployment and income (Perrons 1992). In 
particular, the Southern European "orbit of underdevelopment" from 
Southern Italy to Southern Spain to Greece and the West European 
"Atlantic arc" from Portugal to Ireland including Northern and Western 
parts of the UK, remained significantly and in relative terms - increasingly 
- less developed than the "vital axes" of EU development (Dunford and 
Perrons 1994). 
Europe 2000 had identified growing employment in key growth sectors in a 
Southern European "growth axis", from Baden Wurtemburg and 
Lombardy, through the Rhone Alpes to Catalonia. This complemented the 
"traditional heartland of industrial Europe" that extended from Northern 
Italy across western Germany, Northern France, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and South East England (CEC 1991: 1-2). Tendencies in the so-called 
"motors" of this new "growth axis" - Catalonia, Baden Wurtemberg, 
Lombardy and Rhone Alpes - can be contrasted* with developments in 
more peripheral regions such as the Sud region of Italy, the Sur region of 
Spain and the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (See Appendix 2). 
In terms of employment structure, there appeared to be a rapid growth in 
the significance of employment in marketed services, both in the new 
growth centres of the EU and in its more peripheral regions. This was 
accompanied by a rapid decline in the proportion employed in 
manufacturing in the new growth centres. In the peripheries meanwhile, 
agriculture declined in importance and manufacturing remained as 
significant an employer in 1990 as it was in 1980. This shift to a more 
uniform sectoral spread of employment across the EU did not necessarily 
imply a converging EU spatial division of labour. Concentration of less 
advanced, labour intensive employment in the periphery while capital- 
labour substitution reduced manufacturing employment in the core 
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regions is not reflected in a strict sector-by-sector analysis (See Appendix 2, 
charts 1-10, tables 1 and 2). 
This uneven distribution of the stages of production, rather than the 
sectoral divergence, has forced the periphery to absorb cyclical shifts in 
production - clearly reflected in levels of unemployment particularly of 
long term unemployment in the core regions, compared with the 
periphery (See Appendix 2, charts 11 and 12). There was an increasing 
separation between research or development using highly skilled, 
relatively well paid labour, creating a sustainable economic base in the core 
regions and unskilled neo-Fordist production or even outworking, using 
low paid employment in peripheral regions. EU manufacturers appeared to 
be relocating to make use of relatively cheap labour often in 'greenfield', 
non industrialised regions without a tradition of trade union organisation, 
hence such employment growth is invariably dependent upon external 
decision-makers and is a measure of economic weakness and 
unsustainability rather than of economic strength (NESC 1989: 338). 
The picture that emerges then, is of widened disparities in income levels 
and incidence of unemployment - particularly long term unemployment - 
and convergence in sectoral employment and in manufacturing structure. 
The demand for qualitative measures to reduce these inter-regional 
disparities, such as the re-direction of capital flows at the EU-wide level, 
rather than relatively insignificant financial transfers from EU funds, 
became more urgent as economic integration accelerated. Increased 
deregulation of highly oligopolistic European markets stimulated intra- 
industry rather than interregional trade and the policy of developing 
"European Champions" able to compete in global markets directly 
undermined development prospects in the less developed regions (Begg 
1989; Amin et al 1992: 32). Meanwhile, efforts to achieve "nominal 
cohesion" between tax rates, exchange rates and inflation rates was likely to 
worsen interregional inequalities and undermine the process of achieving 
"real convergence" between the regions (Williams et al 1991) (23). 
As regions competed to influence the location of production, local income 
levels were held down, economic cohesion was damaged and EU-wide 
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economic prosperity was undermined. These problems of EU-wide 
deflationary pressures had been predicted in a confidential Commission 
study which argued that the removal of exchange controls had "eliminated 
a major means of correcting supply imbalances across the community and 
of restoring the competitiveness of... regions which suffer losses in trade 
shares", leaving them with no option but to engage in a particularly 
damaging process of competitive deflation (24). In 1991, for instance, the 
European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Matters 
pointed out that existing inter-regional disparities in the EU were almost 
twice as wide as in the US, and argued that economic and social cohesion - 
"the well-being for all citizens" - should become the "unifying feature of 
community policies" (European Parliament 1991a: 20; 1992a). The failure to 
recognise these issues was reflected in the necessity to widen 'ERM bands' 
to 15% in 1993 and the failure to meet the nominal 'convergence criteria' 
almost as soon as they had been agreed (25). 
Indeed, economic prospects across the EU hinged on the ability to reduce 
social and regional inequalities and maintain acceptable levels of effective 
demand in the EU economy as a whole (Dunford and Perrons 1994). There 
were some signals that such concerns were being forced onto the EU 
political agenda in the early 1990's, embodied in. the proposals for neo- 
Keynesian reflation and 'supply-side Keynesianism' at the EU level. To 
some extent these were reflected in emerging EU urban policies, in 
attempts to revise the Maastricht 'convergence criteria', in the 'European 
Recovery Programme' of limited re-flation, and in the reflationary aspects 
of the Delors' White Paper on reducing unemployment (26). These issues 
are further discussed below, in which there is some attempt to sketch out 
the ideological conflicts between states and regions raised by the phase of 
renewed EU integration; again, first at the 'macro' and second at the 
'micro' regional levels. 
Ideological conflict 
The EU was constructed out of a desire to reconcile enemies in the post war 
era and to underpin the construction of liberal democracy in Germany and 
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Italy. The Union would assist in the process of re-constructing a more a 
stable Western European capitalist bloc - an objective that was particularly 
urgent in the context of the East-West Cold War. As was argued earlier, this 
defensive ideological rationale was re-formulated in the late 1960's in the 
context of declining US hegemony, and again in the face of intensified 
competition from East Asian economies during the early 1980's, suggesting 
that the basis for European integration was "the enemy against which 
Europe was allegedly forced and felt obliged to fight" (Harle 1990: 5). 
These profoundly negative, reactive ideological foundations for European 
integration reflected the lack of a positive set of common values unifying 
the EU member states. The national and 'macro'- or 'micro'-regional 
framework for political legitimation were consequently in constant tension 
in a 'Union' that was propelled by an impulse to increase the power of 
Western European states acting together as a regional bloc. Indeed, amongst 
EU politicians, "the nationalist European is the most common breed of all" 
as across the EU, states constructed often tempestuous marriages between 
national interests and EU regional integration (Gibb and Wise 1993: 36). 
Despite this, a regional rather than a state framework for ideological and 
political conflict began to emerge as socio-economic issues were 
increasingly defined as regional issues, of concern to EU institutions or to 
substate regional authorities. This non-national framework for addressing 
and resolving such issues was in constant tension with the existing 
national state framework -a tension that was focussed on the definition of 
political authority at the EU 'macro' level and at the 'micro' substate level. 
'Macro'-regionalism 
The revival of macro-regionalism in the EU was a product of ideological 
convergence around a common political agenda, generated out of a 
common feeling of economic vulnerability. The final defeat of 'national' 
Keynesianism was signalled with a series of political defeats in the late 
1970's and early 1980's: in 1979 with the destruction of Callaghan's social 
contract between labour and capital in the UK; in 1982 with the defeat of 
Schmidt in West Germany; and in 1983 with the collapse of the 
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Mitterrand's expansionary economic policy in France. These stimulated 
programmes of 'national' economic retrenchment and laid the 
groundwork for a pan-EU consensus on the need for market deregulation 
as concepts of the "social market" which had formed the basis of consensus 
between European Christian Democrat and Socialist Parties until the late 
1970's were replaced by concepts of market efficiency (Thompson 1993). 
Indeed, "it is hard to imagine '1992' having been initiated except for the 
swing away from socialism and toward free markets that occured in the 
1980's" (Shapiro 1992: 134). 
These ideological shifts were also reflected in emerging political divisions 
in the European Parliament (EP) - between a group advocating an EU-led 
'European recovery' founded on deregulation and those advocating a more 
explicitly political initiative to stimulate 'European Union', conflicting 
emphases that were expressed in the controversial "Albert-Ball" report of 
1983 and in the "Draft treaty on European Union" passed by the European 
Parliament in 1984 (European Parliament 1983). At the same time, 
European multinational companies took the initiative to lobby for a 
renewed programme of EU integration on a neo-liberal basis. Encouraged 
by the European Commission, twelve of the largest EU electronics 
companies formed the "roundtable of European industrialists" which 
pressed the Commission to embark on a programme of EU-wide 
deregulation - what they published as the Europa 2000 plan - and struck an 
agreement that led to Commission initiatives encouraging pre-competition 
agreements in the telecommunications and information technology 
industries (Tsoukalis 1991: 46; Moravcsik 1991). 
Ten years later, in 1994, following the surge in cross-EU merger activity, it 
was possible to speak of the formation of a relatively unified "European 
corporate system" (Amin et al 1992: 326). Transnational corporate interests 
maintained their foothold in EU structures in the 1990's and lobbied for 
greater EU integration, on their terms, particularly in monetary matters 
through the "Association for Monetary Union in Europe" (Freiden 1991) 
(27). Meanwhile, the lack of a unifying pan-EU political culture, combined 
with the destabalising effects of deregulation was expressed in a greater 
salience of regional and national divisions. 
158 
EU socio-economic integration exposed the exclusivist, reactive social 
principles of Western European political culture as the process of forging a 
European civic identity led to a sharpened distinction between 'nationals' 
and 'non-nationals', defined in ethnic, religious or cultural terms 
(Maclaughlin 1993). As EU integration was built on existing EU member 
states, the right to EU citizenship was confered only on the 'nationals' of 
EU member states - not on their 'residents' - and as many member states 
confered nationality on the basis of 'blood' rather than place of residence or 
even - in the German case - place of birth, this translated into an ethnically 
based rather than a geographically based definition of EU citizenship 
(Maastricht Treaty, Article 8.1). At the same time, the dismantling of border 
controls within the EU led to increased internal surveillance as, for 
instance, inter-police coordination increased, a tendency symbolised by the 
realocation of 1600 customs officers across the EU from frontier duty to 
intelligence gathering (28). 
Beginning with the Dublin Convention of 1990 EU member states began 
constructing "a wall around the EU high enough to allow the internal 
frontiers to be dismantled": in 1992 an EU list of "undesirables" was drawn 
up, and states agreed to reject asylum applications for refugees who had 
passed through a 'safe' 'third' country, effectively transforming bordering 
Eastern European countries into human buffer zones. This was 
complemented by a range of internal controls as a pan-EU police 
intelligence system, autonomous from democratic accountability, was 
constructed on the model of the "Schengen Agreement" of 1985 which by 
1992 had been signed by all EU states except the UK and Ireland. The 
Agreement allowed information-sharing on all aspects of state security 
with individual files to be kept secret from those subject to "discreet 
surveillance", and permitted internal EU extradition without explanation - 
a reactionary move to increasingly exclusive internal controls that "had all 
the hallmarks of an authoritarian state" (29). 
More generally this reflected the lack of any clearly defined political or 
cultural configuration of "European-ness" (Schlesinger 1994). Indeed, most 
EU political parties seeking or exercising power in state parliaments saw 
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the EU as bolstering their state-centred version of EU politics - as "an 
extremely effective transnational vehicle for national interests", providing 
both allies and alibies (30). In Germany for instance, the ruling Christian 
Democratic Party called for German "national belonging" in the context of 
EU integration in 1993, the first time that mainstream post war German 
parties had entered an election campaign with an avowedly 'patriotic' 
platform (31). Meanwhile, in the UK, the British Conservative Party 
wavered between a nationalist rejection of EU integration, advocated by a 
minority of 'Europhobe' Tory MP's in the House of Commons, and an 
equally nationalist (in fact Gaullist) preference for posturing as a champion 
of British interests at the EU level, arguing that "whatever happens in the 
Community the French will be no less French, the Germans no less 
German the Danes no less Danish". As the Conservative Party Chair - 
Norman Fowler - emphasised, "we are certainly committed to Europe. We 
are also at the same time committed to British interests". The British 
Labour Party also adopted this latter approach, pledging in its 1994 
European manifesto that it would "increase the strength of Britain's voice 
in Europe", and insisting that the unanimity principle be preserved for 
"key areas of national interest" at the Council of Ministers (32). 
Reflecting this persistence of national orientations, attempts at building a 
more politically unified EU foundered on the divergent national interests 
of member states and EU structures have been built on economic, 
functional cooperation, not on a common, shared political identity. Even 
where integration touched on wider issues - for instance in EU cultural and 
media policy - policies were aimed at defending existing 'national' cultures 
against encroachments (from the US media industry) rather than at 
defining an inclusive, common EU cultural configuration (33). Perhaps 
more important, in looking eastwards, EU policies - particularly trade 
policy - could hardly have been less friendly. As a Polish Defence Minister 
pointed out - the Commission and member states had haggled over Eastern 
European import quotas when the total amounted to no more than 1% of 
total EU imports (34). 
This was further illustrated by the breakdown of intergovernmental 
political consensus around the Maastricht Treaty in the context of 
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sharpened recession and monetary crisis in 1992-3. Despite the concerted 
efforts of EU central banks - spending the equivalent of DM284b1 in the six 
months from June 1992 - currency markets exerted downward pressure on 
a number of EU currencies - especially Sterling which had entered at an 
over-valued ERM 'peg' in 1990 and was forced to leave the Mechanism in 
October 1992. "Ancient reflexes reasserted themselves" as British 
government ministers accused German financiers of deliberately deserting 
Sterling, while French ministers did likewise to British financiers and 
editorials in the German, Italian and French press appealed for their 
governments to defend their national interests (35). 
While national economies and national cultures were defended by 
common action at the EU level, so-called 'non-nationals' were denied EU 
citizenship or were turned away at its borders. This politics of fear 
encouraged a drift towards the lowest common denominator amongst EU 
member states - whether in terms of economic, social or cultural regulation 
and ensured that the most successful political initiatives at the EU level 
were those aimed at excluding and insulating 'fortress Europe' from the 
various international pressures, including from population flows. 
Certainly the most tragic and probably the most significant consequence of 
this process of redrawing boundaries in Europe was the failure to take 
responsibility for the war in Yugoslavia, where EU states presented 
themselves as neutral arbiters, as a "bastion of Western civilisation.. in the 
face of oriental barbarism", wanting to "establish a kind of balance of guilt 
where everybody is equally mad", rather than act to defend a multi- 
cultural, not "ethnically cleansed" European society in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(36). 
This compromise or contradiction between the creation of a West 
European, EU-focussed identity and the pre-existing national identities on 
which it was built was perhaps most clearly exposed by the attempts to 
establish an EU institutional jurisdiction. The process of devising a legal 
definition of EU political authority resulted in a "compromise between the 
inadequate and the impossible" as European lawyers attempted to bridge 
the ideological gaps between national sovereignty and regional integration 
(Hoffmann 1994: 18). In the 1960's for instance, the European Court of 
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Justice (ECJ) interpreted the Treaty of Rome as creating a constitutional 
regime rather than a simple agreement between sovereign states (Shapiro 
1992: 126). It established the doctrine of "direct effect which allowed 
individuals to challenge member states through their national parliaments 
and if necessary, through the European Court should states fail to 
implement EU Regulations and Directives (in the Van Gend en Loos case 
of 1963) and, the following year this was underlined through the doctrine 
of EU legal supremacy (in the Costa v. ENEL case of 1964) (Cameron 
1992: 53). These legal doctrines closed off the option of selective 
implementation of EU law and effectively 'nationalised' community 
obligations, leading to the "empty seat" crisis over the use of the French 
veto in the Council of Ministers in 1965-66. This stimulated a parallel 
'nationalisation' of the EU institutional system in the 1970's, as member 
states became more concerned to influence the decision-making process, 
leading to growing state penetration of supranational EC institutions. 
Similarly, in the 1980's, extended EU authority under the majority voting 
system introduced with the Single European Act (SEA), was followed by a 
period of increased state penetration of the institutions (Weiler 1990). 
The European Parliament (EP) also reflected conflicts between states and 
the 'macro'-region. Since 1979 MEPs were directly elected on an EU basis, 
every four years, but they were not elected on the same polling day nor 
even under the same electoral system as member states could not agree on 
the appropriate timing or system for the elections. Many MEP's held office 
as members of their 'national' parliament and in some cases, also as 
members of their local or regional authority. European political parties 
were formed - the European Socialist Party in 1974, the European Peoples' 
Party and the European Liberal Democrats in 1977, in anticipation of the 
first direct elections but there have been constant confusions and 
contradictions between community and 'national' Party manifestos, with 
the European Parties offering support to national groupings during EP 
elections rather than campaigning on a pan-EU basis. 
Overall, the formation of a west European political bloc was fraught with 
ideological and political conflicts between national states and EU regional 
authority. The resulting mixture of 'macro'-regional and national 
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orientations was written into the development of EU policies and 
institutions. 
'Micro'-regional isnº 
Tensions between the national political framework and the 'macro'- 
regional framework for ideological development were paralleled by similar 
conflicts at the substate regional level. The late 1970's and 1980's had seen a 
progressive decline in the role of the 'national' state in the regulation of 
the domestic economy which was accompanied - and perhaps caused - by a 
collapse in economic growth. The failure to construct a replacement 
regulatory regime at the EU level, instead choosing further, EU-led 
deregulation through the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, led to a 
significant widening of disparities between substate regions in the late 
1980's, despite the rise in EU-directed regional transfers - which were seen 
by many as a "cynical sop to soften the inexorable logic of free market 
competition" (37). This stimulated a micro-regional response, in the form 
of increased demands for political and economic autonomy from national 
states. 
As EU membership was widened in 1973,1982 and 1985, EU states became 
increasingly concerned to minimise interregional disparities. The 
'European Regional Development Fund' (ERDF) was established in 1975 
and the Commission was given the responsibility for drawing up 
assessments of EU regions; to be published every four years. As noted 
earlier, these assessments came to assume central importance in the 
calculation of relative regional deprivation and in the distribution of 
regional aid - particularly from 1988 when the Council of Ministers decided 
to concentrate funds in regions "lagging behind" (the so-called "objective 
one" regions) (CEC 1988). 
As the economic significance of carving up the EU into regions and 
ranking them according to ERDF objectives increased, so did its political 
significance. The Commission had an interest in advocating an EU-wide 
regional policy and encouraging the growth of regional representation as a 
means of enhancing its own powers as well as of improving social and 
163 
economic cohesion. Although the links between the Commission and 
regional interests were strongest in the Regional affairs directorate, both 
the Environment and Competition directorate increasingly recognised the 
need to draw up common EU policies that catered for regions as well as for 
states (CEC 1992a; 1992b: 428). 
In alliance with the regions, the Commission was engaged in a process of 
defining an EU-wide regional development policy that, by necessity 
undermined and superseded existing state authority. In the process it 
legitimised autonomist movements as regions worked with . 
EU 
institutions to challenge member states' development priorities. This led 
to a proliferation of disputes over 'national' and regional priorities and the 
use of EU regional funds for state expenditure programmes (the 
'subsidiarity' and 'additionality' debates), in some cases - most notably in 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland - leading to the creation of political or 
administrative structures in the regions (Leonardi et al 1992) (38). 
The legitimacy of regionalism was also enhanced by the European 
Parliament and its Regional Policy Committee. The two 'Regions of the 
Community' conferences which the Parliament sponsored jointly with 
regional associations in 1984 and 1991 played a key'role in driving forward 
the Commission's agenda. The first conference led directly to the creation 
of the Association of European Regions (in 1985 - by 1994 it had 171 
members) and the Consultative Council of Local and Regional Authorities 
(in 1988); and the second ensured that the 'Committee for the Regions' was 
not written out of the 'Maastricht Treaty' by the European Council when it 
met to approve the Treaty in December 1991 (39). 
Partly encouraged by EU institutions and in response to the 'threats and 
opportunities' of the SEM, sub-state regional groupings sought greater 
financial assistance from the 'structural' funding regimes managed by EU 
institutions and demanded greater political power to enhance their 
autonomy from national states. Across the EU regional elites attempted to 
gear their regions to the needs of international capital, 'plugging into' 
trans-national markets and networks and seeking to develop regionally- 
focused systems of innovation as a means of reversing deindustrialisation, 
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to achieve what some observers called "regional inversion" (Suarez-Villa 
and Roura 1993). In many cases the regional authorities played a key, neo- 
corporatist role in stimulating economic development, linking 'Eurocrats', 
multinational companies, the local bourgeoisie and the local trade union 
movement. As a result, the lack or weakness of regional political structures 
was increasingly seen to have a debilitating effect on regional economic 
performance (Harvie 1990; European Dialogue 1993; Leonardi et al 1992: 
265). 
This increased EU-orientation of local and regional authorities was 
expressed in a burgeoning of the EU regional lobby - nothing less than an 
"explosion of political activity at the subregional level" (Anderson J. J. 
1990: 428). Authorities began opening offices in Brussels to ensure that their 
interests were being served by EU institutions - to compete and sometimes 
to collaborate with existing Brussels-based state representations. Bavaria 
was the first region to fund a representative in Brussels, following a 
breakdown in relations between the regional and the Federal government 
on EU related issues in 1986 (40). By 1992 all 16 Lander had joined Bavaria, 
along with many other EU regional and local authorities - including 26 
authorities from the UK (41). 
Even in the UK - one of the EU's most centralised states - regional and 
national groupings had intensified their demands for autonomy, fearing 
further political marginalisation and economic deterioration in the Single 
Market. Neo-corporatist 'partnerships' were established at the local or 
regional level bringing together local representatives, commercial interests, 
trade unions and educational establishments, to maximise opportunities in 
the SEM. The Campaign for a Scottish, for a Welsh and, in England, for a 
Northern Assembly, argued that regional autonomy was urgently required 
in the SEM (European Dialogue 1993; Scott and Millar 1992). The 'North- 
West Regional Association' and the 'West Midlands Regional Forum' 
were encouraged by the European Commission to bid for the 1995-99 
tranche of regional funds in parallel with central government departments 
while in London the need to jointly lobby for European regional 
development funds brought together the Conservative-controlled London 
Boroughs Association and the Labour-controlled Association of London 
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Authorities (Birch and Holliday 1993; Rose 1992) (42). In Northern Ireland 
meanwhile, a cross-community coalition including business organisations 
and local authorities established the 'Northern Ireland Centre in Europe', 
and business interests campaigned for North-South economic integration 
in an all-Ireland regional economy (See Anderson and Goodman 1993, 
1994a, 1994b). 
Welsh and Scottish nationalists, initially hostile to EC membership, also 
became enthusiastic advocates of EU integration - primarily as it was seen 
as favouring the case for national independence in the face of sharpened 
British statism during the 1980's (Keating and Jones 1991) (43). In 1989 the 
Plaid Cymru linked their campaign for an independent Wales to the 
process of EU integration - using the slogan "Wales in Europe" and 
demanding "full national status for Wales in the EU". The 1994 manifesto, 
Making Europe work for Wales, argued that the EU was moving towards a 
Europe of the peoples in which Wales would be "an ideal unit" and 
suggested that the Council of Ministers should be extended to include 
representatives of the regions - making it a "senate of the nations and 
historic regions"(44). The Scottish Nationalist Party policy paper of 1992 - 
Scotland: a European nation - launched the slogan of "independence in 
Europe", rejecting those that would "fob Scots off" with regional status in a 
Europe of the Regions and calling for Scotland to be transformed from a 
"second class region of Britain into a first class nation in Europe". Its 
manifesto for the 1994 EP elections - Power for change - favoured Scotland 
becoming "a powerful partner in the new EU of equal member states... a 
full and equal member of the European family", not "separated from the 
mainstream by little Englanders in London" (45). 
In 1992 the President of the Commission - Jacques Delors - appealed for 
politicians to look to the EU to illustrate how diversity could be a strength 
rather than a weakness, and there was some evidence that this was 
occuring across the EU as sub-state nationalist and regionalist parties 
increasingly defined their goals in an EU framework (46). In the Basque 
country, where the total nationalist vote rose to 661% of the total electorate 
in 1990, the Nationalist Party leader Xabier Arzalluz aspired to regional 
autonomy within the EU, arguing that the key to Basque independence lay 
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in an EU constitution which would override the Spanish one, offering the 
region a "future within an EU which, with the disappearance of nation 
states, would dissolve its tensions with Madrid" (47). In Belgium, 
meanwhile, the Flemish regional government explicitly linked its 
campaign for increased independence to the process of EU integration with 
the slogan "Flanders-Europe 2000" and the President of the Government of 
Flanders - Luc van den Brande - suggested that the Committee of the 
Regions would speed up the regions' transition to independence (48). In 
Italy meanwhile, the leader of the pro-federalist and racist Northern 
League argued that he was "in the avant garde of a new politics in Europe 
which you could say was made up of regions under the umbrella of the EU 
rather than the nation-states" (49). 
In addition to increased pressures for regional powers, regional groupings 
'clubbed together' in interregional Associations spanning different EU 
states. While many were "at best... embryonic: at worst... the wishful 
thinking of... vested interests" (Cochrane 1993), there was little doubt that 
the membership and objectives of some of these Associations reflected the 
deeply uneven access to economic opportunities in the integrated SEM. 
The Single Market threatened exclusion of the less developed regions, thus 
fuelling insecurity (Massey 1993) and encouraging regional groupings to 
build closer working relationships with each other. Consequently, the 
failure to achieve inter-regional cohesion in the SEM encouraged 
interregional alliances reaching out across the EU, giving political 
expression to the sharpened lines of inter-regional inequality. 
Unsurprisingly it was the more prosperous regions that took the lead in 
forging new inter-regional development axes. Catalonia, Lombardy, Baden- 
Wurtemburg and Rhone-Alpes - the so-called 'four motors' of the EU - 
carved out a niche for themselves in the new European economy forming 
"another association of the 'haves"' similar to the OECD or the G7 group of 
industrialised states at the global level (Cooke 1993; Borras 1993) (50). Set up 
in September 1988, this alliance was explicitly designed to help the stronger 
regions take a 'pathbreaking role' in the new Europe as a new "intra- 
European, high-technology cartel" (Harvie 1994: 65). Baden-Wurtemburg 
for instance saw the alliance as part of a strategy of "working with the 
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various stronger regions of Europe" (51), and Catalonia saw it as a means of 
pursuing its own interests rather than taking common cause with poorer 
regions of Spain (Gallagher 1990). Other 'core' regions were organised 
along sectoral lines in the 'regions of traditional industry' or 'motor 
industry cities and regions', or they sought to develop common interests 
with a geographically contiguous region, for instance Nord Pas de Callais, 
Kent and three Belgium regions which established a "Euroregion" 
partnership in 1991 (52). 
Regional associations were only rarely aimed at linking the interests of 
'core' and 'peripheral' regions and for the most part peripheral regions 
were forced to bargain for individual membership of 'core' associations - 
Wales for instance established links with the 'four motors' in 1990 (Harvie 
1994: 62) (53). This, and divergences between rich and poor regions, 
encouraged the less prosperous to more clearly define their common 
interests at the EU level, through the Conference of Peripheral Maritime 
Zones, for example, by linking with a neighbouring peripheral region as in 
the case of the North and South of Ireland, or by campaigning for changes 
in EU policies. For instance in 1992, the year of the completion of the SEM, 
45 regions suffering from deindustrialisation launched a campaign for 
extra EU funds to modernise their industries, led by regions such as 
Strathclyde, Catalonia, Groningen-Drenthe, Nord Pas de Callais, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, North Jutland, Tuscany and Wallonia (54). 
As at the 'macro' level, these developments were resisted by national 
states. Whether by watering-down proposals for the Committee of the 
Regions or by minimising the autonomous powers of regional bodies, they 
actively sought to maintain state power at the sub-regional level. 
Nonetheless, the emergence of regional interests and their articulation in 
the form of demands for regional autonomy or in the construction of pan- 
EU regional associations, had an irresistible logic that complemented and 
was encouraged by the existing macro-regional EU institutions. Such 
political pressures, expressed collectively through the Committee of the 
Regions from 1994, were forcing a limited adaptation of state authority. 
This is examined in the next sub-section. 
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Public Policies - the EU, States and regional Authorities 
States had a crucial conditioning effect on regionalism both in its 'macro' 
and 'micro' forms. Indeed, EU regionalism was in the first instance made 
possible by states, and was defined within limits set by them. By adapting 
to increased economic interdependence, states "strengthened their own 
capacity for territorial management" (Keating and Jones 1991: 324). 'Macro'- 
regional integration gave states greater leverage over economic forces than 
they would otherwise have had and gave them greater influence in global 
arenas, while 'micro'-regional devolution in an EU framework reduced 
the central states' responsibilities without reducing their formal sovereign 
powers. Consequently, EU institutions provided a "framework for 
attempting the resolution of existing national difficulties rather than an 
opportunity for transcending them" (Taylor 1983). This continued 
importance of states in EU regional politics can be traced both at the 
'macro'- and 'micro'-regional levels. 
Macro-regionalism 
EU states attempted to strike stable bargains - or balances - between "the 
postwar politics of domestic economic stabilisation and the demands of 
international economic interdependence" (Kahler 1987: 288). These balances 
were constantly being disrupted as the state ceased to hold sway over the 
increasingly open and internationalised 'national' economy. EU 
integration was aimed at managing and minimising this disruption and 
thereby strengthened the states' gatekeeping roles as they agreed to 
"constrain their autonomy in order to facilitate collective action" (Puchala 
1993: 88). Consequently, state representatives retained control of the key 
elements of EU decision making and supranational initiatives often 
increased rather than reduced state autonomy. 
Nonetheless, state roles were significantly altered. The 'strong state' of the 
immediate post-war years became the 'smart state' of the 1980's. In the face 
of failed 'national' stabilisation policies, states opted for a form of 
"developmental mercantilism" at the EU level allowing them to pursue 
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common, globally defined goals through strengthened EU institutions 
(Kahler 1987: 307). Significantly, these neo-mercantilist structures were 
constructed by state executives in relative isolation from the 'national' 
parliaments to which they were accountable (Kolinsky 1981). This blurring 
of responsibility provided governments with a series of useful political 
scapegoats at the EU level, at the same time providing a channel for 
executive decision-making in the relative absence of public scrutiny. 
Yet, as a result, EU integration forced states into a process of shared policy- 
making, requiring them to accept the consequences of so-called 
"framework" decisions. Distinctions were drawn between issues which 
required unanimity as they extended Treaty agreements or directly affected 
particular national interests; issues of implementation where a policy had 
been established, requiring a qualified majority; and procedural proposals, 
requiring a simple majority. This dilution of states' veto powers in the 
Council of Ministers, envisaged in the Treaty of Rome and implemented 
under the SEA and extended under the Maastricht Treaty, transformed the 
way in which member states exercised sovereignty. Whole swathes of 
economic policy dominated by previously agreed "framework" policies - in 
external trade, currency control, agricultural, regional and competition 
policy were effectively determined at the EU level. Also with the SEA, this 
pressure to define common EU interests rather than particular 'national' 
interests was enhanced by the somewhat restricted powers of 'co-decision' 
which were granted to the European Parliament and the advisory roles that 
were accorded to the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions (Cott and Corbett 1992). 
In terms of external policies, global competitive pressures strengthened EU 
institutions, giving them a neo-mercantilist international legal 
'personality' (55). In the first year of the SEM, 1992, "a tougher, more 
outward looking" Commission was appointed - most notably with respect 
to its key role in the GATT negotiations with North America and East Asia, 
and in the granting, or rather limiting, of access to EU markets to Eastern 
Europe. EU institutions acquired significant powers, primarily over trading 
and financial relations, as they carved out a political space at the 
supranational level which could no longer be reduced simply to the sum of 
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twelve state powers, thus constituting a dimension of political authority 
additional to that of the member states themselves. 
There were in-built tensions between these tendencies and the domination 
of the EU by national states. As economic powers were ceded to the 
Commission, states strengthened political control by "institutionalising 
inter-governmentalism", exercising limited veto powers in the Council of 
Ministers (since 1966), meeting to agree common positions in 'European 
Political Cooperation' (since 1969), setting the pace for integration at 
meetings of the heads of state in the 'European Council' (since 1974) 
(Taylor 1983; Weiler 1990). 
The Commission retained the sole right to propose legislation, as in formal 
terms it acted as the supra-national executive of the EU. In practical terms 
though, it expressed state interests as they could ask for Commission 
initiatives on the basis of a majority in the Council of Ministers and 
although Commission officials could make proposals, these were 
ineffectual if they failed to pass through the Council of Ministers. Indeed, 
from the mid 1970's Commission decision-making was increasingly 
dominated not just by the state-appointed Directors General but also by the 
Committee of Permanent (state) Representatives ' (COREPER) in Brussels 
which monitored every dimension of the Commission's work. As, from 
1987, the Council of Ministers moved away from the unanimity principle 
established under the 'Luxembourg compromise' of 1966, the COREPER 
became more significant and the further diminution of state powers under 
the Maastricht Treaty was again likely to lead to an extension of state 
control in the 1996 "institutional review" process. 
EU institutions were seen, paradoxically, as autonomous international 
actors, subordinate to member state executives. This combining of roles in 
the context of formally mutually exclusive state sovereignties was 
expressed in the German Constitutional Court ruling that the EU 
constituted a "Staatenverbund" - not a federal European state, or a 
confederation, nor simply a concert of states - but an "association" of states 
that had no competence to determine its own sphere of competence (56). 
The EU was essentially a new "hybrid" and its 'democratic deficit' was at 
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least partly due to this internal tension in its decision-making structures -a 
tension that was likely to intensify with the review of EU institutional 
structures of 1996 (Harman 1991). 
These institutional shifts were patterned by global economic pressures on 
the EU macro-region'. EU institutions were granted limited powers as the 
logic of mutual deregulation in the EU 'Single Market' formed the initial 
framework for the new "regime of accumulation" in the EU (Rosewarne 
1992). From 1979 EU member states were obliged to recognise each other's 
product standards following the ECJ ruling in the Casis de Dijon case, 
threatening to shift competitive advantage to the least regulated in a rush 
to the bottom rung of the regulation ladder (Shapiro 1992: 134). This proved 
a powerful incentive for states to agree the programme of managed 
deregulation that was proposed by the Commission in the Report - 
"Completing the Internal Market" - in October 1985. The Report detailed 
some three hundred deregulationist measures aimed at removing non- 
tariff barriers to trade within the EU, many of which had been erected in 
the 1970's. The proposals were introduced under the 1987 SEA together 
with procedural changes proposed by the Dooge Committee which ensured 
that their implementation could be agreed by majority voting in the 
Council of Ministers. 
As the agenda of market deregulation expanded there was a rapid shift in 
the balance between states and markets in the EU in favour of markets - 
and an associated swing in favour of 'market' efficiency at the cost of equity 
and stability (Grahl and Teague 1990: 299). The powerful, ideological logic of 
integration into a single 'free' market cast a shadow over any attempt at 
'tampering' or intervening in the market (Ramsay 1990). The pursuit of 
'market-led' integration required a laissez-faire approach that not only 
denied the need for social protection or fiscal redistribution, but also 
suggested that 'market failure' was a contradiction in terms: as long as 
states and the EU did not intervene, markets would find their equilibrium 
and EU efficiency relative to the other 'global regions' would be 
maximised. Thus the primary impact of EU legislation, in the wake of 
'1992', was to diminish the role of the state in the economy and although 
there were some attempts at formulating compensating forms of social 
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protection and regional policy, these generally performed an ideological, 
rather than a substantive role in the development of EU integration. 
In most aspects of economic policy EU economic instruments were used to 
bolster so-called 'European champions'. In trade policy anti-dumping 
legislation under Article 91 of the Treaty of Rome was used to provide 
selective protection to industry. Regulations were overhauled in 1988 and 
again in 1993, strengthening "local content" regulations, and restricting the 
sales of so-called 'screwdriver' factories in the EU. In 1993 for instance, this 
led to a ban on meat exports from Eastern Europe, continued 'voluntary 
restraint' in Japanese car imports and anti-dumping duties on Chinese 
bicycles. 
Meanwhile, internal EU regulations were used to restrict the role of the 
public sector in the economy. Under Article 92 of the Rome Treaty the 
Commission had the power to prohibit state aid that distorted competition 
and from 1989 it could require states to disclose such subsidies. In the field 
of public procurement from 1993 states were required to put out to tender 
all contracts for public services above ECU200,000. Although the European 
Parliament was critical of the attempt to create free markets in public 
utilities, by 1994 the Commission was threatening to take legal action 
against member states which had retained public sector monopolies in gas 
and electricity. In 1994 initiatives were also proposed for creating 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry, which remained dominated 
by state pricing - initiative`s that in part stimulated state restrictions on 
health expenditure; affecting both the price (in the Italy and Germany) and 
the quantity of drugs used (in France and the UK). 
Deregulation for the state sector was paralleled by minimal intervention in 
private industry. Measures under the Single Market programme which 
involved either mutual recognition or harmonisation of state regulations 
relating to licensing and market access opened up relatively unregulated 
EU markets in telecoms, transport and in financial services (including 
banking, insurance and investment services). Under competition policy 
the Commission had to be informed in advance of any mergers involving 
companies with a world turnover of over ECU5bin or an EU turnover of 
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ECU250m. But the Commission regularly accepted such mergers, especially 
if they involved rationalisation of research and development, purchasing 
and distribution agreements. This "permissive attitude to European 
merger and takeover activity" ensured that between 1989 and 1994 the 
Commission blocked only one merger (57). Meanwhile, large scale private 
industry was granted priority under the Community's technology policy. 
Pre-competitive research was funded to 50%, of its cost and a new "Office of 
Technology Assessment" was established as a 'clearing house' for co- 
ordinating state research programmes, to stimulate collaborative research 
between companies and to distribute EU grants which amounted to 
ECU12b1 between 1994 and 1998, comparing with the ECU15.5bl for the 
Cohesion Fund. 
Where the Commission attempted to regulate private industry its 
proposals were weakened by the Council of Ministers or else redirected to 
support employers' interests. In the area of social protection the 
Commission's formal powers accorded to it under the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht treaty were only partially implemented. The so-called 'social 
dimension' amounted to little more than a series of "symbolic gestures, 
general policy commitments, and a few hotly debated, specific EC 
proposals" (Lange 1992: 229). Of the Social Chapter's" 47 proposals, agreed in 
principle in 1989,15 were implemented, many with highly significant 
implications for employees - such as the working time directive agreed in 
June 1993. But in the context of an EU-wide recession the Commission 
became more cautious and' would not propose legislation unless it was 
backed by both the European Employers' Federation (UNICE) and the 
European Trade Union Congress. Predictably this resulted in inaction 
particularly on the more significant proposals such as the long delayed 
Vredeling directive which had been initiated in 1980 and delayed by an 
alliance between UNICE and multinational corporate capital (Gibb and 
Wise 1993). 
In the face of a pan-EU recession in the early 1990's, the Commission 
focused on the issue of unemployment - rather than on the rights of the 
employed - and began to propose labour market measures that were more 
closely in accord with the neo-liberal, deregulationist agenda. Rationalised 
174 
as a response to the recession, the policy focus shifted onto increasing 
labour mobility rather than on measures to protect workers from social 
dumping (Benington and Taylor 1993). Significantly, in 1993, the 'Delors 
White Paper' proposals for tackling EU unemployment were aimed at 
reducing the cost of labour as well as at expanding overall EU aggregate 
demand. This both legitimised and catalysed a range of measures in 
member states aimed at reducing the cost of taking on new workers, 
including reductions in payroll taxes and contributions to employees for 
holiday or sick pay (58). 
The deflationary effects of deregulation were exacerbated by the macro- 
economic policy objectives formalised in the Maastricht Treaty. States 
signed up to a set of "convergence criteria" that were nominal indicators 
rather than actual measures of economic well-being - such as wage rates, 
unemployment rates, rates of investment (59). Partly as a result, 
speculative flows of finance capital in the integrated EU money markets so 
disrupted the ERM on the eve of the passage of the Maastricht Treaty that 
the 'Delors plan' for monetary unification was postponed, some would 
argue indefinitely, although ironically, member states included the UK 
remained committed to the Treaty's "convergence criteria". 
Nonetheless, in the context of recession, the need to reduce 
unemployment had increasingly become defined as a European issue as 
member states and the European Commission recognised that it was "no 
longer possible for nation states to be the motors of recovery" (60). EU 
integration had become associated with "job killing... diminishing popular 
enthusiasm for European union" and giving a fillip to extreme 
nationalism (61). Despite the on-going resistance of the more neo-liberal of 
EU governments, primarily the British Conservatives, the stability if the 
EU system of production was increasingly seen as dependent upon 
economic regulation at the EU level, including monetary regulation 
through the ERM, social protection through the social chapter and spatial 
cohesion through regional policy, which had all been weakened by the 
anti-regulation bias of the EU political consensus. Together these 
constituted a potential new EU mode of regulation, a 'regime of 
accumulation' that would grant EU 'macro-regional' institutions a greatly 
175 
expanded role in the reproduction of EU capital, both in relation to the 
internal EU economy and in relation to other 'macro-regions'. This, of 
course, increasingly conflicted with the on-going claim to state sovereignty 
by EU 'national' states. 
Micro-regionalism 
These themes were also very much in evidence at the 'micro-regional', 
substate level. In the increasingly integrated EU political economy it was 
the substate 'micro-regions' that felt the full effects of the new regime of 
accumulation. Economic concentration at the EU level centralised 
economic power in the hands of fewer companies, and the benefits of 
economic development were further concentrated in the already advanced 
regions of the West European economy. The SEM was by no means a 
'perfect' market: mobility of labour was constrained and capital flows were 
patterned by historical tendencies shaped by external economies and 
sources of demand rather than by the objective cost differentials. Fiscal 
redistribution to address this was next to negligible, suggesting that the 
process of EU integration would lead to substantial regional divergence. As 
has been mentioned, EU regional and 'Cohesion' funding did little to affect 
the basic integration process and demands for, more 'interventionist' 
measures that would have a qualitative impact, such as measures to re- 
direct capital flows at the EU level rather than simply provide funds to 
compensate for capital concentration, were largely ignored. 
In response, local and regional interest groupings, generally focused on 
local government institutions and became increasingly concerned to 
maximise their ability to re-gear their regions to the needs of capital in the 
Single Market. Like the macro-regional institutions, the power and 
influence of regional and local authorities at the micro-regional level were 
constrained by national states. Indeed, elected regional authorities exist, 
they have no legal standing independent of states and where they did not 
exist, as in England, the result was a "regional policy without regions" 
(Marks 1992: 215). 
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States determined what was and what was not deemed to constitute a 
'region' of the EU. The Commission's analyses of the 174 regional and 829 
sub-regional units reflected the "institutional divisions currently in force 
in the member states" (CEC 1990 Annex 0). Given the wide variation in 
regional structures across the community, this sees the Commission 
comparing regions like the Algarve in Portugal (population 300,000) with 
regions like Ile de France (population 10.3 million), providing a shaky 
foundation for comparative regional analysis - as the Commission itself 
pointed out, "the values of statistical indicators are not independent of the 
regional framework selected", admitting that "some uncertainty surrounds 
the comparability of statistical results" (CEC 1987: 11) (62). These inter- 
regional differences were thrown in sharp relief at the EU level - 
particularly where they involved differences in the degree of regional 
autonomy - differences that have acquired a political edge in the 
"Committee of the Regions" - where the wide variation in political 
structures, in addition to the huge regional variations in size and 
population focus political pressure on the more centralised EU member 
states. 
Some states have directly contributed to the process of regionalising 
political power, granting substantial powers to their regions. Demands for 
regional self government had intensified across the industrialised 'West' 
in the 1960's and 1970's. Regionalist movements and substate nationalisms 
reacted against economic restructuring and state centralism and often 
consciously followed the lead of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist 
movements of the non-industrialised 'South' such as in Algeria and 
Vietnam. Examples include the Basque, Catalan, Breton, Corsican, Flemish, 
Scottish, Welsh and the Irish nationalist movements - all of which gained 
momentum in the late 1960's and 1970's (Tagil 1984). In order to contain 
these regional movements and to absorb centripetal pressures in the wider 
European economy some states decentralised administration to regional 
authorities and established constitutional guarantees of regional autonomy 
(Vandamme 1981). 
Hence regional powers were often established as a means of democratising 
state structures and thereby strengthening loyalty to national states. Just as 
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Germany's Lander were established as a means of countering centralism 
and rekindling democracy, so elsewhere in Europe, in Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece during the 1970's and early 1980's, the process of setting up 
elected regional authorities reflected a general concern to revive 
democratic participation. The Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Belgian 
constitutions granted substantial autonomy to island regions and 'historic 
nations' or linguistic communities which, like the Lander in Germany, 
acted as regional governments. In the UK and the Republic of Ireland state 
centralisation prevailed with a degree of administrative devolution, while 
Holland and Denmark had provincial assemblies (63). In France a strategy 
of 'defensive regionalisation' granted economic autonomy to elected 
regional authorities by 1981 within a firmly uniform, all-France political 
structure - Corsica for instance was not permitted 'special status' (64). 
Although some of the plans for decentralising power to regional 
authorities were only partially implemented (particularly in Portugal and 
Greece) and some of the regional bodies had only limited powers (for 
instance in France), by the mid 1980's, elected regional bodies were 
established as a permanent feature of political life in four of the five largest 
EU states and in several of the smaller ones (Keating 1988; Leonardi et al 
1992). 
Across the EU, forms of regionalism varied as the ruling political 
establishment struck different compromises with substate regional 
interests. States responded to the process of regionalisation by attempting to 
maximise security and stability, but the institutions they constructed were 
constantly in the process of being disrupted and undermined as 
diminished state capability in the face of increased economic globalisation 
encouraged the emergence of regional movements. Permanent conflict 
over development priorities between the different layers of authority 
became a constant theme of EU politics as, within an increasingly 
regionalised EU framework, the central state became a central player rather 
than the central player maintaining the conditions for capital 
accumulation. 
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EU-wide macro-regional institutions played a crucial, supporting role in 
this process of institutional redefinition, building an alliance between 
"bureaucratic elitism" and "emotional populism" (Kolinsky 1978). While 
the interests of regional authorities and their state representatives co- 
incided on many issues, as integration into the SEM accelerated, these were 
increasingly cross-cut and undermined by conflicts of interest in which the 
Commission could cast itself in the role of arbitrator (Anderson J. J. 1990). 
Within the constraints of an EU institutional system that was primarily 
propelled by treaty provisions between states and political bargaining at an 
intergovernmental level, the Commission established an ideological 
priority of regional over 'national' economic development and carved out 
a role for itself and for substate regional bodies, autonomous of the 
member states. This to some degree explained the Commission's 
enthusiasm for the concept of regional development and was reflected in 
the Commission proposal at the Maastricht negotiations that the EU 
should move towards setting up an EU-wide regional representation -a 
"Committee of the Regions" - that would act as the 'upper house' of the 
European Parliament. 
This idea for a powerful and accountable tier of representation at the EU 
level was later 'watered down' by state representatives in the European 
Council and the Committee set up in 1994 had only a consultative role. 
Initially the role of the proposed committee was severely circumscribed - it 
would have no power to propose initiatives and would only be 
automatically consulted on matters that had a direct bearing on the regions 
(65). Nonetheless, the Commission actively worked with regional bodies to 
ensure that the membership of the Committee built on the existing 
Consultative Committee for Local and Regional Authorities and was 
genuinely representative - an issue which was deliberately left open in the 
Treaty (66). When established in 1994 the Committee already had a wider 
remit and Commission officials anticipated that its role would be 
progressively enhanced as it provided a platform for the increasingly 
influential elected representatives of regional governments, becoming a 
"potential rival" to states in the EU (67). 
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Although EU institutions were not breaking up member states into 
substate regions - there was little evidence that Brussels was the "midwife 
at the birth of the new 'subsidiary' states" - they did develop an EU-wide 
concept of regional development and in the process, directly encouraged 
political regionalism (68). EU institutions - and in earlier years the Council 
of Europe had made an "enormous and direct contribution" to the 
legitimation and mobilisation of substate national and regional 
movements, a role that was likely to be enhanced as the process of 
integration accelerated (Hebbert 1986). Regional bodies acquired access to 
policy networks at the EU level which existed independently of central 
governments and regionalism emerged as a political force at the sub-state 
level as regional elites became increasingly aware of the degree to which 
their interests diverged from the interests of their central state. This 
suggested that a unified macro-region internally fragmented into 
individual states and micro-regions was emerging in the post Maastricht 
EU political economy -a Europe of regions and states in which both had, 
often competing, claims political legitimacy. 
Chapter Conclusions 
With global economic integration EU member states have been losing the 
ability to manipulate their 'national' economies. The immediate response 
was to collectively coordinate confrontation with US and Japanese 
dominated economic blocs (Ishikawe 1990). Under sustained pressure from 
West European industry, EU policy was redirected away from regulation 
and towards neo-liberal prescriptions for internal European recovery 
(Lambert 1991). The "articles of faith" of this new EU consensus - 
deregulation and integration - built on an awareness that state economic 
policy was no longer effective at the "national" level (Tsoukalis 1991). As 
state elites realised - often the hard way - that capital no longer respected 
national borders, a new EU 'macro' framework was developed, to monitor 
economic policies, minimise state aid to industry, and to plan for a 
European central bank which would manage EU monetary policy. It was 
hoped that this would open up opportunities for productive investment 
and stimulate a 'great leap forward' in the extraction of relative surplus 
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value, creating the necessary economic space for Western European capital, 
allowing it to compete on a global scale. 
As a result, national states underwent a transformation in which they 
became progressively more 'internationalised'. This signalled a shift in 
states' roles away from dependence on the interests of national capital 
towards a greater autonomy over them, as states, through EU institutions, 
increasingly acted in the interests of EU regional capital 'in general' 
(Burnham 1992). There was a partial return to the pre-Keynesian, pre- 
welfarist 'laissez-faire' state, reflecting a shift in the terms of class struggle, 
combined with a concern to retain some power over international 
economic forces as state elites 'clubbed together' to re-affirm their role in 
an increasingly interdependent and internationalised EU political economy 
(Camilleri 1984). This constituted a new 'regime of accumulation' for 
Western European capitalism as the third pole in the emerging tri-polar 
post-hegemonic global political economy. In the Commission's own words, 
the EU "represent[ed], alongside the US and Japan, one of the three pillars 
on which the global system of pluralist democracy and market economy is 
built" (69). 
In contradiction with the almost missionary thirst for EU integration was 
the reality of widening regional inequalities within the EU. The 
construction of a viable West European economic bloc required massive 
'structural adjustments', especially in the EU periphery. But with 
substantial state intervention effectively outlawed and the EU structural 
funds adding up to little more than 0.5% of total EU GDP, a further 
centralisation of wealth away from the peripheries in the Single Market 
was widely expected (Harrison 1990). EU institutions and member states 
recognised this problem - but more to neutralise opposition than to 
provide an effective remedy and despite increased structural funding, EU 
'macro' policy was still founded on the neo-liberal expectation that the 
'dynamic' benefits of the SEM would filter down to the peripheries and 
reverse uneven development. 
Resistance to the undemocratic, state-dominated structures at the EU level 
and to the feared consequences of the SEM were vested in a reinvigorated 
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politics of regionalism (Held 1989). Substate regional groupings (various 
coalitions of trade unions, women's groups, cultural and community 
groups, local government and local business) have emerged to challenge 
the neo-liberal assumptions and the state-centred superstructure of EU 
integration. This has been expressed through an array of regional and 
interregional organisations and through the European Parliament and has 
been reflected, to a limited degree, in Commission initiatives on regional 
issues. 
This regional assertion was not dissolving state structures or creating a new 
interdependent "Europe of the Regions", celebrating diversity in unity, 
"leav[ing] the Europe of competing nationalisms behind us" (Kearney 
1988: 15). The EU was not like a "a great sponge", able to soak up and express 
the needs of its many and varied regional units (70). On the contrary, EU 
integration was in the first instance led by states, particularly the most 
powerful ones, and was mainly harnessed to state interests. States were not 
superseded 'from above' or undermined 'from below', rather, they were 
adapted to the changing reality of global power and the shifting demands of 
sub-state elites and reports of its death were "distinctly premature" (71). 
Nonetheless, the phase of accelerated EU integration in the late 1980's and 
early 1990's did not leave the state and state sovereignty untouched 
(Kolinsky 1981; Corbett 1992). It was precisely the continued domination of 
the states at EU level, together with fears of peripheralisation in the 
deregulated SEM, which revived regionalism in the EU, rather than a 
benign concern to assert regional interdependence and diversity in a 'new' 
Europe. The EU embodied the aspiration to regionalist unity at the 'macro' 
suprastate level and it positively helped to reinvigorate the politics of 
substate regionalism. Although the state remained the central political 
framework for social organisation, EU integration regionalised 'national' 
economies and increased the need for regional as distinct from state 
channels of political representation. 
Partly as a result, there were significant shifts in political identity. New 
forms of regionalism emerged and nationalisms were set in a new context 
as cross-cutting supranational and sub-national regional affiliations 
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multiplied, encouraging the growth of less divisive forms of political 
affiliation. Nonetheless, these were set in an EU dominated and defined by 
often exclusivist definitions of 'national' state sovereignty. This is further 
examined in Section 3 and 4, which combine approaches developed here 
and in Chapter 4, to examine the impact of these contradictory tendencies 
on Ireland's national conflict. 
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Section Conclusions 
This Section has attempted to map out the historical roots of national 
divisions in Ireland and of the process of transnational integration in 
Western Europe. It has used the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter 3 to examine first, shifts in material interests, second changes in 
the logic of ideological conflict and third, adaptations, even 
transformations in the policies of states, of EU institutions and of sub-state 
authorities. 
In Ireland, it was argued that during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, there was uneven development in all three of these 
aspects. This was to some degree reversed in the mid twentieth century as 
there was increasing convergence in material interests between North and 
South. Ideological conflict in Northern Ireland, though, remained firmly 
defined by confrontation with the South. This was reflected in Northern 
Ireland state polices, which were increasingly aimed at 'modernising' the 
Northern economy at the same time as shoring-up sectarian division 
between 'loyal' Protestants and 'disloyal' Catholics - itself an internal 
expression of North-South division. The failure to reconcile these 
competing objectives was a major factor in the re-emergence of loyalist 
extremism, in the failure to satisfy the civil rights movement and in the 
eventual collapse of Stormont. 
Direct rule from Westminster failed to overcome these tensions in state 
policy as attempts at 'modernising' Northern society were constantly 
contradicted by the process of maintaining British sovereignty in Northern 
Ireland. There was some attempt to offset the impact of the economic 
collapse that followed political collapse, with a massive injection of public 
funds into the Northern economy. This was perhaps the most significant 
result of direct rule as, to a degree, it repressed tensions between material 
interests and ideological conflict. Employment was created for middle and 
upper working class Protestants and for middle class Catholics was 
provided by the British state and challenges to its authority were 
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concentrated in increasingly impoverished working class republican and 
loyalist communities. 
But, as highlighted in Chapter 4, the status quo was maintained at a price: 
in terms of on-going socio-political exclusion, particularly of the republican 
community; in terms of on-going militarisation of society in Britain and 
the Republic as well as in Northern Ireland; and in terms of an escalating 
Northern dependence on a British subvention, which was increasingly 
becoming - as the Secretary of State called it in 1993 - "an incentive for 
change" in British state policy. As discussed in the following Section, these 
various factors combined with the process of integration in the EU to 
stimulate renewed North-South convergence in Ireland. 
The second part of this Section examined the historical roots of EU 
integration. It was argued that, given the weakness of European political 
culture, the various forerunners of the EC, and the EC itself, were built 
primarily out of a concern to defend member states from external threats, 
both political and economic. Hence the EU political system maintained and 
expressed member states' interests while, in doing so, it was forced to 
construct supra-national institutions that undermined state power. 
The result was the emergence of transnational politics, between sub-state 
'micro-regions' within the supra-state 'macro-region', as well as the 
persistence of national politics centred on sovereign states. Material 
interests were increasingly being defined in a transnational context as well 
as in a national context; ideological conflict was increasingly being fought 
out between states and regions, both 'micro-' and 'macro-', as well as 
simply between states; and public authority was increasingly being 
determined by non-state regional bodies, again both 'micro-' and 'macro-', 
as well as by states. 
This limited 'unbundling' of state power, in the context of sharpened inter- 
regional inequalities in the new deregulated EU 'regime of accumulation', 
had substantial implications for North-South divisions in Ireland and 
more directly, for the national conflict. These are explored in the following 
Section. 
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Section Three 
Divisions and Integration 
Section Introduction 
This Section analyses EU-related developments in Ireland and discusses 
their implications for the national conflict. There is detailed analysis of 
shifts in the material, economic context for development, North and South 
(Chapter 6). This is followed by analysis of ideological conflict between 
political parties in Ireland, over the issue of North-South, regional 
integration (Chapter 7). Finally, there is a discussion of British and Irish 
government policies on North-South integration (Chapter 8). 
In Section 2 tensions between pressures for national fragmentation and for 
regional convergence across state borders were highlighted. In this Section 
each Chapter counterposes the pressures to convergence on an all-Ireland 
basis with pressures to 'national' state-centred divergence and assesses the 
implications of these tensions for the conflict. The Section concludes with a 
summary bringing the three strands of analysis together. 
Ireland's national conflict has centred on divisions - between the Northern 
and Southern economies, between unionists and nationalists and between 
the British and the Irish states. The emergence of a trans-state regional 
context in Ireland as a whole as part of the EU - for economic development; 
for ideological conflict; and for political authority - has the potential to cut 
across these divisions. The question of how far this potential has been 
realised is addressed in this Section. 
In Chapter 5 it was argued that states have ceded elements of economic 
decision-making to EU bodies and in some respects national sovereignty 
and state authority have been redefined. Nevertheless, states have retained 
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direct control over many areas of economic and social life - including 
education, social welfare and law and order which impinge directly on the 
everyday lives of the general population. Moreover - as states respond 
differently to general EU developments, the process of EU integration 
could lead to 'divergence' as well as 'convergence' - which, as will be 
outlined, was particularly the case in Ireland where divergent state 
positions reinforced North-South divisions. 
Integration into the Single Market highlighted the need for greater powers 
at substate, 'micro-regional' levels and for greater inter-regional 
cooperation - especially between the more peripheral regions. The growing 
community of interest between EU peripheries resulted in an increased 
desire for joint action to express common interests in the face of growing. 
economic divergence in the SEM. As has been outlined, political, social and 
economic conflicts centring on the territorial definition of British 
sovereignty had divided the island into two separate jurisdictions. 
Consequently, the process of developing policies to reflect changing 
regional interests faces considerable obstacles, primarily relating to the 
competing definitions of national society in the two parts of Ireland. 
Despite this, the process of integration into the EU is stimulating 
significant reorientations - in material interests (Chapter 6), ideological 
conflict (Chapter 7) and in state policy, North and South (Chapter 8). 
Like Section 2, this Section draws on some secondary sources. To a greater 
extent it relies on newspaper material, party publications and official 
documents, all of them primary sources. Again, detailed footnotes appear 
at the end of each Chapter and in the bibliography.. 
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Chapter 6 
Material interests: National and Transnational 
Given the de-regulationist slant of the Single Market programme, and of 
state economic policies in the EU since the 1970's, there were fears that the 
anticipated "dynamic" effects of the Single Market programme would not 
accrue to either parts of Ireland. Across the EU there were concerns that 
attempts at increasing productivity were likely to diminish development 
opportunities in low productivity regions - such as Northern Ireland and 
the Irish Republic (Harrison 1990). Nonetheless, the fortunes of peripheral 
areas like Ireland were by no means determined by these structural 
tendencies in the wider EU economy and there appeared to be space for 
interventionist policies, implemented by local, regional and inter-regional 
bodies at the sub-state level as well as by EU institutions, to enhance 
regional 'cohesiveness' (O'Donnell 1991: 130). 
In Ireland this has generated a debate on how best to maximise economic 
opportunities for North and South in the Single Market. The Chapter 
investigates these debates by, first, examining North-South regional 
economic integration in Ireland. It outlines some of the existing tendencies 
for North-South economic convergence and the emergence of increasingly 
intense demands, primarily from business communities, North and South, 
for increased integration. Second, these pressures for regional convergence 
are qualified by outlining the on-going and in some senses, sharpened 
economic pressures for North-South divergence. These are defined largely 
in national terms as Northern Ireland remains, in the first instance, 
integrated into the UK national economy and the Republic remains 
focused on developing its 26 County national economy. The Chapter ends 
with a brief assessment of these contending regional - national economic 
pressures in Ireland. 
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Regional convergence 
In the 1990's the process of integration into the SEM was defining the two 
economies in Ireland, North and South as a periphery of the EU and while 
still divided, the two economies had become increasingly similar. Both 
were dependent on external sources of finance - the Republic on EU funds 
and, to a greater extent, Northern Ireland on the British subvention. Both 
were also heavily reliant on agriculture and multinational branch plants. 
As industrial employment became less significant in Northern Ireland, 
service employment - both public and private - expanded, reflecting a 
process of "demarketisation" -a well as a process of deindustrialisation 
more common elsewhere in the EU (1). The Republic continued to 
industrialise, with increased employment in capital-intensive 
multinational companies, and in the 1980's there was a rapid growth of 
employment in services, mirroring tendencies in the North (NESC 1989; 
European Parliament 1991b: 28-9). 
These increased similarities, North and South, led to some considerable 
convergence in employment structure (Table 6.1). In 1961 close to 40% of 
employment in the Republic was in primary industry, contrasting with 
13% in Northern Ireland. By 1993 this gap had narrowed to 10%, with 
increased employment in secondary and tertiary sectors, although, 
predictably, tertiary employment remained more important in Northern 
Ireland. Decline in the * importance of Northern Ireland's secondary 
industry combined with its increased importance for employment in the 
Republic, and the sector became as important an employer in the Republic 
as in the North. 
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Table 6.1: Percentage of total employment in economic sectors: Ireland, 
North and South. 
Northern Ireland Republic of Ireland 
1961 1977 1993 1961 1977 1993 
Primary 13.1 7.3 4.5 37.3 21.7 14 
Secondary 40.4 38.5 28.3 23.7 32.4 29 
Tertiary 46.5 54.2 67.2 39.0 45.9 57 
Northern Ireland: Employment by 
sector, 1961-1993 
Tertiary 
Q Secondary 
" Primary 
The Republic: Employment by Sector, 
1961-1993 
Tertiary 
Q Secondary 
0 Primary 
Source: Eurostat Regio Data. 
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Indicators of living standards also converged (2). As outlined below (Table 
6.2), the Republic began the 1970's with a per capita GDP roughly equal to 
Northern Ireland's. This fell to 92% by 1980, to recover some 17% by 1990. 
Table 6.2: GDP per head: Northern Ireland and the Republic, 
1970,1980 and 1990 
1970 1980 1990 
Northern Ireland (St£) 546 2646 6181 
Republic (IRE) 549 2752 7423 
100% 104% 120% 
Northern Ireland (ECU) 1284 4471 8715 
Republic (ECU) 1306 4100 9524 
101% 92% 109% 
Source: European Economy; Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics; 
Eurostat (1993) National Accounts ESA aggregates 1970-1991. 
As GDP includes all profits and property income, regardless of whether 
they are earnt in the country or not, disposable income provides a more 
realistic measure of living standards. These figures are provided below 
(Table 6.3), showing a significant narrowing of income differentials, from 
55% in 1975 to 48% in 1980, and then, dramatically, to 14% in 1990, despite 
the increasing British subvention, which, as noted in Chapter 3, rose from 
23% to 30% of total expenditure in the North over the same period. 
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Table 6.3: Net disposable Income per head: Northern Ireland and the 
Republic, 
1975,1980 and 1990 (thousands) 
1975 1980 1990 1992 
Northern Ireland (StE) 2307 3461 5581 6755 
Republic of Ireland (IRE) 1008 2067 4987 5690 
Northern Ireland (ECU) 4106 5849 7590 9186 
Republic of Ireland (ECU) 1833 3085 6561 7454 
Disposable income in the 
Republic as a percentage 45% 52% 86% 81% 
of Northern Ireland 
(Net personal income after taxation) 
Source: UK Regional Trends, HMSO; National Income and Expenditure, 
DSO. 
This is also reflected in comparative figures as Northern Ireland's per capita 
GDP deteriorated in comparison with EU average income levels by some 5 
percentage points, while the Republic's position improved by 9 points 
(Table 6.4). Again, this presents an exaggerated picture of North-South 
convergence and contrasts with the relative figures for GNP per capita in 
the Republic which improved by some three percentage points - mirroring 
the tendencies highlighted in Table 6.3 (3). 
Table 6.4: Relative per capita GDP: per cent of EU averages, 
North and South (EU=100, PPS) 
1973 1980 1990 
GDP per head 
Northern Ireland 79 62 74 
Republic 59 63 68 
GNP per head 
Republic 59 62 62 
Source: Matthews 1994; Eurostat. 
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Converging living standards are also reflected in rates of unemployment, 
which doubled in both economies in the late 1970's and early 1980's (Table 
6.5). 
Table 6.5: Percentage of the workforce unemployed in 
Northern Ireland and the Republic 
1970 1980 1990 1994 
Northern Ireland 7.0 13.7 13.4 14.0 
Republic of Ireland 6.3 8.0 14.5 18.7 
Source: Eurostat. 
Partly as a result of rising unemployment, industrial productivity rose in 
both parts of Ireland in the mid 1980's and early 1990's - by 24% in 
Northern Ireland and by 65% in the Republic between 1985 and 1993 
(European Economy 1994). Wage rates in the Republic fell by some 15% 
relative to other EU states and state subsidies for industry in both 
economies were among the highest in the EU. Yet still both economies 
faced faced high levels of long term 'structural' unemployment, officially at 
9% in both economies in 1991, out of a total 14.5% unemployed in the 
Republic and 13.4% in Northern Ireland (4). 
EU membership and, in particular, the implementation of EU funding 
regimes was a major factor in this convergence. Farmers, North and South 
for instance, tried to predict shifts in the agricultural support regimes, 
leading to convergence in types of farming activity (5). This was not 
mirrored in Britain, partly because of the greater dependence on 
agricultural support in the smaller, relatively unproductive farms in both 
parts of Ireland. EU regional policy had a similar effect as North and South 
were defined as priority regions for the Regional Development Fund - the 
Republic defined as a region that was significantly "lagging behind" the rest 
of the EU while Northern Ireland, despite having a per capita GDP above 
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the threshold for support as an "Objective One" region, was granted the 
same funding status for "special reasons" (6). 
Despite increased EU regional funding, integration into the SEM was 
expected to threaten the survival of indigenously-owned industry, North 
and South. In Northern Ireland it was estimated that 49% of the region's 
private sector workforce was "moderately vulnerable" to the removal of 
non-tariff barriers and to the expected increase in competition (NIEC 
1992: 37). There were similar concerns in the Republic, leading the 
government to suggest that the task of creating a viable indigenous sector 
was "the main common challenge facing industrial development, North 
and South". Problems shared with the North included high transport, 
communications and energy costs; weak marketing; low skill 
development, particularly in management skills; low levels of research 
and development; a lack of local sources of capital; and a sense of 
sociopolitical peripherality, particularly strong in the North (DSO 1992b: 
41). 
These heightened similarities increased the awareness of a common 
North-South interest in all-Ireland, regional development. As elsewhere 
in the EU, there was an increase in cross-border North-South mergers and 
takeovers in anticipation of the SEM. In the banking sector, the Allied Irish 
Bank bought the Trustees Savings Bank in 1991, giving it a 25% share of 
Northern banking while the Ulster bank increased its operations in the 
South and by 1993 accounted for 10% of the market in the Republic (7). A 
similar process of capital concentration was underway in other sectors -a 
reorientation of ownership that was paralleled by changes in the marketing 
and pricing strategies of multinational companies, including Mars, Unilever, 
Marks and Spenser and Coca Cola - which began to treat Ireland as a single 
market (8). 
There was increasing awareness that, in the context of the SEM, the 
development of the two economies would hinge on the ability to foster an 
indigenous industrial sector able to draw on combined strengths of the two 
economies. Prominent business leaders and government agencies, North 
and South began arguing that if it was to do this, Irish business would have 
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to formulate a new, all-Ireland framework for economic development. 
These pressures for North-South economic integration are examined in 
what follows, first from a Northern perspective. 
The North 
As elsewhere in the EU the Northern Ireland economy was facing new and 
intensified competition in the SEM during the 1990's. This was combined 
with extensive industrial collapse and fear of public sector cutbacks. The 
Confederation of British Industry in Northern Ireland (CBINI) estimated 
that an annual 5% growth in GDP over the next decade would be needed 
for the region to reach the EU's average per capita wealth, whereas the 
highest growth achieved in the previous ten years had been only 2.5% (9). 
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) pointed out that in 1993 the 
number of people employed in manufacturing was less than the number 
registered as unemployed. 
Meanwhile, the public sector - the "engine for job creation" in the North - 
was running out of steam (Barooah 1993) and was threatening to go into 
reverse as the Conservative government tried to reduce the UK Public 
Deficit (EU funding offered no substitute, as at 2.3% of public expenditure 
in the North, it was dwarfed by the British subvention). In 1989 the EU 
Commission suggested that the North was "not entirely integrated into 
either the legal or the economic system of the UK" and concluded that "it is 
therefore not really relevant to see it in a UK context" (10). As the Coopers 
and Lybrand survey of Northern business stated in 1990, the North 
required an "approach to the development of the Province that is different 
to those adopted in other regions of the UK" (11). 
The urgent need for a viable industrial strategy for the Northern economy 
in the Single Market was forcing Northern business to reassess and 
reorient their economic interests, perhaps forcing the "radical rethink of 
public policy" that some have argued is required (Hart and Harrison 1992). 
Traditionally interests had been defined largely in terms of their UK setting 
and sometimes in the broader EU and international context, but rarely 
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were they orientated to the South. A survey in 1992 for instance, found that 
44% of Northern firms had never considered selling into the South (12). 
It was not until 1990 that the annual assessments of the Northern economy 
produced by the Northern Ireland Economic Council included an 
assessment of economic conditions in the Republic - previously the 
Southern economy was considered so extraneous as not to deserve a 
specific mention in these lengthy yearly reports (NIEC 1990: 6). This perhaps 
symbolic move by a semi-autonomous 'quango' stemmed from increased 
awareness of the significance of the South for Northern interests - 
reflecting what one prominent participant described as "nothing short of a 
seachange in economic relationships within the island" (Quigley 1992: 4). 
The April 1990 visit of the Irish Taoiseach Charles Haughey to a Northern 
Ireland Institute of Directors Conference was the first public indication of 
this seachange in North-South relations (13). His message was that 
business, North and South had to see the island as a single operating base 
and had to work together if it was to survive in the SEM and was backed- 
up by a survey of cross-border cooperation calling for cooperation on a 
sector-by-sector basis. The message was well received and the Taoiseach was 
given no less than three standing ovations from a 1000-strong audience of 
Northern business people (14). 
Since 1990 this North-South orientation has gained widespread acceptance 
within the Northern business community and was most clearly expressed 
by Dr. George Quigley, Chairman of the Ulster Bank and of the Northern 
Ireland Institute of Directors when, in 1992 he. proposed that "Ireland, 
North and South, should become one integrated 'island economy' in the 
context of the Single European Market" (15). In the first instance it was 
argued that this would allow greater North-South trade, of particular 
benefit to the North. As highlighted by the President of the Confederation 
of Irish Industry (CII) in the same year, Southern business sold one third as 
much per capita in North as it did in the South, suggesting a possible 
tripling of sales for Southern business. Meanwhile Northern Ireland 
industry sold one sixth as much per capita in the South as it did in the 
North, suggesting a possible six-fold increase in sales (16). As a result Liam 
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Connellan, the CII Director-General estimated, perhaps over-optimistically, 
that this could lead to a net increase in manufacturing sales of £3 billion, 
creating an additional 75,000 jobs in Ireland as a whole (NICE 1993: 134). 
Beyond this potential increase in trade, Dr Quigley argued that there would 
be considerable advantages in joint working. The areas of possible 
cooperation, outlined by him as early as 1989, included joint ventures, joint 
marketing, joint trade missions and exhibitions, joint research on sectoral 
and trade issues, improved communication links, joint support facilities 
for education and training, shared infrastructure, joint environmental 
action and joint public sector acquisitions and sales (17). He suggested in 
February 1992 that the unified economy should be supported by a special 
EU fund for projects agreed jointly by the EU Commission and the two 
governments - to provide a direct route to Brussels should powers be 
devolved to a Northern Ireland Assembly and to facilitate the 
development of a Belfast-Dublin "economic corridor" which had been 
"artificially constrained" in the past (18). In 1993 he argued this had the 
potential to release new productive energies in Ireland, suggesting that "it 
would be ludicrous to be part of a single European market post-1992 and 
fail to transform the island of Ireland into a single market", not simply to 
raise cross border trade, but to develop all-island economic "synergies" (19) 
Various other spokespersons for Northern industry supported proposals 
for North-South integration. Nigel Smyth, Director of the CBINI argued in 
1992 that the North-South division of Ireland damaged industry on both 
sides of the border and advocated all-island integration "purely and simply 
because it makes sound economic sense" (20). Six months later in a Report 
outlining its preferences for the 1994-1999 EU funding round the CBI 
advocated a joint North-South "inter-regional partnership" as a "key 
element" in the funding package, arguing that provision for training, 
marketing and research, transport, tourism, environmental improvements 
should be devised within an all-island framework. It supported Quigley's 
proposal for a North-South "economic corridor" on the eastern seaboard, 
arguing that such initiatives would allow business to exploit "the synergies 
brought about by the formation of a critical mass and the development of 
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clustering activities", as well as "breaking down the psychological barriers 
which result from the border" (21). 
The CBI Report had been drawn up "in conjunction with" the CII and 
subsequently the two business organisations embarked on a three year 
initiative funded by the International Fund for Ireland to investigate the 
possible benefits of North-South cooperation. A Joint Council of forty 
representatives was established and steering groups set up to guide the 
project which involved 450 companies from North and South. Meanwhile, 
joint lobbying focused on the need for improved transport and energy links 
and for co-ordinated public procurement while practical cooperation led to 
a significant amount of all-Ireland import substitution in aerospace, 
textiles, pharmaceutical products and scientific instruments and led to joint 
marketing strategies to win EU contracts in civil engineering and 
construction (22). In the longer term the intention was to assist Irish 
companies to compete within the island market and gain the resources, 
skills and confidence to sell in wider EU markets - initiatives which were 
seen in many quarters as offering a life-line for Northern industry - as the 
project's coordinator - William Poole argued, "senior people North and 
South consider the initiative to be of high significance to the future 
prosperity of Irish industry" (23). 
The CBI's approach was clarified in 1993 when Nigel Smyth Director of 
CBINI outlined seven strategic priorities for Northern Ireland if it was to 
aspire to "world class" status, rather than remaining "at the bottom of the 
UK league". The Director emphasised that strengthened linkages with the 
UK would not deliver the required up-grading. of standards, while the 
development and implementation of strategic, mutually beneficial "win- 
win" linkages in "synergy" with the Republic offered an alternative, 
potentially highly rewarding development path, given that "we cannot 
afford to continue on the track we are on". These linkages could yield 
increased investment, re-skilling and vocational training, improvements 
in innovation through technological partnerships, infrastructural 
development and marketing, particularly of Ireland's environmental 
qualities (24). 
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The Northern Ireland Chambers of Commerce adopted a similar stance. 
The President, Noel Stewart, stated in 1992 that his organisation was "at the 
forefront of initiatives to develop cross border links" - primarily with their 
counterparts in the Republic (25). The Belfast and Dublin Chambers of 
Commerce took joint initiatives to improve North-South cooperation 
including trade fairs and business conventions and drew up joint proposals 
for North-South projects. In 1993 they presented a joint paper to the 
Commission calling for trade-boosting projects and outlined plans for 
setting up a "Chamberlink" to encourage North-South investments and 
were joined by the Northern agency for small firms - the Local Economic 
Development Unit (LEDU) - which organised several conferences for cross 
border business in 1992, arguing that economic "survival lay first and 
foremost in togetherness" (26). 
These various initiatives reflected a widespread, and relatively new 
consensus on the need for all-Ireland economic integration. In 1993 a 
survey found that 97% Northern Ireland Chief Executives viewed North- 
South integration as either necessary (61%) or useful (36%), quoting one as 
as saying "there is no reason why Ireland should not operate as a single 
political and economic entity" (27). This reorientation was by no means 
restricted to the business community. The ICTU, for instance, fearing the 
impact of the neo-liberal SEM, had argued for such an economic strategy as 
early as 1988 and in 1994, speaking at the British TUC, the ICTU President - 
Phillip Flynn - advocated government action to improve North-South 
links (28). The Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Associations, the 
North's officially recognised voluntary sector umbrella body, also 
supported such action and in 1992 its Director, Quintin Oliver, stressed the 
widespread, cross-community acceptance of the need to develop a single 
market in Ireland as a whole before being able to compete effectively in the 
SEM (29). 
There was a growing perception that the North, as the smaller of the two 
economies (population only 1.5, as compared to 3 million), and without its 
own direct government representation in Brussels, was fast becoming "a 
periphery of a periphery" (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1993). Growing 
demands for government action to rectify this appeared to fall on deaf ears. 
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As a result, business organisations including the Chambers of Commerce 
were active in encouraging local authorities to take a more active role in 
the face of what Noel Stewart described as a "remote, ponderous and 
largely unresponsive" central government (30). Such organisations joined 
with local government in financing the Northern Ireland Centre in 
Europe, with 18 of Northern Ireland's 26 Councils agreeing to finance the 
Centre, which had staff in Belfast and Brussels and to some extent 
compensated for having to work through Whitehall, although it had no 
official status and was restricted to political lobbying (31). 
Overall, both sides of industry and especially the trade unions feared that 
the deregulated, neo-liberal SEM could have an extremely damaging 
impact, and they argued that integration with the Southern economy 
offered a much needed lifeline for the Northern economy. The demand for 
government initiatives to establish a North-South political framework to 
deliver economic integration had deep political implications for Ireland's 
national conflict. Partly as a consequence, as one observer noted in 1981, the 
conflict tended to "asphyxiate" North-South initiatives (Hainsworth 
1981: 14). No doubt reflecting this, business enthusiasts for integration were 
at pains to be 'non-political'. But despite this, there were indications, 
particularly post-1992, that the shifts in economic orientation were forcing 
limited adaptations in the ideological party-political positions and in state 
policies (these are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8). 
The South 
As in Northern Ireland, EU membership posed a profound challenge to 
domestically owned firms dependent on UK or home markets. As was 
outlined in Chapter 4, concerns at the lack of indigenous industrial 
development in the Republic had been raised for some years. Despite the 
1970's disruption in international economic development, the flow of 
overseas investment into the Republic was maintained until the early 
1980's but in the meantime, as was pointed out, indigenous industry went 
into rapid decline, only to recover, very marginally, in the late 1980's. In 
the EC from 1973, indigenous producers faced intense competition for 
domestic markets, stimulating much intra-industry realignment, mostly 
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against the EU tendency for economic concentration, and more towards 
greater fragmentation. This perhaps reflected the relative weakness of 
home-owned industry in the Republic and presaged a more thorough- 
going inter-industry restructuring in the context of recession in the first 
half of the 1980's. 
Given that the entire period of EU membership had seen an "almost 
continuous output and employment decline" in Irish-owned industry, 
further deregulation in the SEM was viewed with some trepidation (NESC 
1989). Indigenous industry remained concentrated in low profit, largely 
agri-industrial sectors with relatively low technological input, dependent 
upon Southern Irish markets for over sixty percent of production. In 
contrast, multinational and transnational companies maintained high 
profit rates (usually at least triple the rates in Irish-owned industry), and 
were oriented to external markets for 70% of their sales and relied on non- 
Irish producers for 70% of their inputs (O'Hearn 1993: 179-182). 
In some ways, lacking a stable source of external support equivalent to the 
North's subvention from its "kind auntie" - the British Treasury - there 
was less room for manoeuvre in the Southern economy than in Northern 
Ireland (Clulow and Teague 1993: 102). EU funding, at 2.7% of the 
Republic's GDP in 1993, though significant, was not sufficient to meet the 
Republic's needs or to compensate for the deflationary capital drain caused 
by Irish membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. In the early 1980's 
unemployment had doubled, to 18%, comparable or even higher than in 
Northern Ireland. Wage levels were substantially lower than in most other 
EU countries and had become lower in the 1980's - real unit labour costs 
had fallen by 15% relative to other member states from 1984 to 1993 - 
without a commensurate rise in employment with indigenously-owned 
companies (European Economy 1994). 
The rejection of dependent development within a 26 County framework in 
the face of industrial weakness, was translated into demands for 'positive' 
integration at the EU level and at the all-Ireland level. A concern for 
systems of regional or 'national' innovation, for integrated institutional 
structures as well as for integrated economic sectors - defining economic 
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development as irreconcilably interrelated with political development - 
came to dominate thinking on approaches to stimulating indigenous 
development (NESC 1989; Mjoset 1993). Some argued that the South had 
been naive to believe that the EU would deliver prosperity. As one 
newspaper pointed out in 1993, "by joining the rich man's club we hoped 
to become rich" in an EU that was "stengthening the community's 
economic centre relative to the periphery" - what one Southern MEP 
described as an "Alice in wonderland" approach (32). 
There was ongoing dissatisfaction with what was seen as a policy of 
attracting overseas capital while indigenous industry suffered (33). In the 
immediate post-Maastricht period rising unemployment, the forced 
devaluation of the Punt, the increased incidence of 'social dumping' by 
multinational companies, the reduced supply of foreign investment, the 
failure to meet the so-called Maastricht "convergence criteria" and the 
impending reduction in EU structural funding, all forced the issue of 
indigenous development - as an island economy - higher up the political 
agenda. Linkages with other peripheral regions or states - such as Spain and 
Portugal and Greece - to pressurise for firmer 'cohesion' policies in the EU 
became more significant. 
As in the North, all-island integration was, to a great extent, seen as a 
means of reversing economic stagnation (34). Like the North, indigenous 
industry in the Republic was primarily linked to the domestic and to 
British markets. Southern exports to Britain were dominated by the 
products of the largely home-owned agri-industry (channelled through 
Belfast, which in 1988 took 58% of the Republic's cargo traffic) (DSO 1992b). 
In 1979 Irish manufacturers exported only 29.5% of their output - mostly to 
the UK, in 1982 they accounted for 75% of exports to the UK, while 
multinationals exported 74.5% of their output, mostly to non-UK markets 
(NESC 1983: 295). Consequently, attempts at stimulating indigenous 
industry in the South necessarily had to draw on the North's as well as the 
South's economic capabilities, building upon the common orientations of 
the two economies, to British markets as well as to each other. Indeed, if 
economic development was to be re-defined as 'indigenous', 'regional' 
development, it necessarily had to become an all-island, 32 County 
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concern, rather than simply a matter for the 26 County Republic (NESC 
1989). 
The need to improve linkages between Irish industry and local suppliers 
was defined as an all-Ireland issue in 1992 for instance, with a series of 
subcontractors' exhibitions organised by the Irish Trade Board (ITB) and the 
IDB (35). Similarly, the concerns of agri-industry were defined in a North- 
South context where they involved quality control, joint price support 
mechanisms, joint marketing, production quotas, disease control and rural 
development in border areas, and by 1993 the ITB was participating in joint 
international trade fairs with the IDB and was joining the IDB in calling for 
EU funds to establish an "island network of communication and transport" 
(36). 
Yet in many ways, there was less Southern enthusiasm for North-South 
integration, partly because it had direct access to EU structures and had been 
able to negotiate a major - although one-off - contribution from EU 
structural funds for the period from 1994 to 1999 (in 1992-3). This may have 
reflected a "businessman's dole mentality" in the Republic, given the 
yearly IRE1.5bl in tax breaks and high level of industrial grants (37). More 
likely, given that such grants were at a higher level in Northern Ireland, 
the larger Southern business sector saw itself as in open competition with 
the North and in any case set its sights on EU markets rather than on the 
smaller all-Ireland market. These pressures for inter-capitalist North-South 
competition rather than collaboration are examined below in the sub- 
section. 
Overall, in the early 1990's, the need for economic strategies aimed at 
generating indigenous development in Ireland, North and South, was 
increasingly being recognised - as the Irish Times argued in an editorial in 
1992, the "economic case for closer cooperation is compelling" (DSO 1992b) 
(38). Fear for Ireland's economic future in the deregulated Single Market 
was leading to a reassessment of economic interests and stimulating 
demands for North-South inter-regional integration to jointly to build on 
Ireland's economic strengths (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1993). As the 
Northern nationalist orientated Irish Nezvs commented in 1993, "during the 
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last 12 months it has become increasingly clear that the concerns of Irish 
business North and South are virtually identical", significantly, the more 
unionist orientated Belfast Telegraph agreed, arguing that the process of EU 
integration was bringing North and South closer together as "the island is 
too small for the two states to go it alone" (39). 
Business interests North and South were realising that without economic 
integration on the "island of Ireland", both parts of the economy would fail 
to remain competitive in the SEM. This regionalisation of economic 
interests in Ireland was directly related to the process of EU integration and 
was leading to the formation - or rather reformation - of an all Ireland 
middle class. In the 1990's business classes began demanding political 
action to develop the 'island . economy', demands that had clear 
implications for the ideological positions of political parties and for state 
policies. These are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 below, but first the on- 
going, and in some cases, increased, divisions in North-South material 
interests are highlighted. 
National divergence 
'Regional' convergence in economic orientations has to be set against on- 
going and in some cases, sharpened 'national' divergence between North 
and South. This was largely caused by the upsurge in national conflict, 
centred on the North and to a lesser extent, by competition between the 
two parts of Ireland for sources of inward investment. In general terms, 
from both North and South being closely linked, to Britain as the "origin 
and destination of most trade, capital and labour", the South had 
increasingly defined itself as a region of the EU while the North had 
became more, not less dependent on the UK economy, primarily in terms 
of its dependence on the British Treasury (O'Cleireacain 1983: 109). 
The two economies and societies were poorly integrated - in a sense, people 
living in the two parts of Ireland shared "a small island with their backs 
firmly turned on each other" (40). The inadequacy of road, rail and 
telephone links reflected political and social divisions - not just between 
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unionists and nationalists, but also between a war-torn North and a 
relatively peaceful South (41). Reflecting the development priorities of the 
British government and the on-going dependence of the North on the 
London-based financial markets, the Northern Ireland Industrial 
Development Board (IDB) remained primarily orientated to finding 
market 'niches' in the British economy and to attracting UK companies. As 
the Director of the CBI argued in 1992 - UK companies moved to the region 
to take advantage of fewer skill shortages, lower wage costs and low staff 
turnover, giving them a "a critical competitive advantage" in British 
markets (42). 
Meanwhile, common dependence on multinational capital, North and 
South did not in itself imply common interests. On the contrary, the two 
regions competed for international capital - through the IDA in the South 
and the IDB in the North and multinational producers rarely had local 
linkages, let alone North-South orientations despite some reorientation in 
marketing and pricing strategies (see above). 
This competition between the development agencies North and South to 
attract increasingly scarce and footloose international capital was seen as 
mutually damaging, not least as it diverted public finances - and policy 
initiatives - away from the more sustainable indigenous sector. The direct 
public funding of "industrialisation by invitation", stood at St. £103m in the 
North for the period from 1986-1992, while in the South IR£429m was paid 
to overseas firms from 1981-1990. Many of these companies then benefited 
from tax breaks, training and infrastructure grants, which in the South 
added up to an estimated IRE600 in 1991 (DSO 1992a, Hamilton 1993). As 
early as 1983 the Permanent Secretary to the Northern Ireland Department 
of Economic Development highlighted this competition as a barrier to 
North-South cooperation. By 1993 competition had intensified as sources 
of international capital began to dry-up in the post-1989 context of 
deregulation in the former Communist countries of East and Central 
Europe. In that year for instance, the Northern IDB deliberately out-bid the 
Southern IDA to attract a Malaysian textile plant, Hualon, and in attracting 
a US Battery plant, Valance, to the North (44). 
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For multinationals as well as for local firms there were many barriers to 
North-South linkages, including poor transport links, uncertainty in 
currency exchange rates and a lack of knowledge of suppliers and markets 
across the border that encouraged them to assign the North, with Britain, 
in a separate division from the South. Northern companies with 'parents' 
in Britain tended to price their goods and services at rates reflecting British 
rather than local circumstances, although, as mentioned earlier, there were 
some indications that this was changing in the early 1990's (45). At the 
same time, reflecting the increasing concentration of economic power 
within the EU and increased investment opportunities outside the EU, 
there was a marked increase in 'social dumping'. Perhaps the most 
disruptive disinvestment in the Republic was the departure of the 
electronics firm, Digital, which had employed 1500 technicians in Galway, 
stimulating a widespread questioning of the Republic's dependency on 
externally determined economic decisions (46). 
In addition, as well as being dependent on inward investment, the North, 
and to a lesser degree, the South, are dependent on continued fiscal 
redistribution. While there was a degree of shared dependence on EU 
funding regimes, leading to joint working on EU funding issues, the North 
was considerably more dependent on sources of funds from the British 
Treasury, which dwarfed EU expenditure. In 1990 EU funding accounted 
for 10.8% of public expenditure in the Republic while in the North, as 
noted earlier, it accounted for 2.3% (47). While clearly insufficient, the 
funds provided a useful boost to investment in the Republic, raising gross 
fixed capital formation by 6.3% to 17.9% of GDP in 1989, comparing with an 
EU average of 20.6% (European Economy 1992; CEC 1990: 73). The North, 
meanwhile, again as noted earlier, was dependent on the UK Treasury 
subvention for a third of its GDP. 
In 1993 the issue of EU funding could become an election issue in the 
South as politicians strove to maximise both the size of the structural 
funds 'cake' and the Republic's slice of it. In the North, by contrast, the UK 
Treasury was the focus of concern. As the Secretary of State stated, the EU 
allocation of St£1040m to Northern Ireland for the period 1994-1999 
"reflect[ed] the very special needs of the region" and complemented the 
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government's subvention to the North which was expected to amount to 
at least St£18,000m over the same period (48) 
Beyond these structural and fiscal dimensions, there remained deep 
divisions between business people, North and South, founded on mutual 
fears and suspicions, a legacy of many decades of national conflict, that 
LEDU officials defined as the main barrier to integration (49). Economic 
development North and South, reflected the political conflict as the 
economic policies of the Republic and the UK led to virtually separate 
economic development in an already divided island. While the economic 
base had become more similar, this was the result not of convergence, but 
of divergence, as the North 'demarketised' while the South industrialised. 
The South 
EU integration allowed the Republic to weaken its dependence on the UK 
economy, reflecting the effects of increased overseas investment in the 
Republic and leading to substantial macroeconomic divergence between 
the two Irish economies (Blackwell and O'Malley 1983) (50). In contrast 
with domestic-owned industry, which remained highly dependent on Irish 
domestic and UK markets, multinational capital was orientated to wider 
EU markets and from the 1960's the Republic's export markets were 
increasingly non-British (Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6: Destination of Republic of Ireland Exports: 
percentage of total exports 
1960 1972 1981 1991 
UK 75 61 43 36 
Other EU 6 17 32 41 
Non EU 19 22 25 23 
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This tendency was not so clear for imports which remained closely linked 
to British sources, particularly in energy, perhaps reflecting extensive 
transfer pricing by multinational corporations as well as on-going 
penetration of the Republic's domestic market by British manufacturers 
(Table 6.7) 
Table 6.7: Source of Republic of Ireland Imports: 
percentage of total Imports 
1960 1973 1981 1991 
UK 49 51 51 42 
Other EU 14 18 20 24 
Non EU 37 31 29 34 
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Source: McAleese 1984: 161 and DSO Trade Statistics 1992. 
Although this process of economic reorientation had begun in the 1960's, it 
accelerated from 1973 so that in 1982, for the first time, non-UK, EU 
markets were more important that UK markets for exporters in the 
Republic (Harrison 1990). This drift away from UK export markets had clear 
implications for the Republic's economic relationship with the North, 
which remained tied to UK markets, partly due to the partial withdrawal of 
multinational capital in the 1970's and 1980's. As a result, exports to 
Northern Ireland became less important in the Republic: as a percentage of 
GDP, cross border exports fell from 3.7% in 1960 to 2.9` in 1972 and in the 
context of increased exports overall, had only partially recovered, to 3.3% in 
1991 (Table 6.8). 
Table 6.8: Republic of Ireland Exports as a percentage of GDP, 
1960,1972 and 1991 
0/O 1960 1972 1991 
Overall Exports 30.6 33.2 59.7 
Exports to Northern Ireland 3.7 2.2 3.3 
Source: European Economy; Belfast Telegraph, 8 June 1993. 
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By the 1980's, exports to Northern Ireland were falling as a percentage of 
overall exports - by approximately a third (as were imports, to a lesser 
extent) (Table 6.9). 
Table 6.9: North-South trade: total volume and as a percentage of total 
imports from and exports to the Republic. 
Imports from Exports to 
IRE Northern Ireland Northern Ireland 
1980 
1990 
1992 
223.5m (4.1) 300.4m (7.4) 
500.1m (3.0 816.5m (5.7) 
486.2 (3.6) 825.1 (4.9) 
Source: DSO Trade Statistics 1992,1994. 
Macro-economic policy in the Republic expressed these shifting economic 
orientations. Given the small size of its economy and its extreme exposure 
to international trade it was generally recognised that the Republic needed 
to align its currency with a larger partner. Until the 1970's dependence on 
UK markets dictated that the Sterling link be retained, but with EU 
membership and strengthened trading relations with non-UK EU 
economies, it was preferable to build closer financial links with EU money 
markets. From the early 1970's the Republic began to use the Euro currency 
market to finance balance of payments deficits and as a source of public 
borrowing, rather than rely on the City of London, and by 1979 only 2% of 
the Republic's foreign debt was denominated in Sterling (Bradley and 
Whelan 1993). 
This was followed by the Republic's decision to delink the Punt from 
Sterling and join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1979. Pegging the 
Punt to Sterling had forced the Republic to shadow UK growth rates - 
which in the 1970's were significantly more inflationary than the rest of the 
EU. The link to the ERM monetary system was seen as providing a new, 
more deflationary anchor for the Republic as well as reflecting its 
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increasingly EU-orientated industrial base. Consequently the Punt was 
pegged to the Deutschmark dominated ECU, effectively transforming 
macro-policy and providing a new 'sheet anchor' for the economy. As the 
UK failed to join the ERM until 1990 (and only then for two years), 1979 
marked the effective end of over 150 years of monetary union with the UK. 
As a result, throughout the 1980's there was considerable divergence 
between Punt and Sterling rates of exchange, with a steady appreciation of 
the Punt: ECU rate until 1987 when it stabilised at IRE0.77 to the ECU, 
contrasting with the Sterling: ECU rate, which depreciated from St. E0.64 to 
the ECU in 1978 to St. E0.55 in 1981, to appreciate to St. EO. 78 per ECU in 1988 
(Graph 6.1). The two exchange rates converged after the UK joined the 
ERM in 1990, only to diverge again after the currency crisis and Sterling's 
departure from the ERM in 1992. 
Graph 6.1: Exchange rates of Punt and Sterling relative to the ECU: 
National currency units per ECU, 1978-1992. 
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The Republic's ERM membership was followed by a period of instability as 
monetary, fiscal and incomes policies were reorientated away from UK 
tendencies to more closely mirror the policies of other ERM members 
(O'Donnell 1993a: 70). Falling output and rapidly increasing unemployment 
(from 7% to 17% between 1980 and 1985) led to a breakdown in corporatist 
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economic management while trade deficits, combined with high public 
borrowing led to devaluations in the Punt (3.5"4i in 1983 and 8 in 1986) 
(51). Policies were reorientated with a rapid reversal of the fiscal reflation of 
1979-1981 and by the mid 1980's, a stable balance of payments was restored, 
with Irish interest rates and inflation rates mirroring German rather than 
UK rates (European Economy 1994; O'Brien 1993). From 1986 this was 
reflected in the Punt, which, after the 10 depreciation of 1983, reached a 
stable exchange rate in the ERNI that was maintained until October 1 0021. 
Again in contrast with UK tendencies, as was noted in Chapter 4, in the 
later 1980's the role of corporatist, tripartite agreements was strengthened. 
After the success of the 1987 "Programme for National Recovery", which 
stabilised public finances as well as pay demands, such agreements came to 
play a central role in policy making. In 1991, the "Programme for Economic 
and Social Progress" updated these objectives and significantly, was aimed 
at meeting the needs of Irish indigenous companies in the context of the 
Single Market, drawing on the experience of similar Western European 
economies (Mjoset 1993; NESC 1989). 
This economic reorientation, bringing the Republic more into line with 
wider EU, rather than with UK trends, led to wide divergences between 
economic tendencies North and South. The break between the Punt and 
Sterling weakened North-South financial ties and was reflected in North- 
South price differentials, leading to a surge in cross-border shopping in the 
1980's, mostly from South to North as Sterling fluctuated relative to the 
Punt in the mid 1980's. For the same reasons cross-border smuggling 
increased as "Monetary Compensation Amounts" (MCA's) could be earnt 
by moving agricultural produce across the border . 
As Sterling began to depreciate in the mid 1980's ERM membership also 
temporarily damaged the Republic's competitiveness relative to the UK. 
Ironically, allowing the Punt to shadow Sterling - for instance in the period 
from 1970 to 1978 when it depreciated relative to other EU currencies - may 
have been of greater benefit to Irish indigenous producers than ERM 
membership (NESC 1989). Nonetheless, in an economy dominated by 
multinationals, these and other factors such as the reduction in public 
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borrowing, cuts in real wage levels and labour-shedding in Irish-owned 
industry, boosted overall industrial productivity. This only served to 
further underscore North-South divergence as, from the mid 1980's to the 
early 1990's, industrial productivity in the Republic rose at twice the rate of 
productivity growth in Northern Ireland (52). 
The net effect was that from the late 1980's, economic fortunes in the 
Republic began to mirror those in the rest of the EU rather than in Britain 
and Northern Ireland. In previous years, the direction - if not the 
magnitude - of economic growth in the Republic tended to reflect shifts in 
the British economy rather than shifts experienced in other, similar EU 
economies. This pattern was reversed in the 1980's, leading to significant 
economic divergences between the Republic and Northern Ireland, with a 
discernable effect on North-South relationships. Cross border shopping and 
smuggling led to tighter border controls and in the case of the Republic, 
firmer customs regulations, leading some to suggest that EU membership 
had "emphasised the economic existence of an Irish border which was 
largely absent hithertoo" (Trimble 1989a: 43). This is discussed in Chapters 7 
and 8. 
The North 
Equally, economic interests in the North were by no means been set in an 
all-Ireland framework, despite the enthusiasm for North-South 
integration. In the 1980's the South became marginally more important to 
Northern exporters - exports rose as a percentage of Northern GDP, from 
2.4% in 1960, to 2.9% by 1972 and 4.7% by 1991 (53). But this reflected an 
overall reduction in the North's trading relations with non-Irish markets 
rather than a significant reorientation towards the South. In 1990 the 
NIERC estimated that Northern Ireland exports to the Republic accounted 
for approximately 6`% of total sales, while sales in Britain accounted for 
40 In terms of manufacturing exports, 9.4014, of Northern Ireland exports 
were destined for the Republic and 49.6%> to Britain, while 20.6"o were 
exported to other EU countries (54). 
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Unsurprisingly, UK macro-policies diverged from policies in the Republic 
and invariably failed to reflect the needs of the peripheral, deindustrialised 
yet still heavily agricultural economy in Northern Ireland. Perhaps in 
recognition of the special conditions existing in Northern Ireland, British 
government fiscal and industrial policies were applied with some care in 
Northern Ireland: the Poll tax that was introduced in Scotland in 1989 and 
in Wales and England in 1990, was never implemented in Northern 
Ireland; Northern Ireland did not experience the public expenditure cuts of 
other UK regions - expenditure on the health service and on public 
housing has remained significantly higher than in England; and the 
privatisation programme of the Thatcher government was not extended to 
Northern Ireland until well after her departure from government - with 
the listing of Northern Ireland electricity and water on the London stock 
markets in 1993. 
Despite this relative isolation from British government policy shifts, the 
Northern economy was undermined by British macro- policies more 
orientated towards the interests of the City of London than to the needs of a 
region with a weak indigenous industrial sector on the periphery of the 
SEM. As the Northern Ireland Economic Council repeatedly pointed out, 
UK economic policy was orientated to meeting the needs of the UK macro- 
economy - not to the specific needs of the Northern Ireland economy and 
not only had a detrimental effect on the Northern economy. This 
undermined North-South linkages (NIEC 1989: 56; 1990: 46). 
From 1979 for instance, UK fiscal policy was aimed at reducing rates of 
direct taxation and reducing the cost of labour, which, if anything, 
undermined the Northern economy as historically it had competed with 
the British regions on the basis of relatively low wages for unskilled labour. 
Deregulation of labour markets - in contrast with the shift towards 
corporatism in the Republic - and falling wage rates in Britain reduced the 
comparative advantage of the North, so damaging its relative 
productivity. Also as a result of deregulation, planning in Northern 
Ireland was disjointed and ad lioc, reacting to the on-going weakness of the 
Northern economy and reflecting the failure to embrace economic 
planning in the wider UK economy, despite bouts of recession in the late 
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1970's and 1980's. Of particular importance were drastic reductions in 
regional assistance - from 0.7 to 0.2"',, of UK GDP between 197') and 1985 - in 
contrast with on-going tax breaks and development grants in the Republic, 
which, together with related fiscal retrenchment, helps to explain the 
failure to stimulate significant growth in inward investment to the region, 
despite an EU economic recovery in the latter half of the 1980's (MacKay 
1992). 
This was also reflected in monetary policy, which in the UK was not so 
much 'counter-cyclical' as 'pro-cyclical' - exacerbating the international 
business cycle to maintain the position of the City of London in global 
capital markets and thereby undermining economic development in its 
peripheral regions. The application of monetarist policies led to high 
interest rates during the recession of the early 1980's; the response to the 
1987 stock market crash led to low interest rates during the late 1980's 
recovery; while the fear of 'over-heating' led to high interest rates in the 
recession of the 1990's. This not only tied the Northern economy to what 
were often inappropriate monetary policies, it also systematically 
disadvantaged the North in relation to other - more central - regions of the 
UK, particularly in terms of the availability and cost of borrowing as 
Northern Ireland borrowers were required to pay a premium of up to 3% 
on loans, reflecting the region's distance from the sources of UK financial 
power (NIEC 1982: 122-3). 
In addition, UK exchange rate policy did not provide Northern Ireland 
with the stable, preferably low currency rate relative to its main trading 
partners that it needed. Instead, as noted above, Sterling fluctuated 
erratically (55). UK entry into the ERM in 1990 at an overvalued 
Sterling: ECU rate, designed to favour British interests in the City of 
London, underlined this and was followed by a period of severe exchange 
rate instability after the UK left the ERM in 1992. The devalued Sterling 
rate no doubt favoured Northern industry in subsequent years, but once 
again the UK Pound was subject to rapid fluctuations, independently of 
relative exchange rate stability in the Republic and the rest of the EU. 
Chapter Conclusions 
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Facing increased concentration of economic power at the EU level, 
integration into the SEM increased the importance of developing viable, 
indigenously-owned industry in the peripheral regions in the EU. In 
Ireland this forced business, North and South, to reorientate their interests 
- in the case of Northern Ireland away from a UK-centred perspective, in 
the case of the Republic away from an externally-focused perspective, and 
in both parts of Ireland towards an all-Island perspective. It was no accident 
that this reorientation, and the political pressures it placed on politicians, 
North and South, intensified in the early 1990's so that, by 1994, the need 
for an all-Ireland economic strategy had virtually become conventional 
wisdom. 
There were however, substantial economic obstacles to the formation of a 
single island economy, and many of them directly related to EU 
integration. While the SEM encouraged greater integration between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic it also strengthened the power of 
international capital at the EU level, leading to increased competition 
between the still externally orientated IDA and IDB. In the Republic, on- 
going, and indeed, increased dependence on externally owned industry, as 
indigenously-owned industry continued to decline, strengthened 
dependence on EU markets and encouraged fuller integration into EU 
financial and exchange markets, most clearly expressed in the Republic's 
membership of the ERM from 1979. 
In Northern Ireland, continued disinvestment by multinational capital 
and the collapse of private, locally owned industry, accelerated the process 
of 'demarketisation' and sharpened the region's dependence on sources of 
finance from the UK Treasury. At the same time, British economic policies 
remained geared to maintaining the global influence of the City of London 
and, from 1979, to defining the UK economy as a low-wage, deregulated 
location for multinational capital seeking access to EU markets. British 
financial autonomy from the EU was maximised, as was the ability to 
pursue a strategy of competitive deregulation, expressed in the UK opt-out 
from Economic and Monetary Union and from the Social Chapter in the 
Maastricht Treaty. As EU integration accelerated and the fault-line between 
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'EU-sceptic' and 'EU-enthusiast' became more sharply defined in policy 
terms, the economic border between the Republic and Northern Ireland 
became more important in some respects - exchange rate differentials for 
instance - just as it was becoming less important in others - for instance in 
customs regulations. 
These divergences suggested that if the presumed benefits of integration 
were to be realised for Ireland, North and South, there would need to be 
concerted political guidance and democratic involvement. The degree to 
which this was reflected in ideological shifts within Northern Ireland and 
the Republic and was translated into state-led all-Ireland initiatives 
depended crucially on the process of mediation between economic shifts, 
ideological conflict and state policies (O'Donnell 1993b). The following two 
Chapters again focus on issues of EU and North-South integration; they 
attempt to highlight this mediation as well as mapping-out the relatively 
separate and autonomous dynamics of party-political conflict and state 
authority (Chapters 7 and 8). 
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Chapter 7 
Ideological conflict: Nationalism and 
Regionalism 
In the context of the economic shifts outlined in the previous Chapter, EU 
integration also stimulated ideological shifts, to a degree moving politics 
away from conflicts over 'national' issues and towards conflicts over 
regional' issues. This Chapter attempts to weigh up the contending 
pressures for ideological divergence and for ideological convergence in 
Ireland. First, there is an attempt to assess the emerging, EU-related 
pressures towards consensus between politicians on the question of North- 
South, regional integration in Ireland. Second, the on-going and, in some 
cases strengthened, pressures towards divergence are examined. 
There are some arguments that EU integration would dispose of the 
"sovereignty-identity obsession" in Ireland, offering the possibility of a 
"reassessment of all relationships on these islands", weakening the conflict 
between British "integration" and Irish "separatism", and forging a new 
"European citizenship" (1). There are, however, serious problems with 
these arguments as they assume that the transnational context could 
supersede relations between a dominant national political culture and its 
subordinates. Indeed, de-nationalising state policy would not necessarily 
address the roots of the conflict - assuming that such changes were possible. 
Interpreting the conflict between Britain and the Republic over Northern 
Ireland as a relatively benign relationship between British "integration" 
and Irish "separatism" underestimates the historical and contemporary 
roots of the conflict, and it down-plays the degree of ideological divergence 
between nationalism and unionism within Ireland. 
While all-Ireland regional integration may have become an economic 
necessity this appeared to be having, at most, a minimal impact on the 
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continuing pressures for ideological divergence in Ireland. Nonetheless, 
such 'regionalising' impacts may have longer term significance, and here 
are examined in some detail. 
Regionalist convergence 
EU institutions played a key ideological role in legitiinising the 
redefinition of Ireland as a single island rather than two separate 
jurisdictions. This involved a re-definition of territorial concepts in Ireland 
as EU institutions sought to use depoliticised 'regional' concepts, free from 
'national connotations - unlike existing terms associated with various 
shades of 'green' or 'orange', such as 'Ireland', 'Northern Ireland', the 
'North of Ireland', 'Ulster', the 'Republic', the Free State, Eire, the 6 and 
the 26 Counties. 
In the early 1980's for instance, the Commission began using the concept of 
the "totality of relations within these islands" -a single Irish and British 
geographical entity defining Northern Ireland as a matter of legitimate 
concern for the Republic as well as for Britain which was initially floated by 
nationalist politicians in the South, in particular by Garret Fitzgerald (1972). 
The concept was developed at the EU level primarily because it allowed 
British and Irish representatives to discuss common issues on the sidelines 
of EU meetings, resulting in common Communiques which could be 
released without the fear that either government would be accused of 
interfering in the other's 'sovereign' territorial jurisdiction, thus 
providing the basis for inter-governmental Anglo-Irish dialogue on the 
North, a process of consultation and cooperation that culminated in the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement (2). 
In the later 1980's the concept of the "island of Ireland", became more 
current. This was used by the Commission as short-hand for the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland, as the Commission had been criticised for 
using the term 'Ireland' for the 26 County Republic. This issue was 
highlighted in the first session of the European Parliament in 1979 by the 
UUP NIEP John Taylor, who argued that the term 'Ireland' rubbed out the 
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existence of the North (3). Nationalists and Republicans had also criticised 
this habit of collapsing the 26 County Republic into the concept of Ireland 
as a way of suggesting that the national project in the South was somehow 
complete, when for them it plainly was not. 
The concept of the "island of Ireland" offered a means of addressing North- 
South issues without directly or explicitly questioning jurisdictional 
divisions. In 1988 for instance, the Commission used the concept to 
highlight the need for Community initiatives at the all-Ireland level in the 
1989-1993 framework for the expenditure of EU structural funds. The term 
'island' had a common sense appeal that was virtually irresistible, even to 
those whose primary political purpose was to preserve Northern Ireland's 
link with Britain. By the 1990's it was being used by the British government 
(notably in the Downing Street Declaration) and by Unionist and Loyalist 
politicians. 
It was no accident that this shift in EU nomenclature coincided with the 
acceleration of EU integration in the mid to late 1980's as state borders and 
jurisdictional definitions of territory were partially undermined and 
superseded by the concept of an EU without internal borders with regional 
definitions of territory, at the sub-state and supra-state levels acquiring 
greater significance. In Ireland the new regionalist definitions were 
founded on a relatively non-contentious geographic concepts and provided 
ideological legitimation for North-South policy initiatives and for 
cooperation between the Republic and state authorities in the North. In 
this ideological context a degree of consensus emerged between political 
parties in both parts of Ireland on the question of regional integration in 
Ireland and in the EU. 
The North 
Reflecting sharpened national conflict after EU membership, political 
divisions in Northern Ireland between nationalists identifying with 
Ireland and unionists identifying with Britain, continued to widen: in 1968 
20";, of Protestants saw themselves as "Irish" while 20"4, of Catholics saw 
themselves as "British". By 1989 the equivalent figures were 3 and 8 
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But at the same time, a regionalist redefinition of national identity was 
underway, heavily influenced by EU integration. There was a degree of 
convergence on common regionalist definitions of identity - which 
linguistically and symbolically encompassed both identities (Nloxon- 
Browne 1991). The inclusive concept of "Northern Irish" for instance, 
could express both an affiliation to definitially separate 'NortlIL'rn Ireland' at 
the same time as it expressed an affiliation to Ireland in general (4). 
This paradox that both inclusive and exclusive affiliations had a growing 
appeal was reflected in political preferences in Northern Ireland. Within 
political parties inclusive, regionalist redefinitions of political identity 
offered the basis for a more malleable political categorisation, particularly 
for Nationalists and Republicans (5). It also was a key factor in the 
emergence of a political consensus on the need for power-sharing political 
institutions in the North, with veto powers for both Nationalists and 
Unionists: in a survey conducted by Initiatit'e '92 in 1993, for instance, 86,4, 
of Northern Catholics were found to support this option, together with 
46% of Protestants, adding up to 63% overall (6). 
This superseding of communal and political boundaries, just as in other 
respects they were being sharpened, was also a strong theme in political 
responses to EU integration. The issue of whether Northern Ireland should 
join the EU split both political blocs in Northern Ireland: constitutional 
Nationalists and some "official" Unionists favoured membership while 
Republicans and Loyalists opposed it. An opinion poll held in 1978 
suggested that this reflected public attitudes to the EU, with roughly half of 
all Protestants and half of all Catholics favouring continued EC 
membership (Guelke 1988: 157). 
Furthermore, after membership this cross-community support for EU 
integration grew at a remarkable rate. At the time of the referendum in 
1975, Northern Ireland was the most anti-EU of UK regions; by 1991 it was 
the most 'europhile' UK region (Table 7.1). 
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TaLIc -. 1: Percentage favouring UK withdrawal from the EU: 
Northern Ireland and the UK 
Northern Ireland United Kingdom 
1975 Referendum 47.9 32. S 
(turnout) (47.4) (h4.5) 
1991 Eurobarometer Poll 5.2 19.3 
(survey number) 300 1000 
Source: Derby 1993; Eurobarometer 36, Autumn 1991. 
This reflected a strengthened, shared regional identity of Northern Ireland, 
as part of the EU, which both Nationalist and Unionist politicians could 
claim to represent. As elsewhere in the EU, regional consensus was defined 
against central state authorities, in this case, over issues such as subsidiarity 
and additionality (Hainsworth 1992). Politicians competed to define 
themselves as regional ambassadors, defending regional interests and 
maximising the flow of EU funds to the region -a type of "pork barrel 
regionalism" (Murray 1992: 21). These tendencies emerged in parallel with 
the on-going national conflict in Northern Ireland, and often conflicted 
with its logic - disrupting ideological positions in the conflict, forcing policy 
realignments along regionalist lines, and potentially recasting 'national' 
constituencies. 
Although attitudes to the EU cut across sectarian lines in Northern Ireland, 
party political leaderships mobilised for EP elections on traditional 
nationalist versus unionist lines. Due to what the British government 
called "special circumstances" in Northern Ireland, the region was defined 
as a single Euro-constituency, with its three Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) selected under the proportional representation system 
(7). Partly as a result of this, EP elections were treated as a contest for 
political leadership in the North and as a vote for or against the dilution of 
UK sovereignty - and by implication - the dilution of Northern Ireland's 
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constitutional status as part of the UK. Consequently the sectarian divide 
was clearest in EP elections than at any other election, with very trey 
transfers across the communal divide and cross-community parties - such 
as the Alliance and Workers Party - faring worse in European than in 
either Westminster or local government elections (O'Leary 1990; Guelke 
1988: 156). 
This favoured the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) which tripled its share 
of the votes cast - from 10.2 per cent in the 1979 Westminster election to 
29.8 per cent in the European election of that year, claiming 170,688 first 
preference votes - an event described as "one of the most important years 
in DUP history" as it "established its claim to speak for Protestant Ulster" 
(8). This compared with the successful Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
candidate who polled 127,169. EP elections also favoured the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which in 1979 claimed 24.6 per cent of 
the vote - 4.7 per cent more than in the 1979 Westminster and 7.1 per cent 
more than in the 1981 local government elections. In contrast, the UUP, 
which fielded two candidates in the 1979 elections, saw its share fall by 14.7 
per cent to 21.9 per cent of the vote. 
Although the DUP continued to top the poll after 1979, there was a slight 
movement away from the anti-Maastricht DUP and Sinn Fein, towards the 
less anti-EU UUP and, more significantly, towards the pro-EU SDLP. Both 
the DUP and Sinn Fein saw their share of the vote fall by 3.4 per cent 
between 1984 and 1994 while the less negative UUP saw their vote increase 
by 2.4 per cent and the SDLP by 6.4 per cent, both over the same ten year 
period (Table 7.2). This perhaps reflected the growing acceptance, even 
enthusiasm, for European integration from the mid 1980's, voters began to 
favour political parties with a positive programme for European 
integration. 
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Table European Parliament elections in Northern Ireland: 
percentage of votes cast, 1979-1994 
UUP DUP SDLP SF All WP Oth Turnout 
1979 21.9 29.8 24.6 - 6.8 0.8 16.1 57 
1984 21.5 33.6 22.1 13.3 5.0 1.3 3.2 65 
1989 22.2 29.9 25.5 9.2 5.2 1.0 7.1 44 
1994 23.8 29.2 28.9 9.9 4.1 1.0 3.1 49 
Source: O'Leary 1990, Irish Times 14 June 1994. 
The three Northern Ireland MEPs worked together on what were defined 
as joint regional concerns (Elliott 1990). Funding, 'additionality' and 
representation at the EU level were common themes in election material, 
reflecting an emerging political consensus on such issues (Hainsworth 
1992: 151). The parties were forced to collaborate in 'getting the best deal' for 
the North in the EU, cross-party voting on regional issues at EU level was 
commonplace, and the three MEPs often made joint representations to the 
EU and to the British government. 
As early as 1980 all three MEPs visited Brussels with the Mayor of Belfast to 
call for more EU funds for Northern Ireland. In 1981 they complained that 
the British government was, as the Rev. Paisley put it, "siphoning off 
money intended for Ulster into its own coffers" and in 1985 the three 
MEP's joined with the Ulster Farmers Union and the Northern Ireland 
Economic Council to lobby Brussels for an increased milk quota for 
Northern Ireland under the CAP (9). In 1988 MEPs were united in their 
condemnation of the NIO after the proposed 1989-1993 Community 
Support Framework for Northern Ireland attracted 50", % per capita less than 
the Republic's submission and again, were unified in opposition to the 
criteria applied for allocating Cohesion funds. On this occasion - in 1993 - 
the three MEP's sought, and received, a meeting with the British PM on 
the issue, and returned to Northern Ireland with the promise that the 
Treasury would top-up Northern Ireland public expenditure levels, as the 
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only "Objective One" region not to be allocated 'cohesion' money. As the 
Irish NL'zvs noted, when it came to defining themselves as doing the 'best' 
for Northern Ireland, "cash was thicker than blood" (10). 
A measure of the surprise at such joint action and how it conflicted with 
the politicians' positions in the national conflict can be guaged from news 
reports in 1988 after a press lunch for the MEP's in the Commission's 
offices in Belfast where John Hume and the Rev. Paisley sat side-bv-side 
and stated there was nothing unusual in the two parties agreeing on socio- 
economic issues. The two MEP's clarified that it was their "duty" to get the 
"best" for Northern Ireland and although no press photographs were 
permitted, the next day the Iris/i Times announced that "John and Ian unite 
in amity" (11). 
Party policies 
Partly as a result of this ostensibly ad hoc, 'non political' joint action, there 
was a significant shifting of position in official party policies. In effect, 
parties and their representatives were forced to construct a consistency 
between their ideological positions in the national conflict and the logic of 
regional integration in the EU. 
Amongst nationalists, the Party most influenced by EU integration was the 
SDLP. Regional integration in the EU was seen as stimulating a 
reassessment of North-South relations in Ireland. In 1992 for instance, the 
Party leader called for equal treatment for all the 'objective one' regions 
under the 'cohesion fund' and for a North-South economic Policy 
Commission to manage the "integration of the whole Irish economy 
within the new Europe" (12). In 1977 at its seventh annual conference the 
Party had focused on the the socio-economic impacts of EU membership 
and in 1984 it argued that these constituted an alternative agenda, separate 
from the sectarian politicking of rival candidates. In successive EP elections 
the Party defined itself and its candidate John Hume, as something of as 
expert on EU issues: the Party's 1984 manifesto, Strength in Europe, spoke of 
his "political effort and political expertise... as compared with the negative 
and destructive attitudes of our main opponents". The Party campaigned 
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for continued EU membership in the 1975 referendum and at Westminster 
supported both the Single European Act (1988) and the Maastricht Treaty 
(1993). Ten years later, the 1994 manifesto, Towards a nicw ct'iitury, also 
concentrated on such issues. Under the slogan "Europe for people and 
people for Europe" the Party emphasised issues such as the CAP, the social 
charter, the European employment initiative, environmental issues and 
global economic development and emphasised the influence it could wield 
as a member of the socialist group. 
Sinn Fein shifted closer to the SDLP position, reflecting greater acceptance 
of the EU dimension to politics in Ireland. The Party programme, Eire Nna, 
published in 1971 had favoured a strong Irish national state which would 
distance itself from the "rich men's club of former colonial powers in the 
EC". In its first EP election campaign in 1984 the Party fought the election 
primarily on issues directly related to the conflict. Its manifesto, One 
Ireland, one people, the only alternative, argued that the EU had "subjugated" 
Ireland to the interests of larger EU states and called for a "negotiated 
withdrawal", substituting trade agreements for EU membership. At the 
same time the Party campaigned for "the maximum benefits available", 
demanding improved levels of grant aid and suggesting that EU advice 
centres should be set up in farming communities. The 1989 manifesto, For 
a free Ireland in a Free Europe, argued that Europeanism was no replacement 
for Irishness and again called for the renegotiation of Ireland's EU 
membership. In 1992 it published Democracy or dependency - the case against 
Maastricht and campaigned for a 'no' vote during the Maastricht Treaty 
referendum in the Republic. 
But by 1991 the Sinn Fein leader was admitting that the Party's "inability to 
latch onto the European dimension is a source of frustration for me" (13). 
With the 1994 manifesto, Pence in Ireland, a European issue, there was a 
substantial shift as the Party moved from outright condemnation of the 
EU, to arguing that it was possible to construct "an alternative to the 
undemocratic, anti-worker EU". EU policies were still seen as the product 
of imperialist ideology, centred on the "creation of an economic and 
political superpower" and servicing the needs of transnational 
corporations and international finance rather than the "interests of the 
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actual people of the community" and the Maastricht Treaty was criticised 
not simply for the 'democratic deficit' but also because it would "erode 
further the power and sovereignty of EU member states". But EL' 
integration was not therefore rejected, on the contrary, it was seen as a key 
site of political engagement and the Party came close to praising the EU for 
its use of funds "to promote the image of 'the island of Ireland' as one 
unified economy", regretting that this was not expressed in the policy 
priorities of either the Republic or Northern Ireland. 
Other non-Unionist Parties also moved towards accepting the logic of EU 
regional integration in Ireland. The Workers Party - political descendants 
of the "official" IRA - was opposed to EU membership in 1972. But by 1989 
it had become more positive about EU developments and the possibilities 
for political intervention to improve Northern Ireland's position within it. 
The party argued for improved representation for Northern Ireland at the 
EU level and saw the EU framework as a means of superseding the 
"medieval quagmire" of sectarianism in Northern Ireland (14). It fought 
the 1984 EP election on socio-economic issues - especially employment and 
poverty, standing candidates in three Irish constituencies - in the North, 
Dublin and Munster and its manifesto, Peace, work, democracy, class politics, 
focused on the need to construct "Left unity" at the EU level to challenge 
neo-liberal policy agendas at the EU level which had left 400,000 
unemployed in Ireland - North and South. In Northern Ireland the party 
called for an EU funding boost, to St£3bin, proportionate with the Republic 
and for consideration of an Antrim-Scotland road link. On constitutional 
issues it urged active EU intervention through an update of the "Haagerup 
Report" - the European Parliament's 1984 investigation into politics in 
Northern Ireland (See Chapter 8). 
Unionists were generally opposed to EU integration as it was seen as 
diminishing the significance of British sovereignty and by implication, 
undermining North-South divisions in Ireland. Ironically, the smaller 
Loyalist Parties associated with Loyalist paramilitaries were amongst the 
least hostile to EU integration. Consistent with some prefering Northern 
Ireland independence, there was general acceptance of the need for North- 
South economic linkages, but only as a "working partnership between two 
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states", suggesting, in 1993, that "the two parts of Ireland are far too small to 
paddle with their own canoes"(15). 
Of the 'mainstream' unionist parties, only the small cross-community 
'Alliance' Party defined itself as pro-European Union. It endorsed 
regionalisation as a means of overcoming divisions in Northern Ireland 
and in its 1989 the Party manifesto, Show Europe a new f icc, it argued for 
coordinated EU action on regional development in Ireland. The 1994 
manifesto, Our future together in Europe, called for regional government for 
Northern Ireland to improve representation of Northern Ireland as a 
region at the EU level to "provide... a political structure which all sections 
of this community could support". The Party favoured accelerated EU 
integration and its candidate - Mary Clark-Glass - concentrated on socio- 
economic, environmental and international issues rather than on 
Northern Ireland constitutional issues. 
Unlike the Alliance, the UUP was ideologically opposed to the concept of 
European regionalism but nonetheless, became relatively positive on some 
issues of integration in the 1980's. In the 1975 referendum the Party was 
undecided, primarily because of the pro-European, pro-CAP rural vote, 
with some politicians favouring membership while others, including Jim 
Molyneaux, leading a "get Britain out" campaign in the North and seeing 
European integration as undermining Northern Ireland's constitutional 
position in the UK (16). 
In its 1989 manifesto, Europe in the '90's, the Party welcomed measures to 
liberalise trade in the EU, arguing that "the lifting of trade barriers will 
increase cross-border trade within the island of Ireland" and emphasised 
that it had "campaigned hard to have the present Eire restrictions on 
crossborder trade removed" and in a section on "relations with the 
Republic of Ireland", the Party clarified that it was "not opposed to co- 
operation where there are no political or constitutional implications". 
These issues did not deserve a mention in the 1994 manifesto, Europe: 
making it work for Ulster, perhaps suggesting that they had become politically 
sensitive, and the manifesto returned to more general assertions of the 
need for Northern Ireland to be placed on an equal footing with its 
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European partners and on the role of their candidate in promoting a "two- 
way awareness" and helping to win new understanding of the Province's 
difficulties". 
Nonetheless, the Party - particularly its more 'liberal' wing - had begun to 
recognise the necessity for North-South links. Speaking in Cork in 1003, 
Ken Maginnis (UUP MP) called for both parts of Ireland to develop and 
exploit common strengths, emphasising the urgent need for the Republic 
to adopt a more facillitative and less combative relations with the North 
and amongst some UUP border Councillors, there was increased acceptance 
of an EU-induced reduction in the significance of the border (17). This was 
also reflected in the McGimsey brothers' submission to the Opsahl 
Commission (one of whom was a UUP Councillor in the Shankill area and 
an Honorary UUP Secretary) which favoured strengthening North-South 
linkages between the two administrations to encourage the "questioning of 
old notions of nationalism" in the South as well as to "achieve social and 
economic benefits for the Irish people as a whole (18). 
The Party also addressed the issue of North-South relations with its 
position paper, Blueprint for stability, of February 1994, in which the 
approach outlined in 1989 was deepened, suggesting a closer engagement 
with and acceptance of EU related issues. On North-South constitutional 
issues, arguments for the removal of Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's 
constitution were phrased in terms of the need to learn from "European 
co-operation, namely recognition of existing frontiers, abandonment of 
territorial ambition and mutual co-operation in an atmosphere of respect 
for human rights". The Party emphasised that it was their "ambition... to 
develop co-operation on matters of mutual interest and concern" with the 
Republic and supporting this, there was acceptance of the need to 
incorporate the European Convention on human rights and CSCE 
declarations on minority rights into the Northern Ireland legal system (19). 
The DUP was more actively hostile to EU integration. It campaigned 
against membership in 1975 and in 1979 saw itself as participating in the EP 
to maximise EU transfers to Northern Ireland and to put the Loyalist case 
at the European level. In 1984 the Party stressed issues such as additionality, 
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the need for more regional funding and argued that their candidate - as an 
independent - was concerned "only with advancing the cause of Northern 
Ireland". There were similar themes in the 1989 manifesto, with a 
particular stress on the Party's independence as "a free and unfettered 
voice" in the EP and in 1992 the Party was still "implacably opposed" to the 
Maastricht treaty and committed to "milking the cow before slitting its 
throat" (21). These themes were confirmed in 1994 when the candidate 
claimed he had "no ties with any group which is pro-EC and anti-Ulster in 
character", clarifying that "we oppose the creation of a European super-state 
or anything which strikes at the sovereignty of the UK". 
This was set against the Party's substantial commitment to structures at the 
EU level and to coordinated EU action in support of 'national' policies that, 
by 1994, went well beyond "milking" the EU cow. By 1992 the Party had 
begun to argue for "cooperation in Europe without incorporation", a 
position similar to that of the UUP (22). The Party called for EU action on 
unemployment, proposing a new Commissioner to "channel the resources 
of the community into reducing unemployment" and it welcomed the 
creation of a Commissioner for consumer affairs. It favoured EU action on 
working conditions, supporting the EU Social Charter, and it called for the 
creation of an EU inspectorate to enforce regulations on the transportation 
of live animals. On other issues, EU conditions were used as a yardstick, for 
instance, in developing a "family policy" under which an income would be 
provided for "full time mothers equivalent at least to the minimum wage 
in many EC states". 
Overall, then, there was some convergence between political parties in 
Northern Ireland on issues of EU integration. Parties initially opposed to 
EU membership participated in this consensus-forming process, suggesting 
that EU integration had stimulated ideological conflict along regionalist, 
rather than nationalist lines in Northern Ireland. This was mirrored by 
developments in the Republic. 
The South 
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In the Republic political debate on the process of EU integration also 
increasingly focused on the content of integration rather than the question 
of integration itself. Public enthusiasm with the EU had traditionally been 
high in the Republic - in 1992 for instance, 70.2% saw the EU as a "good 
thing", compared with 46.5% in Northern Ireland, 43.1% in the UK and 
60.4% in the EU as a whole (23). In May 1972 83";, of voters approved the 
proposal to join the EC, following a campaign in which the two major 
political parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, along with the political 
establishment in the Senate and the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
wholeheartedly supported membership (24). Voter enthusiasm for EU 
integration was also reflected in the referenda which approved the 1987 
Single European Act and the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and in successive 
Eurobarometer polls - in 1991 for instance, 5.3` favoured withdrawal from 
the EC, compared with 7.2% in the Community as a whole (Eurobarometer 
36, Autumn 1991). 
Arguably this pro-Europeanism was reflected in voting patterns. As, in the 
1980's and 1990's, a wider range of political parties competed for votes on a 
pro-EU political agenda, there was a movement of votes away from the 
main, largely pro-EU parties - Fine Gael, and Fianna Fail. In 1979 these two 
parties jointly accounted for 67.8% of the vote and nine of the fifteen seats, 
rising to 71.4% of the vote in 1984 and fourteen seats. By 1989 though, their 
proportion of votes cast fell to 52.7%, with ten seats. In 1994, partly due to 
the low turnout, their vote rose to 69.3%, but only increased their 
representation by one seat, contrasting with the Irish Green Party which 
gained its first two seats in the European Parliament (Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3: European Parliament elections in the Republic: 
percentage of votes cast, 1979-1994 
FF FG LP SF PD WP Green Ind 
(turnout) 
1979 34.7 33.1 14.5 --3.3 14.1 (63.6) 
1984 39.2 32.2 8.4 4.9 - 4.3 0.5 10.1 (47.6) 
1989 31.5 21.6 9.5 2.3 11.9 7.5 3.8 11.9 (68.3) 
1994 35.0 24.3 11.0 3.0 6.5 6.5 3.7 6.9 (37.0) 
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Soarer: European Parliament (1989) EP elections 1989: results and elected 
members, PE 133.339,22 June 1989; Financial Tinus, 14 June lc)L)4. 
While this could have reflected a general disillusionment with the two 
main political Parties in the Republic, it also, at least in part, reflected a 
move towards greater political engagement with EU-related issues by a 
wider range of political parties. As in Northern Ireland, this was reflected 
in party policies. 
Party policies 
Generally, the EU was presented as a useful forum for the pursuit of the 
Republic's specific interests, particularly in agriculture. Only on the Left, in 
the trade union movement and in the Labour Party, 'official' Sinn Fein 
(later the Workers Party), from 1992 with the Democratic Left, the Green 
Party and the Irish Communist Party, was there opposition to membership, 
largely on grounds of its impact on the Republic's military neutrality and 
its likely damage to industry - nonetheless, as in Northern Ireland, these 
parties later became less implacably opposed to EU integration. 
The most pro-EU Party - Fine Gael - was dedicated to the development of 
the EU as a "moral enterprise" (Ruane and Todd 1992a). It was fully 
committed in its Party Constitution to working towards a united Europe 
and defined itself, in the European Peoples Party, as within the mainstream 
of European Christian Democracy. Nonetheless, the Party was committed 
to maintaining the Republic's state powers in EU institutions, for instance 
reflected in its proposals for institutional reform of the EU which were 
aimed at protecting the interests of Irish state representatives rather than at 
increasing the pace of integration. It emphasised the role of a reformed 
Council of Ministers in which the Republic would have an equal vote with 
other EU members, in tandem with a strengthened European Parliament 
and when in government, the Party opposed diminution in the 
Commission's "exclusive power of initiative", which was seen as the key 
to preventing the domination of EU institutions by the larger member 
states ('15). Consequently, the Party's 1994 EP manifesto, Working for Ireland 
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at the heart of Europe, called for a "democratic constitution for a strong EU" 
while at the same time opposing "any proposal which is designed to create 
differential membership terms or status for larger states in the Union". 
Fianna Fail was more sceptical of integration. In 1985-0 it called for a 
renegotiation of the Single European Act - in alliance with the French 
Gaullists in the European Democratic alliance. The following year this 
opposition was reversed and the Party fully endorsed the Act in the 
Republic's referendum of 1987. By the 1990's the Party supported the 
transition to European Union: its leader, Charles Haughey, participated as 
Taoiseach in the Inter-governmental Conference which approved the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991 and in 1992 the Party campaigned for a 'yes' vote 
in the Maastricht Treaty referendum. Reflecting this shift, in 1990 the Party 
adopted a more positive position on the role of the EU in the national 
conflict, calling on the Commission to address the "totality of relations 
between all Parties of these islands" (26). 
The shift in Irish Labour Party policy came later. The Party campaigned 
against the SEA in 1987 but by the 1989 election, the Party had adopted a 
pro-integration position, arguing for a strengthened regional and social 
dimension to EU policies in its manifesto, Towards 1992. The Party 
advocated critical endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 
referendum, stressing the dangers of EU deregulation for employment and 
social development in the Republic and by 1994 it was campaigning in 
favour of EU integration as part of the move to a united socialist Europe 
(27). The Party's manifesto, Europe for the people, was positive about the 
process of EU integration and stressed that it was only through 
"cooperation and coherent policies" at the EU level that issues of 
employment, social development and environmental protection could be 
addressed. 
Similarly, by 1994 the Workers' Party was supporting EU integration, while 
two years earlier it had called for a "no" vote in the Maastricht Treaty, to 
allow a re-negotiation to safeguard Irish neutrality and to protect the 
Republic's economy from the so-called 'convergence criteria' (28). This was 
mirrored by policy positions adopted by the Democratic Left, which split 
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from the Workers' Party in 1992. Its 1994 manifesto, Towards a ddennuratic 
Europe, for instance, focused on attempting to shift the political agenda at 
the EU level away from neo-liberalism, towards an eco-socialist agenda, for 
a "people's Europe built on cooperation rather than competition". Finally, 
the Irish Green Party also became more actively engaged with political 
issues at the EU level in 1994. The Party opposed the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, but two years later in its manifesto, Guarantee the earth, presented a 
detailed agenda for environmental improvements, all to be implemented 
at the EU level. 
Overall, concerns about loss of sovereignty for the Republic in the EU were 
replaced by concerns about the content of EU policies. Party political 
positions on the issue of EU integration appeared to converge, as left-right 
political conflict between the parties was translated or transposed to the EU 
level. 
Summary - North and South 
Given these shifts in party policy, to some degree reflected in voting 
patterns, there are grounds for arguing that the process of EU integration 
led to a degree of convergence, North and South in Ireland, towards a 
shared acceptance of the process of EU integration and towards a common 
policy agenda on EU related issues. Effectively, the EU had become a fact of 
political life in both jurisdictions, leading to significant revisions in party 
positions on issues relating to national sovereignty. 
As early as 1972, Garret Fitzgerald, who was later to become leader of Fine 
Gael, predicted that many of the "reserved powers" that were retained by 
Westminster under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act were likely to be 
exercised at the EU rather than at the UK level (Fitzgerald 1972: 109). These 
included foreign affairs, external defence, nationality, corporation and 
income tax, customs and excise duties, trade marks and patents, external 
trade and currency regulation - all of which, since the Maastricht Treaty 
were at least partially exercised at the EU level. 
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Politicians in Ireland, North and South, began to compete to define the 
agenda for these issues at the EU level, to a degree shifting ideological 
conflict out of the 'national' state framework and into a supra-state EU 
regional framework. As socio-economic issues were articulated in a 
common, EU frame of reference in Ireland, North and South, it was 
possible to conceive of a redefinition of social interests, leading to a 
positive sum, "synergy of positive collaboration" between the sub-state 
regions of the EU - including between North and South in Ireland (29). 
This non-national, regional agenda for North-South unity emerged as the 
rhetoric of Ireland's politicians converged on EU-related issues, possibly 
replacing the "tired slogans" of nationalism (30). 
In this 'regionalist' model, it is argued that the weakening of state 
sovereignty in the EU would strike at the heart of ideological dispute in 
Ireland's national conflict. In the EU context the constitutional question 
would be transformed from a zero-sum into a positive-sum issue, in which 
it is possible to conceive of an EU and North-South dimension to 
Northern Ireland's constitutional status as additional to its status as part of 
the UK. It was argued this de facto federalism within the EU may 
"reposition" Northern Ireland in a set of European contexts - 
"guaranteeing democratic participation and minority rights, economic 
development and cultural diversity" (31). 
These optimistic endorsements of EU regionalism perhaps over-emphasise 
its positive impacts and play down on-going ideological conflict over 
sovereignty-related issues. Indeed, the one remaining 'reserved' power 
under the 1920 Act cited by Fitzgerald in 1972, namely the absolute power of 
the "Crown in Parliament", remained central to the concept of state 
sovereignty in the UK and was at least as symbolically central to political 
affiliations in Northern Ireland as it was prior to EU membership in 1972. 
Regardless of the explicitly political dimensions of EU integration, for 
instance on citizenship rights, these claims to sovereignty in the Northern 
Ireland remained firmly in place, in practical as well as in symbolic terms 
(Boyle and Hadden 1994: 146). 
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These issues of on-going and perhaps sharpened nationalist divergence in 
Ireland, leading to greater ideological division between North and South, 
are examined in the next sub-section. 
Nationalist divergence 
The two Irish economies are among the most open - and dependent - 
economies in the EU but in many respects, political configurations in the 
Republic as well as in Northern Ireland are still defined by ideological 
conflict over the 'national' question (O'Donnell 1993a: 40). Indeed, the 
'1992' changes, leading to greater crossborder collaboration in financial, 
economic and social relations, "merely serve(d) to highlight the extent to 
which the continuing existence of the border was determined by political 
and cultural forces" (Hickman 1990: 21). 
All the major political Parties, North and South, with the exception of the 
South's Labour Party were born out of national conflict and very few bridge 
North and South. Only the Workers Party, Sinn Fein and the Communist 
Party stood candidates on an all-Ireland basis in the 1970's and 80's. 
Furthermore, political movements are also divided between Northern and 
Southern elements: there are separate civil liberties organisations for 
North and South; environmental campaigns are centred on either of the 
two jurisdictions, rarely both; voluntary and community development 
agencies such as "Combat Poverty" and the "Community Development 
Workers' Cooperative" are focused exclusively on the South, while the 
NICVA is focused on the North; the pro-choice campaign in favour of 
decriminalising abortion in the North was organised separately from its 
Southern counterpart, reflecting divisions in the women's movement 
which had only intermittently been organised on an island-wide basis 
(Ward 1991). 
There are separate business organisations, commercial groupings and 
agricultural associations for North and South, invariably articulating their 
particular rather than their common interests. Cultural organisations are 
also divided between North and South - even most Irish language agencies 
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are separately organised. While the major religious organisations, such as 
the Protestant Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church and the Catholic 
Church, are organised on an all-island basis, the Protestant Churches rarely 
articulate their concerns in an all-Ireland framework. The same is true of 
the trade union movement - which is organised on an all-Ireland basis 
through the ICTU, but is rarely engaged in linking the concerns of 
Northern and Southern workers. The sporting world has also retained all- 
Ireland structures but again, unevenly, for rugby, boxing and Gaelic sports - 
but crucially, not for soccer. 
While formal politics is almost fully partitioned, significant aspects of 
economic and cultural life remain organised on an all-Ireland, cross-border 
basis, reflecting the uneven historical legacy of national conflict. But this 
cross-border "permeability" is rarely, if ever, politicised, as to do so would 
be to immediately undermine the 'positive sum' basis on which such 
linkages were maintained (Whyte 1983,1991). Hence the weakness of 
North-South organisations reflects 'zero-sum' conflicts between unionism 
and nationalism, in which Irish nationalists are seen as pursuing an 
aspiration that, if successful, directly diminishes the rights of British 
nationalists: if the Republic gains a greater role in political affairs in the 
North then - as the unionist Cadogan Group has argued - "unionists give 
up something real and tangible and they give it up for good" (32). 
These conflicting fears and hopes were reflected in opinions on the impact 
of the removal of borders in the EU, with the SDLP stressing the 
"magnetic" force driving border communities together in the context of the 
EU, while the UUP emphasised that the border divided two "nations", 
expressing, as John Taylor, the UUP MP and former MEP called it, "the 
fundamental division between the two races that live on this island" (33). 
This was translated into open hostility towards the concept of a 'borderless' 
EU with repeated calls to "seal" the border, from UUP as well as DUP 
politicians (34). Hence, the political response to EU integration, in the 
Republic as well as in Northern Ireland, was heavily influenced by the 
national conflict and in what follows these influences are examined in 
some detail, again, primarily using party policy documents and European 
election manifestos. 
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The North 
The political logic of the national conflict was reflected in the electoral 
framework for the EP elections in Northern Ireland. As noted earlier, the 
region constituted one constituency and the elections were run under a 
single transferable vote system - like in the Republic, although the vote 
was held on the same day as in Britain. The use of the STV system and the 
allocation of three seats for Northern Ireland, two more than the UK 
government initially intended to allocate to the region on the basis of 
relative population, reflected a desire to ensure that Northern nationalists 
obtained at least one representative in the EP (Elliott 1980). The 
Commission and the Republic pressed for these concessions which were 
agreed by the UK government on condition that it received an increased 
allocation of seats overall (Fitzgerald 1991). As noted earlier, this helped to 
ensure that the national divide in Northern Ireland was more clearly 
defined in European elections that in elections for Westminster or for local 
authorities. 
In terms of electioneering, issues in the national conflict rather than 
specifically EU issues tend to shape the political agenda. These were 
increasingly intermingled with EU themes, begging the question of 
whether the national conflict is being Europeanised or whether the 
European dimension was being sectarianised (Arthur 1985). 
The SDLP, the most Euro-phile of all the main parties in Ireland, re-cast its 
nationalist agenda in the EU context. In 1982 the Party appealed to the EP to 
"grasp the nettle" in Northern Ireland as the conflict was an "affront to 
community ideals" and in its 1984 election manifesto the Party focused on 
the the EU as a platform for airing Northern Ireland's grievances (35). It 
argued that the debate around the Haagerup report - which Hume had 
initiated through the Socialist Group in the EP - was the "first international 
debate" on the North's problems and that the Parliament had offered a 
forum to focus international attention on human rights abuses in 
Northern Ireland (the Report is discussed in Chapter 8). It argued that 
European integration necessitated action at the all-Ireland level, it 
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complained about the British failure to present Northern Ireland's case and 
suggested that agricultural support should be applied at an all-Ireland level, 
to reflect the shared interests of Ireland, North and South. 
Ten years later, in the 1994 EP elections, the Party had developed these 
campaigning themes into an ideological formulation that expressed the 
nationalist aspiration to greater unity in Ireland within a wider "Europe of 
the Regions". The election address spoke of the "'the ever closer union' of 
the peoples of Europe, the breaking down of old conflicts and barriers" as a 
"major source of assistance in tackling our own problems". The manifesto 
avoided any detailed discussion of what this implied for the North, partly 
reflecting Unionist accusations that the SDLP had imposed its own 
nationalist agenda on the process of EU integration. The only - oblique - 
reference to Northern Ireland's relationship with Britain was the 
argument that "there must be effective direct representation of Northern 
Ireland in Europe, and joint approaches with the Republic, if we are to 
maximise the advantages of EU membership" (36). 
Clearer indications of the Party's developing EU-related, regionalist agenda 
emerged in Party statements from the early 1980's. In 1988 the Party leader 
had argued that the SEM would lead to "harmonisation of both parts of 
Ireland", arguing that "many of the divisions will have to go" (37). Two 
years later, in 1990, he brought a piece of concrete from Belfast's 'peace line' 
to a European Socialists conference in Berlin, to demonstrate his belief in 
the "powerful example that Europe provides for Northern Ireland " and at 
the SDLP Ard Fheis in that year he claimed that "sovereignty and 
independence are no longer Northern issues", making it "much easier to 
accommodate both identities" (38). Later, in a speech to a Church of Ireland 
congregation in Belfast, the party leader emphasised the development of 
EU integration in encouraging "an ever closer union between Britain and 
Ireland, and North and South in Ireland", offering unionism a place in 
these unifying tendencies (39). 
More detailed implications were mapped out in Party policy papers. The 
1992 Party position paper, The SDLP analysis of the nature of the problem, 
argued that the "pooling of sovereignty" in the EU would enable people to 
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"work their common ground together at their own speeds towards a units' 
that respects diversity", founded on substate regionalisation and 
democratic EU institutions, what the Party leader described as a "dilation of 
democracy" (40). This had clear implications for North-South issues. In its 
1988 policy statement, 1992: the implications of the single market for Northern 
Ireland, the Party had argued that - "1992 will mean the effective 
disappearance of the border for practical and commercial purposes" and in 
1990 the Party leader suggested that with the onset of European Union, the 
North-South border would become little more than a "County boundary" 
(41). 
Consequently, in its submission to the NIO on the 1994-1999 EU funding 
round, the SDLP argued that there should be the "maximum integration 
possible" in transport linkages and greater coordination of government 
plans in every aspect of EU expenditure. It was suggested that cross-border 
authorities with tax raising powers in both state jurisdictions, should be 
created in partnership with the European Commission, to manage the 
separate INTERREG fund for border regions (42). On more directly 
constitutional issues, the Party was willing to encourage arrangements that 
would allow the two communities "to share the island short of a single 
island state" and it presented specific proposals, modelled on EU 
institutions, to "Strand One" of the Brooke talks in 1992. A six member 
"Commission" for Northern Ireland was favoured, composed of three 
representatives from the North, elected under the STV system (effectively 
UUP, DUP and SDLP), a representative for each of the two governments 
and a European Commission representative acting as neutral arbiter - 
making the proposals a "bit easier for other people [le - unionists] to accept" 
(43). The Commission would exercise executive powers in tandem with a 
North-South Parliamentary Assembly and an Anglo-Irish 
intergovernmental body, mirroring institutional arrangements at the EU 
level (44). 
To a degree, this increasing articulation of nationalist aspirations in a 
regionalist, EU framework shifted the framework for ideological conflict in 
Northern Ireland, forcing Unionists to abandon rejectionism and to 
compete with the SDLP to define themselves as the more capable 
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ambassadors at the EU level. This was no less true of the Republican 
movement which also built closer ideological linkages between its position 
in the national conflict and its interpretation of EU integration. 
When it first stood candidates in an EP election - in 1984 - Sinn Fein 
campaigned primarily on issues related to the national conflict, arguing 
that a Sinn Fein victory would undermine British authority and force the 
Dublin government into a fundamental reappraisal of its "disastrous, 
grovelling stance on the North". This remained Party policy into the 1990's 
as in its policy document, Towards a lasting peace, the Party argued that there 
was a considerable stock of goodwill in favour of Irish unification to be 
tapped at the EU level and proposed that the Dublin government should 
make greater use of this in pursuit of "national reconciliation" in Ireland. 
In 1992 the Party leader appealed for an EU human rights Monitoring 
Group to be established in Northern Ireland and at the Party's Ard Fheis 
argued "the involvement of the British government in Ireland is a 
European issue" (45). In 1993 Sinn Fein representatives visited the 
European Commission and the Belgian Presidency in Brussels, calling for 
an enhanced EU role in the conflict and the following year the Party 
announced it would be setting up an office in Brussels, "heralding a change 
in the Party's approach to the EU" (46). 
The Party became convinced that EU integration changed Britain's reasons 
for remaining in Ireland, and that it encouraged North-South integration 
(47). Concepts of EU-encouraged all-Ireland democratic economic 
management formed a central theme in the Sinn Fein Submission to 
Initiative '92, of November 1992 and were detailed in its policy document, 
The economics of a united Ireland, published in February 1994 which argued 
that "a united economy could increase wealth creation but without 
economic democracy it will create less wealth in fewer hands". Its 1994 
manifesto developed this theme and the Party argued that without 
democratic North-South institutions, EU integration would create an 
"undemocratic island economy". 
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Hence, both Sinn Fein and the SDLP were beginning to fuse their 
aspiration to Irish unity with a positive aspiration to EU integration. In 
contrast, unionist politicians were vocal in their condemnation of 
'interference' by EU institutions in the affairs of Northern Ireland, 
especially on North-South issues. 
Throughout the 1980's unionist MEP's were active in complaining about 
the implications of EU policies for British sovereignty in Northern Ireland 
and pressed the European Commission to fund linkages between Northern 
Ireland and Britain rather than with the Republic. Any move towards a 
European framework was interpreted as, by definition, a move away from 
the UK framework and by implication, towards an Irish framework for 
political authority in Northern Ireland, in which unionists would be in 
the minority. EU integration was seen as "blurring the edges" of the union, 
muddying the otherwise clear waters of British sovereignty in Northern 
Ireland. Shifting the negotiating framework in the context of EU 
integration from a "purely Northern Ireland focus to a wider perspective - 
of the island as a whole or of 'the totality of relationships within these 
islands"' - was seen as contributing to this 'muddying' process and at worst 
"confused or devious" (48). 
As with the SDLP and Sinn Fein, the two main Unionist Parties competed 
in linking their positions in the national conflict to the process of EU 
integration. The UUP saw themselves as presenting a positive vision of 
European integration as an inter-governmentalist process that preserved 
the individual national sovereignties of member states. Their manifesto in 
the 1989 European Parliament election praised the Thatcher government 
for having "aligned itself with Unionists" in her 1988 Bruges speech. It 
asserted that the EU was threatening "the sovereignty of our nation" and 
promised that the UUP candidate would "be safeguarding the integrity of 
the UK". Underlining this, its 1990 policy document, Signposts to the future, 
committed the Party to oppose any attempts to "further erode the role of 
our national parliament at Westminster". 
The Party combined this hesitant pro-Europeanism with its own agenda in 
the national conflict. In 1993 the Party's support for the Maastricht Treaty 
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bought greater Conservative backing for the UUP integrationist agenda. 
The end to legislation by "Orders in Council" and the creation of a Select 
Committee for Northern Ireland at Westminster were stressed by the UUP 
leader in the Party's 1994 campaign material, while emphasising their 
ability to "develop contacts and friends for the Unionist cause" at the EU 
level. 
On policy issues the Party argued for infrastructural investment that would 
build closer links to Britain, and initially it opposed improved linkages 
with the South. In 1981 for instance, Ulster Unionists on Fermanagh 
Council opposed cross-border projects regardless of their benefits for the 
border economy, projects that were largely accepted under the first 
spending round for INTERREG from 1990-1993. Ulster Unionists remained 
particularly vocal in condemning what they saw as a "takeover" of 
Northern industry by Southern interests. In 1991 John Taylor (UUP MP) 
condemned the acquisition of the Northern TSB by AIB; in 1992 Ken 
Maginnis (UUP MP) complained when the Department of the 
Environment awarded a road building contract to a Southern company; 
and in 1993 the UUP MEP, Jim Nicholson, condemned the acquisition of 
Northern dairy producers by the Southern-owned Golden Vale (49). At the 
same time the Party demanded that the North should be funded at the 
same level as the Republic - calculating that during the 1994-1999 funding 
period the EU would be providing £1960 per head in the South, largely due 
to the 'Cohesion Fund', while the North stood to receive only £760 per 
head. 
Some Party representatives welcomed EU integration as effectively 
restoring the pre-1921 union, bringing Ireland "back under the 
predominant influence of the British Isles from which it had been 
separated for only seventy years" (50). This approach was formulated into a 
proposal for a "Council of the British Isles", presented by the Party leader at 
the UUP's 1992 conference and as the Party's favoured approach for 
'strands two and three' of the inter-party talks initiated by Secretary of State 
Peter Brooke in that year. It was envisaged the Council would provide an 
overarching framework within which to manage Anglo-Irish and North- 
South relations through a British-Irish Parliamentary body and an Inter- 
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Irish Relations Committee. This all-Ireland Committee would allow 
Southern representatives from the Dail to consult with representatives 
from a Northern Assembly on a wide range of issues, but not making 
executive decisions over them, (this would be reserved for the Assembly 
and for the Dail). Consequently, such arrangements would be unworkable 
without Northern devolution and were made conditional on amendment 
of the Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's Constitution. The proposals were 
rejected by the SDLP as they were seen as excessively minimalist - leading 
to DUP accusations of naivety. Despite this, they were further elaborated in 
1993 (although they were made more firmly conditional on agreement to 
remove - not simply to amend - Articles 2 and 3) (51). 
The DUP saw the EU as eroding national sovereignty and thereby 
undermining the border. Ian Paisley joined the EP as a "free and fearless 
Protestant and loyalist voice"; he was the first MEP to speak in the 
Chamber in 1979, to complain that the British flag was upside-down on its 
flagpole outside the EP building. Constitutional concerns were combined 
with a sectarian branding of the EU as a 'Catholic' institution: in 1984 the 
Party argued that Northern Ireland was "the last bastion of Protestantism 
in Europe and stands between the Vatican and her goal of a united Roman 
Catholic state of Europe"; in 1988 the Rev. Paisley attempted to disrupt the 
Papal address during an EP session, culminating in his being ordered out of 
the Chamber; and in 1992, in an interview, the Rev. William McCrea, DUP 
MP, looked forward to "the fall of the system, yes the EC and the fall of 
Romanism - read the 17th Chapter of the Book of Revelations. You get a 
wonderful view of the fall of Babylon" (52). 
The Party fought the 1984 election with the slogan "the EC puts your pound 
in Dublin's pocket" and argued that a vote for the DUP was the best way of 
opposing "schemes which would ultimately lead to a united Ireland", 
clarifying that it was "opposed not merely to our terms of membership but 
to the very principle of membership itself". This was tempered somewhat 
by the need to participate in the EP to counter those "intent on Ulster's 
destruction" and to "milk" the funding regimes, although this was set in 
the context of religious metaphor and missionary calling - given that the 
"Roman Catholic nations" had come together in the EU, the DUP was 
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duty-bound to attend EP sessions, just as "Daniel, against his will, found 
himself in Babylon and raised a faithful and fearless voice there". The Party 
treated the 1989 election as a vote against Tom King - the Secretary of State 
responsible for the Anglo-Irish Agreement - and the 1994 election was 
treated as a "crusade" against the Downing Street Declaration. The Party 
condemned the "betrayal' of "giving to Dublin joint authority in shaping 
the future of Ulster" and labelled the UUP leader as a traitor and a "Judas" 
to the Protestant cause for supporting the Declaration and for agreeing to 
the creation of North-South institutions. Nonetheless, the Party had itself 
adopted a very similar position to the UUP in its policy paper, Breaking the 
logjam, in which it had also favoured a new North-South rapprochement 
and possibly the creation of North-South bodies once Articles 2 and 3 had 
been removed (53). 
Parties linked to Loyalist paramilitaries - such as the Ulster Democratic 
Party, the Ulster Independence Movement and the Third Way/Ulster 
Nation - campaigned for an independent Northern Ireland, at least for the 
"loyal" parts of Northern Ireland, within the EU. Like the UUP, in 
countering the SDLP demand for a Council of Ireland, the UDA called for a 
Council of the British Isles - although these proposals were overshadowed 
by its Planning for Doomsday document, released early in 1994, in which it 
called for re-partition as a last resort for Loyalists, with expulsion, 
internship or "nullification" for Catholics remaining in the now fully 
'loyal' Northern Ireland (54). 
The Conservative Party in Northern Ireland also treated the 1994 election 
as a referendum on the national question. Contesting its first EP elections 
the Party committed itself to defending "Northern Ireland's position as an 
integral part of the UK, not just as a region of the EU" and argued that by 
virtue of its influence in the UK it would be more able to defend "Ulster's" 
interests that its Unionist rivals. 
Overall, unionists tended to see the EU as a "trojan horse" (Hainsworth 
and Morrow 1993: 10). There was an assumed monolithic unity of British 
sovereignty that in a sense could be punctured by the creation of EU 
institutions in which sovereign powers were exercised in tandem with 
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other states, including the Republic. There were widespread fears of the 
impact of EU integration on Northern Ireland's constitutional status, not 
unlike the fears exposed during the period of rapprochement between 
North and South during the mid 1960's. This raises the question of 
whether nationalist aspirations and the unionist fears were correct - 
whether in fact unionism would be fatally damaged "without the 
traditional estrangement from Dublin" (Lyne 1990: 432). Liberal unionist 
politicians in the 1960's clearly did not think so - to their cost, leading to the 
emergence of the DUP and the collapse of Stormont. 
Overall, as Northern Ireland politicians attempted to construct a 
consistency between their positions in the national conflict and the process 
of EU integration there was a marked degree of political divergence, jarring 
with the emergence of a limited regionalist consensus. There were similar 
developments in the Republic. 
The South 
The Republic is the only member of the EU which makes a formal claim to 
the territory of another member state. This claim remained a "touchstone 
issue in Irish politics" - both in the South and in the North (O'Cleireacain 
1983: 108). The state in the Republic was founded on the gains won by Irish 
nationalists and republicans - hence repudiation of the aspiration to Irish 
unity was simply "not a viable option for a state that is grounded in the 
legitimacy of Irish nationalism" (Guelke 1988: 198). As clarified by the 
Supreme Court in 1975 and again in 1990, politicians in the Republic were 
obliged to work for Irish unity, but (as discussed in Chapter 8), this was 
rarely reflected in state policy though politicians in the Republic displayed a 
substantial ideological and rhetorical commitment to nationalist 
aspirations. 
This reflected public attitudes to Irish unity in the Republic. While there 
was a strong tendency to equate the 26 County state with "Ireland", there 
was a firm - and recently growing - commitment to Irish unity, leading to 
the paradoxical growth in 'national' aspirations alongside a growth in 
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'regional' consciousness. This was demonstrated in a series of opinion 
polls conducted in the 1980's and 1990's (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4: Aspiration to Irish unity in the Republic: 
percentage of voters polled, 1983-93 
There will be unity in General aspiration 
25 years 50 years to unity 
1983 39 42 76 
1987 49 29 67 
1991 30 56 82 
1993 39 52 - 
Source: MRBI and 1CM, Irish Times, 22 April and 27 November 1991; 
Independent on Sunday, 12 December 1993. 
As the Irish Times pointed out - "most people in the Republic live in hope 
of unity", combined with a growing reluctance to remove the Republic's 
constitutional claim on the North (55). In 1990 a majority (53°4) was in 
favour of changing Articles 2 and 3, in 1991 this had fallen to 48%, in 1992 
to 40% and 1993 to 39% (56). In a poll conducted by Maynooth College in 
1992 on the question of political structures, the vast majority in the 
Republic favoured the creation of a single all-Ireland government - 75% 
viewing it as "desirable" (57). 
But when it came to practical politics, as opposed to aspirations and hopes, 
there was little commitment to achieving unity in Ireland - people in the 
Republic may have had an emotional attachment to unity but were content 
to keep it as a remote possibility (58). Peace in the North and prosperity in 
the South were more important than Irish unity. In 1991 82% in the South 
were willing to postpone Irish unity to allow a peaceful settlement in 
Northern Ireland and in 1993 75%, opposed tax rises in the Republic as a 
possible price for unity (59). Northern Ireland was seen as a peripheral 
issue in everyday political life, to the extent that in 1993, when the 
government was becoming closely involved in the Irish-British dialogue 
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on the North, only 1°4% of voters in the Republic considered that the 
national conflict was a "major issue" (60). 
The combination of nationalist ideological commitment to a 32 County 
state and substantive, de facto commitment to furthering the interests of 
the 26 County Irish Republic led to North-South divergence both in terms 
of cementing the ideological divisions between the Southern nationalist 
and northern unionist communities and in terms the lack of substantive 
policy initiatives on the ground'. As a result, the concept of Irish 
integration in the context of EU integration proved to be a useful 
ideological tool, allowing reliance on non-political socio-economic shifts to 
deliver political change - thus permitting inaction on issues directly 
relevant to the conflict. 
Irish nationalists had long expected or hoped that EU integration would 
undermine British sovereignty in the North. Entry into the EU with the 
UK sat neatly with the reformulation of Irish nationalism in the 1960's - 
from the agrarian populism of Eamon de Valera, to the technocratic anti- 
partitionism of Sean Lemass (Lyne 1990). Politicians in the Republic had a 
vested interest in preserving domestic tranquility and in distancing 
themselves from the Northern issues. Combining the pursuit of Irish 
integration with the pursuit of EU integration permitted an on-going 
rhetorical commitment to Irish unity, empty of practical initiatives aimed 
at 'winning over', or persuading Northern unionists of the merits of all- 
Ireland unity - either in terms of reform of the Southern state or in terms 
of building North-South linkages (Arthur 1985). 
The formula of relying on EU integration to reduce the "economic 
differences that divide North and South" and also to free the South from 
dependence on Britain, thereby enhancing the self confidence of politicians 
in the Republic - was outlined as early as 1962, five years after the Treaty of 
Rome (Fitzgerald 1962) (61). When forced to develop a response to the 
intensifying conflict in Northern Ireland the Lemass government pursued 
this agenda, paired with the political conviction, as Liam Cosgrave put it in 
the Dail in 1973, that the "reconciliation between its two communities 
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cannot be brought about successfully in isolation from the larger issue of 
reconciliation within the island as a whole" (62). 
This approach was detailed in the Taoiseach's Statement to the Dail on the 
question of EEC membership in March 1972, in which he argued that "if we 
were to remain outside the Community we would be conferring on the 
border the status of a frontier, both economic and political, between 
ourselves and the rest of Europe, thereby "copper-fastening" Partition" (63). 
Similarly, after the referendum on membership, the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch 
argued that as it was required to work towards an "ever closer union of the 
peoples of Europe" under the Treaty of Rome, the British government 
should take immediate action with the Republic to resolve the Northern 
conflict (64). These arguments were repeated during the 1987 referendum 
in the Republic, when the Minister of Finance in the Republic, Brian 
Lenihan, argued "nothing could be more calculated to secure the border" 
than a vote against the SEA, as it would consign the South to 'second 
grade" EU membership while the North, with Britain, would claim "first 
grade" membership (65). Again, in anticipation of a third referendum on 
the question of EU integration, in 1992 the government argued in its White 
Paper on the Maastricht Treaty that "within a closer European Union, the 
common interests of both parts of Ireland in so many areas of Community 
activity should become more apparent", helping "to create closer human 
links and break down barriers on this island" (DSO 1992c: 32). A vote 
against European Union was therefore a vote for sharpened North-South 
divisions. 
Most political parties in the Republic pursued this agenda, combining it 
with the expectation that EU integration would de-peripheralise the Irish 
economy -a "conjunction of the interests of the pocket with certain 
predispositions of the spirit" (Coakley 1983: 64). 
Fianna Fail, with its roots in Irish republicanism, was particularly keen to 
stress the unifying effects of EU membership. In 1990, Charles Haughev, the 
Fianna Fail Taoiseach, saw his personal ideal as "Irish unity as part of a 
wider European unity" (66). At the New Ireland Forum in 1983 the Party 
leader argued that "the existence of this artificially sustained economy has 
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prevented the fruitful development of the island as an economic unit". In 
1989 he invited the Northern Ireland politicians to come to Dublin to 
discuss how the Republic could best work with the North at the EU level, 
in the best interests of the island as a whole, which, in 1990, was followed 
by his visit to the Northern Institute of Directors conference (discussed 
above in Chapter 6). Later in 1990, at the Party's Ard Fheis, he argued that 
"the Irish people will be united in a unified Europe" and announced that 
the Irish Presidency of the EU would be committed to giving special 
attention to cross border issues (67). 
In an interview with the Irisli Times he clarified that "the economies in 
both parts of Ireland are going to converge as the political, economic and 
financial barriers between us disappear", arguing that "this must have a 
political fall out" and suggesting "its not too romantic to think of a united 
Ireland as part of a united Europe" (68). In 1991 these themes were 
reiterated when he argued, during the Brooke talks, that "the EC offers us 
an entirely new context in which to seek political progress in Ireland [that 
would] soften and eventually eliminate the divisions of the past on this 
island" (69). 
Partly because of this increased articulation of the Party's commitment to 
Irish unity in the context of EU integration, in the 1990's it embarked on a 
reassessment of its position on Articles 2 and 3. In 1990 it had opposed a 
Workers Party proposal to amend the Articles which had Fine Gael, Labour 
Party and Progressive Democrat support, on grounds that the proposal was 
inopportune rather than on grounds of principle (70). In 1993 and 1994, it 
announced that in the context of a peace settlement, Articles 2 and 3 could 
be amended to express a political aspiration to unity, rather than a legal 
claim on the North and the Party leader clarified that he was willing to 
propose an amendment to Article 3, making unity conditional upon 
consent being "freely given" in the North (71). 
This tentative reassessment of Party policy on the question of unity was 
combined with an on-going assumption that EU integration would in 
some way deliver Irish integration. In 1993 for instance, Albert Reynolds 
argued that the EU would encourage "development links between the two 
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parts of the island", suggesting that "in the context of the Single Market 
there is immense scope and great opportunity for us to work together, 
North and South in a more friendly and civilised climate" (72). 
In the early 1990's the Labour Party leadership also became increasingly 
enthusiastic about the impact of EU integration on Irish unity. In 
November 1993 Dick Spring, the Party leader outlined the "six principles" 
on which any settlement had to be based, which emphasised the need for 
separate Northern consent to any constitutional change in Northern 
Ireland (73). In general terms the Party argued that North-South 
institutions had to be established to express "the collective needs and 
economic logic of the island as a whole" and to "secure the confidence" of 
the Irish people before risking a referendum on Articles 2 and 3. 
The EU had become a central factor in this framework for "peace and 
reconciliation" in Ireland - largely in terms of its ability to transcend the 
stark alternatives of unionism and nationalism. The process of building 
"one agreed nation for all", separating the Irish nation from state centred 
nationalism, in the context of a continuing British presence in the North, 
was seen as crucially conditioned by EU integration (74). In 1993, Dick 
Spring, the Party leader, speaking as Foreign Secretary, called on the EU to 
"bring its ideals to bear on a serious conflict within its borders" and in 1994, 
he looked forward to a "new Ireland characterised by partnership and 
cooperation", as nationalists and unionists were reconciled as "fellow 
citizens of the new Europe" (Encounter/BIA 1993: 27). 
Fine Gael politicians were less enthusiastic about the implications of EU 
integration for Irish unity, stressing that EU membership would stabilise 
North-South and Irish-British politics, leading to a normalisation of 
relations within Northern Ireland. The Party had traditionally supported 
the removal of Articles 2 and 3 and, as Garret Fitzgerald, former Party 
leader, outlined in 1993, was most centrally concerned with maintaining 
"security and stability" in Ireland, than with pursuing Irish unity (75). 
During his time as Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald encouraged the EU not to 
remain aloof from the conflict and at the New Ireland Forum in 1983 the 
Party supported a greater EU role in encouraging reconciliation in Ireland 
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(76). In 1989 John Cushnahan, a Fine Gael FIEP called for unity in 
Northern Ireland, founded on the ideals of Europe "so that old rivalries 
and bitterness can finally be forgotten" (77). Other Party IVIEPs saw the EU as 
a "logical continuation" of nationalist ideas as it was guided by the attempt 
to strengthen democracy where purely national democratic institutions 
had begun to lose control (78). 
In the 1990's this interweaving of pressures for Irish unity with positions 
on EU integration was intensified. For instance in the 1992 Labour Party- 
Fianna Fail Programme for government, there was a heavy emphasis on 
"working for peace" in Northern Ireland founded on the New Ireland 
Forum formulation of unity by agreement and bolstered by regionalisation 
in Ireland as a whole (79). There was an emphasis on the rewards of 
enhanced North-South economic cooperation and the two Parties 
committed themselves to initiating programmes of action to ensure that 
Ireland, North and South, took advantage of the opportunities arising out 
of the SEM. It was this government, which combined socialist and 
progressive Labour Party traditions with the nationalist commitment of 
Fianna Fail, that was to build on the all-Ireland nationalist unity that had 
emerged in the 1980's, extending it to the Republican movement and to the 
new Democratic Presidency in the US, to build the political conditions for 
the cessation of military conflict in 1994 (again, see Chapter 8). 
Chapter Conclusions 
EU integration brought some significant movements in the ideological 
positions of the main Parties in Ireland North and South, away from a 
focus on conflicts over 'national' jurisdiction and towards a debate on how 
best to meet the needs of the all-Ireland regional economy in the context of 
EU integration. This was cross-cut, in some ways undermined, in others 
reinforced, by an on-going commitment to ideological conflict along 
'national' lines. The ideological tension that resulted forced some 
realignments in political positions in the national conflict, North and 
South in Ireland, with potentially significant implications 
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At the same time, as EU integration accelerated, it also challenged concepts 
of monolithic 'national' state sovereignty, to a significant degree 
transforming the ways in which sovereignty was being exercised. The 
implications of the resulting changes in public policy for the national 
conflict are discussed in the following Chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Public Policy: states, regions and the European 
Union 
This Chapter examines changes in public policy within Ireland, assessing 
whether there has been significant regionalisation on a North-South basis 
as a result of EU integration. As with the previous Chapter, it is divided 
into two parts - the first examining the pressures for North-South 
convergence and the second outlining the pressures for continued and in 
some respects, sharpened divergence between state policies North and 
South. In both these explorations - of 'regionalist convergence' on the one 
hand and 'national divergence' on the other - changes in public policy, 
North and South, are compared. The Chapter ends with an assessment of 
the overall tendencies. 
EU integration has exposed the failings in the state administrations of both 
North and South and has altered the political context of the national 
conflict. This reflected tensions between the 'national' politics of states and 
the regionalist politics of some EU institutions and regional authorities 
which in Ireland sharpened into a deadlock - between the logic of the 
national conflict and the emergence of an "all-Ireland" economic region. 
Although EU integration has most directly affected material interests and 
has had little direct impact on state structures, it has began to legitimate 
demands for regional autonomy and started to open up new fields of 
regionalist political struggle in the regions, not least in Ireland. These 
various regionalising pressures are presented and then are set against on- 
going North-South division centred on the two national states, before an 
assessment of the overall tendencies is attempted in the Chapter 
conclusions. 
26, 
Regionalist Convergence 
This sub-section first examines the pressures from EU institutions for a 
thorough-going regionalisation of political power in the two states, the UK 
and the Republic. This is then complemented by analysis of similar 
pressures from EU institutions that have defined the national conflict, 
centred on British territory in Northern Ireland, as an EU concern and 
have encouraged the British state to work jointly with the Irish Republic in 
managing the conflict. This has forced issues relating to North-South 
regional convergence further up the political agenda in both jurisdictions, 
leading to some, albeit limited, adaptation of state policies. The impact of 
these pressures on state policy, North and South, are examined in the 
remaining parts of the subsection. 
Regionalism and state structures: the UK and the Republic 
Despite being significantly more centralised than most other EU states, the 
EU integration process was having a regionalising impact on the UK and 
the Republic. 
The UK state became increasingly centralised after EC membership but had 
remained regionally and nationally diverse - in some respects increasingly 
so. To a large degree, this reflected regional economic divergence within 
the UK. During the late 1970's and 1980's there was a quadrupling of 
unemployment disparities between UK regions - from an average gap 
between the highest and the lowest regional unemployment rate of 2.1% in 
the years 1959-76 to an average of 8% in the late 1980's (MacKay 1992). Partly 
reflecting this, groupings such as the Campaign for a Scottish, for a Welsh 
and, in England, for a Northern Assembly, argued that regional autonomy 
was urgently required to prevent sharpening peripherality in the SEM 
(European Dialogue 1993; Scott and Miller 1992). Finding greater 
opportunities for economic development at EU level, UK regional interests 
and perceptions were being transformed - particularly in areas such as 
Scotland, Wales, the English North and Northern Ireland which had 
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already experienced at first hand the impact of peripherality in the UK 
political economy. 
Local, County and Regional authorities demanded greater regional 
autonomy and linked themselves to regional bodies elsewhere in the EU. 
Across the UK, from the Strathclyde Region to the "Western Development 
Partnership" in the South West, local government, in alliance with local 
interests and with the EU Commission, sought greater autonomy to 
determine economic and social priorities at the local level (Rose 1992). As 
has been mentioned, Wales actively sought to link-up with the "four 
motors" - signing agreements with Baden-Wurtemberg, giving legal 
guarantees for joint ventures, innovation and technology transfer (1) and 
Kent in the South East of England joined with Nord-Pas de Callais in 
Northern France and the three Eastern provinces of Belgium to form the 
"Transmanche" Euro region (2). 
The associations of Scottish, Welsh and English authorities and the Local 
Government International Bureau successfully campaigned with the 
European Commission to ensure that UK representatives to the EU 
Committee of the Regions could not be appointed by central government - 
as the leader of the North West regional association argued - to prevent it 
from "stifling the voice of the regions" - and secured the only amendment 
to the government's Maastricht Bill in March 1993 (3). Building on this, 
the Association of Metropolitan Authorities proposed that a Cabinet seat be 
allocated to a Minister for the Regions and a Select Committee be formed to 
oversee the workings of local government, arguing for the 
"decentralisation to standard regions of as many government activities as 
possible" (4). 
This redefinition of 'regional' and 'national' interests in the UK was 
actively encouraged by EU institutions. The EU Commission stressed 
regional as against 'national' interests in the distribution of EU structural 
funds and became a useful - and reliable - ally of the UK regions. Partly to 
compensate for UK centralism, as mentioned in Chapter 5, by March 1993 
twenty four regional and local authorities from the UK had established 
representations in Brussels (5). As closer EU integration highlighted the 
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anachronisms of the UK political system, it "transform(ed) the regional 
problem from a merely economic one to a political and institutional one" 
(Bogdanor 1992: 8): even the Government's own Audit Commission argued 
that the "without effective regional groupings the UK (would) lose out" in 
the SEM (Audit Commission 1991: 40). 
In response to pressures from the EC Commission for greater coherence in 
UK regional policy, regional planning groups were re-created by the neo- 
liberal Thatcher government in 1988, nine years after they had been 
abolished. In 1991 provision was made in the Planning and Compensation 
Act for local authorities to combine together in order to draw up regional 
plans; in 1992 the Department of the Environment began encouraging the 
formation of regional planning fora in each of the 'Standard Regions' (6); 
and in 1993 regional aid programmes were decentralised to inter- 
departmental committees based in new 'Standard Region' offices (7). At the 
same time, increased support for the Labour Party-backed 'Constitutional 
Convention' in Scotland and for the Scottish Nationalist Party, led to 
greater administrative devolution in the "taking stock" exercise in 
Scotland, under which greater powers were devolved to the centrally 
controlled Scottish Office and a consultative Grand Committee for Scotland 
was created, forging what the government called a "partnership for good" 
(8). 
In the Republic EU integration also stimulated political debate on the lack 
of regional government. As elsewhere, EU encouragement of 
regionalisation highlighted the issue of regional autonomy as a socio- 
economic issue as much as a purely political issue. In 1987 the European 
Parliament adopted a report that highlighted the centralised structure of 
the Irish state and the need for regional bodies that could "promote their 
region nationally and internationally and stimulate the fullest use of the 
region's indigenous resources" (European Parliament 1987: 8). In 1988 
central government was forced, under pressure from the Commission as 
well as Parliament, to establish regional advisory bodies to oversee the 
distribution of EU funds, one year after Regional Development 
Organisations had been cut to save on travel expenses (9). These bodies 
were composed of the various "social partners" involved in drawing up 
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national economic programmes, "basically a forum for principal vested 
interests" rather than elected representatives (10). The exercise of 
'partnership' under the 1989-1993 structural funds programme was "widely 
seen as window dressing" (Matthews 1994: 49) and partly in response, a 
joint Commission and government process was established to oversee the 
participation of sub-regional units in the management of the Plan (11). 
In 1993 there was considerable pressure on the Fianna Fail-Labour Party 
government to strengthen local government, to ensure that there was 
meaningful consultation for the second National Development 
Programme and these issues formed a central plank in its "Programme of 
Government" (12). In 1993, consultation on the 1994-1999 NDP with 
regional bodies and unrepresented "social partners" was conducted with 
some care to ensure that the Department of Finance did not impose its own 
existing priorities on the process. Western regions in particular, gained a 
higher political profile in this consultation process, to the extent that TD's, 
Senators and the local Church organised a campaign for "the West", based 
in Galway and visited the Commission in Brussels to put their case for 
improved funding for the region (13). 
Despite state centralisation in the UK and the Republic the issue of 
strengthening substate democratic structures had become a key political 
priority in both jurisdictions. Policy implementation by EU institutions 
and the broader process of integration into the SEM were a major factor in 
this process of democratising and strengthening regional, county and city 
authorities. 
EU interventions and Anglo-Irish cooperation 
This regionalisation of politics, encouraged by EU institutions, also had 
direct impacts on the national conflict. The European Parliament and, to a 
lesser extent, the Commission, were increasingly able to define the conflict 
as not simply a 'domestic' issue for the British government to resolve, but 
as a matter of legitimate concern for all Europeans. 
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The conflict was seen as undermining Community ideals and as early as 
1983 Commission officials described it as a "blot on the community" (14). 
From its first session, European Parliament questioned British policy in the 
North and from 1981 passed several resolutions critical of the British 
government. In the early 1980's these interventions intensified as the 
conflict escalated and in 1984 an EP Report identified Northern Ireland as 
one of the most serious problems facing the EU (European Parliament 
1984). In response, officials from the Commission discussed the possibility 
of greater involvement and in the mid 1980's argued that a direct role for 
EU institutions "would offer a much better hope of a long term solution 
than anything which anyone has yet suggested" (Temple-Lange 1988: 252). 
These interventions were driven by a concern to remove the significance 
of intra-EU borders as part of the move to reconciliation in a Europe of 
federalised regions - rather than any specific concern to support Irish 
nationalism. In the early 1980's the Parliament passed several resolutions 
condemning breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
Northern Ireland - for instance concerning the use of plastic bullets, the 
practice of strip searching, the use of supergrasses and the deterioration in 
prison conditions. But at the same time, in 1982, it urged the Republic to 
sign the European Convention on Terrorism to enable South-North 
extradition, arguing that "there can be no justification for the use of force 
against a democratic society" (15). It also, in later years, condemned IRA 
atrocities such as the Enniskillen bombing and welcomed the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, as a step towards reconciliation between the two member 
states. 
Such regionalist interventions in the judicial affairs of EU member states 
was consistent with other assertions of EP jurisdiction in relation to the 
conflict. The decision of the Political Committee in 1983 to overrule the 
objections of the UK COREPER and appoint Nils Haagerrup as an official 
Rapporteur on the political situation in Northern Ireland, granting him 
uniquely broad terms of reference, was informed by this determination to 
map out the Parliament's right to intervene on such issues. This defined 
the conflict as a matter of legitimate concern at the EU level, underlined by 
MEPs who argued that opposition to "interference in internal affairs is a 
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relic of the old and outdated traditional concept of national sovereignty" 
(this contrasted with the inter-governmentalist European Political 
Cooperation, where the topic had been a "taboo subject") (16). 
This had significant effects on British-Irish relations as the 'macro- 
regional' EU institutions established a degree of international legitimacy 
for the Republic's position in the conflict (Keatinge 1991; Coughlan 1992). 
EU membership enhanced the Republic's international status and the 
Partition became less of a symbol of the South's subordination, instead 
becoming more a symbol of zero-sum British nationalism in the face of 
positive-sum Euro-regionalism (Guelke 1988: 164). Indeed, direct political 
pressure from EU institutions encouraged the emergence of an "EC 
engendered trust" between the Irish and British governments and 
provided the practical basis for Anglo-Irish inter-governmental dialogue 
on the North - seen by both governments as an alternative to more 
extensive EU intervention in the conflict (17). 
As early as 1977 meetings between representatives of the two states on the 
sidelines of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the European 
Council offered a private, multilateral setting for relations between the UK 
and the Republic. This gave the two states greater room for manoeuvre as 
neither were required to make "public affirmations of their government's 
respective position on the constitutional issue", in contrast with the 
bilateral framework which bound the states into a direct relationship in the 
glare of media publicity (18). 
In 1985 this was formalised in the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) - which 
institutionalised Anglo-Irish relations and defined the conflict as largely 
the concern of the two state powers. The agreement won widespread 
acclaim from EU institutions, which subsequently contributed to the 
"International Fund for Ireland", which had been set up by the US to 
improve community relations in the North of Ireland, including the 
border regions (19). As a by-product, ironically, the AIA de-legitimised any 
further EU attempts at directly intervening in the conflict (20). The two 
states had come to an agreement on how they would jointly manage it - as 
an issue of common concern, with the UK exercising sovereignty and with 
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the Republic entitled to protect 'its' minority in the North, in consultation 
with the UK government - thereby curtailing the directly political role of 
EU institutions. Partly as a result of this, after devoting an unusual 
amount of time and energy" to the Northern Ireland issue in the early 
1980's, from 1985 EU institutions maintained a relatively low profile of 
Northern issues (21). 
More positively, exposure at the EU level had a direct impact on the 
management of the conflict, as the British Government was forced to take 
'international opinion' into account - leading it into closer cooperation 
with the Government of the Republic (Rolston 1991). Under the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement the two states recognised that the conflict was an 
international issue involving the two states and the two parts of Ireland, as 
much as the two communities in the North (22). This partial relaxation of 
national state sovereignty in a multilateral, regionalist context broadened 
the range of constitutional options being considered by the two 
governments and by participants in the conflict - options that "offered 
some hope for reconciliation" - as the British Foreign Secretary put it in 
1994 (23). In particular, joint government action to increase North-South 
integration, perhaps through all-Ireland institutions with executive 
powers, became more of a possibility, even in the absence of significant 
transfers of constitutional sovereignty (25). 
This increased Anglo-Irish political cooperation to some degree succeeded 
in insulating Britain from directly political interventions by EU 
institutions. But it did not prevent interventions on socio-economic policy 
which in some respects encouraged the redefinition of Ireland, North and 
South, as a single EU region. 
EU pressures for North-South integration 
EU institutions highlighted Northern Ireland's socio-economic problems, 
legitimising and financing initiatives to hasten North-South socio- 
economic integration. Initially this took the form of simply providing extra 
funds for Northern Ireland. In 1981 MEPs emphasised that "the desire for 
peace is closely linked to living conditions and employment" and called for 
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special attention to be given to the region. The resulting report on regional 
development in the North received the support of all three Northern 
MEP's because, as the DUP MEP put it, it confined itself to "social and 
economic" issues rather than touching on the "political and constitutional 
affairs of Northern Ireland" (24). 
This contrasted with the two Unionist MEPs' condemnation of the 
Haagerrup Report in 1984, which was seen as politically motivated and as 
stepping beyond the ambit of EP responsibility into the realm of state 
jurisdiction, constituting "a deliberate interference in the political and 
constitutional affairs of Northern Ireland" (25). The Report also attracted 
the opposition of the British Conservatives - to the regret of at least one of 
their number - Fred Catherwood. Partly due to this, the European 
Commission declined to adopt a directly political profile on the conflict and 
instead continued to offer "exceptional" EU expenditure for Belfast (26). 
This pattern of offering economic support rather than exerting political 
pressure was repeated later in 1984 when the European Parliament 
welcomed the Anglo-Irish process and again called for more funds to be 
directed to the region, reflected in the "integrated rural development 
programme" outlined in the Maher Report of 1986 (27). Again, this Report 
failed to receive the support of Unionist MEP's, not for its 
recommendations but for its political content - in particular, its praise of 
the Anglo Irish Agreement. The UUP MEP John Taylor complained - "we 
need democracy in Northern Ireland, not outsiders interfering in our 
affairs" -a familiar theme, resting on a notional division between the 
realm of 'legitimate' EU responsibility in economic and social affairs and 
the 'non-legitimate' interference in political and constitutional matters 
(28). 
But rather than offering a de-politicised, non-contentious avenue for EU 
involvement, these funding regimes themselves directly raised issues at 
the heart of the national conflict. Despite their insignificance relative to the 
British subvention, the distribution of structural funds highlighted the 
failures of UK policies in the North and, in the context of intensifying 
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concerns about Northern Ireland's prospects within the Single Market, 
legitimised the demand for North-South integration. 
The issue of 'additionality' in particular, directly politicised the British - 
Northern Ireland relationship as central control of EU funds by Whitehall 
contradicted their intended role in serving regional interests (29). The NIO 
was accused of trampling over the interests of Northern Ireland in favour 
of what were defined as UK-wide 'national' interests and of taking an 
unchallenging and overly-technocratic approach to structural funds - 
especially when the 1989-93 National Development Plan failed to attract 
'new Money' for Northern Ireland (30). The bulk of ERDF funds were used 
to finance infrastructure projects often already in the Northern Ireland 
expenditure plans (accounting for 24'%) or were channelled through 
government quangos such as the Industrial Development Board (IDB) and 
the Local Enterprise Development Unit (LEDU). Most ESF finances were 
directed into existing government training projects managed by the 
Training and Employment Agency (84% of overall funds, comparing with 
70% for UK). Most EAGGF funds were distributed directly by the 
Department of Agriculture and, from 1991, through the Rural 
Development Council. Similarly, between 1973 and 1987, over 80`%% of EIB 
loans went to public enterprises - such as the state-owned Shorts, Northern 
Ireland Electricity and British Telecom. Only rarely did locally controlled 
organisations obtain direct access to EU funds - Northern local authorities 
were responsible for 1%% of all EU funded projects while in Britain they 
were responsible for 18% and the voluntary sector in the North gained 
access to 14% of ESF funds, in Britain this sector was responsible for 30% 
(NIEC 1992). 
As the debate about additionality abated - in February 1992 the Regional 
Affairs Commissioner Bruce Millan stated he was "satisfied' with the 
additional impact of community aid in Northern Ireland" - the related 
issue of subsidiarity intensified. This focused attention on question of 
whether UK public expenditure priorities met the needs of Northern 
Ireland as a region in the SEM rather than simply as a region of the UK, or, 
more controversially, more often met the short term needs of the British 
state (31). 
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Agriculture provided the clearest evidence of this divergence in policy 
priorities between the UK government and Northern Ireland. British 
government policies reflected the relative insignificance of the farming 
sector and Britain's position as a net importer of foodstuffs. When the 
relatively powerful farming lobby in Britain pressured the government to 
respond to their needs, it acted in their interests, reflecting the commodity 
composition of British rather than Northern Ireland agriculture. This 
contrasted with government in the Republic - as the New Ireland Forum 
pointed out in 1984 - "the position adopted by Irish Ministers for 
Agriculture in relation to improved support prices under the CAP has been 
more helpful to farmers... in the North than the position adopted by the 
UK ministers" (32). 
Northern Ireland farmers quickly became dependent on the Republic's 
efforts to shape the EU budget, a process of "free-riding" on EU concessions 
gained by the Republic (O'Cleireacain 1983). This was recognised by the 
European Parliament as early as 1981, when it argued that "the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland form a single economic unit in terms of 
agricultural production... [and hence] proposals relating to special measures 
for the Republic of Ireland should be extended to cover Northern Ireland". 
Concern at the lack of 'fit' between local interests and official structures, 
reinforced by a sense of political isolation in the North, stimulated interest 
in alternative routes' to Brussels - as a Northern farming magazine argued 
in 1984 - "second-hand representation simply does not work". Resentment 
at the UK government was only fueled by its refusal to match the 
Republic's level of support to dairy farmers - through the "milk quota" - 
prefering instead to allocate the quota on a UK-wide basis. The dispute 
remained unresolved as it raised the issue of distributing agricultural 
assistance on a basis of need rather than on a 'national' basis - an approach 
that the UK government had consistently vetoed in the Council of 
Ministers. The result in the North was a falling quota of milk output - 
amounting to a 6.5% cut in 1984 and a 10°%o cut in 1988, while in the 
Republic quotas rose by 4.6`/, % in 1984, although in 1990 they fell 3.9% (33). 
Partly as a result of a growing divergence between Britain and Northern 
Ireland, accompanied by increasing commonalities between Northern and 
Southern interests in Ireland, the conceptual divide between 'non- 
political' socio-economic intervention and more directly political forms of 
intervention became increasingly difficult to sustain and EU funding 
regimes became increasingly aimed at meeting the common needs of the 
island economy. Significantly, such political interventions could not be 
deemed to be "too political" by either member state as the EU institutions 
could claim they were under a direct responsibility to initiate and 
encourage North-South cross-border integration as part of the process of 
integration into the 'borderless' SEM. 
This redefinition of Ireland as a single regional unit was first pursued by 
Irish Members of the European Parliament who in 1979 raised the issue of 
economic integration in Ireland and called on the Commission to 
distribute funds on an all-Ireland basis (34). From 1982 EU Commissioners 
highlighted the need for Ireland - North and South - to act together at the 
EU level and to draw up joint development plans that recognised the 
common needs of the two parts of Ireland (35). In October 1992 it was 
proposed that a joint EU development Committee should be established, 
based in Belfast, Derry and Dublin, working to an "Action Plan" to 
maximise the benefits of the EU for Ireland as a whole (this was never 
implemented) (36). In 1991, as the SEM completion date loomed, the 
Commission openly advocated the need for North-South institutions to 
address the political issues raised by closer economic integration; and in 
1993 it proposed that there should be a specific North-South component to 
the structural funds programme in the two parts of Ireland (37). 
This pressure was, to some extent, consistent with the two government's 
existing commitments. In 1976 the UK and the Republic had submitted 
requests for funds under the ERDF regulations to finance half of the cost of 
studies into the Derry-Donegall area, and under the EAGGF, to fund 
projects at the Mourne Fisheries and in the Erne catchment area. The two 
governments commissioned "Joint Studies" to assist them in the "special 
consideration of the totality of the relations within these islands", a joint 
steering group was established to manage the projects and ECU8m was 
273 
spent from 1979 to 1984 (38). European Parliament pressure helped to 
ensure that this was extended in 1980 and again in 1985, when the Council 
of Ministers agreed specific regulations to permit expenditure to improve 
the economic and social situation in Ireland's border areas" - primarily in 
the tourist industry (39). 
In all of these cases of cross-border assistance, the EU integration process 
provided the framework within which they could be agreed - giving a 
"fillip to cross-border cooperation" (European Parliament 1979). Where 
they required joint co-ordination, the programmes of expenditure were 
progressed through the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental committees set up 
in 1981 and from 1985, through the Maryfield secretariate of the AIA. In 
1990 this funding regime was formalised on an EU-wide basis as a 
"Commission Initiative" aimed at assisting border regions - the INTERREG 
programme - which established a regular bidding and allocation 
mechanism that was said to have "unrivalled support" at the Council of 
Ministers. This further legitimised joint working on cross-border 
initiatives in Ireland, which was formalised in September 1991 with the 
creation of a North-South Steering Committee of civil servants and 
Commission officials under the aegis of the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference (40). 
This shift towards treating North and South as one unit was not reflected 
in the Community Support Frameworks drawn up by the two 
governments for the period 1989-1993, despite the two regions being 
awarded "Objective One" status. Although the Commission began liaising 
with the two governments from the same office in Brussels, they devised 
their programmes separately and there was no attempt at cooperation or 
coordination. Throughout the entire funding period the allocation for 
INTERREG - which amounted to ECU76m for both North and South from 
1991-3 - was not integrated with either of the governments' spending plans 
and in contrast with all other EU regions eligible for INTERREG funds, the 
money was allocated without information on which proportion would be 
spent in the North and which in the South (41). In contrast, in the plans for 
the 1994-1999 tranche of structural funds there were some moves towards 
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joint North-South action. In what follows these developments are 
discussed, first focusing on changes in state policy in the North. 
North-South convergence: Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland there was a partial but significant shift away from 
regional planning on a solely Northern Ireland or UK basis, towards 
greater consideration of North-South development issues. A key factor in 
this shift was the recognition that, in order to be effective, government 
priorities for EU funding regimes had to be developed in "partnership" 
with business, community, local authority and other social actors in 
Northern Ireland. The storm of controversy that was precipitated by the 
process of drawing up the 1989-1993 funding programme - mentioned in 
Chapter 6- in which the Northern Ireland government was accused of 
flouting the requirement to act in "partnership" with regional groupings 
when drawing up ERDF priorities, contrasts with the relative consensus 
that had been built up around the 1994-1999 priorities. 
The relative openness in the policy making process - in contrast with the 
closed process of drawing up wider public expenditure priorities in 
Northern Ireland - ensured that North-South dimensions were forced onto 
the agenda. Non-government, business orientated organisations played a 
key role in legitimising such an approach. In particular, the Northern 
Ireland Centre in Europe helped to organise two consultative conferences 
on the issue of structural funding - with the Northern Ireland Department 
of Finance and Personnel in December 1992 and with the European 
Commission in October 1993. At the first of these conferences the need to 
free the Northern economy from its slow-growth British neighbour was 
highlighted and it was argued that Northern Ireland had to build on 
North-South "complementarity" to exploit substantial, as yet missed 
opportunities for improving links within the "island as a whole" (DFP 
1992: 42). The benefits of such North-South coordination - as against 
pursuing similar objectives in separation - were seen as extending beyond 
the one-off benefits of infrastructure improvement, into the dynamic 
benefits of the "close and interactive synergy" of an island economy (DFP 
1992: 92). By placing Northern Ireland's regional development in a 
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transnational EU context, Northern Ireland was redefined as a region in 
the EU rather than simply as a region of the UK, making North-South, all- 
island development not just possible, but desirable. As the Northern 
Ireland Centre argued, at the second conference, integration into the EU 
"must necessarily pose the question of closer cooperation with the Republic 
of Ireland" - mapping out a new agenda for economic policy in the North 
that, strikingly, forced Government representatives to defend their record 
on improving North-South linkages (NICE 1993). 
In the subsequent funding round Northern Ireland and the Republic both 
remained as "Objective One" regions, and more important, in terms of the 
distribution of the funds, there emerged a new interest in North-South 
development. In the 1993 Structural Funds Plan (SFP) for Northern 
Ireland, external cohesion, defined as cohesion with the Republic as well as 
with the wider EU, was identified as one of the three strategic objectives for 
economic development in the North, along with economic growth and 
internal cohesion. Given Northern Ireland's relative peripherality - which 
the Report argued was likely to sharpen with the completion of the 
channel tunnel - it was suggested that improved linkages with trans- 
European networks would be a key factor in the development of the 
Northern Ireland economy. These included improved networking "on a 
territorial basis" with the contiguous Southern economy, in order to reap 
the benefits of greater economic integration on "the island of Ireland", 
which required "a strategic framework... [to] take account of the benefits of 
developing and strengthening mutually advantageous linkages within the 
island of Ireland" (HMSO 1993: 39-41). 
This strategic overview of the Northern economy, in which linkages with 
the Republic were defined as a key element in the overall development 
package, was a significant new departure for the Northern Ireland 
government. Economic relations with the Republic had been 
acknowledged as an important issue since 1989 but they had been restricted 
to the funding regime under INTERREG and their implications had not been 
reflected in the overall framework for the 1989-1993 Development Plan. By 
1993, in contrast, relations with the Southern economy had become a 
central element in the Programme's strategic overview. 
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This innovative strategic framework lost its lustre when translated into 
Operational Programmes. Relations with the Republic did not figure in the 
main programmes and instead were discussed in a separate Chapter that 
had been drawn up jointly between the two governments. This new 
Chapter on "Cooperation with the Republic" highlighted a number of 
general non-specific commitments and current activities and could be read 
as a self-congratulatory re-writing of history, in which both governments 
were seen to have pursued cooperation, assisted by the Commission. 
Despite the high profile accorded to linkages with the Republic, 
commitments to North-South integration were not written into any of the 
"Development Priorities" or the "Operational Programmes", under which 
the bulk of the structural funds were allocated. Rather than specifying how 
such strategic, North-South issues would be addressed through the 
development priorities, the Plan simply stated that "all regional priorities 
may contribute" to the strategic theme of cross-border coherence (HMSO 
1993: 91). In practice there was no mention of the Republic in any of these 
priorities, beyond what had already been committed and within the 
sectoral programmes there was reference only to the the familiar themes of 
the need for enhanced transport and energy links (42). Otherwise, it was left 
to the reader's imagination just how far these overwhelmingly Northern 
Ireland-focused priorities had any relevance for "cross border coherence". 
The Single Programming Document (SPD) confirmed these suspicions. It 
made no mention whatsoever of the Republic - on transport, tourism, 
technological development or on training while on energy it highlighted 
the agreement to fund separate gas and electricity interconnectors to the 
UK. The only reference to the Republic was a picture of the Fruit of the 
Loom factory which showed the Donegall hills in the background and the 
only reference to the border areas was in relation to the INTERREG 
programme's provision for funds to improve water quality. Additional 
information on these initiatives, it was announced, would appear in a 
subsequent publication -a clear indication that INTERREG and relations with 
the Republic would be kept separate from the overall structural funds 
programme (HMSO 1994). 
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North-South convergence: the Republic 
In the Republic politicians had for some time been formally committed to 
supporting initiatives for North-South cooperation, primarily in the 
border areas. By 1992 this had broadened into an all-island perspective as, 
in the context of the SEM, the government announced its intention to 
focus on North-South economic relations - suggesting that "the costs of 
the current one island/two economy basis of operation in many areas will 
become a greater drag on economic progress" (DSO 1992b: 32). 
The Republic's 1989-1993 National Development Programme had only 
made cursory reference to cross-border, all-Ireland development. The need 
to stimulate indigenous industry was linked to the need for stronger 
North-South linkages - joint "mutually beneficial" North-South initiatives 
were seen as "essential to optimum economic development in the island 
as a whole" (DSO 1988: 15). But, as, in practice, investment in indigenous 
industry amounted to IR£145.8m, contrasting with IR£263.8m spent on 
attracting overseas investment, concrete action was largely restricted to 
participation in the INTERREG programme which played a minimal, 
symbolic role in raising the profile of North-South development issues. 
After the Report of the Industrial Policy Review Group, which stressed the 
necessity for policies to stimulate indigenous industry (the "Culliton" 
Report) and the government's Report on "Economic Cooperation on the 
island of Ireland in an integrated Europe" - both published in 1992 - it was 
widely anticipated that the 1994-9 Development Plan would more clearly 
address the need for indigenous development on a North-South, all-island 
basis (DSO 1992a, 1992b). In 1992 Mary O'Rourke, the Minister for Trade in 
the Republic, announced that cross-border schemes under the joint North- 
South Chapter in the NDP would be a high priority for the Fianna Fail- 
Labour Party government. Subsequently a government official confirmed 
that this approach was shaping government policy - stressing "we believe 
that, by pooling our limited resources in appropriate areas and developing 
an island-wide approach we can build on our strengths and maximise the 
gains for the two economies, North and South". More specifically, in 1993, 
278 
Eithne Fitzgerald - Junior Minister of Finance responsible for the NDI' - 
stated that the Republic was committed to extending inter-departmental 
links to identify "areas where joint approaches or parallel actions can be 
mutually beneficial and to ensure insofar as possible that our development 
priorities are complementary" (43). 
As a result, the Republic's 1994-1999 NDP attempted to elaborate possible 
North-South dimensions to most of the seven priority areas for structural 
funds investment. The industry Chapter for instance, included a sub- 
section on joint working with Northern Ireland, identifying the need for 
joint product promotion, import substitution and research collaboration, 
while the 'human resources' Chapter proposed joint working on 
vocational education and training and on technology transfer (DSO 1993: 
94). The government saw this and the joint North-South Chapter as a 
"significant cross-border element" but, as with the Northern Ireland plan, 
serious consideration of how such issues were to be addressed were 
postponed until the details of the INTERREG programme had been 
negotiated (44). Indeed, despite the government's announced intention to 
focus on developing indigenous economic muscle, the strategy of attracting 
overseas capital was still expected to require over half of the funding 
available for industrial grants under the Republic's NDP (IRE310m, with 
IRE291 allocated for indigenous industry), and was expected to yield a 9,000 
growth in jobs, comparing with an 11,000 growth of employment within 
indigenous industry (DSO 1993: 46). These plans were to be considered "in 
conjunction with" the Northern Ireland Plan, but it was not made clear 
exactly what this would mean for the funding programme (45). Moreover, 
in maintaining an externally orientated approach to economic 
development in tandem with attempts at stimulating domestically owned 
industry -a 'dual track' approach which dated back to the early 1980's - 
there was every possibility that on-going competition for sources of 
external capital would disrupt improved North-South co-operation. 
Nonetheless, the limited attempts in the Republic and in Northern Ireland 
at integrating the two separate Development Plans was a new departure 
and signaled a possible sea-change in official economic orientations in both 
jurisdictions. Perhaps more important than its limited content, this 
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North-South joint working had significant symbolic effects, particularly in 
terms of legitimising practical ad lioc initiatives. In the early 1990's, for 
instance, building on a history of cooperation dating back to the early 
1980's, the Northern Ireland Tourist Board and Bord Failte began 
cooperating in jointly financing a unified bookings system. Similarly, from 
1990 cooperation between the four border Health Boards was intensified, 
leading to North-South information-sharing and joint procurement - 
saving St£4m in 1992 (46). 
On transport, the Plan confirmed that the Dublin-Belfast road and rail links 
would be a "top" priority for investment (DSO 1993: 108). The Dublin 
government had routinely ignored the need to improve cross-border 
transport links: the Republic's national expenditure plans and submissions 
for EU funding down-played North-South linkages while emphasising 
Dublin-Cork, Dublin-Wexford and Dublin-Galway transport links (47). In 
the 1989-1993 structural funds programme a feasibility study for improved 
rail links was completed but not acted-on as the Department of Finance had 
channelled EU funds into transport improvements for the Dublin 
suburban area. By 1989 the NIO had approved expenditure for the project, 
but it was only with the sustained pressure of Irish business associations - 
particularly the CII/IBEC and the CBINI, that funds from the Republic's 
1993-99 funding programme were made available (48). 
To some degree then, there was a shift in public expenditure priorities, 
away from a 26 County towards a 32 County perspective. To a degree the 
Northern government - and increasingly, its Southern counterpart - 
defined its policies in a North-South framework as, on the periphery of the 
EU, all-island socio-economic development was seen as offering a life-line 
for the two economies. EU integration had encouraged some movement 
towards policy-making on an all-Ireland basis but this process was 
depended on EU encouragement and, as outlined in Chapter 6, on 
pressures from business. Consequently, North-South cooperation tended to 
be piecemeal and disjointed and did little to disengage the North from the 
UK macro-economy. While there may have been some, limited regionalist 
adaptations of state policy on a North-South, all-Ireland basis, state policies 
remained focused on the separate 'national' jurisdictions. These counter- 
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pressures encouraging North-South divergence are discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
National divergence: state policies 
In this sub-section state policies are examined to map Out the extent to 
which Northern Ireland and the Republic retained nationally defined 
institutions and policies despite increased pressures to regionalisation. It 
first examines the overall pressures for national state centralisation in UK 
and the Republic and then focuses on specific constitutional conflicts 
between them where they meet in Ireland. This provides the context for a 
more detailed discussion of the pressures on state policy that push against 
North-South regional integration, first in terms of British policies in 
Northern Ireland, and second, policies in the Republic. 
State centralisation: UK and the Republic 
The Republic and the UK are the among most centralised states in the EU 
and have been criticised periodically by the Commission on this count. As 
a constitutional monarchy, the UK state was founded on concepts of the 
sovereign power of the "Crown in Parliament" while in the Republic state 
authority was intimately linked to a popular, 'national' mandate, deriving 
its legitimacy from the "Irish nation" (Constitution, Article One). The 
concept of 'national' or 'Crown' sovereignty that dominated the politics of 
both countries was thrown into sharp relief by decentralising and 
federalising tendencies, which had become a central requirement of EU 
integration (Loughlin 1991). Consequently, the two states tended to act as 
constraints rather than as 'facilitators' in the regionalisation of state policy 
in the EU, and this had clear implications for Ireland, North and South 
(49). 
In the UK the British Parliament governed with some administrative 
powers devolved to local authorities and to appointed administrative elites 
(Crick 1991). In the 1970's proposals to democratise the British system of 
government were shelved and throughout the 1980's and early 1990's there 
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was a progressive transfer of administrative powers from local 
government to centrally appointed 'quangos' or to Whitehall (50). 
For the most part the UK state ignored the demands for regional 
autonomy, reflecting a fear of fragmentation in the heterogenous, 
multinational, multi-regional UK state -a fear of what the Secretary of 
State for Scotland called the "slippery slope" of home rule that concerned 
the power of symbolic images and rhetoric of the state as much as its 
institutional structures (51). Despite EU pressures, the UK moved closer to 
becoming an 'elective dictatorship', for instance dismantling the Scottish 
regions and many English Counties just as they were gaining recognition at 
the EU level (Bogdanor 1992). Clearly the concept of subsidiarity, written 
into the Maastricht Treaty - was an "an off-shore principle" that, as far as 
the British government was concerned, did not apply to the UK (52). 
This was a particular problem in Northern Ireland where the political 
consequences of national conflict - the powerlessness of local government, 
the unaccountability of the Northern Ireland Office, and the priority 
ascribed to security policy sharpened state centralism and minimised the 
impact of EU institutions. In 1993-4 local government accounted for 
UKE194m - or 0.272% of public expenditure in Northern Ireland (53). In the 
early 1990's local government finances were supplemented by limited 
funding for community relations initiatives, councils were permitted to 
spend up to 2% of their income from rates on local economic development 
initiatives and were promised a greater role in the 1994-1999 EU structural 
funds (54). But these extra powers were at most miminal. 
State centralism in the Irish Republic had a very different story. The 26 
Counties had a population of 3.5 million - smaller than many EU regions 
such as Lombardy and Catalonia - while the UK population was 56.4 
million; the Republic was built out of anti-colonial struggle while the 
British state was built out of conquest; Ireland has a written constitution 
while Britain's "unwritten constitution" was 'vested' in Parliament; 
people living in the Republic never demanded the right to secede from the 
Irish state while Britain was internally divided between regional and 
national groupings; finally, state centralism in the Republic was founded 
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on an ideological consensus around 'national' aspirations while the UK 
political consensus centred on the sovereignty of the "Crown in 
Parliament". 
Many Parliamentary politicians in the Republic failed to see centralism as a 
political issue and like the UK, the Republic 'opted out' of the EU-wide 
tendency to devolve power to sub-state regions (55). Centralisation can be 
dated back to the 1960's when regional and local economic policies were 
increasingly vested in central authorities, a process that culminated in the 
1969 Buchanan Report which recommended the removal of revenue 
raising powers for local government (implemented in 1977), thereby 
undermining the institutional infrastructure required to service 
indigenous economic development and to encourage backward and 
forward linkages between branch plants and the local economy (56). 
The Republic has no elected regional authorities and local government is 
largely conducted through County Councils, whose chief executives were 
appointed by central government. There are a number of District Councils 
which, together with the Counties, have limited expenditure and exercised 
minimal local powers. Local authority expenditure stood at 5% of GDP or 
11.3% of total public expenditure in 1990 and local powers were minimal as 
key elements of the local government system in the rest of the EU - social 
services, policing and education - were run at the 'national' level. These 
limited powers were themselves considerably weakened during the first 
tranche of 'programmed' structural funds, which was directly managed by 
the central Department of Finance. Ironically, these greatly increased 
central powers reinforced "the neo-corporatist nature of the state" and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, the Department resisted EP-inspired and 
Commission-led attempts at devolving these powers to regional levels (57). 
Domestic pressures for greater devolution of state powers had little success. 
In 1990 the "Barrington Report" - drawn up by an Irish Commission of 
Enquiry into Local Government - compared Ireland with EU states, arguing 
that Ireland had "lagged behind with overly centralised institutions of 
government". The Report highlighted the abolition of rates in 1977 as the 
central factor in the declining significance of regional and local 
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government in the Republic. But the recommendations for strengthened 
local and regional government were not acted on as the Fianna Fail- 
Progressive Democrat coalition government could not agree on their 
implementation. In 1991 a local government Bill was introduced, ignoring 
the Barrington recommendations, giving local authorities the power to 
nominate to the regional bodies and to twin with other regions in the EU. 
Meanwhile, District Council elections were postponed indefinitely, 
pending resolution of the government's internal political differences. 
Nonetheless, as has been mentioned earlier, two years later the Fianna Fail 
- Labour government committed itself to examining the proposals, 
although the issue was again deferred and District elections were not held, 
as had been promised, at the same time as the European elections, in June 
1994 (58). 
State centralisation associated with these claims to absolute political 
sovereignty exaggerated divergences in political culture, North and South 
and was a key factor in perpetuating divisions in Ireland. Although the 
North's economic problems were often very similar to the South's and 
required joint responses, policy coordination was generally ad hoc or non- 
existent. There was no coherent Northern 'state view' on North-South 
cooperation across different government departments, there were few joint 
initiatives by the two administrations (Anderson 1994). This was 
exacerbated by competing state claims to territory. 
Contesting territory: North and South 
The lack of significant North-South adaptation of state policy in both parts 
of Ireland was at least in part a product of the contestation of national state 
jurisdiction. The British government was committed to maintaining 
sovereignty in Northern Ireland. Under the 1800 Act of Union it was 
decreed that Ireland and Britain would "for ever be united into one 
Kingdom" (Article one). As outlined in Chapter 4, the 1920 Government of 
Ireland Act underlined this commitment, stating that the supremacy of the 
UK Parliament remained "unaffected and undiminished over all persons 
and things in Ireland and every part thereof" (Section 75). The post- 
partition Anglo-Irish Treaty recognised the Southern transition to 
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'dominion' status and decreed that Northern Ireland would continue to be 
governed under the terms of the 1920 Act (Article 12). This non- 
conditional constitutional guarantee set the framework for subsequent 
clarifications of Northern Ireland's status as references to the need for 
"consent" to constitutional change in Northern Ireland - first defined as 
the consent of Stormont in 1949 and later, from 1973, of the Northern 
populace - were initially seen as a means of strengthening the provisions of 
the 1920 Act and of confirming North-South divisions in Ireland 
(Mansergh 1981). 
British claims to territory in Ireland were contested by the Southern state 
from when it became a Republic in 1937. Its Constitution stated that "the 
national territory consists of the whole of the island of Ireland.. " and 
claimed "jurisidiction over the whole of that territory" (Articles 2 and 3). 
This claim was to be pursued by peaceful means as the Republic also 
committed itself to the "ideal of peace and friendly cooperation" and to the 
"pacific settlement of international disputes" and hence - implicitly - to the 
need for Northern consent to reunification (Article 29) (59). The Anglo- 
Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985, which recognised that "any change in the 
status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland" (Article 1), expressed this de 
facto recognition of Partition (Coughlan 1992). At the same time, though, 
as noted earlier, politicians in the Republic were required to work for unity 
as a "constitutional imperative" (60). 
Pressures from the EU institutions and intergovernmentalism at the EU 
level encouraged reconciliation between the two governments, often, 
ironically, at the cost of North-South relations. As outlined in Chapter 7, 
reconciliation was founded on mutual recognition of the need for 
Northern consent to any political change, encouraging Southern 
politicians to postpone the pursuit of North-South unity and reinforcing 
the necessity for the unionist community to hold onto its numerical 
majority in the North. In this context, indications that the Republic was 
willing to consider revisions to Articles 2 and 3, to be presented as part of a 
wider package of measures to create structures promoting "reconciliation 
between the two traditions and North-South cooperation" were greeted 
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with some trepidation, particularly within nationalist communities in the 
North where the constitutional commitment has "enormous emotional 
significance" (Donoghue 1993: 18). 
Primarily because of these competing claims to sovereignty, but also 
exacerbated by state centralisation, attempts at establishing limited contacts 
with the Southern administration under the auspices of the Co-ordinating 
Committee of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC) were 
instantly politicised, primarily by Northern Unionists concerned that such 
contacts would undermine British sovereignty in Northern Ireland. 
When questioned by unionist members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
for instance, the Permanent Secretary at the Department of Finance and 
Personnel insisted that they were a routine matter and were "along the 
lines of similar arrangements between member states of the European 
Community" and hence were no cause for alarm: unionist politicians 
remained opposed arguing that "economic cooperation is being used as the 
first stage on the way to... political cooperation" (61). 
Despite these concerns, by 1988 the AIA inter-ministerial councils had 
agreed a programme of joint meetings with the Commission and civil 
servants to draw up cross-border projects, joint meetings which were later 
used to manage INTERREG expenditure (62). This inter-ministerial control 
of EU funding programmes, aimed at excluding Northern Nationalists and 
Unionists, was linked to greater intergovernmental cooperation under the 
AIA and was in clear breach of Commission funding regulations 
established in 1988 which stated that funding programmes should be 
devised and managed in close "partnership" with "authorities", designated 
by the member states "at the national, regional, local, or other level" as 
well as with the Commission (63). 
This plainly did not occur in Ireland, where attempts to 'depoliticise' 
North-South cooperation in the border areas, keeping it in the hands of the 
two governments, directly led to the exclusion of local community groups 
and local politicians from the process of determining priority projects or of 
managing EU expenditure (O'Dowd et al 1993). Such control stifled North- 
South linkages, ensuring that they were restricted to playing a symbolic, 
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legitimising role rather than meeting the urgent needs of the single island 
economy. 
North-South divergence: Northern Ireland 
The increasing "Irish dimension" of British administration in Northern 
Ireland in the early 1990's was combined with various British government 
announcements in the early 1990's appeared to signal a "a major change of 
tone" in the British position and, reflecting a "deep seated desire to have 
less and less to do with Northern Ireland" (64). In November 1990 the 
Secretary of State - Peter Brooke - declared that Britain had no "no selfish 
strategic or economic interest" in Northern Ireland and two years later, in 
December 1992 there was acknowledgement of nationalisms' legitimate 
aspirations and grievances, coupled with a recognition that the British 
record had not always been exemplary. The British government more 
clearly defined itself as an impartial "facilitator of the expression of 
democratic will in Northern Ireland", suggesting, as the Secretary of State 
pointed out in July 1993, that the "challenge and the task for the 
nationalists in both parts of Ireland is to work towards winning the consent 
of the unionists", not to persuade Britain to leave (65). 
This formula was clarified to the IRA during secret negotiations in 1993 
and was probably a major factor in securing the ceasefire (66). In its 
statements the government cast itself in an open-ended role of facilitator 
for reconciliation in Ireland stating that it had "no blueprint". This stress 
on comprehensive agreement - "the totality of relationships in these 
islands"- set the context for its assertion that Britain would "continue to 
uphold the union" as long Northern consent to constitutional change was 
lacking, suggesting that a range of measures, perhaps including North- 
South institutions, could be progressed a part of a general process of 
reconciliation in Ireland as a whole (67). 
In wider negotiations, during interparty talks on the North in September 
1992, British government proposals on North-South institutions were 
leaked which distinguished three approaches or "models" for North-South 
bodies: cross-border "middle ground" institutions; "transcending" all- 
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Ireland institutions; or institutions "integrating" the two jurisdictions - 
which could be responsible to both the Irish and British governments - or 
to a nominated North-South executive. The proposals were blanketed in 
the EU context and, as the document stated, they were aimed at 
encouraging an "agreed Ireland" and at "optimising the benefits of the EC 
framework for the two parts of Ireland". Initially UUP politicians were 
"favourably disposed" to the proposals until the end of 1992 when Jim 
Molyneaux joined Ian Paisley in demanding that there should be no talk of 
North-South institutions until the Republic had revoked its territorial 
claim on the North (68). 
The British government was immediately isolated and once unionist 
politicians had linked progress on the issue to wider constitutional issues, 
it quickly asserted that such proposals would have to first be agreed by 
Unionist politicians. The Northern Secretary of State remained convinced 
that "once people start to see what can be achieved by way of better 
cooperation without in any way diminishing the position of Northern 
Ireland in the UK, then I think fears dissipate and they take heart and they 
say that wasn't bad! ". But despite governments pledges with the 
breakdown of the talks that they would improve North-South policy co- 
ordination through the Anglo-Irish process, they appeared unwilling to 
take substantive steps until a firm decision-making framework had 
emerged (69). 
Similar confusion over whether North-South socioeconomic institutions 
presented a threat to British sovereignty or were purely 'functional' and 
could be progressed independently of a wider agreement, surfaced during 
the Reynolds - Major talks in Autumn of 1993. The British government 
proposals embodied in the "Focus and Direction" document presented to 
the Irish government in September of 1993 contained a commitment to 
establishing North-South institutional structures to manage the regional 
economy, which the Secretary of State believed would "not impinge on the 
sovereignty of Northern Ireland" (70). The "Downing Street Declaration"- 
issued in December 1993 - provided an explicit commitment to promote 
North-South cooperation at all levels and made it clear that such 
cooperation could be progressed regardless of whether an agreement to end 
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the conflict was reached - arguing that "the development of Europe will of 
itself require new approaches to serve interests common to both parts of 
Ireland" (71). 
But these ostensibly non-political North-South institutions and the 
broader development of the North-South relationship were once again 
made conditional upon Unionist consent in the British government's 
subsequent attempts at clarifying the Declaration (72). Jim Molyneaux 
claimed that he had had an effective veto on the Declaration, filleting out 
its substantive mechanisms, making it more a declaration of principles 
than a framework for reconciliation (73). In February 1994 the Secretary of 
State argued that North-South institutions could "help transform the 
relationship between nationalists and unionists" but stated that only with 
the agreement of Northern Unionists could they "take on an increasingly 
dynamic role on the island" (74). In response, somewhat predictably, 
Unionists voiced "unalterable" opposition and intensified their hostility, 
stating that they would oppose the creation of all-Ireland institutions 'on 
principle', regardless of any amendment to the Republic's constitution. 
Further illustration of British ambiguity on the question of North-South 
structures was to be found on the question of the "union" itself. In part this 
reflected the need to win UUP votes in the House of Commons - John 
Major's "Shotgun Marriage" with Jim Molyneaux (75). But government 
pronouncements on the status of Northern Ireland appeared to be more 
genuine than purely tactical - particularly as UUP support was guarantied 
given the Labour Party's position on the national conflict at that time (76). 
Significantly, the Prime Minister argued that the Downing Street 
Declaration provided "an unambiguous acknowledgement by all 
concerned of Northern Ireland's status within the UK", he described 
himself as "4 square behind the Union" and explicitly ruled out devolution 
as a step on a slippery path to break up of the UK, arguing that "the Union 
is vital for all parts of the UK" (77). 
In more concrete terms, British government security policy continued to 
take precedence over any concern to assist the process of North-South 
integration. As an official of the Northern Ireland Office outlined in 1993, 
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social and economic policies in Northern Ireland were designed to 
"complement and reinforce" the security strategy (Bell 1993: 27). This was 
an important theme of North-South politics and was sharpest in the border 
areas which were described as "something of a test case in assessing the 
links between national sovereignty and territorial sovereignty" (O'Dowd ct 
al 1993). Indeed, as EU integration accelerated the border was further 
fortified, serving as a 'national' barrier rather than as a regional contact- 
point between British and Irish jurisdictions (O'Dowd and Corrigan 1992). 
Yearly expenditure on fortifying the border was more than doubled in the 
late 1980's - to StE30-35m per year until 1995, totalling St£160m, spent on 
229 new installations (78). 
A dualism between regionalist policies and 'national' territoriality had 
emerged in British state policy in Ireland. The British government had 
adopted a policy of accepting the need for some form of regional 
integration on an all-Ireland basis while at the same time maintaining 
what were defined as the core elements of British sovereignty in Northern 
Ireland (79). This became a constant theme of North-South politics as "at 
every step of consideration of economic integration, the security and 
political situation in Northern Ireland is seen as a major obstacle" 
(O'Donnell 1993a: 39). This reflected the continuing logic of British state 
sovereignty in Northern Ireland, the absolute priority accorded to 'security' 
related issues, and the perceived necessity to hold the 'union' together in 
the face of potential fragmentation (80). 
But at the same time, the necessity to maintain coherence in this internally 
contradictory set of policies forced the British government to redefine the 
concept of unionist consent. In 1985 it had insisted that such consent was 
not necessary for the creation of Anglo-Irish consultative structures and in 
1992 had suggested that such consent was not required for North-South 
economic institutions. This position was formally established with the 
Downing Street Declaration in late 1993, which signalled a tentative 
"creeping confederalism", challenging "old ideas of Britishness" with direct 
implications for the conflict and also for the rest of the UK. Although this 
again was cross-cut by later clarifications that such structures would be 
subject to a referendum in the North (81). 
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North-South divergence: the Republic 
Despite being an enthusiastic advocate of North-South integration, the 
Republic was prepared to make few practical concessions to improving 
North-South linkages. In many respects state interests in the Republic 
diverged from UK state policies and there were considerable policy 
divergences between North and South. 
The Irish government failed to associate and work with other peripheral, 
small economies within the EU, including Northern Ireland. In spite of 
some ad hoc cooperation with the 'cohesion group', it did not want to be 
associated with "that peripheral riff-raff" (82). Irish politicians tended to 
aspire to membership of the the "core" group of Germany, Italy, France 
and Benelux: as Charles Haughey put it - "to be safe in the middle of the 
pack" (83). This was partly motivated by a desire to further loosen 
dependence on the British economy. It also stemmed from a desire not to 
be defined as a 'peripheral' economy in the Single Market (84). This North- 
South divergence was exacerbated by administrative centralism as state 
policy in the Republic was aimed at meeting the immediate requirements 
of state rule rather than at addressing the needs of the EU periphery or the 
future of the all-Ireland economy (85). As noted earlier - "the priority... to 
achieve security and stability" took precedence over the aspiration to Irish 
unity and specific policies were orientated to the needs of the Republic of 
Ireland electorate rather than the needs of the island as a whole, as a result 
(86). 
Of the wide range of issues that illustrated these tendencies, cross-border 
trade and exchange rate policy were perhaps the most significant. From 
1979, with Ireland's entry into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, 
the Punt shadowed the Deutsch-Mark rather than Sterling - thus creating 
potentially significant price differentials between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic. In response to the increase in cross border shopping, from South 
to North in April 1987, the government imposed restrictions, under which 
travellers were not entitled to a duty free allowance for journeys out of the 
Republic lasting less than forty-eight hours. This had the immediate effect 
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of cutting retail sales in Northern Ireland by some 6 and increasing sales 
in the Republic by 2 thus safeguarding jobs in the border areas and raising 
exchequer revenues by some IR£100m per year (Foley and Mulreany 1990; 
Trimble 1989a: 40). The restrictions were declared to be in contravention of 
the 1987 Single European Act by the European Court in 1990 - but were 
maintained in amended form by the Republic's Fianna Fail Minister of 
Finance - Albert Reynolds - to win votes in the border constituencies (87). 
The ambivalent attitude to addressing issues of North-South regional 
development was most clearly illustrated in the public debate that followed 
the collapse of Sterling and its departure from the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in October 1992 (88). The Irish government's determination to 
maintain the value of the Punt within the ERM reflected the aspiration to 
membership of a German-led 'core' monetary union, intermingled with 
hopes of gaining enhanced independence - for the 26 Counties - from the 
declining UK economy. The Republic therefore was heavily committed to 
the ERM and to EMU, regardless of the consequences for North-South 
relations in Ireland - as reflected in the Taoiseach's confident assurance in 
1991 that "Ireland will be in a position to move to stage three of the EMU 
with the first groups of countries" (89). 
In 1992-3 this led to a five month battle to maintain the value of the Punt, 
which saw the Irish government "nail its colours to the mast" of the EMU. 
From the moment that Sterling left the ERM in October 1992, falling in 
value by some 20%, over three months, market speculation placed the Punt 
under enormous downward pressure. In the ensuing struggle to maintain 
the currency's value, the government introduced a range of measures: 
IR. 50 million was spent compensating companies exporting to the UK 
(mostly Irish owned); IRE24 billion was spent by the Treasury buying Punts 
on the exchange market; and interest rates were increased to 15% to attract 
funds into the Punt. These attempts were frustrated as speculators forced 
the Irish currency back into closer parity with Sterling - leading to a 10% 
devaluation and allowing a 9% reduction in the interest rate in February 
1993 (90). 
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Even after the Punt had been "kicked out into the doghouse with Sterling" 
Bertie Ahern, the Finance Minister insisted that although "we are on the 
periphery, we have to keep pushing" and Brendan Halligan Head of the 
Institute European Affairs in Dublin maintained that "the more the 
community integrates the more we move towards the centre" (91). The 
former EU Commissioner, Chair of the Allied Irish Bank, and soon to be 
GATT President, Peter Sutherland, returned to the familiar themes of the 
need to de-couple from Sterling, to "accelerate diversification" from the 
British economy and "aspire to the fast lane" of currency union in an EU 
currency area of low interest rates (92). 
But others were more sobered by the experience. The Foreign Affairs 
Minister Dick Spring described it as a "chastening experience" and voiced 
"deep disillusionment with the failure of EC solidarity" (93). This reflected 
a growing awareness of Ireland's peripherality in the EU - as one Irish MEP 
put it - "access to the benefits of the SEM for Ireland is like access to the 
most expensive Dublin hotel for all the Irish people" (Higgins 1992: 63). In 
effect, the aspiration to membership of the 'fast lane' of integration - 
leaving Northern Ireland to languish in the 'slow lane' with the rest of the 
UK - was frustrated by the perception in EU finance ministries and central 
banks, that the survival of the Punt was of relatively minor importance in 
the ERM and that the Irish economy was, in any case, still tied to the UK 
economy. 
Sections of the Irish press acknowledged that the EU integration process 
had strengthened the 'core' relative to the 'periphery': "by joining the rich 
man's club we hoped to become rich" (94). There was growing recognition 
that the "buckets of Euromoney will only keep us in our place" and that 
"the ironic result of greater unification in Europe would be to make us 
even more marginal" (95). Integration into the SEM confirmed that the 
Republic - along with many other regions in the EU - was on the "outer 
periphery" of the SEM and it highlighted the need to maximise Ireland's 
indigenous economic potential (96). This translated into an increasing 
"refusal to accept a outward orientated and exploitatitive model of 
dependent development" and was reflected in an increased awareness of 
2q; 
the effects of Southern policies on North-South divisions (Munck 
1993: 149). 
From 1983, with the publication of the NESC Telesis Report (NESC 1983), 
successive National Plans in the Republic had promised a new emphasis 
on indigenous industry, but as the Culliton Report pointed out ten years 
later this had failed to materialise (DSO 1992a). By 1994, with the 1994-99 
National Development Plan there was an increased emphasis on the need 
to invest public funds in indigenous industry coupled with a new 
acceptance of the necessity to involve regionally representative bodies in 
the process of regenerating Irish industry and a new recognition of the 
necessity to maintain and extend linkages with the Northern economy (97). 
As argued by the Taoiseach in November 1993, "in the context of the 
Single Market there is immense scope and great opportunity for us to work 
together North and South in a more friendly and civilised climate" (98). 
This increased recognition of North-South issues had clear implications for 
economic policy, for the emergence an all Ireland' regional economy, 
shared with the North and, crucially, for political institutions to express 
this. In November 1993, during discussions with the British government 
over their response to the Hume-Adams proposals it became clear that the 
government in the Republic was seeking to create an "institutional 
framework for practical and effective North-South cooperation and 
coordination" with executive powers that would be "the instrument for 
developing an integrated approach for the whole island in respect of the 
challenges and opportunities of the EC" (99). 
Overall then, to a degree, state policies in the Republic were undergoing 
some shifts towards a range of policies more orientated to the needs of 
indigenous industry based at the sub-regional level and at the all-Ireland 
level. But as in the UK, these shifts were piecemeal and failed to meet the 
demands of the business communities North and South and were 
undercut by a continued commitment to separate development. As 
illustrated by the limited - and belated - shifts in public expenditure 
programmes and economic strategies, state policy reorientations were 
centrally dependent upon continued policy development at the EU level 
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and on lobbying by the business community, North and South. Clearly, a 
more effective North-South state response to regional integration 
desperately required stronger institutional guidance. 
The Republic had seen EU membership as a means of gaining greater 
autonomy from Britain -a strategy that was primarily aimed at serving the 
interests of the 26 County Republic rather than meeting the objective of 
North-South unity. As the Republic's accession to the ERM demonstrated, 
the pursuit of such autonomy and the economic benefits it implied, 
generally over-rode any legal or constitutional responsibility to enhance 
all-Ireland unity (Laffan 1983). Southern governments were reluctant to 
give priority 'to the future citizens of a united Ireland at the expense of the 
electorate of the present day Republic" (Lyne 1990: 430). Indeed, the more 
that politicians in the Republic were conscious of the immediate needs of 
their electors and the more they sought autonomy from the UK within a 
EU setting, the greater the division between North and South. 
Chapter conclusions 
North-South socio-economic integration urgently needed political 
direction. The more ambitious proposals for policies to create a 'synergy' of 
economic interests in order to exploit the more dynamic opportunities 
offered by the SEM required political leadership. Defining economic policy 
for the island as a whole required accountable North-South decision- 
making structures. Instead, since 1986, North-South initiatives had been 
fed through the AIIC and non representative quangos such as the IFI, thus 
surrendering authority on North-South issues to unelected officials and in 
the last resort, to private business. Partly as a result, adjustments to the 
policies of the two governments remained largely piecemeal, were 
contradicted by 'national' macro-economic policies and were stalled by 
over-centralised administrative structures, North and South. 
But, as the costs of maintaining North-South divisions escalated - in terms 
of opportunities lost as well as in terms of the existing commitments and 
as the two governments conceded the need for mutual compromise 
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between the states' constitutional claims - it became possible to conceive of 
new institutional frameworks which could supersede the current, stunted 
constitutional arrangements. Indeed it was on this basis that the British 
government floated proposals for a partial transfer of authority to all- 
Ireland economic institutions during the talks process in 1992 and that the 
SDLP in the North, the Irish Labour Party - Fianna Fail coalition in the 
South and sections of the British Labour Party argued for joint Irish-British 
responsibility for the North as the political expression of common interests 
on the 'island of Ireland' (O'Leary et al 1993). 
For the Republic the key issue was not so much whether it should 
postpone socio-economic aspirations in favour of political aspirations; but 
rather whether the process of pursuing its objectives within a 26 county 
framework would become consistent with the process of strengthening all- 
Ireland unity. The phase of EU integration in the early 1990's began to have 
this effect, leading politicians in the Republic to recast 26-County state 
policy in a 32-county mould. Meanwhile, as British state policies in the 
North were placed in the context of increasing demands for North-South 
economic integration, there was a limited, but nonetheless significant, 
"redefinition of Britishness", embodied in the Downing Street Declaration 
and tentative moves towards building stronger North-South linkages 
(101). 
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Section Three Conclusions 
EU integration was riven with conflicts between what may broadly be 
termed a 'national', usually state-centred political orientation and the 
politics of 'macro' and 'micro' regional development. Reflecting the 
weakness of a trans-state Euro-identity, the integration process was largely 
confined to economic concerns rather than social, cultural or political 
concerns, and generated dichotomy between a growing transnationalism in 
economic affairs and the continuing ideological significance of national 
and state divisions. 
This dichotomy was particularly sharply defined in Ireland. Integration 
into the SEM had stimulated a heightened awareness, within the 
Southern and especially the Northern business communities, of the need 
for North-South economic integration. In response to the demands of a 
weak but nonetheless growing all-Ireland business orientation, that 
perhaps would lead to the formation of an all-Ireland middle class, there 
were some significant shifts in the nature of ideological conflict in Ireland 
and some related adjustments to the exercise of state power in Northern 
Ireland and in the Republic. But these ideological and political responses 
were minimal and they were cross-cut and contradicted by on-going 
national conflict and undermined by the related centralisation of political 
structures in the two jurisdictions, North and South. Nonetheless, the 
pressure for all-Ireland regionalisation of material interests, of political 
conflict and of state policy was unlikely to diminish. 
This Section began with a concern to map out the depth and extent of the 
space for public intervention in Ireland, though 'macro' and 'micro' 
regional bodies in the EU as well as at the state level. In the context of EU 
integration in the 1990's, it was increasingly becoming common wisdom 
that such intervention had to occur at the all-Ireland level - as well as at 
other levels - if it was to have any chance of success. EU integration had 
opened up a sharp tension between nationalism and regionalism in 
Ireland, which had stimulated a debate on possible North-South 
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institutions -a debate which was of central importance both for the 
economic and for the political future of the island. 
The following Section focuses on those actively engaged in addressing this 
emerging agenda for North-South integration in Ireland. The process of 
reconciling the competing demands of national conflict and regional 
integration was driving forward a reconstitution of political positions: the 
Section examines the problems that this presented for political actors both 
in EU institutions and in Ireland. 
? 04 
Section Four 
National Adaptations 
Section introduction 
The previous Section examined historical and contemporary 
tendencies, following a broad three-part framework. In this Section 
there is a shift in the method and focus of analysis in order to 
investigate how political actors accommodate themselves to these 
tendencies. As already argued in Chapter 3, if the process of 
reproducing, realigning or transforming nationalism in the context of 
transnational integration is to be understood, it is necessary to 
investigate how political actors themselves re-constitute their political 
positions. This Section then, uses transcripts from interviews held with 
political actors in Belfast and in Brussels, building-on and extending the 
analysis in Sections 2 and 3. Interview material is used to highlight how 
historical tendencies are changed or reproduced, allowing a focus on the 
process of explanation and argument - the 'laws of becoming' - rather 
than simply on their content (Hammersley 1989: 73). Interviews are 
treated as a form of primary 'evidence' that illustrates the 'content' of 
various political positions and highlights the 'process' of adapting and 
stabilising them. This approach merges distinctions between material 
interests, ideological conflict and public power, pulling them together. 
This deepens analysis as it reveals how the three aspects of 'social order' 
inter-relate, how far they conflict and how far such conflicts generate 
political change. 
This Section, then, problematises the process of reproducing 
nationalism in the context of transnational integration. The Section is 
divided into three chapters. Chapter 9 discusses the broad consensus on 
the need for increased North-South economic cooperation in Ireland, 
outlining the views of the various participants, beginning with the 
most enthusiastic advocates of regional integration. In Chapter 10 this is 
contrasted with sharp disagreements on the question of whether EU 
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integration has implications for national state sovereignties and for the 
national conflict in Ireland. These views fall into several broad 
categories and these are discussed beginning with those most closely 
attached to conceptions of state sovereignty. Chapter 11 brings these two 
often contradictory strands together and examines how interviewees try 
to construct consistency in their viewpoints - focusing on the types of 
dilemmas that they face and on the ways in which they try to reconcile 
or avoid them (Anderson and Goodman 1995a, 1995b; Goodman 1995a, 
1995b, 1995c). 
Political dilemmas 
The previous two Sections outlined deep tensions and contradictions 
between EU integration and the national conflict in Ireland. As was 
argued, the political culture of Ireland, North and South, continues to 
be dominated by nationalism both in colonialist and anti-colonialist 
forms. The Republic is the only former colony among EU member 
states. As noted in Chapter 7, most political parties in both parts of 
Ireland are organised on national rather than on class lines and across 
the island, national affiliations are shaped by conflicts over state 
jurisdiction and territorial affiliation. 
At the same time, it has been argued that both Northern Ireland and the 
Republic are subject to growing regionalisation, at EU and at substate 
regional levels. North and South are highly dependent on EU 
multinational capital and the South is more locked into EU trading 
patterns than any other member state. Partly because of this already 
highly advanced internationalisation, but also because of the pressures 
arising out of integration into the SEM, North and South are 
increasingly defined as constituting a single island economy. As 
outlined in Chapter 6, EU integration is encouraging business interests, 
including from the Northern unionist community, fearful of 
sharpened economic peripherality on the 'edge' of Europe, to call for 
greater integration, as a single regional economy able to survive in the 
SEM. 
These regional pressures disrupt political constituencies and challenge 
established Party political positions. Elsewhere in the EU politicians 
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have difficulty in reconciling political positions on 'national' issues 
with the impacts of regional integration in the EU: between the logic of 
state-centred 'national' development and EU or sub state, regional 
development. In Ireland, these difficulties sharpen into contradictions 
that generate deep ideological dilemmas and force redefinitions of party 
policy positions. 
Such tensions and contradictions between regional development and 
national sovereignty in Ireland have more general relevance. As EU 
member states adapt themselves to the realities of global economic 
power they are forced to pursue national interests within an EU 
regional framework. This process requires the adaptation or 
reformulation of nationalism which forces states to fuse - or at least in 
some way to combine - the politics of national identity and nationalism 
with the politics of EU identity and regionalism. The tension between 
these two competing dynamics is opening up new opportunities for 
political change across the EU, particularly for substate regions. More 
immediately in Ireland, such tensions are central to understanding the 
various policies and positions being adopted on economic cooperation 
and the national conflict. 
Political discourse and rhetoric 
To probe and analyse these tensions, in depth interviews were held in 
Belfast and Brussels where politicians and public officials are most 
directly faced with the practical problem of how to negotiate the 
dilemmas between national conflict and transnational integration 
(details of interviewees appear in Appendix 1). 
In Brussels there were twenty-two interviews with politicians and civil 
servants, including: nine MEPs, two English, one Welsh and six from 
Ireland; two officials from the Parliament's Research Directorate; and a 
member of the British government representation in Brussels. In the 
EU Commission there were interviews with two officials in the 
Regional Affairs Directorate; two working on structural funds for 
Ireland; two in the Directorate for agriculture; and one in the office of 
the Commission President. The head of the Northern Ireland Centre in 
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Europe, and the head of the Irish Institute in Leuven, and two Brussels- 
based journalists were also interviewed. 
In Northern Ireland there were sixteen interviews. There were two 
party representatives interviewed from each of the main political 
Parties - the Alliance, DUP, UUP, SDLP, and Sinn Fein. In addition, one 
representative was interviewed from the Workers' Party, one from the 
Communist Party of Ireland and one from the from the Ulster 
Democratic Party. To supplement these party political interviews and in 
recognition of their political role in the North, two Northern Ireland 
government officials and one Northern Ireland-based Commission 
official were interviewed. 
Reflecting the interest in qualitative issues, interviews were semi- 
structured and open ended. Most lasted between one and two hours 
and were loosely structured around a set of open-ended questions about 
the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership to date, allowing 
the interviewee to specify the issues which he or she thought were the 
most important, then followed-up with more specific questions about 
the reasons and evidence for their opinions. This allowed a more 
interactive dialogue than the use of a fixed questionnaire, enabling a 
joint 'construction of meaning', yielding a fuller, more nuanced 
response, particularly useful when the intention is to highlight 
attempts at bridging often contradictory concepts (Mischler 1986; Potter 
and Wetherell 1992). 
Points raised by interviewees were set off against contrasting accounts 
drawn from newspaper research and from other interviews, to explore 
inconsistencies and tensions within personal accounts and to "question 
the arguments that arise within a particular common sense" (Billig 
1988: 17). While in-depth interviewing is useful in eliciting the 
qualitative views of participants, it can be less useful in gathering 
reliable quantitative data. As far as possible, information was thus 
'cross-checked' with a number of different sources and with different 
perspectives on the same issues. 
The tensions between positions in the national conflict or on the 
question of national state sovereignty in the EU and the process of 
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North-South, regional integration into the EU are seen as raising sharp 
dilemmas and inconsistencies. Interview analysis was aimed at 
highlighting the process of reconciling - or avoiding - these dilemmas, 
using transcripts of interviews to contrast the ways in which consistency 
was constructed. As they struggle to maintain coherent accounts, 
political actors are seen as employing specific political arguments and 
ideological devices. These, is is argued, reflect the political logic of 
nationalism and expose how it is reproduced. In the process, it is 
suggested, political actors, both at the EU level and in Ireland, are forced 
to adapt their political positions, with significant implications for the 
national conflict. 
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Chapter 9 
Regionalist Consensus 
From the early 1990's a remarkably widespread consensus emerged 
amongst officials and politicians in EU institutions and amongst 
politicians in Northern Ireland on the need for more North-South 
economic cooperation as both parts of Ireland became more integrated 
in the SEM. Indeed this has now achieved the status of 'conventional 
wisdom', especially in the North. While many politicians - mostly 
unionist - are less enthusiastic than the business community, there is 
widespread acceptance of the necessity for improved North-South 
economic linkages in the context of broader moves in the UK and the 
Republic, towards greater economic integration in the EU. 
In stark contrast there are sharp disagreements over the extent of 
integration required, over the means of achieving it and over its 
possible political implications. These disagreements reflect wider 
national disputes, over whether Ireland should be redefined as a single 
island unit within the EU, or whether it should remain divided into 
two parts, with the North retaining its primarily British political 
orientation. These differences of opinion centre on the question of 
whether EU integration has any substantial impact on national state 
sovereignty and, by implication, on the conflict in Ireland, and are 
analysed in Chapter 10. 
But first, this Chapter examines the pressures towards consensus. 
Primarily using interview transcripts it outlines the regionalist 
consensus, highlighting its content and its limits. This is necessarily 
brief, as many of the arguments have been discussed in Section 3. Here 
the political positions of representatives from each party are outlined, 
focusing on the expected impact of the SEM and related proposals for a 
'one island economy', and on the institutional and political 
arrangements required to make it a reality. 
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To contextualise these positions, there is some discussion of the 
perspectives of the business communities and of EU Commission and 
Parliament officials on the question of improved North-South linkages. 
Generally, there was a greater consensus between business organisations 
and EU institutions than between politicians on the need to improve 
integration and to construct policies and institutions to bring it about. 
This pressure for improved North-South linkages intensified in the 
early 1990's as the Single Market neared completion. The political 
responses to these pressures are then analysed beginning with the most 
enthusiastic advocates of North-South regional integration. 
Business perspectives 
Amongst business representatives the economic problems in the North 
were generally seen as similar to the South's and as therefore requiring 
similar and preferably coordinated political responses. In fact, as was 
argued in Chapter 6, business representatives in the North appeared to 
be keener on cooperation than their counterparts in the South, largely 
because of the North's greater peripherality, in political as well as in 
economic terms. The dominant view was that the Northern Ireland 
had benefited less than the Republic from EU membership and that its 
interests had been downplayed or ignored by London when they 
conflicted with dominant interests in Britain. The Republic and the UK 
were often on opposite sides in EU debates but the North's economic 
interests were more usually coincided with the Republic's and there 
was concern that Northern interests are not actively represented by the 
UK government and that this was likely to be especially damaging to 
agricultural interests and small firms. 
The recent upsurge of business enthusiasm for integration, has been 
motivated by economic, not political concerns. Many of its business 
advocates stress that for it to succeed it must be kept separate from 
'politics'- according to Quigley (1992), "making a reality of the island 
economy is dependent on there being no political agendas, overt or 
hidden". The scope for increasing North-South trade was emphasised as 
the respective markets in Ireland were seen as particularly accessible for 
small Northern and Southern firms not already exporting to the UK or 
to the wider EU. But the Irish markets were small in EU terms, and the 
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potential benefits of building a common 'synergy' between economic 
forces, North and South, were seen as equally, if not more important. 
Some observers argued that any serious attempt at economic 
integration would have to address political issues - including the 
problem of ensuring accountability to two separate electorates in two 
separate states, and the inevitability of conflicts of interest between 
them, suggesting that integrating the two economies would require 
concerted political management and joint North-South institutions 
legitimised by democratic involvement (See Anderson 1994). Such 
political and institutional requirements unavoidably encroached on 
national sovereignty and on issues related to the national conflict. 
Consequently, they attracted the enthusiastic support of constitutional 
nationalists, North and South and encountered not only the predictable 
Ulster unionist opposition to anything that appeared to unify the 
island, but also, where the EU was involved, the opposition of British 
nationalists and of officials in the highly centralised British state. 
EU Commission and Parliament perspectives 
Interviewees in Brussels confirmed that an EU role in encouraging 
North-South integration faced political opposition - not least from 
British state nationalism. In the European Commission and the 
European Parliament there was considerable frustration that while the 
creation of a single Irish economy in the SEM was an "absolute 
imperative", there had been very little political movement towards it. 
There was great concern at the lack of coordinated plans and initiatives 
from the London and Dublin governments, while in European 
Parliament circles there was the further worry that divergencies in the 
national policies of the two governments were having the unintended 
effect of reinforcing North-South divisions in Ireland. 
From 1990, in response to the anticipated completion of the SEM, there 
had been been a significant increase in joint North-South initiatives by 
various business organisations, but as Commission officials pointed 
out, these had only had, at best, a symbolic impact. As far as Northern 
Ireland business was concerned, the Republic might as well be on the 
eastern fringes of the SEM - "somewhere east of Germany" and if left to 
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continue, such economic divisions would lead to a further 
deterioration in economic competitiveness - just at the time when 
markets, North and South, were being targeted by other EU businesses. 
Officials were particularly frustrated that they could do little to rectify 
this. The Commission could take the lead on initiatives aimed at 
increasing Northern Ireland's or the Republic's integration into the 
Single Market. But where they involved action to enhance North- 
South integration, their initiatives tended to be vetoed by one or other 
of the two governments - usually the UK - or stalled by the lack of 
regional government in both jurisdictions and related over- 
centralisation, particularly of any North-South, all-Ireland initiatives. 
While some civil service departments had a long history of cross-border 
contact, other organisations, including local authorities, had generally 
been excluded or circumscribed in what they could do and the two 
governments retained direct control, ostensibly for reasons related to 
security and the national conflict. 
There was considerable dismay within the Commission at the UK 
government's refusal to allow North-South coordination of EU 
agricultural policy, despite its repeated attempts at convincing the 
British government. Proposals to apply the same advantageous funding 
for agriculture in the North as in the Republic had been rejected on the 
grounds of maintaining 'equal treatment' for all UK regions, despite 
cross-community and cross-Party support for such measures in 
Northern Ireland. 
The EU had made an exception in granting the North favoured 
"Objective One" status for regional funding in 1988 largely out of a 
concern to treat it in the same way as the Republic. It was therefore 
particularly ironic that the British government was pressing for this 
status to be renewed in the 1994-9 spending round, at the same time as it 
was refusing to favour the North in how it distributed funds allocated 
to it under the CAP. But despite having the same funding status, which 
was renewed in 1994, there was no North-South coordination of EU 
funding regimes because, as a senior Commission official stated, this 
was judged to be "too political" and would have been blocked by the 
British representation in Brussels. 
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Meanwhile, Commission officials had to turn a blind eve to breaches of 
regulations agreed for the only substantive North-South funding 
programme, the INTERREG fund, which was established in 1990. As 
noted earlier, the two governments had failed to provide details on 
how the money would be split between the two jurisdictions, the only 
part of the EU where this was accepted by the Commission. The 
initiative was managed directly by intergovernmental - joint 
committees, empowered by decisions at the Maryfield secretariat of the 
AIA and composed of civil servants from North and South, with local 
substate representation signally absent, despite Commission regulations 
on 'partnership' and 'subsidiarity'. Not only were these cross-border 
committees somewhat removed from local border communities, they 
were also powerless on border issues that did not directly involve the 
spending of INTERREG funds. At one meeting for instance, a Dublin 
official had asked why the British Army was destroying road links 
across the border, which led to the embarrassed reply from a British 
official that this was a 'security' not an 'economic' matter and hence 
was beyond their terms of reference. 
As the British representation to COREPER in Brussels pointed out, in 
Northern Ireland, to a greater degree than elsewhere, the EU 
Commission could not to be seen to act politically. Consequently there 
was great pressure to define EU policies as technical or administrative 
tasks and to tie them as closely as possible with clearly identified local 
interests. The result was that while there was a clear need for initiatives 
to realise at least some of the enormous potential benefits of joint 
working, this was not forthcoming - in the words of one prominent 
Commission official - the two states had not shifted their policy stance 
"one iota". 
In the view of the Commission, policy shifts were desperately needed to 
'kick-start' the politico-economic dynamic of integration. In 1992 there 
was considerable disillusionment that two years after the much 
trumpeted meetings between CBI (NI) and the CII, and after 
investigations into possible areas of joint working, no substantive 
proposals to the Commission had been drawn up. Although the 
business community was making new demands on the politicians, 
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these had not materialised into concrete proposals that could be 
presented as deserving EU assistance. Some put this down to logistical 
or cultural difficulties leading to a lack of political will to jointly work 
up detailed North-South projects. Regrettably, the result was 
expenditure of structural funds on relatively low priority projects such 
as the Ballyconnell canal project or projects that treated the two 
economies in separation - such as the two electricity cables and the two 
gas pipelines across the Irish sea. 
If more appropriate projects, focused on integrating North and South 
had been put on the table, the Commission would have had no 
hesitation in releasing resources to fund them. Without more concerted 
lobbying by non-governmental organisations - community, women's, 
trade union, cultural and voluntary, as well as by business organisations 
- and without at least the acquiescence of the two governments', EU-led 
initiatives on North-South issues would lack the necessary legitimation 
and the Commission would be unable to act. The EU's "goodwill 
money" for Northern Ireland would continue to fail to address the 
central issues at a crucial period in Ireland's economic development, 
encouraging instead, a particularly negative form of "pork-barrel 
politics". 
Party positions 
Partly in response to pressures from business organisations, there was 
considerable agreement on the need for increased North-South 
economic cooperation amongst party political representatives. Most 
Northern politicians shared fears of peripheralisation in the SEM and 
were broadly in agreement that EU integration required a re-assessment 
of economic development policies for the North. 
Most enthusiastic were representatives from the SDLP. Like 
constitutional Nationalists in the South, the Party had for long seen EU- 
related convergence as furthering the objective of a politically united 
Ireland. Representatives argued that the urgent necessity for economic 
integration between North and South within the EU contradicted the 
logic of Unionism. This lent a particular significance to the common 
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ERDF designation for North and South and to the occasional joint 
SDLP-UUP-DUP delegations on EU-related issues. 
Representatives were convinced that integration into the EU changed 
the roots of the Irish-British relationship, transforming the nature of 
political conflict in Northern Ireland as Unionists were forced to adapt 
their anti-EU position, fearing that the SDLP would gain credibility as 
the only European party in Northern Ireland. As a result, Unionist 
politicians had been forced to participate in getting the 'best deal' for 
people in Northern Ireland, leading them to accept the definition of 
Ireland, North and South, as an economic region in the SEM, thus 
undermining the concept of Northern Ireland as a region in the UK. 
The Party leader emphasised this pressure to cooperate with the South, 
stressing "evolutionary process going on that is created by decisions like 
the removal of borders and by the fact that there is a CAP... farmers in 
the North were dying to meet Ray McSharry, before that they wouldn't 
have gone within a mile of him". He was critical of the two 
governments over the lack of cross border initiatives which, he argued, 
was primarily the fault of the Department of Finance in Dublin rather 
than of the Northern Ireland Office. The Southern state had its own 
separate priorities - money for the border regions was "money out of the 
public purse", whether it be taxation revenue or EU funds. In contrast 
with the two governments' disinterest in cross-border development, he 
emphasised that many of the border Councillors, Unionist and 
Nationalist, were "all into it because they know the reality - they live 
with real life... its just being practical.... at the end of the day that's what 
regionalism is all about". 
Similarly, Sinn Fein argued that the economy was becoming 
increasingly unified - pointing out that the demand for an all-Ireland 
framework for economic development had been Party policy for many 
years. It was recognised that economic shifts may eventually be reflected 
in a political shift to the all Ireland framework but interviewees 
emphasised that in the medium term the shift away from an unevenly 
developed island economy and the removal of border controls would 
have little impact on the day-to-day experiences of the nationalist 
community in Northern Ireland. Representatives were highly critical at 
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the Republic's apparent conversion to the idea, which was seen as an 
attempt to combine a 'safe' technocratic agenda with the nationalist 
agenda without incurring the wrath of Unionists, reflecting a 
widespread fear of social instability amongst politicians from the 26 
Counties. 
But like the SDLP, there was a degree of optimism that the need for 
North-South regional integration would bring political changes. Sinn 
Fein stressed that there was a very strong potential for North-South 
linkages, given pressures from the business community in the North 
and from the EU bureaucracy. These were not only consistent with 
nationalist aspirations, North and South, but also with the British 
strategy of normalising and stabilising politics in the partitioned 6 
County statlet. UK state policies at the EU level may have reflected 
British nationalist isolationism but 'on the ground' in Northern 
Ireland, where, they were designed to meet British counter insurgency 
priorities, they were focused on generating "a more positive picture of 
Northern Ireland... in terms of the 'feel good' factor". Hence, John 
Hume was presented with an "open door" whenever he argued the case 
for North-South cooperation in the Derry area for instance, "because it 
suits the policies of the NIO at this point in time". 
Sinn Fein therefore agreed with the SDLP that the Southern 
government was the main blockage to North-South integration. 
Representatives argued that although Unionist politicians were not 
enthusiastic supporters of improved cross border linkages, many, 
especially those based outside of Belfast, were not opposed to it on 
principle - "they might be - you know - reluctant - they may be fairly 
apathetic", but "they're definitely not blocking it - they haven't the 
power to - they can be quite disruptive and messy about it but they're 
certainly not the problem. " The real problem was the nature of 
Southern politics, as clientelism was focused on the Dublin metropole 
and politicians tended "to see things in terms of Dublin and the urban 
centre as opposed to for instance cross-border economic policies or 
matching funding" and therefore had "genuine problems about general 
commitment to our area" (ie - to Northern Ireland). 
317 
The Communist Party representative was also enthusiastic about 
North-South regional integration in the EU, but agreeing with Sinn 
Fein that the political implications of such integration should not be 
overplayed. The Party stressed the need to campaign against the EU's 
neo-liberal economic policies, as did the Workers' Party, whose 
Northern chair was considerably less enthusiastic about the political 
implications of North-South integration. The representative favoured 
improved North-South linkages, but not in a "trojan horse sense" and 
argued that "there has to be recognition of the very peripheral location 
and the very small region that we make up within the wider Europe" 
and emphasised the internal consequences of EU integration, in terms 
of building programmes, youth training schemes, and "cultural visits by 
young people from both sides of the community to European 
countries". 
Unionist politicians were generally sceptical of proposals for North- 
South institutions, viewing suggestions for such institutions either as 
nationalist-inspired or as naively foolhardy. Nonetheless, while widely 
criticised for a pre-occupation with constitutional politics, they generally 
acknowledged the necessity for some degree of economic co-operation 
with South in the context of the SEM. Rather than condemning the 
concept of North-South economic integration, Unionists tended to 
emphasise the lack of practical participation by the Southern state and 
the competition between North and South. Northern business 
enthusiasm for economic integration is explained in 'terms of a fear 
that the South will develop faster than the North. Meanwhile, 
Southern tardiness over issues such as joint tourist marketing and the 
Belfast-Dublin rail link, in contrast with its enthusiasm for developing 
the port of Dublin is put down to Southern disinterest in the North. 
This is interpreted as directly leading to wasted government funding on 
what are seen as symbolically significant North-South development 
projects - such as the Ballyconnell canal, which accounted for a large 
slice of the first tranche of INTERREG funds. 
It would be a mistake though, to play down the significant political 
shifts that have emerged on this issue within Unionist parties. Some 
leading members of the major Unionist party, the UUP were not 
opposed to cooperation with the South although there were concerns at 
318 
being "flooded" by Southern goods and taken over by larger Southern 
businesses. 
Indeed, the Alliance Party welcomed increased North-South 
integration. Its leader pointed out that "since Partition - there has been a 
lack of cooperation in the island which is quite strange in economic 
terms for a very small island on the periphery of Europe". The Party 
representative suggested that "there are a number of things which can 
helpfully be dealt with on the basis of the island of Ireland - things like 
agriculture the environment, energy requirements, transport 
infrastructure, crime - which do not respect borders - even in Ireland". 
Such common policies would, in his view, have to respect the existing 
competition between the two parts of Ireland, "because we have 
different interests", largely due to the differing business conditions, 
arguing "we are cooperators but we are still competitors. You know, 
kids in the same family are at the same time siblings and also rivals". 
In accordance with its 'liberal' unionist perspective, Alliance Party 
politicians argued that the South's constitutional commitment to unity, 
and consequent inability to recognise the Northern statelet, had been 
the main historical obstacle to North-South linkages. Substantial 
amendment of this constitutional claim was a necessary element in any 
cooperative arrangements. Further, he emphasised that despite a 
consensus on the need for North-South institutions at the Brooke talks, 
without a Northern Ireland assembly no agreement could be struck as 
there could be no basis for Northern participation in such institutions - 
except as appointees of the British government. 
The UUP representative was less enthusiastic and downplayed the need 
for North-South economic integration. While accepting the need for 
North-South cooperation - "we don't have a problem with maximum 
cooperation" - he argued that Northern Ireland's socio-economic 
orientation should be towards 'mainland' Britain and beyond. He 
emphasised that "our long term objective opportunities are getting 
more and more into mainland UK and getting beyond that - its not 
enough any more to get into mainland UK we need to get beyond that". 
He argued that the Northern Ireland government should more 
vigorously promote Northern industry, in competition with the South 
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- "we would all create 2000 jobs tomorrow if DANI and the IDB would 
get up off their backsides and expand the pig industry in Northern 
Ireland - instead of letting it all go South". Against this more traditional 
position, those more on the 'left' of the Party argued that EU integration 
threatened to place Northern Ireland on "the periphery of a periphery" 
and that there was an urgent need for Unionist politicians to be 
proactive in EU politics in resisting economic centralisation in the EU 
and if that involved joint working with the Republic then so be it. 
Even DUP representatives, traditionally more vehement in their 
opposition to links with the South, deplored the existing gap between 
Unionist politicians and business and were happy to accept an all- 
Ireland framework within the SEM "if that's what business wants". 
Representatives were willing to accept economic and social 
intervention by the EU, even if this led to integration with the 
Republic, as long as it remained at the economic and social level. Any 
suggestion of the EU having a political impact on Northern Ireland - 
rather than Northern Ireland participating in EU structures to get the 
most from Europe - was condemned as unwarranted meddling in the 
political affairs of Northern Ireland. 
DUP politicians consequently tended to distinguish between North- 
South measures that were ad hoc and measures that were defined as 
having wider implications. Initiatives designed to meet a particular 
objective, such as the borders programme; the proposal for a Belfast- 
Dublin economic corridor; or funding for community relations work, 
were accepted "pragmatically" by the Party. Similarly, the Party was 
happy for business to deal across the border and to develop its interests 
outside Northern Ireland and had "no problem" with a European or 
Irish framework for private industry - "we are not at all opposed to the 
EC creating an easier market place... businessmen must be free to make 
whatever decisions they like". 
Broader measures which were felt to have "political implications" - 
such as those proposed by Sir George Quigley - were opposed. 
Representatives were "opposed to anything which has political 
undertones - or which is sort of intended for political consumption". 
They were happy for the EU to work towards greater economic and 
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social integration between North and South - but only as part of its 
wider process of integrating the European economy. They would not 
tolerate any extension of this economic and social integration into the 
political realm and resisted any broad brush assessments of Northern 
Ireland as part of the Irish economy - for instance - as implied in 
Quigley's proposal for an all-Ireland EU spending programme. 
In terms of general political strategy, UUP and DUP representatives 
tended to see two options, the first was to be cautious, avoiding any 
form of North-South political initiative as long as the Republic retained 
a constitutional claim on the North - until "the relationship is 
normalised". The second was to accept political involvement in non- 
political North-South affairs, on the basis of mutual benefit. 
Representatives saw themselves as steering a middle course between 
these two. The DUP, for instance, would argue "for what is in the best 
interests of our people and the South will do the same", and would 
work with the South pragmatically - "if those interests coincide we will 
use that and work with them". But it would not therefore agree to the 
creation of more permanent North-South structures to manage 
cooperation - "we do not then say 'well, the logical outcome is that you 
lump us all in together as one"'. 
Chapter Conclusions 
A remarkable consensus had emerged between politicians in Northern 
Ireland and EU officials and politicians in Brussels on the need for 
much more cooperation between North and South in response to the 
challenges of the SEM. By the early 1990's the process of EU integration 
was beginning to legitimise the concept of the 'one island economy', as 
a central component of socio-economic development in Ireland. 
But practical progress on economic integration had been hampered by 
the divergent policies of the two states and by political divisions 
associated with the national conflict. The next Chapter explores these 
divisions, focusing on tensions between the general consensus on the 
need for greater North-South economic integration in the EU and 
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general disagreements over the impact of EU integration on states 
sovereignties and on the national conflict. 
;,, 
Chapter 10 
Nationalist Divergence 
Political disagreement between interviewees on the political 
implications of EU integration contrasted with the broad consensus on 
the issue of regional integration in Ireland. This Chapter outlines these 
disagreements, first focusing on differences of opinion over the nature 
of EU integration, its impact on national state sovereignty, and then 
over whether EU integration had any significant implications for the 
national conflict. 
The various political actors interviewed expressed a variety of opinions 
on the impact of EU integration on states and nationalisms. These 
opinions were loosely paralleled by a range of perspectives on the 
impact of EU integration on Ireland's national conflict. These opinions 
can be related to the theoretical discussions presented in Chapter 2 on 
the role of state in international politics, suggesting that political actors 
draw on a range of "ideological repertoires" to construct versions of the 
EU and of its impact on the conflict that are consistent with their 
existing political roles or positions in the conflict (Potter and Wetherell 
1992). 
As with Chapter 9, the various strands of opinion that are highlighted 
here are not 'party political positions' as such, nor are they mutually 
exclusive. Representatives and officials may draw on more than one 
interpretation and may employ different and contradictory arguments, 
whether intentionally or for self-serving or opportunistic reasons, or as 
a result of unintentional incoherence. Indeed, given the degree to 
which political discourses associated with regional EU integration 
conflict with and disrupt national political discourses, consistency is 
perhaps the last thing which should be assumed. 
Interpretations of state sovereignty and regional politics in the ELI 
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In attempting to offer an account of the impact of EU integration, party 
politicians and EU officials construct positions that are consistent with 
the presumed aspirations of 'their' national community, or in the case 
of EU officials, with their organisational priorities, which in the case of 
Commission officials, commit them to work towards an "ever closer 
union". This, it is argued, serves both to adapt and reproduce their 
existing political positions. 
Interviewees go to some lengths to make their position consistent with 
a wider interpretation of the impact of EU integration on states and 
nationalisms. In doing so, they draw on broader political perspectives 
on international politics and the positions reflect a theoretical strands in 
international relations literature, suggesting that theoretical debates 
have some - perhaps considerable - impact in shaping, as well as 
reflecting the various discourses of participants in the conflict and at the 
EU level. 
A number of general orientations are outlined. These are discussed 
beginning with those most opposed to changes in the role of states, who 
reject EU membership and favour a 'Europe of independent states'; 
followed by discussion of the more positive, Gaullist-type perspectives 
of a 'Europe of states in the EU; of the largely sceptical views of those 
arguing that the EU constitutes a 'capitalist bloc'; of the more positive 
'Euro-federalist' perspectives; and finally, of the Euro-enthusiast, 
'Europe of the regions' perspectives. Party-political, personal and official 
positions as outlined by representatives in interviews, match these 
general orientations, although there is considerable overlap - which is 
in itself significant. 
A Europe of independent States 
This perspective on EU integration emphasises the importance of 
'traditional' state sovereignty and the need to resist any encroachments 
on it. It attracts those advocating withdrawal from the EU or 
renegotiation of EU treaties, so as to restore 'proper' authority to the 
state. There were various views on why the power of national states 
was deemed to be so important, whether as the expression of democratic 
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priorities or as the guarantor of security, but the overriding priority was 
to preserve or restore it intact. 
This perspective reflects elements of the traditional 'realist' approach to 
international relations. As noted in Chapter 2, this stresses the role that 
states play in maintaining domestic 'order' and emphasises the 
anarchical 'state of nature' at the international `level' and the need to 
maintain an 'international order' founded on balances of power 
between sovereign states. Such an international society of states is not 
only seen as presenting a true picture of the international system; more 
significantly, it is seen as the picture to be prefered, as it is only in the 
rational pursuit of states' interests that international order is 
guarantied. This prescriptive element to the 'realist' perspective is 
reflected in the rhetoric of its advocates. 
The political actors adopting such a position fell into two broad 
categories - loyalist and republican. Loyalists adopted this position as a 
means of maintaining the status quo: the DUP for instance, welcomed 
Denmark's rejection of Maastricht, seeing the EU as a threat to UK 
sovereignty and a potential vehicle for Irish unity "by the back door". 
The Party argued that the UK should leave the EU, while remaining 
part of the customs union and representatives criticised EU 
interference, not just in the political affairs of Northern Ireland, but also 
in the economic affairs of the UK - for instance arguing that the UK 
government should be free to support Northern industry at the same 
levels of support as prevail in non-EU states such as South Korea and 
Taiwan. 
Party representatives stressed the role of states and the importance of 
territorial sovereignty, condemning any public funding or political role 
for independent organisations such as the Northern Ireland Centre in 
Europe, arguing that "you cannot have a situation in Europe where you 
have a region of a country - you know - where the UK is speaking for it 
in the Council of Ministers but there's another government sitting 
round at the Council of Ministers who also speaks for it - either we're a 
region of the UK or we're not... ". Representatives stressed loyalty to the 
British 'Crown' and argued that "every nation should retain its 
powers", emphasising the importance of 'national' politics as the basis 
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for democratic accountability. Consequently, the European Parliament 
was seen as an artificial conglomeration of national and regional 
interests and the idea that it could become the basis for a new EU 
political accountability was dismissed. 
In contrast, the second, Republican variant to this perspective was 
committed to democratic 'national' statehood as a means of 
overthrowing the constitutional status quo. Sinn Fein and Irish 
Communist Party representatives argued that 'national' sovereignty 
should be preserved as a means of maintaining democratic rights in 
Ireland. Thus, both parties campaigned for the Republic's withdrawal 
from the EU, and for the withdrawal of Ireland as a whole in the event 
of Irish unity - although, for Sinn Fein, this position was increasingly 
superseded by a more positive approach. 
Sinn Fein was traditionally hostile to the process of integration at the 
EU level as the Party's anti-imperialist line was combined with a 
concern to preserve the national sovereignty of the Republic - and of a 
future all-Ireland state. Its representative acknowledged that despite 
some adaptation of the Party's position in the 1990's, the objective of 
achieving national sovereignty remained a central demand which 
could not easily be deleted from the Sinn Fein programme. As the CPI 
representative put it "the whole concept of the EU" had to be opposed 
in order to preserve "the sovereign powers of our internal economic 
development". 
A Europe of States in the EU 
In contra-distinction with the argument that states should withdraw 
from the EU in order to maintain their sovereignty, there was a, 
perhaps more sophisticated, perspective which argued that states should 
retain membership of such organisations as they expressed and 
extended state sovereignty. According to this version of EU integration, 
states can and should control the process of integration, thus enhancing 
their international profile and increasing their influence over 
transnational, particularly economic, forces. This interpretation reflects 
the 'neo-realist' perspective on international relations, as international 
organisation is seen as primarily intergovernmental, stimulating inter- 
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rather than transnational integration and in the process, strengthening 
rather than weakening state sovereignty. 
Some Commission officials subscribed to this view - albeit regretfully. If 
the EU was to overcome the divisions generated by national 
sovereignty then it had to address the issue of how to transform 
national identities, particularly when its attempts at increased 
integration appeared to have stimulated nationalist reaction, rather 
than leading to the emergence of an EU identity. It was suggested that 
perhaps the EU had approached the whole question of integration in 
the wrong way - by choosing the intergovernmental approach and 
linking it to functionalism rather than attempting to directly address 
the 'high' politics of sovereignty and nationhood that still dominated 
EU states - especially Britain. Prominent representatives in the 
European Parliament from the British Conservative Party were more 
enthusiastic advocates of this version - arguing that while the EU had 
encouraged cooperation, influenced forms of political debate and 
changed forms of political expression, this process was firmly in the 
hands of the member states. 
In Northern Ireland meanwhile, the UUP was most clearly in support 
of this position, and were joined, to a differing degree and for different 
reasons, by some DUP, Alliance Party and Workers' Party 
representatives. UUP representatives favoured integration at the EU 
level, as long as the powers of individual states were defended. They 
were concerned to maintain links with the global economy through the 
UK and, as far as possible, to delink Northern Ireland from the 
Republic. The Party tended to take a British nationalist, 'integrationist' 
approach to 'national' politics in the North and reflecting this, some 
representatives were actively hostile to the Northern Ireland Centre in 
Europe - seeing it as anti-democratic and anti-constitutional. Formally 
the UUP position was that all contact with the EU should be through 
the NIO or through the MEPs, but in practice the Party worked with the 
Centre on day-to-day issues. 
On the question of economic integration with the South, then, it was 
argued that "its not enough any more to get into mainland UK, we.. 
need to get beyond that. I certainly don't believe for one moment -I 
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think it's a fallacy - that just because we have a similar market and that 
the South would want to increase their exports across the border". More 
extensive, government-led cooperation with the Republic would be 
dependent upon the creation of a Northern assembly - "if we had a 
regional assembly here and if we had a permanent representation from 
that assembly in Brussels I think that we would obtain more and get 
more and achieve a heck of a lot". 
Some DUP representatives also, in practice, adopted this perspective. 
Despite the Party's anti-EU rhetoric, representatives tended to take the 
existence of the EU as a political given and argued for a strengthening of 
Westminster's role in debating and overseeing the passage of EU 
legislation. This was seen as a means of correcting the 'democratic 
deficit' at the EU level, allowing for more debate of EU related issues in 
the existing national assemblies, prior to decisions being taken in the 
Council of Ministers. This fall-back, compromise, position on the EU 
emphasised the role of national states at the EU level and was aimed at 
copper-fastening a clearly defined division of responsibilities which 
would ensure that only UK ministers and officials would be 
representing Northern Ireland at the EU level - as one representative 
argued - "as far as the treaties are concerned, you can't be a hybrid, 
you're either one thing or the other". 
The Alliance Party also, in practice, adopted this approach. The EU was 
seen as having, regrettably, a minimal impact on the politics of 
Northern Ireland - as one leading Party official mentioned - the EU 
could bring about a swing from the DUP to the UUP in a North Antrim 
Council by-election when, by insisting that it should not open on a 
Sunday, the DUP had threatened EU funding for a local heritage centre. 
But beyond that, it had little impact on the substance of Northern 
Ireland politics. 
Consistent with the Party's liberal Unionist position, its leader argued 
that the regionalist context for EU politics was underdeveloped and as 
yet, had little impact in Northern Ireland - "there has been a failure to 
address the question of European Union... so, in so far as it hasn't 
succeeded in Northern Ireland, it hasn't succeeded because it hasn't 
addressed the political question at the European level". In any event, 
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even if there was increased regionalisation in the EU, regional identity 
would not offer a solution as in Ireland there was no congruence 
between 'nation' and 'region', unlike in most EU regions, such as in 
Scotland and Wales. 
Similarly, the Workers' Party representative stressed the continuing 
primacy of national political issues - arguing that the process of EU 
integration had "been far too much related to the economy and hasn't 
been matched by corresponding developments in the social and cultural 
areas". The Party condemned the SDLP proposals for a North-South 
Commission wielding executive power with EU participation as "the 
point is to create more democracy within Northern Ireland - not less". 
The representative was not opposed to EU integration, arguing that 
"there is certainly a lot to be gained from this idea of a common 
European home and the development of a greater Europe and so on", 
but like the Alliance, argued that this was at most a dim hope. 
A capitalist bloc 
In contrast with the perspective which stresses the importance of states, 
there is a further general political configuration that focuses on the 
economic and social impact of EU integration, endorsing or rejecting it 
according to the degree to which it meets broadly defined social or 
socialist objectives. The EU is defined as a capitalist bloc, to be 
condemned if it is seen as undermining more progressive nationally 
orientated political blocs, or to be critically embraced if it offers 
possibility of superseding less progressive national policies. If favoured, 
EU integration is seen as a means to an end, rather than as an end in 
itself as for federalists and for Euro-regionalists. The question of 
whether there should be greater EU integration then, is not a question 
of principle, but one that is shaped by the prevailing political 
circumstances. 
Like the other, statist perspectives, this approach is broadly consistent 
with a theoretical 'paradigm' in international relations - in this case, 
Marxist-influenced approaches, particularly the Gramscian approach. It 
emphasises the importance of economic power in shaping patterns of 
political authority and hence focuses on the structures of capitalist 
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hegemony and on the means to secure their overthrow or 
transformation. 
In Northern Ireland this was a strong theme in the rhetoric of two of 
the three avowedly socialist parties - namely, the Sinn Fein and the 
Irish Communist Party. As was noted in Chapter 7, Sinn Fein's 
position on the question of EU integration was in flux in the early 
1990's. Its opposition to Maastricht Treaty was founded on the view that 
the EU was a "rich men's club" in which, there was no room for 
democratic structures. With the possible democratisation of EU 
structures and the emergence of less neo-liberal EU policies, such as the 
social charter and other policies aimed at maximising social cohesion, 
Sinn Fein's attitude to the EU had begun to soften. Post-Maastricht the 
Party was seeking "to form democratic alliances" with similarly 
minded, anti-imperialist parties and movements across the EU. The 
Party saw itself as participating in debates about the EU to "become part 
of a whole political discourse that may for instance be part of the debate 
on socialising if you like the whole kind of EC programme as it affects 
Ireland". 
By way of contrast, the Communist Party of Ireland representative 
remained firmly opposed to the process of EU integration, primarily 
because of its neo-liberal policy agenda and - at least partly the cause of 
this - its lack of democratic accountability. Consequently the Party 
focused its campaigning against what it (rightly) saw as EU-related 
privatisation programmes in Ireland, North and South - the 
privatisation of Northern Ireland water and electricity being an example 
- and against EU-induced deflationary policies, particularly in the South. 
A federal Europe 
The federal perspective, in contrast to Marxist-influenced position, 
emphasises the need to create a pan-EU government that would 
exercise sovereignty in the name of its members or in the name of a 
strengthened European Parliament and advocates the eventual 
construction of an EU federal or confederal state, building on the 
common interests of the individual sovereign states. This perspective 
draws on strands of the 'liberal' tradition of international relations 
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theory which see the formation of a single federal or con-federal entity, 
encompassing the member states of the EU, as a prelude to world 
government. The 'functionalist' variant of this approach stresses the 
role of economic and social integration in the EU as building the 
foundations for a deeper, cultural and political, federal unity between 
the states of the European Union. Political action by the member states - 
according to the 'neo-functionalist' variant - would hasten this 
transition to a European federal or con-federal state, which would 
express the collective sovereignties of its members. 
Amongst Northern Ireland political Parties the federalist or 
'functionalist' perspective was not especially popular as it was generally 
seen as leading to the creation of an over-centralised EU 'super-state': 
the adapted, federalist-influenced perspective, favouring a 'Europe of 
the regions' (see below), was the much prefered option amongst the 
more Euro-phile politicians in Northern Ireland. 
Amongst officials and representatives of EU institutions variants of the 
federalist perspective were a strong, if not dominant, theme. 
Commission representatives stressed that the EU was in the first 
instance, an inter-governmental institution. Issues such as the 
exclusion of Northern Ireland from access to the Cohesion fund were 
seen as a symptom of this domination of the EU by trade-offs between 
member states - in this case, between less developed Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and the Republic of Ireland and the rest of the EU. 
But in proposing legislation and then in implementing it after adoption 
by the Council of Ministers, the Commission could claim to have 
considerable political power and senior Commission officials - for 
instance those in the President's Cabinet - did not see themselves as 
simply servicing the needs of member states. As part of the only body 
with the power to define and implement EU-wide policies, they 
prefered, instead, to see themselves as bearers of the integration process 
-a role defined by Treaty of Rome. According to this quasi-federalist 
interpretation of EU politics, the Commission policy-making process 
encouraged an active interaction between the interests of member 
states, political groupings in the EP and budgetary gatekeepers in the 
Commission administrative structure. 
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Officials stressed that the Commission did not simply take its political 
'steer' from COREPER, but internally, from its own dynamic: the 
proposals for instance of a socialist Commission head would be adapted 
and shifted - not watered down - but enhanced, by the internal 
Commission decision making process. Issues that are defined by any of 
the parties to the decision-making structure as "politically sensitive", 
would be avoided and EU policies would follow the lines of least 
resistance, leaving whole swathes of EU, political life (including 
Ireland's national conflict), relatively untouched. Nonetheless, 
common interests were invariably identified and it was the 
Commission that defined the content of the resulting common policies 
in what was de facto, a confederal policy making framework. 
Officials from the European Parliament also highlighted this relatively 
independent institutional dynamic at the broader EU level, that 
included the various EU institutions as well as the Commission and 
emphasised the tensions in the process of formulating of EU-wide 
policies, between the various institutions of the Union which in many 
senses were seen as acting against each other. On issues related to 
Ireland's national conflict, for instance, the Parliament had taken the 
most active approach, defining the conflict as an area of legitimate EU 
concern. In contrast, the state-dominated European Political 
Cooperation, the Council of Ministers and that European Council had 
tended to respect the British argument that the conflict was an internal 
UK matter in which the Republic may have had a legitimate interest, 
but on terms defined by the UK - not by the EU. The Commission 
meanwhile, was seen as charting out an EU-wide, quasi-federal 
framework for the conflict, often in alliance with the Parliament, with 
more or less direct implications for the conflict according to the area of 
policy. 
This sense of an alternative, quasi-federal context or framework for 
politics offered EU politicians and officials from each of the institutions 
a common reference point which could be used to gloss over the lack of 
any direct role in the national conflict. In more ideological terms, this 
account was sufficiently flexible to allow some to argue that such a 
framework was built on the mutual security and confidence that 
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politicians felt at the EU level - as their 'national' jurisdictions were 
unquestioned and indeed cemented by EU institutions. This viewpoint 
rejected the assumption that integration and cooperation would lead to 
a whittling away of the state - rather, it was suggested that integration 
was institutionalising and stabilising current arrangements, and that 
rather than taking sovereignty out of the situation, it was building on 
existing sovereign relations. The EU, it was argued, did not answer the 
national question; nor simply rephrase it; it asked a new question 
altogether. In this strongly 'neo-functionalist' interpretation, it was 
argued that this would eventually build the EU into a federation that by 
necessity would be a federation of regions - due to the logic of non- 
national economic development - not due to the political idealism of 
Euro-enthusiasts. 
A Europe of the regions 
In this prescription for EU politics, inter-state rivalries are defined out 
of existence, not by constructing a new EU super-state, as in the 
federalist version, but by removing the concept of sovereign statehood 
from EU politics. States are not only superseded by the emergence of 
more powerful institutions at the EU level, they are also undermined 
by the strengthening of sub-state regional or local institutions. This 
erosion 'from above and below' is seen as the dominant tendency in EU 
politics and is embodied in the concept of a 'Europe of the regions', 
which in some respects has become a campaigning slogan for its 
advocates. 
Like the 'federalist' interpretation, this approach also broadly reflects 
the functionalist approach in international relations theory. 
Nationalism is seen as as having lost out to regionalism, in both its 
'macro' and its 'micro' forms and state institutions are seen as 
outmoded in an increasingly interdependent world. Hence, the process 
of inter- or trans-state integration and the regionalisation that it 
generates, are, by definition, preferable to the maintenance of 'national' 
or state sovereignties. 
In Northern Ireland this position is advocated by two political parties, 
most enthusiastically by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
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and especially its leader - John Hume. He was a "strong believer in the 
Europe of the Regions" and stressed the impact of EU integration on 
state sovereignty, arguing that, "we have moved on from the nation- 
state, from independence into interdependence. " The implication was 
that "in keeping with what I have said about the nation-state having 
outlived its usefulness -I don't see Europe as a group of nation states - 
centralisation represented by the capital cities of the nation states is over 
and there has been a much greater regionalisation". 
In contrast with for instance, the DUP, the SDLP leader argued that 
"parliamentary democracies are outdated" as they had "not evolved 
with society" and in outlining the concept of regionalism he suggested 
that "for the people on the ground now there is universal education, 
they have the capability and the leadership to deal with their own 
affairs, if they are given the authority to do so". This required autonomy 
at the most local level - "because the real wealth, we tend to forget this, 
of any country, is its people and the harnessing of its people. That's best 
done closer to the ground". Further, he argued that since the early 
1980's SDLP policy initiatives had been based on this conviction. In 
April 1983, for instance, the party had argued for a three-part 
institutional framework, "in keeping with the European model", 
including an intergovernmental council, an Anglo-Irish secretariate 
and an Anglo-Irish parliamentary tier - later mirrored in the structures 
established under the AIA. 
The Alliance Party too, favoured a 'Europe of the regions', arguing that 
regionalism would come to supersede nationalism in the EU. In its 
leader's view, Northern Ireland needed to develop an autonomous 
regional administration as an absolute priority if it was not to be 
excluded from the benefits of the Single Market - there had to be a 
"recognition that unless you get the people of Northern Ireland to take 
some responsibility as a region with a regional administration like the 
Lander, like the Spanish and so on, if Northern Ireland doesn't have 
that possibility, its in deep trouble - it just becomes an absolute 
backwater". His personal ideal was that "over a considerable period of 
time we would move to a situation where Europe is not a Europe of 
nation-states, but is a Europe of the regions in which Northern Ireland 
is a region and has a regional identity". 
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Some EU Commission representatives also adopted this perspective, 
stressing that the sub-state regional dimension was emerging as the 
corollary of the supra-state EU dimension in post-1992 and post- 
Maastricht politics. The momentum towards economic and social 
harmonisation, begun under the SEA, was seen as driving forward the 
more political dimensions of integration. For some European 
Parliament officials the Maastricht Treaty was a side-show to the main 
attraction which involved the autonomous development of sub-state 
regions and of EU institutions in the EU political economy. Some 
Commission officials agreed, also stressing the inexorable and 
irreversible emergence of the 'regional dimension' in EU politics - 
arguing for instance, that the soon-to-be established "Committee of the 
Regions" would very quickly gain an overarching political profile in EU 
politics. 
Overall, political parties in Northern Ireland and officials and 
representatives in Brussels interpreted the development of the EU in 
the light of their particular political positions. In doing so, they 
constructed versions of the EU that drew on strands of international 
relations theory, enabling them to maintain ideological stability in the 
face of rapid, perhaps transformative changes in EU politics. These 
various positions helped political actors in developing a consistent and 
coherent response to the question of whether EU integration was 
having any discernable impact on the national conflict, and if so, in 
what way. These perspectives are discussed in the following sub-section. 
Interpretations of the impact EU integration on the national conflict 
Just as the various positions taken on the nature of EU integration 
reflected the political actors' attitudes to 'national' state sovereignty, so 
their arguments on the impact of EU integration reflected their 
positions in the conflict. Again, several sets of arguments and counter- 
arguments were elaborated in the interviews. Most popular, were 
arguments that the politics of regional development and the politics of 
'national' sovereignty could be separated. Alternatively, there were 
other arguments which saw the implications of the SEM and European 
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integration in terms of a triumph for Irish nationalism or, less 
convincingly, for Northern Ireland Unionism. Less divisive were 
suggestions that cooperation on economic matters in the SEM would 
necessitate political cooperation, increasing the areas of common 
interest between the contending national groupings, thereby deflating 
conflicts between them. According to this approach, Nationalist or 
Unionist triumphalism was the problem and European integration was 
the solution. Finally, the most hopeful or idealistic argument was that 
national states, and along with them, the national conflict in Ireland, 
would be superseded in a 'Europe of the Regions'. Again, these stands 
of opinion are not party political or official positions, and interviewees 
often spoke in a 'personal' capacity, and drew on a variety of 
viewpoints. 
Separating regionalism and nationalism - No impact 
Among the strongest expressions of the dichotomy between regional 
economics and national politics were arguments which, for a variety of 
reasons, sought to ignore or deny causal interrelationships - thus 
separating 'non-political' socio-economic issues, defined in an all- 
Ireland regional framework, from the politics of the national conflict. 
As was pointed out in Chapter 6, in discussing the opinions of 
representatives from trade unions and from the business community, 
the separation of the politics of regional, North-South economic 
integration from the politics of national conflict, allowed leaders on 
both sides of industry to adopt a 'non-political' posture, minimising the 
risks of provoking political disagreement . within their own 
constituencies and beyond. 
EU officials were also under pressure to sidestep the 'national question' 
and present EU policy-making as a technical rather than a political 
process. They generally agreed that issues of national identity, 
particularly in Northern Ireland, appeared to have been unaffected by 
the EU, and some felt that the wrong approach may have been adopted. 
Rather than relying mainly on a strategy of intergovernmentalism 
linked to functional cooperation on 'bread and butter issues', the 
Commission should have directly addressed the 'high politics' of 
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national identity and state sovereignty which still dominated the 
politics of European states, especially in Britain and Ireland. 
This was also reflected in the position of the British representation in 
Brussels, although for different reasons. Issues of North-South 
cooperation were largely separated from the logic of conflict: 
cooperation in Ireland was motivated by a concern to resist the threats 
posed by the SEM and was founded on insecurity and fear of isolation in 
the market of 320 million, not by a concern to resolve the conflict. The 
EU did not affect the central issue of contested sovereignty, nor did it 
define "non political" middle ground between contending parties, in 
his opinion it simply mapped out new areas of possible cooperation and 
joint action. Some in the Commission agreed, arguing that the EU 
could not solve the conflict because it was still basically an 
intergovernmental grouping of national states, each jealously 
protective of its own sovereignty. 
Amongst politicians in Northern Ireland this was primarily a Unionist 
argument as it permitted support for economic integration apparently 
without having to shift political ground on the national question. For 
the 'hard-line' unionists in the DUP, pragmatic support for cross-border 
economic initiatives could be combined with repeated demands to 'seal 
the border' for security reasons. One DUP spokesman went so far as to 
describe the joint submissions of nationalist and unionist MEP's, not 
simply as pragmatic attempts to get resources for the North, but as 
cynical attempts at deceiving officials into believing that they were 
helping to bridge sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland. 
Given the political aspirations of nationalists, North-South linkages 
would always have to remain 'low-key' and primarily technical rather 
than political. As one DUP representative argued - "it just comes down 
to the basic situation that we're either a region of the UK - or we're 
not", clarifying that "we would, our Party would, certainly would be 
very, very opposed to anything that dilutes Northern Ireland's status as 
a region of the UK, in Europe". Unlike for instance, between France and 
Germany, where links could be seen in purely economic terms, "in the 
Irish context any links between North and South... inevitably have 
political implications... in many cases, rightly so". 
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The UUP agreed, although representatives were generally more aware 
of the potential benefits of joint working on a North-South basis. One 
UUP spokesman went so far as to accept that Northern Ireland's 
farmers and industrialists would be better off economically in a united 
Ireland, but qualified his own statement with the observation that 
"man does not live by bread alone" and that national identity was of 
over-riding importance. Although farmers and industrialists may 
benefit from a united Ireland, they would still vote for the Union. 
Meanwhile, the UUP MEP argued that North-South cooperation could 
never be properly progressed until the political conflict had been 
resolved - "if we were able to get to a new position of understanding... 
then maximum cooperation would be a whole lot more easy". 
For the leader of the Alliance Party the dichotomy lay in the contrast 
between "irrational and primitive" nationalism and rational economic 
behaviour. He dismissed the idea that the latter automatically 
influenced the former - arguing that the "real" problem in Northern 
Ireland was the lack of democratic institutions - that keep "normal" 
politics off the agenda and restrict politicians to oppositionalism rather 
than responsibility. Only once these issues had been directly addressed 
would the EU have any prospect of a role in the conflict. 
The Party's former leader, now a Fine Gael MEP for a Southern 
Constituency, distinguished three "levels" to the conflict - local, 
national and European - and argued that each had an impact on the 
other, but problems specific to each level should be directly dealt with at 
that level: any attempt to deal with them indirectly would exacerbate 
the problem. The EU generated a "politics of the head" which was fairly 
independent of the "politics of the heart", and as it was the latter which 
dominated in the national conflict, it could have little impact on it. 
Instead of having resolving the conflict 'on the ground' in Northern 
Ireland, the EU dimension simply replicated it at the EU level - with the 
SDLP seeking recognition for Northern Ireland as a region of Ireland 
and Unionists defending its status as a region of the UK - thus leaving 
little room for its more positive impacts. Thus EU-related issues should 
be kept firmly separate from primarily internal political conflicts in 
Northern Ireland and vice versa. 
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If some Unionists expressed hostility towards EU integration because 
they feared that it might lead to a united Ireland, Sinn Fein 
spokespersons expressed hostility for the opposite reasons. In their view 
the EU could have very little effect on the main cause of the national 
conflict, defined as "British occupation of Irish territory". There was a 
conviction that, regardless of EU developments, as long as Britain was 
in occupation of Northern Ireland, the nationalist and republican 
community would still be harassed in their own streets by British 
soldiers. The EU was seen as undermining the Republic's neutrality, 
forcing it into a pro-EU, pro-US position, severing its links with other 
post-colonial states while in the North, the EU-inspired AIA was seen 
as legitimising increased anti-Republican repression. As for the future, 
representatives feared that increased peripherality in the EU and 
associated increases in unemployment and further reductions in wage 
levels would be most sharply felt in the nationalist community. Those 
advocating a "Europe of the Regions" were criticised for failing even to 
notice Partition, as were the Dublin-based technocratic nationalists, who 
were seen as apologists for the Republic's failure to act on behalf of the 
Northern nationalist community. 
The Irish Communist Party also defined the problem as Britain's 
underwriting of Ireland's partition and argued against any reliance on 
the EU to provide an automatic solution. The Workers' Party 
representative agreed - but differed in arguing that the central problem 
was not the British presence or the lack of North-South integration but 
the political conflict between nationalists and unionists in Northern 
Ireland - focused on working class communities largely untouched by 
the process of EU integration. Just as all-Ireland sporting activities, in 
sports dominated by the middle classes, could exist side-by side with 
national conflict, so North-South economic integration could develop 
in relative separation from the central issues of the conflict. 
For the Workers' Party, the changing position of unionist parties on 
North-South issues was seen as largely insignificant - stemming from 
business pressures and reflecting "an attempt to protect themselves 
from this criticism that they are obstructionist... they are very conscious 
of criticism of unionism as backward and uncompromising". The 
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mistake would be then to assume that this influenced the conflict, as 
such North-South integration "doesn't address the fundamental 
political divisions that exist within Northern Ireland", in fact it may 
have exacerbated them, as those advocating integration were seen as 
attempting to "rehash old nationalist arguments". 
There was something to these various arguments, but many of the 
politicians and interest groups involved, whether in Belfast or Brussels 
(or for that matter in London or Dublin),, were relying on a false 
distinction between 'the economic' and 'the political', or between 
'rational' and 'primitive' -a sharp separation, constructing a duality 
between the processes of regional development or integration and what 
were deemed 'political' issues such as state sovereignty and national 
identity. Certainly some believed that a sharp distinction existed while 
others clearly used it as a means of insulating themselves from political 
controversy. 
Nationalism triumphs 
In contrast with this interpretation, some MEPs and Commission 
officials argued that EU integration would encourage Irish unity. It was 
argued that regionalist politics heightened a sense of shared 
peripherality in Ireland as a whole, thus eroding the administrative 
power of London. A reduction in the social and economic meaning of 
the border would lead to a whittling away of the socio-economic 
foundations of Protestant and unionist ascendancy in the North, 
gradually diminishing the significance of 'the Union' for people in the 
North. In having to concede that economic and social integration was 
necessary, Unionists would then become less and less able to defend 
their political position on economic or social grounds. In this scenario 
the EU was expected to further undermine the social base of unionism, 
paving the way for a political reunification of Ireland. 
Some politicians in the North - particularly some constitutional 
Nationalists - agreed. Some representatives of the SDLP argued that EU 
integration was undermining the traditional definition of Northern 
Ireland as a region of the UK and was making the unionist political 
position untenable. As EU integration deepened, the contradictions 
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between, on the one hand maintaining existing links with Britain and, 
on the other hand, the pursuit of Northern Ireland's economic interests 
would intensify, forcing realignments in Unionist politics. 
The Communist Party saw great promise in the prospect of deepened 
economic links with the Republic, arguing that "at this point in time 
that is one of the most fruitful things... because the one island economy 
will have its political results". For the CPI unionism was founded on an 
alliance that included "the landed aristocracy - basically the ascendancy, 
businessmen, workers - the slogan was 'there'd be grass in the shipyards 
if you get home rule' and the farmers - 'well your markets in the British 
empire - how are you going to get your goods sold? ' - and this was the 
economic reality that was built into the political force that created the 
conditions for Partition to be established". The party argued that the 
material base of unionism had been undermined by the reversal of 
'uneven development' between what was previously an industrially 
ascendant North and a 'rural' South. With the qualification that the 
"central political question still has to be addressed" - it was anticipated 
that further economic convergence would help to highlight the purely 
political nature of the border by underlining the question "what the hell 
have we got Partition for anyway ?" 
Some of the more optimistic Sinn Fein representatives also subscribed 
to this general viewpoint. While prefacing their comments with the 
assertion that the only basis for peace in Ireland was to get rid of the 
British-guarantied sectarian headcount in the North, some 
representatives suggested that EU institutions -could assist the two 
governments in obtaining Northern consent to Irish unity: as one 
representative argued, "if the intervention is a negotiated one and a 
democratic one and is actually based on on a programme that is 
designed to facilitate the emergence of agreed democratic structures in 
Ireland then I think that it could be a positive one". 
The existing, impoverished level of political debate existed as, "in 
Ireland we have two truncated states and each of them in their own way 
very inward-looking and conservative, reactionary, in some aspects 
even fascist - you know - and certainly no culture of political discourse". 
The EU could help to address this problem and assist in the 
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decolonisation of Northern Ireland, by offering a neutral reference 
point for negotiations, under-writing human rights and assisting the 
socio-economic transition in Ireland as a whole, as well as encouraging 
more progressive forms of North-South dialogue and socio-economic 
integration - that would begin "to take on a political dimension because 
it's clearly the basis of more cohesive political structures - social and 
economic cooperation". 
Some commentators in Brussels also suggested that EU institutions 
could develop such a directly political role, perhaps by guaranteeing 
individual and communal rights. In particular, the EU role in peace 
negotiations in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in administering 
"safe zones" for instance in Mostar and its role in devising the 
conditions for minority rights and regional autonomy under which 
former Warsaw Pact countries would gain "associate" status and 
eventually full membership of the EU, were seen as having potential 
implications for its role in Northern Ireland. 
Unionism triumphs 
Nationalist 'triumphalism' about the EU, however long-term or 
qualified, tended to fuel the insecurity of unionists as a minority within 
Ireland and increased their antipathy towards EU integration. One 
response - from a minority of 'integrationist' unionists, mostly in the 
UUP and in the British-based Campaign for Equal Citizenship - was to 
argue that the EU would dilute Irish nationalism, favour unionism and 
reintegrate Britain and Ireland. 
Such 'liberal' unionists were wearied, rather than angered by the SDLP 
insistence that EU integration would lead to Irish unity. Instead, they 
argued that after 1992, - "no one will care about the border". It was 
anticipated that 'Europeanisation' would break the essentially 
nationalist link between cultural identity and political allegiance to a 
particular state: existing states would remain in place, but Irish 
nationalists in the North, for instance, would be able to feel fully 'Irish' 
in cultural terms without the need for a united Irish state - although the 
same argument is not made for unionists. 
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This, it was argued, would encourage the Southern political 
establishment to further 'revise' its traditional aspiration to Irish unity; 
allowing a partitionist 26 County nationalism' to further displace the 
'32-county' version, already contradicted in practice by the workings of 
the Southern state. In this scenario, the EU was expected re-integrate the 
Southern and the British economies and to foster 'normal' (that is, 
non-nationalist) politics in Ireland, bringing the Republic back into the 
European 'mainstream'. Hence, integration and cooperation in the EU 
were seen as institutionalising and stabilising the constitutional status 
quo, not subverting it. 
Deflating the conflict 
Other, much more widespread approaches, similar to the arguments 
that the EU was 'de-nationalising' the conflict, although much more 
even-handed, suggested that the process of integration mapped out a 
non-controversial political 'middle ground' and thereby deflated the 
conflict. Co-operation on economic matters in the SEM was seen as 
necessitating political co-operation between North and South and 
helping to reduce sectarian divisions in the North. 
This was reflected in the dominant Commission view that the EU 
needed to preserve as sacrosanct the 'neutral ground' that economic 
developments had opened up between North and South, while at the 
same time extending the range of issues defined as unconnected with 
the 'national question'. Unionists and nationalists were seen as 
distorting the reality of the EU for their own ends; some unionists still 
claiming it was a 'papist plot', others denying that it affected national 
sovereignty, while some nationalists greatly exaggerated its implications 
for North-South integration. This notion that EU integration was 
creating a wider area of 'non-political middle ground' had widespread 
and often enthusiastic support amongst officals working in EU 
institutions. For some, it was anticipated that European regionalism 
would have an impact on the conflict but stressed that no directly 
political role was possible. Thus, although the EU may have effected a 
broad political transformation across the EU, this was kept relatively 
separate - "above" or "sidestepping" - the politics of the national 
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conflict. Nonetheless, it was seen as having significant impacts, 
particularly in terms of changing its context. 
Those more committed to European ideals argued that the Commission 
had a responsibility to strengthen this emerging regional context. It 
needed to reassess its role in Northern Ireland and take a more active 
lead in responding to the demands of business for North-South 
economic integration. Where this raised issues of political 
accountability, requiring a line of all-Ireland political responsibility, this 
would force politicians, North and South, to work together to draw up a 
joint programme to meet EU objectives. Should this be blocked by the 
British government the Commission should waive the subsidiarity rule 
- at least as it applied to the Republic and Northern Ireland - to allow EU 
officials to draw up the required programmes in consultation with the 
two governments and with local interests. 
In general terms though, a less interventionist approach was favoured 
by most Commission officials and MEPs. It was argued that EU 
institutions would have to "take sides" if they were to have any direct 
impact on the conflict, which would serve only to polarise the conflict - 
not resolve it. While the European Parliament had at times demanded 
some action, the Commission had wisely kept a low profile. One official 
recounted how close the Commission had come to taking action on 
Northern Ireland following the EP's Haagerrup report, which had 
suggested that there was a need for the Commission to oversee 
negotiations on Northern Ireland. The President of the Commission at 
the time - Gaston Thorn - had adopted an ambiguous position on the 
report which only served to heighten speculation as to what it would 
propose. His advisers had to plead with him not to call for an active EU 
role in negotiations as the feeling was that this would destroy what little 
joint working the EU had been able to establish in Northern Ireland - 
through the new Commission office in Belfast, one of the first to be 
established outside of the EU capital cities. As a result, there were some 
substantive proposals developed but in the event these were never 
presented to the Council of Ministers as instead, the Commission opted 
for a more indirect role in the politics of the region. 
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For some MEP's this tentative edging towards direct political 
intervention - as implied in the European Parliament's investigation 
into the "political situation in Northern Ireland" (the "Haagerrup" 
Report) - was seen as potentially very damaging and the Commission's 
eventual decision to resist prescribing a particular solution, or even to 
define a role in assisting negotiations, was welcomed (European 
Parliament 1984). The decision to fund economic and social measures 
on a cross-border and all-island basis - was seen as particularly 
significant - as it opened up a realm of "common sense" cooperation 
that was leading, it was hoped, to local management of cross border 
resources - for instance on a Newry-Dundalk or a Connaught-Ulster 
basis. At the political level, the EU was seen as re-contextualising the 
conflict and shifting the political positions of participants - of the SDLP 
towards notions of regionalism in Europe and the unionist parties 
towards getting the best for Northern Ireland at the EU level, but no 
more than that. 
Officials stressed the minimal room for action by supra-national 
authorities - the two parts of Ireland may have both been designated as 
"Objective One" regional funding regimes and administered from the 
same Commission office in Brussels, but officials in the unit took 
instructions on the two separate national plans from the UK and the 
Irish representations in Brussels and officials emphasised that in the 
first instance, they were responsible to the UK and Irish representatives 
in the COREPER. Unusually for EU member states, there was little 
counterweight from regional bodies, either from the Republic or from 
Northern Ireland. The newly created Northern* Ireland Centre in 
Europe was seen as a partial corrective to this, as was the Dublin-based 
Irish Business Bureau, but non-government interests within the two 
parts of Ireland remained relatively under represented - in contrast with 
other parts of the EU where elected regional representatives would 
commonly offer an alternative perspective on their governments' 
regional development plans. Hence the Commission had greater 
difficulty in making alliances with regional groupings in Northern 
Ireland and in the Republic, and consequently had less autonomy in 
relation to the two national states. 
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With Commission autonomy thereby diminished, the Commission 
officials were faced with a dilemma. Either it saw its lack of a role in 
North-South relations in Ireland as an exception or it sought to 
emphasise the less direct means through which EU integration was 
bringing the warring parties together on "the island of Ireland". The 
second approach was generally prefered and was expressed in the 
Commission's optimism that EU integration would bring some benefits 
in terms of offering a different context for parties to the conflict - in a 
Europeanised and regionalised 'island of Ireland'. While doing so, 
officials were forced to recognise that EU institutions could have no 
discernable direct impact. 
Commission officials involved in managing the INTERREG project 
argued that the EU had a role in improving North-South linkages and 
addressing the lack of participation from democratically elected 
representatives, particularly in the border areas. But this role had to be 
indirect: while it was acknowledged that the Commission had a 
responsibility to assert its right to take a political role in the conflict, this 
could not be taken to include direct intervention. Hence it was argued 
that the EU encouraged and empowered those arguing for greater 
economic and social integration in Ireland and, as stressed by some 
long-time Commission observers of the impact of EU integration on the 
conflict, inducing a longer term "feedback loop" into the 
intergovernmental political context and thereby having a significant, 
indirect impact on the conflict. 
The Commission had seen the conflict as a blemish' on the EU objective 
of encouraging peace and reconciliation in Western Europe - as recent 
as 1993 the EU President had demonstrated this as, when he was unable 
to attend a Commission-sponsored Networking Conference to be held 
in Belfast (due to ill health), he not only sent his Deputy but also 
rescheduled his visit for the following week. This was seen as reflecting 
Commission concerns -a form of indirect political pressure that since 
1972 had an initially unintended "feedback" effect, particularly on 
British but also on the Republic's policies in the conflict, inducing a 
range of practical and ideological shifts in the two states' policies and in 
the political demands being made 'on the ground', North and South 
(argued in Section 3). 
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Some political representatives from Northern Ireland also favoured 
this interpretation, usually in preference to more directly political 
impacts. While not addressing the central problem, the EU was seen as 
perhaps knocking off the corners or blunting the rhetoric of 
nationalism and Unionism - as the Workers' Party representative 
suggested, "it can be part of a process whereby people can remove the 
old stereotypes and shackled thinking that they were brought up with... 
modernising social attitudes". Countering these more optimistic 
arguments, though, was the point made by a number of Northern 
Ireland politicians, including from Sinn Fein and the Workers Party, 
that this 'middle ground' or 'new context' had little impact 'on the 
ground', particularly on the various republican and loyalist 
paramilitaries and the mainly working-class communities from which 
they were drawn. Indeed, such EU-related developments, rather than 
helping to solve the conflict, may have helped the much more limited 
objective of marginalising and containing it within particular parts of 
Northern Ireland - what many commentators see, and criticise, as 
existing official policy (Rolston 1991; Ruane and Todd 1991). 
Conflict superseded 
Finally, there was the view that EU integration would create a 'Europe 
of the Regions' that would supersede the existing Europe of 'nation 
states' and in the process, would dissolve the national conflict. 
According to this interpretation, European federal institutions would 
erode the 'nation' state 'from above' while regional forms of sub-state 
government eroded them 'from below', leading to the formation of a 
new EU political system that would be more able to accommodate 
"diversity and difference" (See Kearney 1988). A prime cause of 
nationalist conflicts, the state-centred framework in which national 
separatism and irredentism were the main alternatives, would thus be 
removed. 
This approach was favoured by some EU officials, for instance in the 
European Parliament, who argued that the EU defined a new context for 
the expression of national and regional identities and offered a positive, 
regionalist alternative to the state framework in which separatism was 
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the only means of opting out of current political arrangements. Others 
in the Commission suggested that the new EU framework was 
progressing with an irresistable logic that was dragging states into the 
new regionalist context. The notional division between constitutional 
sovereignty and the pooling of individual states' competencies on 
economic and social issues at the EU level was seen as setting up a false 
dichotomy between states and the EU: in fact they were bound together 
into a single movement that was dramatically redefining the meaning 
of political authority in the EU. 
The SDLP and particularly its leader, John Hume, was closely associated 
with this interpretation of the EU. In general terms, the Party argued 
that EU regionalism offered a model for reconciliation in Ireland - as 
the leader argued - "my thesis throughout is that if this model can bring 
the French and the Germans together why can't it bring us together". 
Aware of the argument that regionalising Europe might simply 
reproduce rather than supersede national conflicts, Party 
representatives emphasised that the EU was integrating the regions 
within a more unified Europe, not simply encouraging -regional 
diversity. In this vision of a new Europe, shared by some of the more 
federalist-minded officials in Brussels, the issue of whether Northern 
Ireland was primarily a region of the UK, of Ireland, or of the EU, would 
simply became unimportant as the constitutional issue was redefined 
out of existence or at least was completely recast so that there were no 
longer any 'winners' or 'losers'. 
Consequently, the SDLP argued that the removal. of borders in the EU 
would lead to the demise of "petty nationalism". Representatives 
stressed the need for regional diversity within European unity -a unity 
that was able to "accommodate and promote diversity" - avoiding the 
twin pitfalls of exciusivist regional identities and of monolithic EU 
identity. Party representatives saw no tension between this and the 
nationalist aspiration for North-South unity, emphasising the broad 
consensus in the South in favour of European unity and identifying the 
move away from exciusivist state-centred political identities within a 
regionalised EU, as offering the best hope for peaceful resolution of the 
national conflict. For. -the SDLP leader then, "the movement towards an 
ever closer union completely changes the nature of the Irish problem". 
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In discussions with the IRA and Sinn Fein leadership, he had sought to 
persuade them that in the new EU context Britain had no interest in 
Ireland and hence the problem was not the British presence, but "the 
existence of a divided people which is a completely different thing", 
adding that "whatever justification there might have been for their 
methods against the British presence, there is no justification when the 
problem is healing the wounds of a divided people". 
Not only did Britain no longer see Ireland as its strategic "backwater" in 
the new, peaceful EU, but also it was now a partner with the Republic, 
"together in the new Europe sharing sovereignty". EU integration, it 
was argued, had led to the demise- of national sovereignties in a new 
interdependent, quasi-federal 'Europe of the regions' as, "in a lot of 
ways the nation state has outlived its usefulness and we have moved 
on from the nation state from independence, into interdependence". 
Taken together, these factors "change the whole nature of the problem" 
in Ireland - "so that what we have, the problem that we now have to 
solve, is a divided people - full stop". 
Some interviewees however, were sceptical about whether a 'Europe of 
the Regions' would materialise, or, even if it did, whether it would 
solve the Irish conflict in the ways suggested. The hope that "a Europe 
of the Regions would descend like Mary Poppins to resolve the conflict" 
was seen as completely unrealistic by the less federalist-minded EU 
officials. The EU may have generated a new politics of regional 
development and blunted some nationalistic rhetoric, but a 'Europe of 
states' was likely to remain the dominant reality. 
On the other hand some of those more favourably disposed towards a 
'Europe of the Regions' feared that its potential to solve national 
conflict would be lost if the European 'ideal' was manipulated for 
nationalist ends. These anti-nationalist EU regionalists criticised the 
SDLP for conflating the concept of 'European unity' with its own 
nationalist aspiration to 'Irish unity'. This was a particular theme of 
Alliance Party representatives, one of whom argued that the SDLP 
"wobbled" between a cosmopolitan, European, anti-nationalist stance 
and a parochial adherence to traditional Irish nationalism. 
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Other Unionists were also generally scathing, though at least partly 
because there were fears that in some senses the scenario might have 
been accurate. The Unionist concern was to preserve Northern Ireland's 
status, first and foremost, as a region of the UK. Partly for this reason, 
'devolutionists' in the Unionist camp (unlike some devolutionists in 
Scotland) had not linked their demands for a devolved Northern 
Ireland Assembly to a 'Europe of the Regions'; for instance stressing 
that their participation in the proposed EU "Committee of the Regions" 
would only be as part of a UK delegation. 
The SDLP scenario was more directly condemned as unrealistic 
"hogwash" and "wishful thinking" by some representatives of Sinn 
Fein, its rival for the North's nationalist vote. The SDLP was seen as 
elitist and as not engaging in the real issues affecting the nationalist 
community and as consequently clouding the real political issues raised 
by British occupation of the 6 Counties. 
Overall then, some interviewees adopted an 'avoidance' strategy, 
ignoring or denying interrelationships between EU integration and the 
national conflict, fearing or disliking the implications which economic 
integration held for their own political positions. Others deployed 
triumphalist arguments that the EU would resolve the conflict in their 
own favour, whether Nationalist or Unionist. There were arguments 
which suggested that it was increasing the area of non-controversial 
'middle ground' between Irish nationalists and unionists. Finally, there 
were arguments that 'Europeanisation' would supersede these 
triumphalisms, rendering the national conflict historically redundant, 
in a new 'Europe of the regions'. 
Chapter Conclusions 
Politicians and EU officials interpret 'Europeanisation' to suit their own 
political ends. The first part of this Chapter identified several 
perspectives on the EU integration process: a Europe of independent 
states; Europe of states in the EU; a capitalist bloc; a Europe of the 
regions; a federal Europe. Each of these draws on a particular aspect of 
international relations theory and offers a perspective on the 
350 
integration process which political actors can use to account-for or 
explain away their attitude to it, thus offering an "interpretative 
repertoire" of the EU integration process (Potter and Wetherell 1992). 
The second part of the Chapter examined more specific interpretations 
of the role of the EU in the conflict - which were, to a degree, influenced 
by these wider perspectives. Again, there were several positions, 
including those suggesting that it would have no impact; that unionism 
would 'triumph'; that nationalism would 'triumph'; that the conflict 
would be deflated; and finally those suggesting the conflict would be 
superseded. These positions can be summarised as follows: 
Table 11.1: Interpretations of the EU. and its impact on the national 
conflict: political parties and EU institutions 
Political actors Interpretation of the EU Impact on the conflict 
DUP, SF, Europe of independent states No impact 
CPI, UUP 
UUP, DUP, Europe of States in the EU Unionism triumphs 
Alliance 
CPI, SF, Capitalist bloc Nationalism triumphs 
(WP? ) 
WP, Brussels A Federal Europe Conflict deflated 
officials 
SDLP, Europe of Regions Conflict superseded 
Alliance 
To a degree this suggests a fluidity between the various positions, with 
some political representatives falling into two or more categories. This 
is true of all the political parties except the SDLP, although some 
unionists argued that its interpretation would be more closely aligned 
with the 'nationalism triumphs' than with the 'conflict superseded' 
category. Similarly, officials from EU institutions fall into a variety of 
positions, although the dominant interpretation, as noted earlier, is that 
the process of EU integration will deflate the conflict. This may imply 
that these various interpretations, and the assumptions about 
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international politics that they reflect, are simply chosen by political 
actors according to the circumstances. 
Nonetheless, despite the eclecticism that this may imply, political actors 
- for instance, from the DUP, the Alliance and the Workers Party - do 
tend to express a preference for a particular interpretation, although 'in 
practice' they may be forced to accept a 'second-best' option. This 
highlights the degree to which opinions about the role of national states 
in the EU and its expected impact on the conflict are mutually 
supporting and thereby help political actors to construct consistent and 
coherent political preferences. 
These various interpretations of EU politics - the "interpretative 
repertoires" available to political actors - are employed to support 
particular positions in the national conflict and to stabilise them in the 
face of political questions posed by the process of transnational 
integration into the EU 'global region'. The various political actors 
actively construct these relatively stable political interpretations - thus 
reproducing conflicts over the national question and extending them 
into disputes over the question of how EU integration affects states 
sovereignty and the national conflict. 
This political disagreement is contradicted by the relative consensus on 
issues of North-South economic cooperation - as outlined in Chapter 9. 
This contradiction generates sharp political dilemmas for political actors 
that force significant shifts in political positions. This process of 
ideological disruption and political realignment is discussed in Chapter 
11. 
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Chapter 11 
Contradictions and realignments 
This Chapter combines and extends the analysis of Chapters 9 and 10. 
Chapter 9 outlined a remarkably broad consensus that much greater 
economic cooperation between the North and South is needed to meet 
the threats posed by the SEM. In stark contrast to this consensus, 
Chapter 10 highlighted deep political divisions on the question of 
whether the EU integration process affects national states and the 
national conflict. Here the focus shifts onto the tensions between these 
two policy strands. It is argued that political actors are faced with deep 
political dilemmas between embracing regional integration and 
maintaining national divisions. In order to reconcile or avoid such 
dilemmas, they draw on various rhetorical devices which expose the 
logic of how nationalism and national conflict is realigned and 
reproduced in an increasingly regionalised or transnationalised context. 
The Chapter is divided into two subsections. First it examines the 
various forms of political dilemma faced by politicians and EU officials. 
Several general types of dilemma are discussed, each of which is 
associated with interviewees from one or more political party or EU 
institution. Second, it discusses the various types of rhetorical devices 
that are used to reconcile these dilemmas. It. is argued that two 
tendencies dominate -a tendency to re-define the emerging EU regional 
agenda in national terms and a tendency to construct an unchanging 
'traditional' national identity. These rarely succeed in reconciling the 
political dilemmas, leading to heightened mutual suspicions and 
sharpened national conflict. This is followed by some attempt at 
assessing the differences between the various political actors, in terms of 
the intensity of the dilemmas that they face and the types of rhetoric 
that they rely on. The Section conclusion attempts to assess the degree 
to which the various attempts at resolving or avoiding these dilemmas 
are successful. 
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Political dilemmas 
Conflicts between unionists and nationalists over what the "European 
dimension" means for 'domestic', Northern Ireland politics reflect 
wider ideological struggles over the definition of European integration 
being fought out in member states across the EU. The reinterpretation 
of the EU "dimension" to suit party political ends and to shore up 
existing political constituencies is in itself, not very different from 
'national' conflicts at member state level in the Council of Ministers 
and at the European Council. 
Clearly the political tendencies in Ireland draw on the ideological 
repertoires expressed in wider conflicts over the future of the EU. 
Where the divisions over the EU role in Ireland's national conflict 
differed is in the degree to which these positions are internally 
contradictory and produce deep ideological dilemmas. This reflects the 
quasi-colonial themes of Ireland's ongoing political development - or 
lack of development - which sharply contrast with the often colonising 
histories and the mostly metropolitan development paths of other EU 
member states. 
Several such dilemmas can be identified, each broadly linked to a set of 
political actors. These are discussed to illustrate the range of positions, 
beginning with political actors most hostile to EU integration, namely 
the 'loyal statists' in the DUP; followed by the pragmatic 'EU statism' of 
the UUP; the 'tactical republicanism' of Sinn Fein and the CPI; the 
'reluctant statism' of Workers Party and Alliance spokespersons; the 
'hands off federalism' of representatives from EU institutions; and 
finally, the 'Euro-nationalism' of the SDLP. 
As with previous Chapters in this Section, these political strategies are 
by no means mutually exclusive, neither are they consistently 
articulated by individual representatives. Nonetheless, they do serve to 
highlight general political and ideological tendencies and help to pin- 
point the exact nature of the political dilemmas encountered. 
The DUP: 'loiial statism'? 
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DUP representatives oppose any diminution of UK state powers - or of 
any other state powers - and oppose UK and Northern Ireland 
membership of the EU. But at the same time the Party has been forced 
to become involved in the development and formulation of EU 
policies, as opting out of EU-related policy issues - deciding not to 
contest EU elections or abstaining from the political process at the EU 
level - would force its constituents to consult other political parties, 
driving the DUP to the margins of political 
, 
life in Northern Ireland. 
Thus representatives are actively involved in and quite often claim the 
credit for maximising the benefits of EU membership for Northern 
Ireland. 
As noted earlier, the Party described this approach to the EU as "milking 
the cow before killing it"; as a Party representative clarified, "we're 
opposed to the common idea of a closer union -a political union - so do 
we opt out and say we've having nothing to do with it - or do we 
getting there and strike the best deal from an economic point of view 
for Northern Ireland... have our voice heard and at the same time 
oppose the developments politically". This has forced the Party into 
constructing a false separation between the 'economic and social' 
consequences of EU membership, as opposed to its 'political' 
consequences - "we do not oppose crucial cooperation on economic and 
social matters - those sorts of issues - but we will oppose any sort of 
political integration". In clarifying why the Party opposed political 
developments at the EU level, a representative pointed out that "the 
SDLP were keen on the idea that Northern Ireland should be regarded 
as part of an all Ireland entity - saying this has no political implications 
- this is purely for [EU] funds and so on - and that the South could 
represent us - is all part of that same idea - and we very firmly said that 
would not be acceptable to Unionists. We could not have that... it. 
The political slogan of wanting to milk the EU "cow" and then kill it 
reflected these tensions in the Party's political position and leads to, 
apparently arbitrary, opposition to some EU-related proposals - for 
instance Quigley's proposal for the single all-Ireland budget line for 
regional funds. Others proposals are - equally arbitrarily - defined as 
non-political and as deserving of support, for instance the decision to 
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grant "Objective One" status to Northern Ireland with the Republic, 
which was described as by one prominent Commission official as the 
"most political" act of the Commission in Ireland. Effectively the Party 
wanted to 'have its cake and eat it'; by trying to 'have it both ways' it 
was forced into contradictory policy positions - as the Alliance leader 
pointed out, if you own a cow and become dependent on its milk, you 
don't kill it, you feed it. 
The UUP: 'EU statism'? 
The UUP is caught on the horns of a similar, though less starkly defined 
ideological dilemma. It favours state-led economic integration, within 
which states would retain their powers and EU institutions would 
remain accountable to 'national' parliaments. This reflects its British 
nationalist, integrationist position in the national conflict, in which an 
EU role in Northern Ireland is accepted, provided that such a role is 
determined and mediated by the British state. Any autonomous 
Northern Ireland role as a region of the EU - rather than as a region of 
the UK within the EU - is condemned, as is any joint action by political 
authorities in Northern Ireland and the Republic, in representing the 
interests of the 'province' at the EU level. 
Like the the DUP, Party representatives were effectively forced to 
pragmatically accept the definition of Northern Ireland as a region of 
the EU. While this meant that they accepted the regional dimension for 
Northern Ireland politics as it related to EU issues, this was kept 
separate from the politics of the national conflict. The UUP MEP 
clarified that - "I take a perhaps simplistic view - that at the end of the 
day I have got to live with whatever it [ie - the EU] is - and work within 
it. The one thing I'm convinced of is that the UK is not going to come 
out of Europe", arguing that "as long we're in the UK we're going to be 
in Europe". 
This pragmatic view is often in direct contradiction with the Party's 
'Euro-sceptical' position on the question of EU integration - as expressed 
by Party representatives in Westminster. This presented difficulties - as 
the UUP MEP said, "I get on with whatever they [the UUP MP's] decide. 
I can live with it. At the end of the day that is to some extent ducking 
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out of it". Avoiding the issue in this way was seen as the only means of 
maintaining credibility, although there were some hopes of greater 
acceptance of EU integration - of "an evolution within the Unionist 
Party to where there was certainly more for than against". 
In terms of the implications of EU integration for the conflict, like the 
DUP, the Party distinguished between its 'political' and the ostensibly 
'non-political' aspects. This also led to some circular reasoning: the MEP 
for instance, suggested that "the problem that Quigley has - when he 
makes his proposals - is that they seem political - no matter how 
unpolitical he may try to make them". Party representatives favoured 
North-South cooperation -"what. I've been saying is yes, have 
maximum cooperation to achieve whatever we can achieve out of 
that". But when it came to any suggestion that this logically led, for 
instance, to a joint North-South EU fund, distributed on an all-Ireland 
basis, there was vociferous resistance. 
The CPI and SF: 'tactical republicanism'? 
Sinn Fein and CPI representatives also faced dilemmas in making their 
positions in the national conflict consistent with their positions on the 
question of EU integration. Both parties were formally committed to the 
creation of a sovereign independent all-Ireland state and had 
campaigned against approval of the Maastricht Treaty in the Republic: 
their desired all-Ireland sovereign state would define its own 
relationship with the EU, in accordance with the expressed wishes of 
the Irish electorate, not according to the dictates of *Treaties struck pre- 
unification. 
The CPI maintained this commitment to an all-Ireland sovereign state 
although in practical political terms the Party had been forced to adopt a 
more pragmatic position. As the Secretary of the Party outlined - "we 
fight on aspects of legislation that are useful to us - obviously our 
campaign for withdrawal from the EC is not realistic - but that is our 
position of course, but we can't campaign on it - so we fight on single 
issues". 
357 
Sinn Fein had been forced into a similar position. As their 
representative argued - "what I am saying is that the reality is there, it 
[the EU] affects practically every facet of economic life in Ireland - and 
increasingly so - it dominates the whole economic debate in Ireland 
North and South - that's going to be the reality for the foreseeable 
future". This presented the Party with broadly four options - "if you 
have that overriding reality there's the question whether you must 
lament it; or whether you attack it; or you take a hands off policy; or 
whether you look for ways to use it to try and, achieve a particular goal". 
At the time of interview (1993) the Party had been moving away from 
the second approach, a purely oppositional stance to the EU, towards the 
latter, as it adopted a more positive attitude towards the more 
progressive elements of EU policy, moving towards a more proactive 
EU political stance, seeking allies in anti-imperialist movements and 
political parties elsewhere in the EU and arguing for more effective 
North-South institutions in Ireland to express the shared interests of 
the island in the SEM. 
This has clear implications for the Party's political programme for a 
united Ireland. In effect, the Party was arguing that the EU opened up 
political opportunities as well as threats - and was a useful political 
platform on which to argue for Irish self-determination and for all- 
Ireland unity. These opportunities suggested that the EU had much to 
offer, both in terms of defining the socio-economic context for Irish 
unity, and in terms of offering a source of political legitimacy and 
sympathy if not solidarity for the Republican cause. The implications of 
this for the Party's position on the national conflict had not been fully 
elaborated, but given the its reluctance to forego the commitment to an 
independent sovereign all-Ireland state, it appeared that it would have 
difficulty in overcoming what was likely to become an increasingly 
sharp ideological tension as the role of EU institutions and the Party's 
proactive orientation towards them intensified. 
The WP and the Alliance: 'reluctant statism'? 
The Workers' Party and the Alliance Party also have to deal with 
ideological tensions between their political positions on the national 
conflict and the process of regionalisation in the EU. Both parties 
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stressed the need for an 'internal' solution to Ireland's national conflict 
based on political agreement within Northern Ireland, but at the same 
time both adopted a positive political stance on the process of regional 
integration in the EU. 
The tension between these two components was particularly sharp in 
the case of the Alliance Party. As an active member of the of the 
"European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party" in the European 
Parliament, it adopted a Euro-regionalist perspective on EU politics, 
advocating a 'Europe of the regions' as its ultimate goal. But the Party 
resisted advocating this political approach as a solution to Northern 
Ireland's political conflicts - as the Party leader argued, the definition of 
what was and what was not the legitimate regional unit was heavily 
contested in Ireland. Advocating a regional solution would have forced 
the Party to abandon its ostensibly cross-community perspective on the 
conflict - as it would be forced to clarify whether the appropriate 
'regional' unit would be the six Northern Counties or the 32 all-Ireland 
Counties and whether Northern Ireland's existing status as part of the 
UK or, alternatively, the aspiration to a united Ireland, should be 
consigned to the dustbin of history. 
The Alliance then, wavered between its liberal unionist position on a 
possible solution to the national conflict and its liberal Euro-regionalist 
perspective on the issue of EU integration. Representatives attempted to 
resolve the tensions between these two ideological accounts by arguing 
that the EU had not progressed sufficiently down the regionalist road 
for it to merit having a role in the Northern conflict, with the ironic net 
effect of shoring-up the more statist interpretations of the DUP and 
UUP. 
The Workers Party found itself in a similar position. As its 
representative argued, "we have advocated North-South cooperation 
within the EU, but at the end of the day if its not an agreement between 
the people of the Falls and the Shankill then its not going to work". He 
stressed that - "part of the mistake is to try and go outside of Northern 
Ireland looking for a solution and bring it back - it is here that the 
division exists and it is here that the solution must be found". Like the 
Alliance leader, he argued that EU integration, while positive, "still 
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doesn't come anywhere near addressing the fundamental political 
differences". Again, this plays down the political implications of the EU 
and thereby in effect supports the Unionist case for Northern Ireland's 
continued and unquestioned membership of the UK, undermining 
what is formally the Workers Party's ultimate political objective of 
politically re-unifying the island, North and South. 
The EU institutions: 'hands off, federalism'? 
Officials and political representatives in the EU institutions, no matter 
how committed to the federal ideal, tended to advocate extreme caution 
on issues relating to Ireland's national conflict. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 9, INTERREG officials working in the Commission acknowledged 
that they actively sidestepped the national question in Ireland, despite 
the Commission's stated objectives. Hopes that the development of a 
supranational, avowedly federalist political authority would defuse 
inter-state conflicts and bring peace to Western Europe faced the reality 
of on-going political and military conflict in Ireland. The Commission 
had been unable or unwilling to take concerted action on the issue, but, 
as an official said, "can you blame them? ". 
Direct, Commission-led EU intervention in the conflict was impossible 
without the consent of the UK government, and in any case, it was not 
desirable. Commission and EP officials, and all but a handful of MEP's, 
viewed any direct involvement in the conflict with some trepidation. It 
was feared that the EU would become embroiled in a conflict that would 
taint its non-political, consensual image. While designed to make 
another European war an impossibility, the EU was not in the first 
instance an explicitly political, collective security organisation. Its 
primary agenda was technocratic, social and economic and only 
indirectly did it challenge the role of states in managing 'domestic' 
political conflict, at most setting parameters (for instance through the 
European Court of Human rights) rather than defining the content of 
state action. 
This challenged the very logic of the EU's federalist project, suggesting 
that in so far as it had failed to have any direct role in Western Europe's 
most protracted and violent national conflict, it could hardly be 
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expected to have a significant impact on the national identities and state 
sovereignties that it presumed to supersede. This concern that perhaps 
Ireland's national conflict constituted a crucial 'test case' of the EU's 
potential to build a 'federalist' future for Western Europe was a 
constant theme in interviews with EU officials and MEP's. It paralleled 
a deeper questioning of the EU's functionalist, technocratic agenda 
which assumed that the sharing of material interests in a newly 
interdependent political configuration would lead to a diminution of 
cultural and ideological attachments to existing state structures -a 
concern that had been voiced by some of the architects of EU 
integration, notably Jean Monnet, in the face of the repeated failure to 
make the transition from the so-called 'low' politics of economic union 
to the 'high' politics of political union. 
The Commission's - and to some extent the Parliament's - 'federalist' 
aspirations conflicted with their firmly 'hands off' approach to the 
conflict, leading them to retreat into a perhaps naive optimism in the 
expectation that the co-operative framework established by EU 
integration would have some discernable impact on the conflict. As was 
suggested in Section 3, there was certainly some substance to this claim, 
particularly in terms of its impact on North-South economic and social 
integration and on Anglo-Irish management of the conflict. But the 
dilemma remained a powerful factor - both in terms of exacerbating the 
fears of those opposed to such a role and in terms of raising the hopes of 
those expecting an EU-inspired solution to the conflict. 
The SDLP: 'Euro-nationalism'? 
Like other participants in the conflict, the SDLP also had difficulty in 
reconciling its position on the national conflict with its broader 
perspective on EU integration. As has been highlighted, Party 
representatives favoured a redefinition of Northern Ireland as part of 
the "island of Ireland" in the EU, rather than as a region of the UK 
within the EU (or indeed as an autonomous Northern Ireland region in 
the EU). The Party then, was selectively committed to a particular 
manifestation of EU regionalism which was consistent with its 
aspiration to Ireland's national reunification. 
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Party representatives argued that "this piece of earth is already united - 
it is the people who are divided". The unified piece of earth was, of 
course, the island of Ireland and the division was between unionists 
and nationalists. Thus reconciliation had to be aimed at bringing 
together all the people of Ireland, in a joint sharing of interests. Irish 
people, North and South, should be seen as constituting a single 
decision-making unit in the EU, and, it was argued, should be given the 
power to define the meaning of regionalism in the island as a whole. 
Party representatives wanted to see "the people on the ground in 
Ireland as a whole having the authority". Whatever the proposed 
arrangements - whether there were nine regions in the Republic or four 
regions in Ireland as a whole - the crucial issue was that the "people on 
the ground [should] have the authority for the economic development 
of their own region". 
This 'regionalist-nationalist' perspective presented the SDLP with some 
difficulties, as in some respects the two ideological trajectories are 
mutually exclusive - not least because increased national division in the 
EU would undermine regionalisation. By combining them in the 
context of intensifying EU integration, the Party was apparently moving 
away from a commitment to Irish unity in the formal sense of 
independent sovereign statehood. In the process, perhaps, it was 
attempting to redefine Irish nationalism. 
For the SDLP then, the development of the EU marks an historical 
break as it replaces territorialism with regionalism and delinks states 
from their territorial jurisdictions. For the Party's. leader, the linking of 
territory to national identity was the problem to which EU integration 
was the solution - "nineteenth century nationalism and what has 
happened down the centuries that led to two world wars - was based on 
a territorial concept and Irish nationalism and the provos are based on 
territorialism". EU regionalism allowed a move away from the 
certainties of sovereignty, towards a more fluid politics of regionalism - 
with a multiplicity of local units 'below', 'national' units 'in between', 
transnational units 'across' and EU units 'above' the pre-existing 
sovereign states. Within this fluidity the re-constitution of Ireland as a 
unified 'national' region was seen as the most hopeful, peaceful 
approach to resolving the conflict. 
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Overall then, the political and official actors who play the central role in 
defining the impact of the EU on the national conflict are caught in a 
series of dilemmas. These stem from tensions between their positions 
on EU integration and their role in the national conflict. In attempting 
to resolve these tensions, they draw on a number of rhetorical devices. 
These are discussed in the next sub-section. 
Rhetorical Devices 
Interviewees made use of a number of rhetorical devices to reconcile 
these dilemmas. Some have already been mentioned - such as the 
tendency to draw distinctions between the 'economic' implications of 
EU integration and its 'political' implications. Here discussion focuses 
on three rhetorical themes that relate directly to the process of 
reproducing nationalism and national conflict. Politicians from 
Northern Ireland, rather than officials from EU institutions are the 
main source for this discussion, as the focus is on the ways in which 
positions in the national conflict are re-constructed in the light of EU 
integration. 
The first two devices broadly reflect Nairn's image of the nationalist as 
someone who faces both forwards and backwards: defining a future for 
the 'nation' in terms of a mythologised past. Hence, politicians 
constructed a version of national 'progress' - defining a 'modern' 
national development path, whether for the 'island of Ireland' or for 
the UK. Second, and complementing this, they used versions of 
communal identity to anchor their political positions - defining 
themselves as reasonable advocates of 'their' community. Thirdly, the 
tension between these two elements of political discourse generated an 
over-riding mutual suspicion which could in some ways be functional 
as, by exaggerating the motives of 'others' from outside 'their' national 
grouping, politicians could more clearly define the boundaries of their 
'own' grouping. 
This sub-section investigates these three characteristics of the 
politicians' arguments in order to illustrate how nationalisms are 
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politically re-constituted, in spite of a general acceptance of the 
implications of EU regionalism for socio-economic integration in 
Ireland. In the conclusions the relative success of this process of 
reconstitution is assessed. 
'national' progress 
The politicians were generally at pains to identify their position with 
'rational', modernising processes. Social issues are "appropriated" in 
domestic political competition to mobilise the "national identity 
dynamic" and so are politicised as a 'stake' in the conflict (Bloom 
1990: 85). This results in ideological competition between political parties 
to gain 'ownership' of particular forms of social change. As the gaining 
of such 'ownership' redefines these elements of social change in 
'national' terms, politicians engage in an intense ideological struggle to 
re-appropriate them. 
The impact of the EU and regional integration in Ireland has been most 
successfully incorporated into the rhetoric of nationalist politicians in 
the SDLP. Their representatives stress the strength of the Party's 
European contacts and actively identify the Party with 'new' political 
relations in the integrated EU. As the Party leader argued, "our 
approach has been completely different in the sense that again [it] is in 
keeping with the whole new European thinking". 
Sinn Fein also increasingly linked their arguments for all-Ireland 
economic development to EU integration. As one Party representative 
argued, the EU made it possible to "develop the internal market, to start 
to develop indigenous industry within Ireland to supply that internal 
market as a means of creating wealth as well as regulating the external 
relationships". As with the SDLP, the boundaries of mutual benefit 
matched the boundaries of the island, not the boundaries of the UK, nor 
the boundaries of the EU - and the "external relationships" included 
those with Britain and with the rest of the EU. 
Defining EU integration in terms of all-Ireland economic prospects was 
combined with a linking of EU political integration with a all-Ireland 
political integration. As was illustrated in the earlier subsection, this 
364 
was a common feature of SDLP rhetoric: it also was increasingly adopted 
by Sinn Fein. As one representative argued, the EU highlighted the 
need for constitutional change - and would "facilitate the emergence of 
agreed democratic structures in Ireland" - in contrast with the current 
arrangements as he described them. 
Unionist politicians challenged these Irish nationalist definitions of 
socio-economic integration in the EU, and attempted to redefine them, 
instead, in their own 'national' UK terms. The process of North-South 
economic integration in Ireland is seen as a secondary issue of relatively 
minor importance in comparison with the North's UK linkages. This is 
a common theme in the rhetoric of UUP representatives, who play 
down the significance of North-South economic integration and stress 
the importance of Northern Ireland's linkages with and through 
Britain into wider EU markets, an argument that is underlined by 
emphasising that the "new generation" is not interested in the South. 
In terms of North-South trade, it is argued that "there's not going to be 
much of an increase" and it is suggested that for "the new younger fry 
that are coming up now in the business world - we're breaking out of 
Ireland". 
DUP representatives argued along slightly different lines, drawing a 
firm distinction between economic and political developments while 
identifying their Party with the process of improving economic 
conditions in Northern Ireland. For them business is not concerned 
with the political and constitutional implications of developments like 
the Maastricht Treaty and the ERM - "they're interested in what's in the 
best interests of business - you know - my share of profit". Whereas, 
responsible politicians have "to look at it in terms of - it may be in your 
interests - but is it in the interests of people, all the people of our 
country? ". At the same time the search for wider markets for Northern 
Ireland business in the EU, including the Republic, is welcomed 
"there's a bigger effort... to get people to look beyond Britain... I think 
the more that that happens the better, in terms of investment, jobs, and 
in selling your goods and so on, we've got to be there". 
These various attempts at linking political positions to 'progress', as one 
politician puts it -, to "what's new" - strengthened the national political 
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ideologies of the main Northern Ireland parties. Politicians constructed 
versions of 'progress' that were consistent with concepts of national 
communal identity -a linkage that forced politicians into redefining, 
some would say distorting these concepts of 'progress' in ways that 
would not significantly disrupt communal affiliations. 
'national' identity 
The assumed impacts of these developments were often explicitly set 
against constructed national identities. A number of the politicians 
defined themselves - often in personal terms - in relation to a usually 
static and unchanging communal identity. To a varying extent they 
distanced themselves from these concepts of identity, so as to appear 
reasoned and reasonable, unlike the 'extremists'. This has been 
identified as a common theme of official discourse (Burton and Carlen 
1979), and amongst the politicians interviewed it was particularly 
important for unionist politicians, both 'loyalist' and 'liberal' unionists 
. This may reflect 
the logic of the unionist position, which forced 
politicians to more explicitly rely on notions of primitive, unchanging 
identity as part of the process of trying to maintain the status quo in 
Northern Ireland. 
An Alliance Party representative, for instance, argued that "people fail 
to realise the depth of the primitiveness and the power of these 
nationalistic questions particularly when national, religious and 
political cleavages run along the same fault line - they form a very 
powerful group". In view of this, economic interests could only have at 
most a minimal impact on national identity. To illustrate the point he 
recounted an anecdote -"one my colleagues was visiting a hospital in 
the Republic of Ireland, and in discussing the much better facilities in 
the North his friend whipped round and said - Yes, but its our poverty... 
laughter... its our poverty, any wealth you have is something that has 
been given to you by somebody else. You can't possibly have this sense 
of pride". He was keen to distance himself from this view of national 
affiliation but emphasised that "the point is, he was saying there's 
something that's far more important than not having economic or 
social disadvantage... I'm simply saying that if you think that that is all 
people are about then you haven't learnt the first lesson about people". 
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Consequently, any attempt at creating North-South institutions with 
economic or social powers would "produce, without any shadow of a 
doubt, massive violence on the loyalist side, no doubt about it 
whatsoever". 
DUP representatives identified themselves more closely with this 
constructed loyalist identity, arguing that unionists would "not be 
happy at all with anything that - sort of - dilutes our identity as a region 
of the UK in Europe - once you get this thing where Ireland is regarded 
as a single island - you're onto a very slippery slope then". On these 
grounds, even in the event the Republic repealing Articles 2 and 3, it 
was argued that North-South economic integration would be 
undesirable -"it's one thing to cooperate in our mutual interest and to 
work together, but why should you subsume your own identity in all- 
Ireland context, in an all-Ireland identity, I don't think we'd be prepared 
to go that far. We'd be quite prepared to support each other but we 
would not be prepared to give up our status or our identity". 
When questioned about North-South integration and, specifically the 
proposal for a single EU budget for Ireland as a whole, the UUP 
representative came closest to directly refering to his own identity by 
objecting - "how can you agree to that, to joint control of the budget, 
when you have the other state saying in their constitution saying that 
we want to take you over - no bloody way - he's on a political hiding to 
nothing before he starts". This shift from the 'public persona' into the 
personal realm, as he directly identified himself as a barrier to such 
integration, was quickly reversed as he distanced himself from such a 
position - arguing that "it may well be that at a certain level - or echelon 
- in this Province - he would get support for that - from the great and 
the good the chattering classes, but out in the broad mass there he's not 
going to get support for that". 
More positively, the expression of a specifically Northern Ireland 
identity at the EU level is favoured. UUP as well as DUP representatives 
lament the lack of profile for such an identity - although "Northern 
Ireland is in Europe - Northern Ireland is there - Northern Ireland is 
creating a regional identity - which the Scottish have, the Welsh have - 
the Irish have, the English have - people don't know what we are. We 
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are a sort of a hybrid somewhere - you're not really Irish no - you're not 
really English - no - I'm Northern Ireland". 
Similar concerns about political identities in Northern Ireland were 
voiced by nationalist and republican politicians. There was significant 
difference though, as these identities were seen as changeable and 
shaped by political and social circumstances. In contrast with some of 
the more static constructions of unionist identity, the SDLP 
representative argued in favour of more freely defined national 
categories in the context of regional integration. He argued that - "if you 
study conflict anywhere in the world you will find the circumstances 
are different but that at the root of the problem is a fundamental refusal 
to accept difference and treating difference as a threat". The importance 
of the EU context was stressed, in which formerly 'national' affiliations 
were broken up into local and regional identities, unified by an 
overarching European identity in which it would become possible to 
share national and regional identities, making conflict a thing of the 
past. 
For Sinn Fein representatives the central factor causing national conflict 
was the maintenance of the British constitutional guarantee: if "the 
British government actually say that it is their intention... to facilitate 
the exercise of self-determination for all of the people of Ireland, that 
immediately I believe changes the whole context". Without such 
changes, and wider changes in the Republic, the unionist and loyalist 
reaction against North-South economic institutions was logical and 
understandable: "the Laager mentality has been. used to describe the 
unionist... community as a culture and a tradition that is under siege in 
Ireland is a very accurate one - they have very genuine fears and 
certainly the way that society has ordered itself in the 26 Counties, there 
is nothing whatsoever to allay those fears. All we can see is this very 
dominant Catholic ethos and a very intolerant and conservative 
society". Without constitutional shifts, in the first instance in the 
North, but also in the South, Sinn Fein representatives argued that 
unionists would become more alienated from the political system: as 
"the nationalist community... grow in strength" there would be a "kind 
of benign imperialism, just as threatening as the overtly oppressive 
forms". 
368 
In more general terms Sinn Fein representatives were optimistic about 
the ability of unionist politicians to transcend their traditional 
identification with Britain as British 'nationals', pointing out that - 
"there's no such nationality - you can be Scottish, you can be English 
you can be Welsh you can be Irish". Those within the unionist 
community, including prominent UUP and DUP politicians who had 
begun to formulate an Irish-British identity were seen as "a fairly strong 
pragmatic influence within Unionism that justifies the hope that this 
can actually be resolved by democratic compromise". 
Overall, then, the construction of an unchanging communal identity is 
a central theme of loyalist and unionist political rhetoric. There were 
hesitant attempts at defining a hybrid Northern Ireland identity, but 
this was largely confined to the EU level - not least as in Northern 
Ireland such adaptation would be interpreted as a sign of weakness in 
the unionist community. Such redefinitions of unionist identity, even 
if confined to EU-related matters, indicated some movement away from 
the more monolithic conceptions of unionist national identity. 
Constitutional nationalist and republican politicians were more 
inclined to emphasise the socio-economic or political context of 
communal identity. They argued that identities were shaped and 
reshaped by circumstances and drew some hope from the hesitant 
reformulations of Northern unionist identity. But more negatively, 
such optimism substantiated opposition to such 'weaknesses' amongst 
unionists and fuelled mutual suspicions. 
For all politicians that were interviewed, the concept of identity was 
central to their political rhetoric and their use of it reflected their 
political position in the conflict. But at the same time the construction 
of a communal identity could lead politicians away from the 
depersonalised rhetoric of political discourse, exposing personal identity 
and personal interests, suggesting that they were actively willing the 
mythical homogenised communal identity into existence (Bhabha 
1990), as a necessary component of their 'national' ideologies. 
'national' suspicions 
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The two devices of 'national' identity and 'national' progress occur 
simultaneously, politicising regionalism as a 'stake' in the conflict and 
thereby fuelling mutual suspicions. In particular, unionist and loyalist 
politicians suspected that nationalist and republican views on EU 
regionalism were linked to the parties' 'national' political agendas. 
Similarly, nationalists and republicans accused loyalists and unionists 
of distorting the impact of EU to suit their narrow political ends. 
Nonetheless, political struggle in the national conflict was not simply 
transposed into ideological competition to define EU integration in 
'national' terms. On the contrary, across the political spectrum, regional 
integration was defined as in some way separate from the conflict, as 
something to be appropriated for 'national' ends rather than 
as something necessarily defined as part of the conflict. But rather that 
depoliticising issues of regional integration, this ideological gap between 
regionalism and nationalism made their meeting points an intensely 
contested realm of political life - as hidden motives were suspected on 
both sides of the political divide, generating intense mutual suspicions 
and fuelling political divisions. 
These suspicions operated at (at least) two levels. First, politicians were 
suspicious of hidden motives. This was a particular theme for unionists 
and loyalists and again, this may have reflected the logic attempting to 
maintain the constitutional status quo in Northern Ireland. 
Nationalists and Republicans meanwhile, focused on responding to 
accusations of duplicity. 
Even if in favour of improving North-South linkages on- non-political, 
pragmatic grounds, loyalist and unionist distanced themselves from 
them for fear of encouraging nationalists. The DUP representative saw 
this as a 'Catch 22' situation, that - "causes a lot of resentment among 
many unionists - they say if something is a good on economic grounds 
then let it happen - don't always seek to use that and say well why can't 
the North and South get together - after all you are together - so that is 
what causes the wariness among many unionists - who say well you 
know what that is going to lead to - you . 
know what is going to be said 
about it - you know what demands are going to come next". This 
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suspicion was also reflected in the DUP's account of the party's refusal 
to enter into negotiations with the Republic on the question of North- 
South institutions. Representatives argued that "there's no benefit for 
us in telling the South what we're going to do and they sit back and say 
well let's see what you're going to do first and then we'll think about 
removing Articles 2 and 3 or not... ". 
In similar vein, an Alliance representative argued that "the real 
question why the unionists are so congenital" was "that from the 
beginning of the century the British government has been doing its 
very best to get rid of the them... you're not paranoid if they are against 
you". The SDLP was accused of "making sure that you can't get any 
domestic resolution" and continually moving "to a position always two 
steps beyond what the unionists are prepared to offer". As for the 
unionists, if they started to compromise "they are putting themselves in 
the position where they have to move further in the next round of 
negotiations. If you have already said publicly I will accept that - then 
the next time you have already given away that ground". 
Second, suspicions operate at the level of personal integrity, and like the 
process of constructing communal identities, this reactive suspicion can 
be highly personalised. The UUP representative for instance, voiced a 
no doubt genuine frustration - "the problem is when I open my mouth 
the comment is always 'he would say that wouldn't he'... unfortunately 
you get immediately tarred with a certain - things are tarred with a 
certain brush before you begin. What I was saying was misconstrued". 
Surprisingly similar comments were made by nationalists - with the 
SDLP representative complaining that "what I say is that to people is 
don't call me political names but I say look at what I am saying and tell 
me what's wrong with it - an awful lot of this goes on - what I find in 
the Northern Ireland context is that they can't deal with the reason of 
your situation so they call you names instead". He argued that his 
position was shared by a range of people across Europe, unconnected 
with the conflict and "who know nothing about Ireland", and hence 
arguments that the SDLP enthusiasm for Euro-regionalism was "a 
subterfuge for Irish unity says something about those who are making 
that accusation". 
371 
Both these forms of mutual suspicion feed off the contradictions and 
consequent ideological tensions between the logic of national conflict in 
Ireland and the impact of regional integration in the EU, often leading 
to a sharpening of the political divide, rather than a closing of it. 
Overall then, politicians actively attempted, but often failed, to 
construct a consistency in their ideological accounts, drawing on myths 
of national progress and of national identity. The element of redefining 
'progress' in national terms allowed some adaptation to perceived 
political or social reality while the process of constructing communal 
identities helped to maintain political positions, making them highly 
resilient in the face of socio-economic change. These two rhetorical 
themes combined to exacerbate mutual suspicions, generating an 
internal, intensely personalised, political struggle that reproduced and 
in some senses exacerbated the national conflict. 
Chapter Conclusions 
While ideologically incompatible, nationalism and regionalism are 
intertwined. Hence, politicians are forced to recognise the pressures for 
regionalisation and adapt their political positions in the national 
conflict. This process of reconciling the tensions between the logic of 
regional integration and national conflict sees politicians constructing 
their own versions of EU regionalisation, consistent with their 
interpretation of 'national' progress. At the same time, as they 
accommodate themselves in various ways to regionalist pressures, they 
are forced to redefine 'their' national community. 
As detailed in Chapter 7, both constitutional nationalist and republican 
politicians became committed in practice to non-sovereign forms of 32 
County autonomy in the EU. While Republicans retained their 
aspiration to all-Ireland independence, this was increasingly defined 
within the EU, rather than separated from it. Similarly, constitutional 
Nationalists articulated their demands for strengthened North-South 
linkages in Ireland, perhaps involving a sharing of political 
responsibility for Northern affairs between Britain and the Republic, in 
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an EU, regional, framework rather than in a national state framework. 
Similarly, and partly in response to political pressure from key figures 
in the unionist business community, UUP and DUP politicians began to 
accept the need for North-South economic and social integration and 
for political cooperation to make this possible. While Democratic 
Unionists remained resolutely opposed to the creation of North-South 
political structures to manage the 'island economy', there were some 
indications that Ulster Unionists had begun to reassess their position 
and, as noted in Chapter 7, had conceded the need for a North-South 
Cooperation Council, in the context of an overall political settlement. 
This dual re-configuration of 'national' rhetoric possibly signals a shift 
away from the politics of mutually exclusive 'national' blocs into a 
regionalist political rhetoric, strengthening positive-sum inter- 
communal linkages on an all-Ireland basis, rather than partitioned and 
zero-sum intra-communal linkages. 
Less optimistically, there was also an on-going re-construction of 
'national' communities along lines of 'national' division, linked to 
new myths of 'national' progress in the regionalised EU, reflecting the 
malleability of highly "luminal" national ideology (Bhabha 1990). 
Politicians attempted to bridge the emerging ideological tensions 
between their position in the conflict and their growing acceptance of 
EU regional integration: by redefining the EU integration process in 
terms of 'their' national development; by measuring their response to it 
in terms of what 'their' national community would be willing to accept; 
and finally, by accusing other politicians of manipulating the process of 
EU regionalisation for their own narrow political ends. 
These themes were particularly strong in the rhetoric of UUP and DUP 
politicians, who felt the necessity to construct a unionist or loyalist 
community resolutely opposed to any form of political 'link-up' with 
the Republic, as an unchanging 'fact' of political life in the North. This 
was supported by arguments that the EU would strengthen, rather than 
weaken, Northern Ireland's linkages with the UK 'mainland', rather 
than with the Republic. Nationalists and republicans, in contrast, 
emphasised the malleability of political categories in the North and 
stressed the pressures for North-South integration in the context of the 
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SEM, consistent with the aspiration to 'national reconciliation' in a 
more unified Ireland. 
This active, willed reproduction of 'national' ideology, by both 
unionists and nationalists, reflected the continued, indeed in some 
senses strengthened, significance of nationalisms and national states in 
the EU. In the face of accelerating dis-empowerment in a regionalised, 
globalised EU political economy, national ideology perhaps became 
more, not less significant as the national framework remained the 
single, most viable means of gaining some control over the forces 
shaping people's lives. 
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Section Conclusions 
This Section has examined the political dilemmas and rhetoric of 
political actors in Northern Ireland and in EU institutions who are 
engaged in defining the impact of EU integration on Ireland's national 
conflict. In doing so, it has supplemented the analysis of historical and 
contemporary tendencies in Sections 2 and 3, allowing some 
investigation of how 'agents' in the political process understand and 
account for the impacts of transnational integration on their national 
positions and more generally on national states. 
It has focused on the ways in which the logic of EU integration clashes 
with the logic of national conflict, thus creating sharp dilemmas for 
political actors. As some state roles in the EU are exercised in a regional 
rather than a national framework, while others remain firmly within 
the ambit of national states, there is a weakening of the constructed, 
monolithic consistency of nationalism and national identity. 
Increasingly insistent political dilemmas emerge, broadly between 
issues defined in a regional context and those defined in a national 
context. As the myths of national unity or sovereignty become 
inconsistent with the pursuit of regional interests, political positions are 
disrupted and politicians dependent upon the support of a 'national' 
community are forced to adapt their political positions and redefine 
their political constituencies. 
These tensions and dilemmas are seen as a general feature of 
transnational integration. In Ireland, it is argued, they are particularly 
sharply defined. The dispute over national state sovereignty, between 
on the one hand, unionists and the British state, and on the other, 
nationalists and the Southern state, dominates political life in the 
North. At the same time, both parts of Ireland are highly - even 
exceptionally - integrated into the EU 'global region'. This has posed 
particularly sharp political dilemmas, even contradictions, for political 
actors, both in the North and in EU institutions. 
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The process of reconciling such dilemmas and maintaining consistency 
centres on the use of myths of communal identity and of 'national' 
progress, that, together define the 'nation's' membership and it's 
collective 'national' interests. As argued by Tom Nairn, these two 
elements - of 'national' unity and 'national' purpose - stand at the 
heart of nationalist ideology (Nairn 1977) and should be mutually 
reinforcing. In Ireland, where uncompleted anti-colonial nationalism 
confronts variants of pro-colonial, in some senses 'official' nationalism, 
these core rhetorical elements of nationalism are marshalled in 
opposition to each other. 
Political actors in the North construct accounts of Ireland's national 
identities and re-interpet the process of regionalism in terms of the 
'progress' of 'their' presumed 'national' community. The way in 
which they construct 'their' national community and the degree to 
which they distort the nature of EU regionalisation to suit national 
political ends varies sharply. As pressures at the EU level and within 
the business communities, North and South, increase, there is every 
likelihood that the unionist hopes or expectations that EU integration 
will not undermine linkages between Britain and the North, will be 
proved mistaken. At the same time, as increasingly large sections of the 
Northern unionist community respond in different ways to the process 
of regionalisation in the EU, there is every likelihood that the 
constructed, unified, static national identity of the Northern unionist 
community will come under increasing internal pressures. This is 
likely to force a reappraisal of political positions adopted by Democratic 
Unionist and Ulster Unionist Parties, not least as. they are increasingly 
outflanked both by the unionist business community and by an 
apparently more accommodating loyalist working class, expressed for 
instance, in the Progressive Unionist Party. 
This is likely to be paralleled by an on-going reappraisal of nationalist 
and republican positions. The growing acceptance of a mostly regional, 
only residually national, future for Ireland as part of the EU has 
redefined the aspiration to national unity. There are some indications, 
with increased acceptance of power-sharing and of sub-state 
regionalisation, that Irish unity will not be seen as necessarily requiring 
all-Ireland national sovereignty. This regionalist re-definition of 
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'national' progress, in which the emphasis is on the processes of national 
reconciliation rather than on its outcomes, possibly also enables a partial 
move away from the assumption that unionist national identity is 
easily malleable, towards a greater acceptance that it is likely to remain a 
feature of Ireland's political landscape, whether unified or not. 
These political implications of the process of EU integration are further 
discussed in the thesis Conclusions. 
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Section Five 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
This study has attempted to employ what could be called a 'critical- 
theoretical' approach. In broad theoretical terms, it has sought to to 
examine how the existing order has come about, how it may be 
changing and how that change may be influenced or channelled. It has 
examined theories of international relations and of nationalism and 
has questioned whether their units of analysis are the correct or the 
most useful ones. It has also raised epistemological questions in the 
methodological shift from the use of written material, whether 
historical or contemporary, in Sections 2 and 3, to the use of interview 
material in Section 4. It is acknowledged that neither of these sets of 
questions can be satisfactorily answered by a thesis of this sort, and the 
process of asking them raises more questions than it resolves. Despite 
this it is essential that such questions be raised if historical and current 
tendencies are to be investigated, even if they are by no means fully 
resolved. 
More specifically, the thesis has examined linkages between national 
conflict and transnational integration. Again, in some senses, this raises 
more questions than it answers. Transnational regional integration on 
the one hand and nationalism and national conflict on the other are 
cross-cutting, at times contradictory, and the resulting tendencies are 
anything but one-way. Indeed, in many respects they appear to be inter- 
determining, even interdependent, reflecting, as Nairn notes, the 
contradictory unifying and fragmenting dynamics of capitalist 
development (Nairn 1977). Nonetheless, it has been argued that the 
process of re-casting nationalisms in the context of increasing 
transnational integration disrupts and destabilises the current political 
order, and potentially opens up new opportunities for political struggle. 
In the light of the preceding discussions, this concluding Section 
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attempts to sketch out some of these opportunities, as well as 
highlighting some of the theoretical implications of the investigation. 
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Chapter 12 
Political developments and theoretical 
implications 
This study has explored the relationships between transnational 
integration and nationalism by focusing on, the EU and the national 
conflict in Ireland. This has been done in four main ways. Section 1 
established a theoretical perspective and developed a framework for 
analysis. Section 2 sketched in the historical background of national 
conflict in Ireland and transnational integration in the EU. Section 3 
used material published in official documents and newspapers, as well 
as secondary sources, to investigate the contemporary tendencies. 
Finally, Section 4 analysed how political actors have been responding 
and contributing to these developments. 
Sections 2 and 3 employed a three-part analytical framework to trace the 
structural linkages between three aspects of social order - material 
interests, ideological conflict and public policies. Both these Sections 
examined the developing relationships between national division and 
transnational integration in Ireland and the EU. In Section 4 political 
consensus on the need for North-South integration in Ireland was 
contrasted with deep political disagreement on the question of whether 
EU integration affects national state sovereignty and, by implication, the 
national conflict. Interview material was used to illustrate the range of 
dilemmas that face political actors and to highlight how they reconciled 
or avoided them. This provided the basis for some assessment of 
whether regional integration into the EU was significantly transforming 
the political conflict, and if so, in what way. 
The four broad approaches to analysing the case study complemented 
each other and pointed to largely similar conclusions. Here there is 
some attempt to draw these conclusions together. In particular, 
discussion centres on the empirical questions posed in the thesis 
introduction, namely: what impact has EU integration had on the 
national conflict in Ireland and what does this suggest about the 
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relationships between transnational integration and nationalism? First 
though, there is some discussion of the more theoretical issues, largely 
in terms of the usefulness of the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter 3. 
Theoretical analysis, international relations and nationalism 
A major objective of the thesis was to construct a framework for 
analysing nationalism in a transnational context. In Chapters 1 and 2 it 
was argued that the interrelationships between nationalism and 
international relations have been under-theorised. Analysis of 
nationalism tends to focus on the emergence or construction of the 
'national' community from 'within' and theories of international 
relations tend to be biased towards the analysis of states in the 
international system. In order to break down the theoretical boundaries 
between 'international' and 'national' politics, the various theoretical 
approaches were assessed according to whether they are capable of 
analysing the interconnections between nationalism and transnational 
integration. In addition, they were examined to determine how far they 
can explain the reproduction of nationalism in global politics rather 
than simply suggesting how it originates. 
In Chapter 1 five broad strands in the theory of nationalism were 
identified and it was argued that, amongst them, the 'uneven 
development' perspective best meets the two criteria as it analyses 
nationalism as a product of an on-going interaction between global 
capitalism and national-state fragmentation. Chapter 2 meanwhile, 
examined the three main strands of international relations theory, 
arguing that Marxist-influenced interpretations have a theoretical 
breadth that spans both domestic and global society and therefore offer 
the most appropriate theoretical framework. In addition, it was argued 
that both these sets of theories suggest how the existing system is 
maintained or reproduced, in spite of its internal contradictions and 
disruptions, and therefore help in developing an understanding of its 
current tendencies. 
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In Chapter 3 these perspectives were combined to construct a 
framework for analysing the interconnections between transnational 
integration and nationalism. This drew on the 'uneven development' 
approach to nationalism and elements of both the 'state-centred' 
perspective developed by Breuilly and the 'class-centred' approach 
developed by Amin. These were combined with the insights of 
Wallerstein's analysis of the 'world system' in a three-pronged 
framework based on Cox's neo-Gramscian analysis of global politics. 
This framework examined conflicts over material interests first, 
ideological conflict second and conflicts over public policies third. It was 
argued that these three aspects of. analysis are patterned by conflicts 
between national fragmentation and transnational integration, 
reflecting an over-arching tension between the fragmented national 
states' system and the single, integrated, global capitalist system. This 
dual logic of national fragmentation and globalisation is inscribed into 
the process of capitalist development that, paradoxically, binds global 
integration and national division together into an interdependent, 
dialectical relationship. Hence, ironically, as transnational forces are 
strengthened, there are perhaps greater pressures to define material 
interests in national terms, for ideological conflict to be dominated by 
nationalism and for public policies to be aimed at serving nationally- 
defined interests. 
This approach is vulnerable to the criticism that any number of 
categories of 'social order' could be chosen. The three categories tend to 
overlap, leading to some unavoidable repetition, suggesting that the 
framework is, to a degree, arbitrary. Nonetheless, as argued in Section 1, 
the approach is particularly useful for analysing relationships between 
nationalism and transnationalism: material interests are increasingly 
being transnationalised, but at the same time they sharpen existing 
divisions and create new divisions between territorially defined 
communities - thereby dividing 'nationals' and 'non-nationals'; 
similarly, political ideologies are to a degree being re-defined in a 
regionalised, transnationalised context, but again, at the same time, in 
response to increased socio-economic insecurity in the global political 
economy, they reflect and fuel nationalisms; meanwhile, public policies 
- whether of state, regional, or transnational bodies - reflect an 
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increasing 'transnationalisation' of political issues, not least as state 
policies themselves are 'internationalised', but are still invariably 
designed to serve nationally-defined interests and remain, perhaps 
more intensely, the focus of national political rhetoric. 
Equally important, the three-part analytical framework enabled the 
material, ideological and institutional aspects of the case study to be 
separated. This was particularly, useful for the historical analysis in 
Section 2 as it drew attention to the differing intensity of pressures for 
national divergence or, alternatively, for regional convergence in 
Ireland and in the EU. Similarly, in Section 3, where discussion focused 
on the contemporary impacts of EU regional integration on North and 
South in Ireland, the framework allowed discussion of the tensions and 
contradictions between material interests, ideological conflict and public 
policies, thereby helping to pinpoint likely future developments. This 
highlighted the linkages between nationalism and transnational 
integration as conflicts over material interests, over ideological 
hegemony and over public policy rebound onto each other and were 
seen as interrelated, even interdetermined. 
Section 4 moved beyond analytically separating these three aspects of 
'social order'. Instead, it examined how far the tensions and mismatches 
highlighted in the previous Section were causing difficulties for 
political actors. This deepened and extended the analysis, allowing an 
investigation of how, in practice, the often contradictory logics of 
regional integration and national conflict are managed by political 
actors. It therefore allowed some exploration of the process of realigning 
national conflict in Ireland, permitting some broader analysis of how 
nationalisms are reproduced in the face of accelerating transnational 
integration. 
These more substantive concerns about the impact of the EU on the 
national conflict in Ireland and about the relationship between 
transnational integration and nationalism in global politics are 
addressed in the remainder of these conclusions. 
ELI integration, Ireland and national conflict 
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In general terms, it has been argued that there has been a significant 
shift in the exercise of political authority in the EU. As states have acted 
collectively, they have been required to tolerate the emergence of a 
range of policy frameworks and a range of representative bodies that no 
longer operate according to the dictates of 'national', state-centred 
politics. In this political environment, what the EU Commission calls a 
Europe of "spheres not tiers", political authority and the public sphere is 
no longer, by definition, state-defined - the state is no longer the place or 
site of political engagement (1). 
With increased transnational integration in the EU, Western European 
states have increasingly discarded their role in shielding 'domestic' 
society from global change, leading to sharpened socio-economic 
instability and political insecurity. New political forms have emerged as 
a 'power gap' has opened up between states and their increasingly 
transnationalised 'national' societies. Pan-EU bodies have been 
constructed and states have, by necessity, been forced to cede elements of 
policy-making - particularly economic policy - to the EU 'macro'-region. 
Partly as a result, 'micro'-regions have demanded greater power to 
regulate their local economies and substate regions have themselves 
constructed new associations reaching across EU state borders. 
Significantly, the shape and power of these new non-state public bodies 
is dictated by the need influence transnationalised economic forces. 
They therefore cut across existing state boundaries, disrupting state 
powers and state-centred nationalisms, opening up new potential for 
political change - perhaps offering a pathway out of the monolithic, 
mythical conceptions of 'national' state sovereignty. More specifically, 
as different dimensions of political power - whether they be related to 
economic policy, social and welfare provision, or even defence and 
security - are exercised at a number of different 'levels' in the political 
system, a lateral or horizontal dimension - as well as a hierarchic, 
vertical dimension - is introduced to political authority. 
This has profound implications in Ireland, where the political demands 
of business elites, the ideological conflict between formal political 
parties and the policies pursued by the two states are, to a degree, being 
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forced into an all-island regional framework. Integration into the SEM 
encourages North-South convergence, and has the potential to reverse 
the uneven socio-economic development that, as argued in Chapter 4, 
was a major factor in the late nineteenth century sharpening of North- 
South national divisions. In Ireland, North and South, business 
groupings, political parties and public bodies are being forced to 
reorientate their interests - in the case of Northern Ireland away from a 
UK-centred perspective, in the case of the Republic away from an 
externally-focused perspective, and in both parts of Ireland towards an 
all-island perspective. 
In other respects, though, EU integration sharpens divisions between 
the two Irish economies. The SEM has exacerbated North-South 
competition for overseas capital and the two states have responded 
differently to the process of EU integration. The North has been tied 
ever closer to the British Treasury and the Republic has become 
increasingly dependent on EU markets, and the fault-line between 'EU- 
sceptic' and 'EU-enthusiast' has been inscribed across the north of 
Ireland, the EU's only land border with the UK. 
Consequently, much of the expected benefits of integration into the EU 
hinge on the ability to construct a regional 'system of regulation' for 
Ireland, North with South, in the EU context. As argued in Chapter 6, 
increased consultation between public bodies, North and South, is 
unlikely to achieve economic integration. More coherent, all-Ireland 
institutions with executive powers and democratically accountability 
are required if the expected North-South 'synergies' are to be realised. 
As noted in Chapter 8, the responses of the two states to these pressures 
have been, at best, minimal. But this is likely to change as the costs of 
maintaining North-South divisions escalate. Increasingly in the 1990's 
EU institutions and business interests have pressurised both states to 
increase North-South linkages and as a result, the Republic has begun 
to recast its state policies in a 32-county mould and the British 
government has made tentative moves towards encouraging greater 
North-South cooperation. 
But while such institutions may assist economic development in 
Ireland as a whole, they would not, in themselves, resolve the conflict, 
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not least as political consensus on the need for greater North-South 
economic cooperation is contradicted by conflicts between Irish 
nationalism and Northern unionism (as noted in Chapter 7). Indeed, 
the conflict dominates debate on the political implications of 
integration and creates sharp North-South political divergences on the 
question of how the EU is developing or ought to develop. 
Nonetheless, the relationships between regional development and the 
national conflict are 'two-way' or dialectical with each influencing, or 
potentially influencing, the other, and politicians from across the 
political spectrum, republicans and nationalists, unionists and loyalists, 
and politicians and civil servants in Brussels, recognise that the 
institutional and political requirements of economic integration open 
up new political avenues which might decisively recast the national 
conflict. 
Responding to the emerging agenda for North-South integration, 
political actors have been actively involved in redefining and 
reconstituting their political positions. Politicians and officials construct 
conflicting perspectives on the integration process - 'interpretative 
repertoires' that reflect ideological conflict along 'national' lines. These 
are increasingly contradicted by the relatively consensual debate over 
how to meet the needs of the all-Ireland regional economy in the EU 
context. 
The resulting dilemmas between 'national' politics and the logic of 
transnational integration force political realignments which have 
potentially significant implications for the national conflict. Unionist 
and loyalist politicians have been forced to respond to increasing 
demands for North-South cooperation and increasingly have 
recognised that 'their' communities are by no means monolithically 
opposed to socio-economic and cultural integration with the South. 
Nationalists and republicans meanwhile, have increasingly persued 
North-South integration in the context of EU integration and have 
become less committed to all-Ireland state sovereignty. Partly as a result, 
they are more willing to recognise the legitimacy of Northern unionist 
identity and to accept that it cannot be subsumed or dissolved in a single 
all-Irish identity. 
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This process of political adaptation is leading to greater North-South 
political convergence and is perhaps the single most important factor 
encouraging the process of consensual constitutional change in Ireland. 
As well as defining positive reasons for Northern unionists to 
reconsider their opposition to some all-Ireland 'unbundling' of state 
powers, it also pressures nationalists to accommodate themselves to 
Northern unionism by focusing not on the goal of sovereign statehood, 
but on a more open-ended process of North-South reconciliation. At 
the same time it encourages both Northern and Southern politicians to 
re-focus their attention on the indigenous development of Ireland as a 
whole. The process of EU integration thus introduces a new political 
agenda that has the potential to disrupt the "double binds" - between 
accommodation and division (Greenslade 1993) - that face both 
nationalists and unionists in Ireland, opening up new avenues for 
political change, reshaping political conflicts and potentially defining a 
process of 'national reconciliation' in Ireland as a whole. 
As argued in Chapter 8, such an optimistic assessment depends, 
crucially, on the degree to which EU integration is altering national 
state sovereignty. Given the conflict's roots in a political confrontation 
between the British 'Crown' expressed by the British state, and the Irish 
'nation' expressed in the Republic's constitution, any significant 
transformation in the nature of state sovereignty is likely to have a 
significant impact on the conflict. Here it has been argued that there are 
substantial grounds for suggesting that there are strong, perhaps 
irresistable pressures for such a transformation. It is possible that, in the 
EU context, the British doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty 
and the centrality of 'national' territoriality in the Republic will adapted 
as state power is increasingly regionalised on a North-South, all-Ireland 
basis. Furthermore, as the gap widens between the ideological claims to 
state sovereignty and all-Ireland regionalisation, a thorough-going re- 
foundation or re-constitution of state legitimacy may become possible. 
Prior to accelerated integration within the EU, British government 
policy on Northern Ireland wavered to and from a perspective that 
permitted the the Republic involvement in governing Northern 
Ireland and a more British nationalist determination to exclude the 
Republic from such a role. The EU offered a legitimising framework for 
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the former, institutionalising closer Anglo-Irish relations, giving the 
Republic a more permanent role in Northern Ireland affairs, both 
indirectly, in consultation with the UK, and directly, through the 
Maryfield secretariate of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This was 
combined with parallel pressures for greater North-South integration in 
the SEM, themselves legitimised by EU funding regimes, which 
encouraged intergovernmentalism and, at least in part, led to the 1993 
Downing Street Declaration, in which the British and Irish 
governments pledged to work for 'national reconciliation' in Ireland. 
In contrast with the Downing Street Declaration of 1969 which was 
issued unilaterally by the British Prime Minister and which declared 
that the affairs of Northern Ireland were entirely a domestic political 
issue, the 1993 version was issued jointly by the British Prime Minister 
and the Irish Taoiseach and constructed a joint Anglo-Irish consensus 
on the framework for negotiations on the future of Northern Ireland. 
These new arrangements reflected Britain's agnosticism on Northern 
Ireland's constitutional status and if underwritten jointly with the Irish 
government this shift in British sovereignty would be given the status 
of an international Treaty and would herald a permanent shift in the 
direction of de facto, confederalised relations in Ireland. 
In the context of this joint recognition of constitutional conditionality 
in the North, the two states could pledge themselves to persuading 
North and South to reach an accommodation within the island of 
Ireland through North-South socio-economic institutions. Again, 
merely a British government agreement to. create North-South 
executive institutions would only have limited implications in the 
context of an ongoing claim to de jure British sovereignty. But if 
explicitly established under an international Treaty between the two 
states, such institutions would permanently temper the exercise of 
British state sovereignty. The two states would be permitting a partial 
sharing of their powers, adapting themselves to growing transnational, 
North-South integration in Ireland, with substantial implications for 
the national conflict. Indeed, de facto federalism on economic and social 
issues could, with the agreement of the two guarantors, be extended 
into other areas of social life, perhaps leading to the creation a regional 
all-Ireland parliament providing democratic accountability for all- 
388 
Ireland institutions, in the same way that the European Parliament 
legitimates common EU decision-making. 
This separating-out of the dimensions of zero-sum state sovereignty in 
the context of EU integration, would de-link of aspects of state 
responsibility from the 'national' state framework, instead defining 
them in a North-South regional framework. Such institutions could 
strengthen popular democracy in both parts of the island as North- 
South integration is defined as a positive-sum. process that benefits both 
North and South, rather than a zero-sum process in which one 
'sovereign' state's gains, while the other loses. 
Nationalism and transnationalism 
This study has explored the apparent paradox that transnationalism 
exacerbates nationalisms and national conflict. It has argued that 
transnational integration has stimulated EU integration. The 
emergence of 'macro' and 'micro' EU regionalism is seen as a response 
to globalising trends that undermine the ability of the state to intervene 
in the sphere of production. These regionalisms have been built on 
national states, and reflecting this, political identification with regions, 
as well as a wider European affiliation, generally remain much less 
powerful than national identities and nationalisms. State-centred 
national politics and 'official' nationalisms continue to dominate EU 
institutions and the concentration of states' roles at the EU level gives 
states enhanced powers, bolstering, even extending, the exercise of state 
sovereignty. 
As a result, EU integration is riven by tensions between the politics of 
regional development and the politics of national. states and 
nationalisms. To a degree this reflects a separating-out of political roles 
between state institutions and regional authorities - while the sphere of 
production has become increasingly regulated at the EU and sub-state 
level, social control and social reproduction remains largely in the 
hands of state authorities. The state continues to maintain social 
stability by institutionalising inter-class relations, while EU institutions 
manage productive relations between the national and the 
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transnational capital and sub-state 'regional' bodies service the needs of 
local capital. This division of labour suits dominant economic interests 
as sub-state and supra-state regional bodies are able to manage the 
collective affairs of the bourgeoisie in a way that the state, subject to 
pressures of liberal democracy, never could. 
This uneven integration of state roles disrupts EU nationalisms - 
especially in its 'official' forms. In Section 4 it was suggested that two 
elements shape nationalist ideology, the first, rooting it in the past, the 
second, adapting it to socio-political change. In the first instance, the 
'nation' is seen as a static, unchanging community, founded on internal 
homogeneity and safe from 'external' threats. Nationalists must define 
both the membership and cultural content of their 'nation' as it is 
vulnerable both to internal fragmentation and to external challenge. 
The political priority is to maintain the webs of relationships that 
homogenise the 'nation', that knit it together and as a key element in 
this, maintain a clear distinction between 'nationals', who are part of 
the self determining nation and 'others' who are not. 
Second, and equally significant, national politicians define a path of 
national development, and a set of national interests that link 
nationalism to the process of wider socio-economic change, so placing 
the nation in a line of universal progress and projecting the myth of 
'national' unity into the future. In the face of shifts in the socio- 
economic and political framework, nationalisms are up-dated and made 
consistent with historical and contemporary tendencies - an absolute 
necessity if national constituencies are not to be. undermined 'from 
within' as members of the 'nation' define their interests in opposition 
to it. 
The result is a dependence both on a constructed cultural history, and 
an often equally constructed concept of 'national' progress that maps 
out a 'self-determining' pathway into the future. The nationalist is 
forced into a constant process of combining these two aspects of 
'national' ideology - of identifying some version of 'national progress' 
while at the same time preserving the traditional core concepts of 
'nationhood' -a duality that is embodied in the idea that nationalism is 
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always 'Janus faced', both reactionary and progressive, both 
traditionalist and modernist. 
This unity-in-tension, between an aspirational projection into the 
future and a backward-looking construction of the 'national' 
community, helps to explain the - often paradoxical - increased role of 
nationalism in the context of greater transnational integration. The two 
tendencies are interlinked and interdetermining, consequently it is not 
possible to draw up a 'balance sheet' that weighs up pressures for 
transnational integration against the pressures for national division. As 
social order in Ireland and in the EU is shaped by forces - including 
forces of production - that are increasingly defined outside of the 
national state framework, social groupings and public bodies are 
disempowered. In response, national configurations are reconstructed 
and redefined in the new transnational context, building on and 
reflecting at times sharpened schisms between national states and 
nationalisms. 
This opens up new political opportunities as nationalisms are realigned 
and potentially transformed in the face of transnational integration. 
The fixed categories constructed by national states and nationalisms 
become more vulnerable to political challenge and the construction of 
more progressive forms of political affiliation, whether 'national' or 
non-national, becomes more of a possibility. Indeed, in Ireland and in 
the EU, heightened transnational integration has the potential to 
generate new, more inclusive transnational solidarities, capable of 
challenging the divisive and exclusionary logics of transnational 
capitalist integration. 
Notes 
1. See Regions in the EU, European Information Service, March 1993 
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Appendix 1: 
Research methodology: interviews and other 
sources 
This study draws on three sources of primary material: official 
documents, newspaper reports and interview transcripts. The method 
of collection and analysis for each of these sources is outlined here. 
Official documents 
These included: government documents and public records from 
Britain and the Republic of Ireland; European Commission, the 
European Parliament and Council of Europe documents; publications 
from political parties in Northern Ireland, the Republic and in Britain; 
and publications of sub-state local or regional bodies. These were 
collected from libraries and directly from the various institutions or 
agencies. Where they have been used in the text they appear either as a 
footnote or in the bibliography. 
Newspaper research 
The newspaper survey included all Northern Ireland newspapers, 
British and Republic broadsheets from 1991, although there was some 
more focused use of earlier news reports at key dates in the 
development of the conflict and in the EC. Newspapers cuttings were 
collected from newspaper libraries in London, Belfast and Dublin and 
from papers as they appeared from 1991 until August 1994. 
The newspaper sources included: the Irish Times; Sunday Tribune; Belfast 
Telegraph; Irish News; Belfast Newsletter; Guardian; Times; Sunday Times; 
European; and the Financial Times. In addition, back-issues of Agence 
Europe were surveyed. Relevant information, including quotes and 
figures, was entered onto computer, to form a data base of 
approximately 800 pages. Although very time consuming this was 
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particularly useful both for guiding interview questioning and for 
confirming issues raised in interviews. In addition, newspaper reports 
provided a necessary source for the more contemporary elements of 
analysis in Sections 2 and 3. 
Interview research 
There were, in total, thirty-eight interviews. The sample frame included 
Northern Ireland politicians and officials, mostly interviewed in 
Belfast, and EU politicians and officials, mostly interviewed in Brussels. 
Interviews varied in length - lasting one to two hours - and were held 
in confidence on party premises, in Commission offices or parliament 
buildings. In order to get a sense of the developing relationships and to 
permit the cross-checking of information and perspectives, there were 
three 'rounds' of interviews. The officials and politicians interviewed 
in each 'round' were as follows: 
First Round (June to July 1992) 
Belfast: Mr. David Ford, Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 
(Chairperson); Mr. Patsy McGlone of the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (Chairperson); Mr. Richard McAuley, Sinn Fein (Press officer and 
spokesperson); Mr. John Clark, Ulster Unionist Party (European officer). 
Brussels: Mr Gerry McAlinden, Northern Ireland Centre; Mr Eddie 
McVeigh, European Parliament Research Directorate; Mr Esben 
Poulsen, EU Commission, Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
Regional Funds (Head of Unit); John Palmer, Guardian European Editor; 
Brendan Conlon, Freelance Journalist; Conor Kearney, EU Commission 
(Structural Funds Coordination). 
Second Round (October to December 1992) 
Belfast: Mr. Ian Paisley Jnr. Democratic Unionist Party (spokesperson); 
Mr. John Lowry, Workers' Party (Northern chairperson and MEP 
candidate); Mr. James Stewart, Communist Party of Ireland (Secretary); 
Ms. Jane Morrice (Head of the EU Commission office in Belfast). 
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Brussels: Mr Joly Dickson, EU Commission (President Jaques Delors' 
Special Adviser on UK and Irish Affairs); Belinda Pyke, EU 
Commission Regional Fund, UK and Ireland; Marios Camhis, Regional 
policy directorate; Interreg Official, responsible for Ireland, North and 
South (not identified); Malachy Vallely, Irish Institute for European 
Affairs, Leuven (Executive Director); Mr Amadee Turner (Conservative 
MEP); Mr Wayne David (Labour MEP); Mr John McCartin (Fine Gael 
MEP); Mr Fred Catherwood (Conservative MEP); Mr John Cushnahan 
(ex-Alliance Party, Fine Gael MEP). 
Third Round: (May to June 1993) 
Belfast: Dr. John Alderdice, Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (leader); 
Mr Jim Nicholson (MEP), Ulster Unionist Party; Cllr Nigel Dodds 
European, Democratic Unionist Party (Cllr and spokesperson on 
European issues); Mr John Hume (MP, MEP), Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (leader); Cllr Mitchell McLoughlin, Sinn Fein (Northern 
chairperson); Representatives of the Department of Finance and 
Personnel in the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Northern 
Ireland Office. 
Brussels: Mr Neil Blaney (Independent MEP); Mr Proinsias de Rossa 
(Democratic Left TD, MEP); Mr Ramsay, Director-General of Research, 
European Parliament (follow-up interview); Mr Gerry McAlinden, 
Northern Ireland Centre (follow-up interview); Mr Phillip Lowe, EU 
Commission (Agriculture); Mr Hourican, EU Commission (Structural 
Funds Coordination); Mr Esben Poulsen, EU Commission, Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland Regional Funds (Head of Unit, follow-up 
interview). 
In addition a transcript of an interview conducted by James Anderson 
with Mr. Gary McMichael, Ulster Democratic Party (spokesperson) was 
used. 
There was substantial preparation for interviews, using the newspaper 
archive and official documents, to give the interviewer the authority of 
the informed, so as to introduce novel perspectives on the issues 
discussed and to gain the trust and acceptance of interviewee. In the 
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interview setting, power is often contested - between the knowledge and 
interpretations of the interviewer and those of the politician or official. 
The interviewee may have the advantage as she or he is embedded in 
the process being examined and is accustomed to reflecting on their 
experiences - although perhaps not in an interview with a researcher. 
Invariably it was necessary to get past 'gate keepers' in order to gain 
access to particular interviewees. This problem was minimised by using 
a 'snow-balling' strategy - particularly effective in Brussels where there 
is a well established social circle or network of officials, politicians and 
journalists from Ireland, North and South. In Belfast a process of 'seed 
sampling' was prefered, through which 'pilot' interviews were held 
with party press officers before gaining access to the politicians 
themselves. Both these techniques served to ensure that a stock of 
knowledge about the party or institution could be built up before a 
particular party politician or senior official was contacted. Also, the 
'rounds' of interviews in the two locations were rotated: with pilot 
interviews, seed sampling, snowballing, network sampling and the 
final interviews conducted alternately between Belfast and Brussels. 
The interviews were all in depth and qualitative. This is particularly 
useful when the intention is to examine non-stable interpretations - 
and to highlight the lack of fixed categories and the the need to bridge 
often contradictory concepts. The unstructured nature of such 
interviews can be disorientating for interviewees more accustomed to 
or more trusting of an interviewer who has a clear set of pre- 
determined questions. In all cases the interviewer was explicit to the 
interviewee about the strategy and aims of the project - helping the 
initial wariness to dissipate. As the interview proceeded, interviewees 
would realise that a conversational, discursive response was 
appropriate - and generally would welcome this. 
Interviews were shaped by their social context as well as by the 
interview method. Interviewees were mostly male and all were white 
and shared these characteristics with the interviewer. Many differed 
from the interviewer in their non-English origins and occasionally in 
their rural or at least, non-metropolitan, local identity., They also 
differed in being older and in - often considerably - more powerful 
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positions, not only in terms of being 'insiders', but more broadly, in 
forming part of a socio-political elite, that in Northern Ireland has been 
characterised as a "paranocracy" (Arthur 1990). 
Despite these contingencies, as outlined in the thesis introduction and 
at the start of Section 4, interview analysis was founded on the 
assumption that discussion of issues in an interview setting can yield 
ideological accounts which reflect wider power relations in society. The 
tension between the discourse of national conflict and the discourse of 
regional development in the EU and the dilemmas and inconsistencies 
that it generates were seen as directly influencing social and political 
change in Ireland, as by legitimising or by challenging power relations, 
such arguments "do not just describe things; they do things" (Potter and 
Wetherell 1991). 
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Appendix 2: Regional development in the 
European Union. 
The argument that there is a divergence between 'core' and 'periphery' 
in the EU is central to debates in Chapter 5 and in Sections 3 and 4. This 
Appendix uses EUROSTAT data to illustrate this divergence. The statistics 
allow two main sets of comparisons to be made: first, comparisons of 
regional employment patterns and their changes between 1980 and 1990; 
second, comparisons of regional unemployment levels using figures 
from 1981 and 1991. 
The analysis focuses on the degree to which divergences between 
'peripheral' regions and 'core' EU regions are reflected in these two sets 
of figures. Four peripheral regions are selected - the south of Spain, the 
south of Italy and, where statistics permit, Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. Shifts in employment and unemployment in these 
regions are contrasted with developments in the "four motors", 
Catalonia, Baden-Wurtemberg, Lombardy and Rhone-Alpes, which in 
1992 were cited by the EU Commission as the main regional 
beneficiaries of the emerging EU "growth axis" (CEC 1991b). In addition, 
economic performance in each of the regions is contrasted with 
tendencies in their national economies . 
There was some divergence in employment structure in both types of 
regions - the peripheral regions and the "four motors" - either 
exaggerating or conflicting with tendencies in their national economies. 
This can be illustrated by comparing changes in the*sectoral distribution 
of employment. Here analysis focuses on changes in the relative 
importance of employment in four main sectors: employment in 
primary industry, including agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 
employment in manufacturing, including construction and fuel; 
employment in marketed services (mostly private sector services); and 
employment in non-marketed services (mostly public sector services). 
This use of four sectors allows comparison of the extent of the shifts in 
private sector activity - between primary, secondary and tertiary 
employment - in separation from the public sector. 
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In Italy there was some considerable divergence between the experience 
of Lombardy, one of the 'growth poles' and the underdeveloped 'Sud'. 
In the Italian economy as a whole there was a general shift from 
primary and secondary employment to marketed services. 
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Chart 1: Employment shifts in Italy 
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Lombardy exaggerated these tendencies, with a greater increase in the 
proportion of the workforce employed in marketed services and a 
greater fall in employment in manufacturing industry. Meanwhile, 
primary employment saw only a slight relative fall. 
Chart 2: Employment shifts in Lombardy 
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The 'Sud' region of Italy experienced a much greater expansion in 
employment in marketed services, accounted for by a much larger 
decrease in the proportion employed in agriculture. 
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Chart 3: Employment shifts in Sud Italy 
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This pattern was repeated in Spain. Employment in the Spanish 
economy shifted from primary and to a lesser degree, secondary 
employment, into marketed and non-marketed services. 
Chart 4: Employment shifts in Spain 
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In Catalonia, like Lombardy, there was a decrease in manufacturing 
employment and an expansion in employment in marketed services. 
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Chart 5: Employment shifts in Catalonia 
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In 'Sur' Spain, as in 'Sud' Italy, there was a large decrease in the 
proportion employed in agriculture and a large increase in marketed 
services while the proportion employed in manufacturing remained 
relatively stable. 
Chart 6: Employment shifts in Sur Spain 
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The experience of both Sur Spain and Sud Italy also contrasted with the 
remaining two Southern European growth 'motors' - the Rhone Alpes 
and Baden Wurtemberg which both experienced a significant fall in 
secondary employment coupled with a rise in employment in marketed 
services. 
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Chart 7: Employment shifts in Rhone Alpes 
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Chart 8: Employment shifts in Baden Wurtemberg 
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As with Catalonia and Lombardy, these shifts mirrored tendencies in 
the respective national economies: 
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Chart 9: Employment shifts in France 
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Chart 10: Employment shifts in Germany 
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For the 'four motors' overall, the proportion of the workforce 
employed in manufacturing and marketed services - the non-primary 
private sector - stabilised, or increased marginally, with the largest 
increase in Baden Wurtemberg (of 3%). This contrasted with the two 
peripheral regions, which saw the overall proportion employed in this 
sector rise by 5-6%, in both cases exaggerating tendencies in their 
national economies (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Percentage increase of overall employment in 
manufacturing and marketed services, 1980-1990 
States % change Regions % change 
West Germany -1 Baden-Wurtemberg +3 
France +2 Rhone Alpes +1 
Spain +2 Catalonia -1 
Sur +5 
Italy +3 Lombardy 0 
Sud +6 
Source: Regio Statistics, Eurostat (2). 
For the 'four motors' this masks a significant reduction in the 
proportion employed in manufacturing, offset by a rise in the 
proportion employed in marketed services (Table 2). 
Table 2: The 'Four Motors': manufacturing and marketed services 
1980-1990 
% fall in proportion employed % rise in proportion employed 
in manufacturing in marketed services 
Baden-Wurtemberg 5 3.7 
Rhone Alpes 56 
Catalonia 33 
Lombardy 99 
Source: Regio Statistics, Eurostat (3). 
This pattern contrasts with the two peripheral regions of the EU, where 
growth in the proportion employed in marketed services was associated 
with a fall in the proportion employed in primary industry (in the Sur 
from 23% to 14% and in the Sud from 26% to 18% of employment). 
Overall, then, there appeared to be a degree of convergence in sectoral 
employment patterns between the growth poles of the EU and the more 
peripheral regions. 
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This contrasts with significant divergence in patterns of unemployment 
- and perhaps more significant - of long term unemployment. Figures 
for unemployment, comparing 1981 with 1991, expose a startling degree 
of divergence between the new 'growth poles' of the EU economy and 
its 'peripheral' regions. 
In Italy as a whole, for instance, unemployment had grown by 2.7% to 
10.3 In the Lombardy "growth pole" it fell by a third to 3.5% while in 
the Sud region it increased by two thirds to 17.9%. 
In Spain a similar pattern emerged. 'Harmonised' figures for overall 
unemployment are only available from 1985, when unemployment in 
Spain as a whole was 21.9%; in the Catalonia "growth pole", it was 
22.9% and in the peripheral region of Sur Spain, it was 29.1%. By 1991 
unemployment had fallen by a third in Spain overall to 16.1%; in 
Catalonia it was halved to 11.8%; while in Sur Spain it fell by only a 
fifth, to 23.9%. 
Meanwhile, both France and Germany fared less well overall than their 
two "growth poles". Unemployment increased on average, by 1.9% in 
France while in the Rhone-Alpes region it increased by 0.8%. In 
Germany, unemployment increased by 0.7%, while in the Baden- 
Wurtemberg 'growth pole' it increased by 0.2%. 
These tendencies are underlined by figures which are available for the 
UK and for Ireland, North and South: while unemployment in the UK 
fell by 0.4% to 9.4%º; in Northern Ireland, it rose by 0.8% to 16.8%; while 
in the Republic there was a 3.3% increase to 16.1% (Chart 11). 
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Chart 11.: Percentage of working population unemployed: 
1981 and 1991 
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These divergences are confirmed by figures for long term 
unemployment. Contrasting with trends in the Italian, French, Spanish 
and German economies, there were substantial reductions in the rate of 
long term unemployment in the "four motors". Similarly contrasting 
with their national economies, the two peripheral regions experienced 
exceptionally high levels of long term unemployment. 
In Italy as a whole, for instance there was a marginal increase in long 
term unemployment. In the Lombardy 'growth pole' it was halved to 
1.8%, while in the Sud region it increased by a third to 11.8%. In Spain, 
meanwhile, long term unemployment fell by a third to 8.3%: in 
Catalonia it was halved to 7.1%; in the Sur region it fell by only a fifth to 
11%. 
In Germany meanwhile, long term unemployment doubled to 2.2%, 
while in the Baden-Wurtemberg "growth pole", it fell by a third, to 
0.91%x. Again, the figures for the UK and for Ireland, North and South 
underline these tendencies: in the UK long term unemployment was 
more than halved, while in Northern Ireland and the Republic it fell by 
less than a fifth (Chart 12). 
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Chart 12: Percentage rates of long term unemployment 
1987 and 1990 
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Source: Regio Statistics, Eurostat. 
Overall, then, as discussed in Chapter 5, there appeared to be substantial 
divergence in regional economic fortunes in the EU, between its 
emerging 'growth poles' and its less fortunate peripheries. This, as 
argued in Section 3 and 4, was a key factor in the increased 
regionalisation of material interests in Ireland as a peripheral, island 
region in the EU. 
Notes 
1. The figures used for the discussion of employment structures and of 
long term unemployment are previously unpublished. Figures for 
overall unemployment appear in successive editions of the EUROSTAT 
publication - Regions: statistical yearbook. 
2. This table compares 'NACE' employment categories, adding B02 
(manufacturing, construction, fuel) plus B68 (marketed Services) and 
comparing this with the remainder - B01 (Agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries) and B86 (non-Market services). 
3. Changes to B02 (manufacturing, construction, fuel) compared with 
B68 (marketed Sevices). 
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PhD. by James Goodman Bsc (econ), M. A: 
Nationalism and Transnationalism: the national conflict in 
Ireland and European Union integration 
Abstract 
This study poses the question of why national conflicts persist in the 
context of increasing transnational integration. From the early 1970's and 
especially since the end of the 'Cold War', nationalism has gained 
increased global significance. At the same time, seemingly hand-in-hand 
with the upsurge in nationalism, there has been an acceleration in trans- 
national integration. 
This apparent paradox is explored in several ways: first by developing a 
theoretical framework for linking nationalism and transnationalism, 
second by analysing a particular case of national conflict in its 
transnationalised setting, and third by investigating the interpretation and 
re-interpretation of 'national' interests by key political actors. 
The case chosen is the national conflict in Ireland in the context of 
transnational integration in the European Union. In Ireland the two global 
tendencies - of national division and transnational integration - are focussed to a high degree of intensity. The transnational integrative process 
, 
is at its most advanced in the European Community which, in 1993, 
became the 'European Union', one of the most ambitious examples of 
inter-state and trans-state regional integration to date. The national conflict 
in Ireland meanwhile, is more deeply entrenched than in any other 
Western European state and was, until the IRA ceasefire on 31 August 
1994, the most highly militarised conflict in Western Europe. 
This study suggests that the relationships between transnational 
integration and national conflict are becoming a defining factor in Ireland's 
political development and that such relationships also pattern 
developments in the wider EU. Indeed, to the extent that the process of EU 
integration is seen as an antidote to nationalism in Western Europe, the 
impact of the EU in Ireland's national conflict could be interpreted as a test 
case of EU integration. 
